What were the specific grounds upon which Mursahi and Miriyi sought to void their agreement with Morib and recover AED 50,000?
The Claimants, Mursahi and Miriyi, initiated this dispute against Morib, an immigration advisory firm, following their engagement to secure Portugal business visas. The core of their claim rested on allegations of misrepresentation and professional negligence. The Claimants argued that the Defendant failed to provide a comprehensive disclosure of all costs associated with the visa process, specifically regarding government fees and subsequent administrative requirements in Portugal, such as obtaining social security numbers and police clearances.
The Claimants contended that the fee structure was opaque, particularly regarding whether government fees were charged on a "per person" basis or as a flat fee for both applicants. They sought to recover AED 50,000, arguing that had they been fully informed of the total financial commitment and the necessity of additional services, they would not have entered into the contract. As noted in the judgment:
On 19 April 2023, the Claimants appointed the Defendant for immigration services to apply for and obtain a Portugal business visa in return for payment of AED 26,250 excluding any third-party fees (the “Agreement”).
The Claimants further alleged that the Defendant’s communication regarding these fees was inconsistent, leading them to believe that their final payment of EUR 2,000 covered all remaining obligations, only to be informed later that further payments were required.
Which judge presided over the SCT hearing for Mursahi v Morib [2023] DIFC SCT 349?
The matter was heard before SCT Judge Maitha Alshehhi in the Small Claims Tribunal of the DIFC Courts. The hearing took place on 7 November 2023, with further submissions provided by the parties on 8 November 2023. The final judgment was issued by Judge Maitha Alshehhi on 17 November 2023, with the order formally issued by SCT Judge and Assistant Registrar Hayley Norton.
What were the primary legal arguments advanced by the Claimants and the Defendant regarding the transparency of the fee structure?
The Claimants argued that the Defendant engaged in misleading conduct by failing to clarify the "per person" nature of government fees until after the Agreement was signed. They pointed to a WhatsApp communication from 24 April 2023, which introduced a EUR 3,000 per person fee, as evidence of a lack of transparency. They asserted that this was a departure from their initial understanding and that the Defendant had omitted critical information regarding the true cost of the immigration process.
On 24 April 2023, the Claimants submit that they received a WhatsApp message from the Defendant stating that pending government fees in the amount of EUR 3,000 per person (total of EUR 6,000) needed to be settled by the First and Second Claimants. The Claimants allege that such a per person payment scheme was not communicated to them prior to signing the Agreement.
Conversely, the Defendant maintained that they were entirely transparent throughout the engagement. They argued that all vital information was provided during initial meetings, within the written Agreement, and via the subsequent checklist provided to the Claimants. The Defendant contended that the Claimants failed to provide evidence of misrepresentation and that the Claimants' dissatisfaction stemmed from a "change of mind" rather than any contractual breach or failure to disclose on the part of the advisory firm.
What was the precise doctrinal issue the Tribunal had to determine regarding the scope of the Defendant’s advisory duties?
The Tribunal was tasked with determining whether the Defendant’s failure to disclose broader living expenses and specific administrative steps in Portugal—such as tax representation or social security registration—constituted actionable misrepresentation under the DIFC Law of Obligations. Specifically, the court had to decide if the Defendant’s contractual duty to assist with a "business visa application" implicitly extended to providing a comprehensive roadmap of life in Portugal, or if the scope was strictly limited to the visa application process itself. Furthermore, the court had to resolve whether the fee communication was sufficiently clear to satisfy the requirements of a valid contract.
How did Judge Maitha Alshehhi apply the doctrine of misrepresentation to the facts of Mursahi v Morib?
Judge Alshehhi’s reasoning focused on the strict interpretation of the contractual scope. The Tribunal found that the Defendant’s role was clearly defined as providing immigration services for visa applications. Consequently, the court held that the Defendant was not obligated to advise the Claimants on the practicalities of living in Portugal or the incidental costs of residing there, as these fell outside the agreed-upon services.
Regarding the fee dispute, the Judge analyzed the communications between the parties and concluded that the Claimants were aware of the nature of the fees. The court rejected the argument that the provision of a checklist after the signing of the agreement created ambiguity. The Judge determined that the Defendant had acted within the parameters of the contract and that the Claimants had failed to establish that any misrepresentation had occurred.
Accordingly, I do not find that the Defendant has misrepresented the case as it is not in line with Article 29 of the DIFC Law of Obligations.
The Tribunal emphasized that the Claimants' reliance on their own post-contractual research to claim misrepresentation was insufficient to void the Agreement, particularly when the Agreement itself contained clauses limiting the Defendant's liability for refunds.
Which specific DIFC statutes and legal provisions were central to the court’s analysis?
The court’s decision was primarily grounded in the DIFC Law of Obligations No. 5 of 2005, specifically Article 29, which governs the requirements for establishing misrepresentation. The Tribunal also relied on the general principles of the DIFC Contract Law No. 6 of 2004 to interpret the validity and scope of the Agreement signed by the parties. Additionally, the court referenced Clause 5 of the Agreement, which explicitly stated that the Defendant would not be responsible for any refund should a client revoke the agreement or change their mind after signing.
How did the court interpret the evidence regarding the fee communication between the parties?
The court reviewed several pieces of evidence to determine if the fee structure was misrepresented. The Claimants highlighted a pre-contractual inquiry where they were told the government fees were "3,000 Euros to be paid step by step." The court also examined an email from 20 June 2023, where the Defendant clarified the final registration cost.
On 20 June 2023, the Defendant contacted the Claimants by way of email with regards to the rest of the payment, as per the below:
“The total final cost of your registration after the discussion with the management is EUR 2,000/- which is equivalent to AED 8,025/- as of today’s conversion rate.”
The court found that these communications did not support the Claimants' assertion of a "discrepancy" or "misrepresentation." Instead, the Judge viewed the communications as consistent with the professional services provided, noting that the Claimants had not provided sufficient evidence to prove that the Defendant had intentionally misled them about the per-person nature of the government fees.
What was the final disposition of the claims brought by Mursahi and Miriyi?
The Small Claims Tribunal dismissed the Claimants' claims in their entirety. The court ruled that the Claimants were not entitled to the reimbursement of the AED 50,000 they sought, nor was there any basis to render the Agreement void. Regarding costs, the Tribunal ordered that each party should bear its own costs, meaning no order for legal fees or court costs was made in favor of either side.
What are the wider implications of this ruling for immigration service providers and their clients in the DIFC?
This judgment serves as a significant reminder that the scope of service in professional advisory contracts is strictly confined to the explicit terms agreed upon. For immigration service providers, the ruling confirms that they are not liable for failing to provide advice on "life in the destination country" unless such advisory services are explicitly included in the contract. It also underscores the importance of maintaining clear, written records of fee structures, particularly when dealing with multiple applicants, to mitigate the risk of "per person" versus "total" fee disputes.
For clients, the case highlights the risks of signing agreements without a full understanding of the fee structure and the scope of services. The court’s reliance on contractual clauses that preclude refunds upon a "change of mind" suggests that the DIFC Courts will uphold the sanctity of such agreements, provided there is no clear evidence of actual misrepresentation. Future litigants must ensure that any expectations regarding "all-inclusive" services are explicitly documented in the contract, as the court will not imply such obligations.
Where can I read the full judgment in Mursahi v Morib [2023] DIFC SCT 349?
The full judgment is available on the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/small-claims-tribunal/1-mursahi-2-miriyi-v-morib-2023-difc-sct-349
Legislation referenced:
- Law of Obligations No. 5 of 2005, Article 29
- Contract Law No. 6 of 2004