How did the Claimant, Alizz Islamic Bank, frame its application for immediate judgment and strike-out against Alef Capital in CFI 048/2025?
The dispute centers on a high-stakes application for immediate judgment brought by the Claimant, Alizz Islamic Bank S.A.O.C, against the Defendant, Alef Capital B.S.C.(C) (formerly Investrade Company B.S.C (C)). The Claimant sought to resolve the underlying litigation through summary disposal, specifically targeting the Defendant’s limitation defence. The procedural tension arose when the Defendant served a witness statement from Ms. Haseena Bangash on 1 April 2026, just days before the scheduled hearing, without having previously sought or obtained formal leave from the Court to serve late evidence.
The Claimant’s position was that the Defendant’s failure to adhere to the Court’s established timetable necessitated a strict procedural response. As noted in the Court’s schedule of reasons:
By an application dated 11 February 2026, the Claimant applies for immediate judgment under RDC 24.1 and for strike-out relief, including, in the alternative, strike-out of the limitation defence.
The Claimant argued that the late service of the Bangash statement effectively ambushed the proceedings, depriving them of the procedural protections afforded by the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC). The Claimant requested that the Court exclude the evidence entirely and strike out portions of the Defendant’s skeleton argument that relied upon the contested statement.
Which judge presided over the procedural directions hearing in CFI 048/2025 and when was the order issued?
The procedural directions were issued by H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere of the DIFC Court of First Instance. The order, which addressed the admissibility of the late witness statement and the scope of the upcoming 8 April 2026 hearing, was formally issued on 6 April 2026.
What specific procedural arguments did Alizz Islamic Bank and Alef Capital advance regarding the Bangash statement?
The Claimant argued that the Defendant’s failure to serve evidence by the deadline of 11 March 2026, as required by RDC 23.46(2), constituted a significant procedural breach. The Claimant contended that the service of the Bangash statement on 1 April 2026—only one week before the hearing—violated the spirit of the RDC, which aims to ensure parties have adequate time to prepare.
As summarized in the Court’s reasoning:
It further submits that the Bangash statement was served late and that its service shortly before the hearing deprives the Claimant of the 14-day period in RDC 23.46(3) within which evidence in reply could ordinarily be served.
The Defendant, while acknowledging the delay, opposed the Claimant’s request for exclusion. The Defendant maintained that the evidence was essential for the Court’s determination of the immediate judgment application and that the Claimant would suffer no irreparable prejudice if granted a limited opportunity to respond. The Defendant’s position was that the Court should favor the admission of relevant evidence over the imposition of a terminal procedural sanction.
What was the precise doctrinal issue the Court had to resolve regarding the late service of evidence?
The Court was tasked with determining whether the exclusion of evidence is a proportionate response to a failure to comply with RDC 23.46(2) when the opposing party claims prejudice due to the loss of the standard 14-day reply period under RDC 23.46(3). The doctrinal challenge lay in balancing the Court’s duty to enforce its own directions and the RDC timelines against the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly and ensuring that the Court has all relevant evidence before it to reach a fair determination on the merits of the immediate judgment application.
How did Justice Rene Le Miere apply the proportionality test to the Claimant's request to exclude the Bangash statement?
Justice Le Miere adopted a pragmatic approach, emphasizing that procedural sanctions must be commensurate with the nature of the default. The Court acknowledged the Claimant’s frustration regarding the timeline but determined that the prejudice claimed—the loss of the 14-day reply period—could be cured through less drastic measures than the total exclusion of the evidence.
The Court’s reasoning was anchored in the principle that evidence should be admitted if the procedural imbalance can be corrected through directions. As stated in the judgment:
The exclusion of evidence is a serious sanction. Where late evidence is tendered shortly before a hearing, the Court considers the seriousness of the default, the explanation for it, and whether any prejudice can be cured by proportionate directions short of exclusion, including by confining the use of the evidence, permitting short responsive material, and/or making costs orders.
By allowing the Claimant to file a short responsive witness statement and a responsive skeleton argument, the Court effectively neutralized the prejudice caused by the late service, thereby upholding the integrity of the hearing without resorting to the "serious sanction" of exclusion.
Which RDC rules and procedural authorities were central to the Court’s decision in CFI 048/2025?
The Court’s decision was primarily governed by the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC). Specifically, the Court referenced RDC 23.46(2), which mandates the timeline for serving evidence in answer, and RDC 23.46(3), which provides the 14-day window for evidence in reply. The Claimant’s application for immediate judgment was brought under RDC 24.1. Furthermore, the Court exercised its general case management powers under RDC 24 to issue directions that would allow the hearing to proceed on 8 April 2026 despite the procedural irregularities.
How did the Court utilize its discretionary powers to manage the late evidence in this case?
The Court utilized its discretion to craft a "proportionate course" rather than a binary "admit or exclude" decision. By acknowledging the default—that the Defendant failed to serve evidence by the date identified under RDC 23.46(2)—the Court maintained its authority while simultaneously ensuring the hearing remained effective. The Court’s decision to permit the late evidence was conditional, requiring the Defendant’s evidence to be met with a specific, time-bound response from the Claimant. This approach ensured that the "seriousness of the default" was recognized without allowing the procedural error to derail the substantive hearing on immediate judgment.
What was the final disposition of the Court regarding the Bangash statement and the limitation application?
The Court granted the Defendant permission to rely on the Bangash statement, subject to strict conditions designed to protect the Claimant’s position. The Court ordered:
The Defendant has permission to rely on the witness statement of Ms Haseena Bangash dated 1 April 2026 and its exhibits at the hearing on 8 April 2026.
To mitigate prejudice, the Court granted the Claimant permission to file a responsive witness statement of no more than 10 pages and a responsive skeleton argument of no more than 6 pages, both due by 4pm on 6 April 2026. Additionally, the Court confirmed that the Defendant’s separate application to determine limitation as a preliminary issue would not be heard on 8 April 2026, maintaining the Court’s earlier direction.
How does this ruling influence future practice regarding late evidence in the DIFC Courts?
This case reinforces the DIFC Court’s strong preference for case management over the imposition of terminal sanctions. Practitioners should anticipate that the Court will be reluctant to exclude evidence simply because it was served late, provided the delay does not render a fair trial impossible. Litigants seeking to exclude evidence must be prepared to demonstrate actual, incurable prejudice rather than relying solely on the breach of RDC timelines. Conversely, parties serving evidence late should expect the Court to impose strict conditions—such as page limits on responsive filings or adverse costs orders—to compensate the opposing party for the disruption.
Where can I read the full judgment in Alizz Islamic Bank S.A.O.C v Alef Capital B.S.C.(C) [2026] DIFC CFI 048?
The full order and schedule of reasons can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-first-instance/cfi-0482025-alizz-islamic-bank-soc-v-alef-capital-bscc-formerly-investrade-company-bsc-c
Legislation referenced:
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC):
- RDC 4.16
- RDC 23.46(2)
- RDC 23.46(3)
- RDC 24
- RDC 24.1