How did the dispute between Union Insurance Company and International Precious Metals Refiners lead to a strike-out of the Claimant’s PTA Application?
The litigation concerns a protracted dispute between Union Insurance Company PJSC (the Claimant) and International Precious Metals Refiners LLC (the Defendant), which has spanned both DIFC and onshore UAE courts. Following a stay of the DIFC proceedings granted by H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi on 12 May 2025—a decision necessitated by the conclusive resolution of the underlying dispute by the Sharjah Court of Appeal and the Union Supreme Court—the Claimant sought permission to appeal (PTA) the stay order. The Defendant subsequently filed an application to strike out this PTA request, characterizing it as a misuse of process.
The court found the Claimant’s appeal grounds to be entirely devoid of merit, particularly regarding allegations that the court had misstated procedural facts in its recitals. The court clarified that the stay was a necessary consequence of the onshore litigation, rendering the DIFC proceedings redundant. In disposing of the matter, the court issued the following order:
The Claimant shall pay the Defendant’s costs of the PTA Application on the standard basis. The Defendant shall file and serve a statement of costs, not exceeding 3 pages, by no later than 4pm on Friday, 4 July 2025.
For further background on the procedural history of this dispute, see UNION INSURANCE v INTERNATIONAL PRECIOUS METALS REFINERS [2022] DIFC CFI 064 — procedural management of a jurisdictional challenge (29 November 2022).
Which judge presided over the strike-out application in CFI 064/2022?
H.E. Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi presided over this matter in the DIFC Court of First Instance. The order, which addressed the Claimant’s PTA Application and the Defendant’s Strike Out Application, was issued on 26 June 2025.
What were the specific legal arguments advanced by Union Insurance Company and International Precious Metals Refiners regarding the stay of proceedings?
The Claimant argued that the Stay Order of 12 May 2025 was procedurally flawed and breached principles of natural justice. Specifically, the Claimant contended that the court’s recitals contained misstatements, asserting that the court had incorrectly claimed to have reviewed "submissions" and had misrepresented the nature of a hearing held on 17 March 2025. The Claimant attempted to draw an "artificial distinction" between oral advocacy and written submissions, arguing that the absence of a specific oral hearing on the stay application itself constituted a denial of the opportunity to be heard.
Conversely, the Defendant maintained that the PTA Application was entirely meritless and vexatious. The Defendant argued that the Claimant had been afforded ample opportunity to be heard through the filing of extensive witness statements—specifically the Seventeenth Witness Statement and Exhibit MEB17—which the court had duly considered. The Defendant asserted that the stay was a proper exercise of the court’s case management powers under the RDC, particularly given that the onshore courts had already conclusively determined the underlying dispute.
What was the precise doctrinal issue the court had to resolve regarding the validity of the PTA Application?
The court was tasked with determining whether the Claimant’s grounds for appeal met the threshold for permission to appeal under the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), or whether the application should be summarily struck out as an abuse of process. The doctrinal core of the issue involved the court’s power to determine applications on the papers pursuant to RDC 23.69(3) and whether such a determination, when based on a holistic review of the procedural history and written evidence, satisfies the requirements of natural justice. The court had to decide if the Claimant’s attempt to challenge the stay based on alleged "misstatements" in the court’s recitals constituted a legitimate ground for appeal or a vexatious attempt to prolong redundant litigation.
How did Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi apply the RDC to justify the strike-out of the PTA Application?
Justice Al Sawalehi conducted a rigorous analysis of the Claimant’s grounds, finding them to be "unfounded and misconceived." The court rejected the Claimant’s attempt to distinguish between written submissions and oral advocacy, noting that the filing of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Seventeenth Witness Statements constituted substantive submissions that the court had fully reviewed. The judge emphasized that the court’s power to decide matters on the papers is a well-established procedural tool that does not infringe upon a party’s right to be heard when that party has already submitted voluminous evidence.
The court’s reasoning was firm in its rejection of the Claimant’s attack on the court’s procedural record:
I also order that the PTA Application be struck out in its entirety under RDC 44.94(1), and I find that there is a compelling reason to do so within the meaning of RDC 44.95.
The judge further noted that the Claimant’s insinuation that the court misunderstood the subject matter of the applications was not only unsubstantiated but "discourteous." By characterizing the appeal as "vexatious," the court concluded that the PTA Application lacked any legal or factual merit, necessitating its summary dismissal to protect the integrity of the court’s docket.
Which specific DIFC statutes and RDC rules were applied in the determination of CFI 064/2022?
The court relied upon Article 14(C)(2) of the DIFC Courts Law, which provides the framework for the court’s jurisdiction and procedural authority. Regarding the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), the court specifically invoked:
- RDC 4.2(6): Regarding the court’s power to stay proceedings.
- RDC 23.69(3): Regarding the court’s discretion to determine applications on the papers.
- RDC 44.94(1): Regarding the power to strike out an application for permission to appeal.
- RDC 44.95: Regarding the existence of a "compelling reason" to strike out an appeal.
- RDC 1.6, 4.12, and 4.13: Pertaining to the court’s general case management powers and the duty of parties to assist the court in furthering the overriding objective.
How did the court address the Claimant’s specific allegations regarding the recitals in the Stay Order?
The court addressed the Claimant’s allegations of misstatement by systematically dismantling the Claimant’s interpretation of the procedural record. Regarding the recital concerning the review of submissions, the court noted:
As to the first Recital (“reviewing the submissions of both the Applicant and Respondent”), the Claimant adopts an artificial distinction by denying that submissions had been made.
The court highlighted that the Claimant had filed the Seventeenth Witness Statement and Exhibit MEB17, which were clearly before the court. Furthermore, regarding the hearing on 17 March 2025, the court clarified that the recital did not claim the stay application was heard orally, but rather that a hearing occurred which was "procedurally and substantively intertwined" with the stay application. The court rejected the Claimant’s attempt to isolate the stay application from the broader procedural history, stating:
Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi on 17 March 2025”), the Claimant’s contention that this misrepresents the subject matter of the hearing is unfounded and misconceived.
What was the final outcome of the application and the orders made regarding costs?
The court struck out the Claimant’s PTA Application in its entirety, finding it to be a misuse of process. The Defendant’s Strike Out Application was dismissed as the court had already granted the relief sought via the strike-out of the PTA. The Claimant was ordered to bear the costs of the application on the standard basis.
The Claimant shall pay the Defendant’s costs of the Application on the standard basis. The Defendant shall file and serve a statement of costs, not exceeding 3 pages, within 5 days from the issuance of this Order.
What are the wider implications of this decision for DIFC practitioners?
This decision serves as a stern reminder that the DIFC Court will not tolerate attempts to relitigate issues that have been conclusively resolved in other competent jurisdictions, such as the onshore UAE courts. Practitioners should note that the court is increasingly willing to utilize its powers under RDC 44.94(1) and RDC 44.95 to strike out appeals that are deemed vexatious or devoid of merit. Furthermore, the ruling confirms that the court’s discretion to determine applications on the papers under RDC 23.69(3) is robust; provided that parties have had the opportunity to file written evidence, the court will not entertain arguments that a lack of oral hearing constitutes a breach of natural justice. Litigants must ensure that all submissions are substantive and avoid making discourteous or unsubstantiated attacks on the court’s procedural record, as such tactics are likely to result in adverse cost orders and summary dismissal.
Where can I read the full judgment in Union Insurance Company PJSC v International Precious Metals Refiners LLC [2025] DIFC CFI 064?
The full judgment can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-first-instance/cfi-0642022-union-insurance-company-pjsc-v-international-precious-metals-refiners-llc-12 or via the CDN link: https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/court-first-instance/DIFC_CFI-064-2022_20250626.txt
Cases referred to in this judgment:
| Case | Citation | How used |
|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | N/A |
Legislation referenced:
- DIFC Courts Law Article 14(C)(2)
- RDC 1.6
- RDC 4.2(6)
- RDC 4.12
- RDC 4.13
- RDC 23.69(3)
- RDC 44.94(1)
- RDC 44.95