Why did Hala Mansour argue that the Worldwide Freezing Order against her should be discharged in GTC Trading S.A. v Hazem Abdolshahid Mahmoudi Rashed?
Hala Mansour, the Third Respondent, sought the discharge of the WFO and related continuation orders on the basis that the protective measures against her had become obsolete. She contended that she was not a judgment debtor and that the ongoing enforcement proceedings, particularly those overseen by the Dubai Execution Court, had already established that she held no assets capable of execution.
Her argument centered on the lack of any remaining risk of asset dissipation, asserting that her cooperation with disclosure requirements had been exhaustive. As noted in the court records:
She says there is no conceivable possibility that she could dissipate any assets. She referred to the multiple enforcement orders open against her in Dubai by the Claimant and relied upon the Claimant’s application of 11 December 2025 to confirm that its enforcement requires nothing from her to complete enforcement.
Furthermore, she emphasized that the regulatory and judicial landscape had shifted since the initial granting of the WFO. She maintained that the court-approved share sale mechanism had effectively superseded the need for personal restraints against her, as the enforcement process had moved into a phase where her personal assets were no longer relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment debt.
Which judge presided over the application to discharge the WFO in GTC Trading S.A. v Hazem Abdolshahid Mahmoudi Rashed?
H.E. Justice Robert French presided over this application in the DIFC Court of First Instance. The order was issued on 30 January 2026, following a review of the Third Respondent’s application dated 15 December 2025 and the supporting witness statements provided by the parties.
What were the specific legal positions of GTC Trading S.A. and the Third Respondent regarding the continuation of the freezing order?
The Claimant, GTC Trading S.A., maintained that the Third Respondent’s involvement remained necessary to prevent the dissipation of assets, pointing to the historical context of the Second Respondent’s corporate structure. The Claimant argued that the dissolution of the Second Respondent, H.M.R. Investment Holding Ltd, prior to the execution of the judgment debt, justified continued scrutiny. As the court observed:
Dissolution prior to execution of the judgment debt being effected was said to underscore the Claimant’s concerns about the use of the Second Respondent as a vehicle for dissipating assets against which enforcement might take place.
Conversely, Hala Mansour argued that her personal restraint had no practical impact on the enforcement process. She highlighted her compliance with disclosure proceedings, noting:
She referred to disclosure proceedings initiated against her by the Claimant before the Dubai Execution Court and stated that she cooperated fully and provided complete and honest disclosure.
She further argued that the Claimant failed to demonstrate how the WFO provided any additional security that was not already covered by the court-controlled enforcement framework.
What was the precise doctrinal issue the Court had to resolve regarding the necessity of the WFO against third parties?
The Court was tasked with determining whether the continued existence of a WFO against third parties remains justifiable when the primary enforcement mechanism—in this case, the court-approved sale of shares—has reached a stage of maturity that renders the freezing order redundant. The doctrinal issue involved balancing the Claimant’s right to secure the fruits of a judgment against the principle that freezing orders are extraordinary remedies that should not be maintained once their protective purpose is exhausted. The Court had to decide if the "tenuous" nature of the connection between the third parties and the remaining assets warranted a discharge to avoid unnecessary prejudice to the Respondents.
How did H.E. Justice Robert French apply the test for the continuation of a WFO in light of the advanced enforcement proceedings?
Justice French applied a proportionality test, evaluating whether the WFO continued to serve a legitimate protective function. He concluded that the progress of the enforcement proceedings had fundamentally altered the landscape, making the WFO against the Second and Third Respondents unnecessary. The judge reasoned that the enforcement process was now sufficiently robust to proceed without the ongoing burden of the freezing order on these specific parties.
The reasoning is captured in the following observation:
It seems to me that the foundation for the continuation of the WFO against Ms Mansour and the Second Respondent has become rather tenuous in light of the stage at which the enforcement proceedings hav
The Court also noted that the Second Respondent had been dissolved for non-activity, confirming that it held no assets capable of execution, which further undermined the Claimant’s justification for maintaining the order.
Which specific authorities and RDC rules were central to the Court’s decision in this enforcement matter?
The Court’s decision was heavily influenced by the procedural history of the case, specifically the orders of H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke dated 27 May 2024, 18 September 2024, and 3 October 2024. These orders established the initial WFO, the Continuation Order, and the Indemnity Costs Order. Additionally, the Court considered the order of H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser dated 26 February 2025 regarding Part 45 enforcement proceedings. The application was brought under the framework of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), specifically RDC 25.64, which governs the variation or discharge of injunctions.
How did the Court treat the previous Indemnity Costs Order in the context of the discharge application?
The Court distinguished between the discharge of the WFO and the setting aside of the Indemnity Costs Order. While the Court granted the discharge of the WFO, it refused to set aside the costs order, maintaining that the initial imposition of indemnity costs remained appropriate given the circumstances under which the orders were originally sought and obtained. The Court reinforced the finality of the costs order, dismissing the application to vacate it.
What was the final disposition and the specific relief granted by the Court on 30 January 2026?
The Court granted the application in part. It ordered the discharge of the WFO and the Continuation Order against the Second and Third Respondents, effective seven days after the completion of the share sale proceeds payment. The Court also mandated that the Claimant notify the Court within 24 hours of that completion. Regarding costs, the Court ruled:
(c) The Application be dismissed so far as it seeks an order setting aside the Costs Order imposing costs on an indemnity basis against the Second and Third Respondents. (d) The Second and Third Respondents pay the Claimant one half of the costs of this Application to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed.
This decision effectively removed the Second and Third Respondents from the immediate scope of the freezing measures while holding them liable for a portion of the costs incurred during the application process.
What are the wider implications of this ruling for practitioners dealing with WFOs in the DIFC?
This ruling serves as a reminder that WFOs are not permanent fixtures and are subject to the principle of proportionality. Practitioners must anticipate that the DIFC Court will actively monitor the progress of enforcement and will not hesitate to discharge protective orders once the underlying enforcement process—such as a court-approved asset sale—reaches a stage where the third party’s involvement is no longer required for asset preservation. Litigants should be prepared to provide evidence of "changed circumstances" when seeking to discharge such orders, particularly when disclosure obligations have been satisfied and the enforcement path is clearly defined. This case is part of a broader series of enforcement actions, including the GTC TRADING SA v HAZEM ABDOLSHAHID MAHMOUDI RASHED [2024] DIFC CFI 046 — Dismissal of stay and extension application (27 May 2024), GTC TRADING SA v HAZEM ABDOLSHAHID MAHMOUDI RASHED [2024] DIFC CFI 046 — Enforcement, contempt, and the rejection of tactical delays (30 May 2024), GTC TRADING S.A. v HAZEM ABDOLSHAHID MAHMOUDI RASHED [2026] DIFC CFI 046 — Approval of share sale and amendment of payment mechanism (30 January 2026), and GTC TRADING S.A. v HAZEM ABDOLSHAHID MAHMOUDI RASHED [2026] DIFC CFI 046 — Dismissal of application to purge contempt (24 February 2026).
Where can I read the full judgment in GTC Trading S.A. v Hazem Abdolshahid Mahmoudi Rashed [2026] DIFC CFI 046?
The full text of the order can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-first-instance/cfi-0462023-enf-0222023-enf-0232022-gtc-trading-s-1-hazem-abdolshahid-mahmoudi-rashed-2-hmr-investment-holding-ltd-1-royal-view-1 or via the CDN link: https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/court-first-instance/cfi-0462023-enf-0222023-enf-0232022-gtc-trading-s-1-hazem-abdolshahid-mahmoudi-rashed-2-hmr-investment-holding-ltd-1-royal-view-1.txt
Cases referred to in this judgment:
| Case | Citation | How used |
|---|---|---|
| GTC Trading S.A. v Hazem Abdolshahid Mahmoudi Rashed | [2024] DIFC CFI 046 | Procedural history/Previous orders |
Legislation referenced:
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), Rule 25.64