What is the nature of the dispute in MAG Development Services v The Collection Club Restaurant and why is AED 13,000,000 at stake?
The litigation concerns a commercial dispute between MAG Development Services Limited (the Claimant) and The Collection Club Restaurant Limited, Laurent Buisine, and Hugo Valat (the Defendants). The underlying claim involves allegations of contractual breach within the real estate and hospitality sectors, with the Claimant seeking damages amounting to AED 13,000,000. The dispute centers on the performance of obligations under a commercial agreement, which has now progressed to the pre-trial stage.
The procedural conflict arose when both the Claimant and the Defendants filed applications seeking permission to rely on expert evidence to support their respective positions on quantum and contractual liability. The Claimant sought to rely on the evidence of Mr. Conor Given, while the Defendants sought to introduce their own expert, Mr. Ruchon. As noted in the court’s records:
The Claimant’s Application seeks permission to rely on the expert evidence of Mr Conor Given, and for the costs of the application and the expert fees to be costs in the case.
The court’s refusal to permit this evidence signifies that the parties must now proceed to trial based on the evidence already available, without the benefit of specialized technical testimony, which significantly impacts the strategy for proving the AED 13,000,000 claim. The full order can be reviewed at https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-first-instance/cfi-0922024-mag-development-services-limited-v-1-collection-club-restaurant-limited-2-laurent-buisine-3-hugo-valat-1.
Which judge presided over the expert evidence application in CFI 092/2024 and when was the order issued?
The application was heard by H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani in the DIFC Court of First Instance. The order, which addressed the competing applications from both the Claimant and the Defendants, was formally issued on 7 November 2025.
How did the parties argue the necessity of expert evidence under RDC 31 and English CPR 35?
The Claimant’s position was heavily predicated on the assumption that English procedural law could be imported to supplement the DIFC Rules. Specifically, the Claimant relied on CPR 35.1 and 35.3(1), arguing that the court should adopt the three-stage test established in British Airways Plc v Paul Spencer [2015] EWHC 2477 (Ch) to determine the necessity of expert testimony. The Claimant argued that such evidence was "reasonably required" to resolve the complex contractual and quantum issues inherent in the AED 13,000,000 claim.
Conversely, the Defendants initially contested the procedural approach, with the court noting a specific objection regarding the format of the filing:
As a matter of housekeeping, the Claimants object to the format of the Defendant’s Application pursuant to RDC Part 23 and its excessive length.
Despite the procedural friction, the Defendants ultimately sought to introduce their own expert, Mr. Ruchon, to counter the Claimant’s case. The court observed that the Claimant’s application was technically uncontested by the Defendants in terms of the principle of calling an expert, but the court maintained its duty to assess the necessity of such evidence independently of the parties' agreement.
What was the precise doctrinal question regarding the "waterfall provision" of Article 8(2) of DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004?
The court had to determine whether the "waterfall provision" of Article 8(2) of DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004—which allows for the application of English law where no DIFC law exists—permits the importation of English procedural rules (specifically the CPR) regarding expert evidence. The doctrinal issue was whether the RDC is a "complete and clear" code that occupies the entire field of procedural law, thereby rendering the English CPR irrelevant and inapplicable to the DIFC Courts.
How did H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani apply the RDC 31 test to reject the expert evidence?
The court applied a strict interpretation of RDC 31, emphasizing that the court’s primary duty is to ensure that expert evidence is only admitted when it is strictly necessary for the resolution of the proceedings. The judge reasoned that the issues of contractual breach and quantum were well within the court’s own competence and did not require the assistance of external experts. The court explicitly rejected the notion that English precedents could override the RDC.
In my view, neither Application meet the threshold required by RDC 31 or RDC 1.6 to give permission to adduce expert evidence.
The judge further reasoned that allowing such evidence would be contrary to the Overriding Objective in RDC 1.6, which mandates that the court deal with cases proportionately and avoid unnecessary expense. Regarding the Defendants' proposed expert, the court found:
I am not satisfied that Mr Ruchon meets the standard required under the RDC 31 or that the evidence sought is necessary to resolve any issue in dispute.
Which specific RDC rules and DIFC statutes were applied to the determination of expert evidence?
The court’s reasoning was anchored in the following provisions:
* DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004, Article 8(2): The "waterfall provision," which the court clarified does not permit the importation of English procedural law where the RDC is already comprehensive.
* RDC 1.6: The Overriding Objective, which requires the court to balance the need for expert evidence against the principles of proportionality, saving expense, and the efficient allocation of court resources.
* RDC 31.2, 31.5, 31.6, 31.7(1)(b), and 31.10: These rules govern the court's power to restrict expert evidence. Specifically, RDC 31.10 was cited as the primary threshold for determining whether evidence is "reasonably required."
How did the court distinguish or utilize English precedents like British Airways v Paul Spencer?
The court addressed the English authorities cited by the Claimant, specifically British Airways Plc v Paul Spencer [2015] EWHC 2477 (Ch) and Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP [2016] UKSC 6. While acknowledging these cases provide a three-stage test for expert evidence in English law, the court held that they were not binding or even persuasive in the context of the DIFC. The judge clarified that because the RDC provides a complete framework for expert evidence, any reliance on English principles is misplaced and will be overlooked. The court effectively signaled that the DIFC Court is a self-sufficient jurisdiction that does not require the "crutch" of English procedural jurisprudence.
What was the final disposition of the applications and the order regarding costs?
The court rejected both the Claimant’s and the Defendants’ applications for permission to rely on expert evidence. Consequently, the trial will proceed without the testimony of Mr. Conor Given or Mr. Ruchon. Regarding costs, the court made no order, meaning each party will bear its own costs for these specific applications.
Therefore, the Claimant’s Application does not meet the threshold under RDC 31 and permission to adduce expert evidence is refused.
The court’s refusal to grant the applications underscores a firm stance against the "over-lawyering" of procedural motions and the unnecessary inflation of trial costs through expert testimony.
What are the wider implications for practitioners regarding expert evidence in the DIFC?
This judgment serves as a stern warning to practitioners that the DIFC Court will not tolerate the routine importation of English procedural law, particularly when the RDC provides a clear mechanism for managing evidence. Litigants must now anticipate a much higher threshold for justifying expert evidence; it is no longer sufficient to argue that an expert would be "helpful." Practitioners must demonstrate that the evidence is "necessary" for the court to resolve the dispute, failing which the court will exercise its power under RDC 31 to exclude such evidence to preserve proportionality and judicial resources. This aligns with the court's broader effort to maintain an efficient, cost-effective, and independent procedural regime.
Where can I read the full judgment in MAG Development Services v The Collection Club Restaurant [2025] DIFC CFI 092?
The full judgment can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website at https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-first-instance/cfi-0922024-mag-development-services-limited-v-1-collection-club-restaurant-limited-2-laurent-buisine-3-hugo-valat-1 or via the CDN link: https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/court-first-instance/DIFC_CFI-092-2024_20251107.txt.
Cases referred to in this judgment:
| Case | Citation | How used |
|---|---|---|
| British Airways Plc v Paul Spencer | [2015] EWHC 2477 (Ch) | Cited by Claimant; rejected by Court as inapplicable. |
| Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP | [2016] UKSC 6 | Cited by Claimant; rejected by Court as inapplicable. |
Legislation referenced:
- DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004, Article 8(2)
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC): 1.6, 31.2, 31.5, 31.6, 31.7(1)(b), 31.10, 31.13