The DIFC Court affirms its supervisory jurisdiction over a DIFC-seated arbitration, granting an interim injunction to preserve the status quo in a deadlocked medical waste joint venture despite jurisdictional challenges.
What specific dispute between Oswin and Otila necessitated the urgent intervention of the DIFC Court in ARB 032/2025?
The litigation arises from a fundamental breakdown in the management of a joint venture company operating within the medical and hazardous waste sector. The Claimant, Oswin, holds a 49% stake in the venture, while the First Defendant, Otila, holds 51%. The governance structure requires unanimous board decisions and a 75% majority for shareholder resolutions, creating a deadlock that prevented the operational management of the entity. Oswin alleged material corporate governance breaches and unauthorized unilateral acts by the Second Defendant, Ondray, which constituted an Event of Default under clause 4(1)(I) of the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA).
To prevent further dissipation of assets and to maintain the status quo pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal, Oswin sought urgent interim relief. The court’s intervention was required to freeze the situation until the merits of the dispute could be addressed by the tribunal. As noted in the court’s reasons:
On 29 August 2025, I granted the Claimant an ex parte injunction in support of-a DIFC seated arbitration to be commenced under the Joint Venture Agreement dated 12 March 2019 (the “JVA”) pursuant to Article 24(3) of the DIFC Arbitration Law No. 1 of 2008, RDC 43.48 and RDC 43.50.
Further details regarding the procedural history and the court's initial intervention can be found at: Oswin v Otila [2025] DIFC ARB 032 — Defending the Seat Against Parallel Onshore Proceedings.
Which judge presided over the ARB 032/2025 proceedings and in which division was the matter heard?
The matter was heard in the Arbitration Division of the DIFC Court of First Instance. H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke presided over the ex parte application on 29 August 2025 and the subsequent return date hearing on 8 September 2025, issuing the final order with reasons on 16 September 2025.
What were the specific legal arguments advanced by Mr Khan for Oswin and Mr Ismail for the Second Defendant regarding the court's jurisdiction?
Mr Khan, representing Oswin, argued that the DIFC Court possessed clear supervisory jurisdiction because the parties had expressly designated the DIFC as the seat of arbitration in the JVA. He contended that this designation empowered the court to grant interim measures under the DIFC Arbitration Law to protect the subject matter of the dispute. Conversely, Mr Ismail, representing the Second Defendant, challenged the court's jurisdiction by asserting that the Abu Dhabi Courts held exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. He argued that public order rules prohibited the parties from contracting out of the jurisdiction of the Abu Dhabi Courts, effectively attempting to oust the DIFC Court’s authority despite the arbitration agreement.
What was the precise doctrinal question Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke had to resolve regarding the interplay between the JVA arbitration clause and the alleged exclusive jurisdiction of the Abu Dhabi Courts?
The court was tasked with determining whether the existence of a potential parallel jurisdiction clause—or the Second Defendant’s reliance on public order arguments regarding Abu Dhabi Courts—could negate the DIFC Court’s supervisory role when the parties had explicitly chosen the DIFC as the seat of arbitration. The doctrinal issue was whether the dispute fell within the ambit of the JVA’s arbitration clause, thereby triggering the DIFC Court’s statutory power to grant interim relief, regardless of competing claims about the governing law or the jurisdiction of onshore courts. As the court framed it:
It may very well be the case that a dispute falls within the ambit of a number of jurisdiction or arbitration clauses in different agreements but the sole question with which this Court is concerned is whether or not the dispute which is to be referred to arbitration under the JVA by the Claimant does fall within the ambit of the arbitration clause in that agreement.
How did Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke apply the test for interim measures to the jurisdictional challenge raised by the Second Defendant?
Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke rejected the Second Defendant’s attempt to discharge the injunction, noting that the Second Defendant failed to address the merits of the Claimant’s application, focusing exclusively on a jurisdictional point that lacked substance. The judge applied the standard test for interim measures, finding that the disputes were clearly arbitrable under the JVA. He emphasized that the court’s role was to act in support of the prospective arbitration, which the Claimant had committed to commencing. As stated in the judgment:
As already indicated, the Second Defendant made no point on the merits of the Claimant’s application, taking only a point as to the jurisdiction of this Court to grant the injunctions in support of the future arbitration which the Claimant had undertaken to commence when it could.
Which specific DIFC statutes and RDC rules were applied to confirm the court's authority to grant the injunction?
The court relied heavily on Article 24(3) of the DIFC Arbitration Law No. 1 of 2008, which provides the statutory basis for the court to grant interim measures in support of arbitration. Procedurally, the court invoked RDC 43.48 and RDC 43.50, which govern the court’s power to issue injunctions in arbitration-related matters, alongside the general provisions of RDC Part 25. Furthermore, the court’s authority was reinforced by Articles 14 and 15 of DIFC Law No. 2 of 2025 Concerning Dubai International Financial Centre Courts, which define the court's jurisdiction and powers.
How did the court utilize the precedent of Narciso v Nash [2024] ARB 009 in its reasoning?
The court relied on the principle established in Narciso v Nash [2024] ARB 009, which confirms that the DIFC Court retains supervisory jurisdiction whenever the seat or legal place of arbitration is specified as the DIFC. By citing this authority, Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke reinforced the doctrine that the parties' choice of seat is paramount. This choice carries with it the inherent powers of the DIFC Court to act as the supervisory body, ensuring that the arbitral process is not frustrated by parallel proceedings or jurisdictional challenges in other forums.
What was the final disposition of the court regarding the injunction and the allocation of costs?
The court ordered the continuation of the injunction until the arbitral tribunal is appointed and determines the matters in dispute. The Second Defendant’s application to discharge the injunction was dismissed. Regarding costs, the court ordered the Second Defendant to bear the financial burden of the proceedings. As specified in the order:
The Second Defendant shall pay the costs of the Claimant’s application to continue the Injunction, the costs of the Second Defendant’s application to discharge the same and the costs of the hearing on 8 September 2025.
The court further clarified the assessment process:
The costs payable by the Second Defendant to the Claimant under the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Order are to be the subject of assessment by the Court in the absence of agreement between the parties within 7 days of the date of this order.
What are the wider implications of this ruling for practitioners dealing with DIFC-seated arbitrations and parallel onshore proceedings?
This ruling reinforces the "supervisory shield" of the DIFC Court. Practitioners must anticipate that the DIFC Court will robustly defend its jurisdiction when the seat of arbitration is the DIFC, even if the underlying contract references other local courts or is governed by UAE law. The case serves as a warning that jurisdictional challenges based on "public order" arguments are unlikely to succeed if they contradict the clear intent of the parties to arbitrate in the DIFC. For a deeper analysis of the risks associated with defying this jurisdiction, see: Oswin v Otila [2025] DIFC ARB 032: The High Cost of Defying the DIFC Supervisory Shield.
Where can I read the full judgment in Oswin v Otila [2025] DIFC ARB 032?
The full judgment is available on the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/arbitration/arb-0322025-oswin-v-1-otila-2-ondray or via the CDN link: https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/arbitration/DIFC_ARB-032-2025_20250916.txt.
Cases referred to in this judgment:
| Case | Citation | How used |
|---|---|---|
| Narciso v Nash | [2024] ARB 009 | To affirm that the DIFC Court has supervisory jurisdiction where the seat is the DIFC. |
Legislation referenced:
- DIFC Arbitration Law No. 1 of 2008, Article 24(3)
- DIFC Law No. 2 of 2025 Concerning Dubai International Financial Centre Courts, Articles 14 and 15
- RDC 43.48
- RDC 43.50
- RDC Part 25