This order clarifies the threshold for setting aside a default judgment in the DIFC, emphasizing that while service at a registered office is strictly binding, the court retains broad discretion under RDC 14.2 to prioritize the resolution of disputes on their merits.
What was the nature of the dispute and the specific monetary amount claimed by Sanja Boskovic against Mirabaud (Middle East) Ltd?
The litigation originated from a claim filed by Sanja Boskovic against Mirabaud (Middle East) Ltd, seeking recovery of a significant financial sum. The dispute centers on contractual obligations and the handling of account information, which led the Claimant to initiate proceedings in the DIFC Court of First Instance.
On 26 June 2025, the Claimant filed a claim against the Defendant claiming the sum of USD 741,537.67 (equivalent to AED 2,723,297.09).
The Claimant successfully obtained a default judgment on 13 August 2025 after the Defendant failed to respond to the initial service of the claim. The Defendant subsequently moved to set aside this judgment, citing internal administrative failures that prevented the legal documents from reaching the appropriate executive channels within the company.
Which judge presided over the application to set aside the default judgment in CFI 064/2025?
The application was heard by H.E. Justice Maha Al Mheiri in the DIFC Court of First Instance. The order was issued on 16 September 2025, following a review of the parties' submissions regarding the validity of service and the merits of the underlying defense.
What arguments did Sanja Boskovic and Mirabaud (Middle East) Ltd advance regarding the validity of the default judgment?
The Defendant’s application was supported by a witness statement from Mr. Maher Atitallah, the CEO of Mirabaud (Middle East) Ltd. The Defendant argued that while the documents were delivered to their registered office, they were misplaced due to an internal administrative error and never reached the CEO’s desk. Consequently, they sought relief under the discretionary powers of the court.
The Defendant’s Application is brought pursuant to RDC Part 14, namely Rules 14.1 and 14.2, and supported by a Witness Statement from Mr Maher Atitallah, CEO of the Defendant company.
In opposition, the Claimant relied on the strict procedural requirements of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC). Mr. Antonios Dimitrakopoulos, representing the Claimant’s position, argued that the judgment was entered correctly because the service was executed in full compliance with the rules.
In reply to the Defendant’s Application, the Claimant filed a Witness Statement of Mr Antonios Dimitrakopoulos dated 29 August 2025, arguing that the judgment was validly entered and no sufficient grounds exist to set it aside.
What legal questions did the court have to resolve regarding RDC 14.1 and 14.2 in the context of the Defendant’s application?
The court was tasked with a two-stage inquiry. First, it had to determine if the default judgment was "wrongly entered" under RDC 14.1, which would necessitate setting it aside as a matter of right. Second, if the judgment was found to be procedurally sound, the court had to determine whether it should exercise its discretion under RDC 14.2 to set aside the judgment based on the existence of a real prospect of success or other "good reasons."
In review of the Defendant’s Application, the Court is required to determine whether the Default Judgment was wrongly entered under RDC 14.1, and, if not, whether there exists a real prospect of successfully defending the claim or some other good reason to set it aside under RDC 14.2.
How did H.E. Justice Maha Al Mheiri apply the doctrine of service at a registered office to the facts of this case?
The court confirmed that the Claimant had strictly followed the rules for service. The evidence showed that the Claim Form was delivered via DHL to the Defendant’s registered office on 30 June 2025, and a Certificate of Service was filed shortly thereafter.
On the question of service, the Court found that the Claim Form was served at the Defendant’s registered office via DHL on 30 June 2025, and a Certificate of Service was duly filed.
Justice Al Mheiri held that the Defendant’s internal failure to process the document did not invalidate the service. Under RDC 9.17–9.27, service at a company’s registered office is deemed valid irrespective of internal errors in handling. Consequently, the court ruled that there was no basis to set aside the judgment under RDC 14.1, as the service was legally effective.
Which specific RDC rules and procedural thresholds did the court apply to evaluate the Defendant’s request for discretionary relief?
The court evaluated the application under RDC 14.2, which allows the court to set aside a judgment even if it was correctly entered. The court focused on whether the Defendant could demonstrate a "real prospect of success" as required by RDC 14.2(1) or provide "some other good reason" under RDC 14.2(2).
The court noted that the Defendant raised substantive issues regarding the timing of the dispute, the applicability of specific contractual terms, and the accuracy of account information. Although the defense was not yet fully pleaded, the court found it sufficient to meet the threshold for a real prospect of success.
How did the court utilize the "overriding objective" in its decision to grant the application?
In its reasoning, the court emphasized that the Defendant acted promptly upon discovering the judgment and that the failure to respond was administrative rather than intentional. By invoking the overriding objective under RDC 1.6, the court determined that the interests of justice were better served by allowing the case to proceed to a trial on the merits rather than maintaining a default judgment.
In considering the discretionary grounds under RDC 14.2, the Court will next assess whether the Defendant has demonstrated a real prospect of successfully defending the claim or otherwise shown a good reason for the judgment to be set aside.
What was the final disposition of the court, and how were costs allocated between the parties?
The court granted the Defendant’s application and set aside the default judgment. The Defendant was ordered to file its defense within 14 days of the order. Regarding costs, the court determined that they should follow the outcome of the substantive proceedings.
Therefore, I shall set aside the Default Judgment, and order that the Defendant shall file its defence within 14 days from the date of this Order.
What are the wider implications for DIFC practitioners regarding service of process and default judgments?
This case serves as a critical reminder that the DIFC Courts maintain a strict interpretation of service at a registered office. Practitioners cannot rely on internal administrative failures as a defense against the validity of service. However, the ruling also highlights that the court is pragmatic; if a defendant can show a meritorious defense and act promptly, the court will likely exercise its discretion under RDC 14.2 to ensure the dispute is resolved on its merits rather than through procedural default.
Where can I read the full judgment in Sanja Boskovic v Mirabaud (Middle East) Ltd [2025] DIFC CFI 064?
The full judgment can be accessed via the official DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-first-instance/cfi-0642025-sanja-boskovic-v-mirabaud-middle-east-ltd
Cases referred to in this judgment:
| Case | Citation | How used |
|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | No external case law cited in the order. |
Legislation referenced:
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC): Part 14, RDC 1.6, RDC 9.17–9.27, RDC 14.1, RDC 14.2, RDC 14.2(1), RDC 14.2(2).