STELIAN GHEORGHE v BSA AHMAD BIN HEZEEM & ASSOCIATES [2026] DIFC CFI 045 — Refusal of permission to appeal costs assessment (06 April 2026)

This order addresses the Claimant’s attempt to challenge a prior costs assessment, reinforcing the Court’s broad discretion in managing procedural costs and the high threshold for appellate intervention in such matters.

What was the specific dispute between Stelian Gheorghe and BSA Ahmad Bin Hezeem & Associates regarding the immediate assessment of costs in CFI 045/2025?

The litigation originated from a jurisdictional challenge where the Claimant, Stelian Gheorghe, sought to contest the forum for his dispute against the law firm BSA Ahmad Bin Hezeem & Associates and Jimmy Haoula. Following the Court’s decision to uphold the Defendants' jurisdictional objection, the Court ordered the Claimant to pay the Defendants' costs. The subsequent dispute centered on the quantum of those costs, which were subject to an immediate assessment by the Court. The Claimant challenged the resulting order, arguing that the Court had improperly resolved ambiguities in the Defendants' favor and failed to hold the Respondents to their evidentiary burden.

The Claimant specifically alleged that the Court’s assessment process was procedurally unfair and failed to adhere to the requirements of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC). As noted in the Court’s summary of the Claimant's position:

The Claimant contends that given the nature of the costs claimed by the Defendants, including inconsistencies and the absence of clarity in disbursements, the Court erred in ordering immediate assessment.

The Claimant sought permission to appeal the assessment, claiming that the Court had essentially "cured" deficiencies in the Defendants' cost submissions through an impermissible "broad-brush" approach. The dispute highlights the tension between the Court’s desire for efficient, summary disposal of costs and a party’s right to demand strict proof of legal expenses. Further details on the initial stay of proceedings can be found in STELIAN GHEORGHE v BSA AHMAD BIN HEZEEM & ASSOCIATES [2025] DIFC CFI 045 — Stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration (28 October 2025).

Which judge presided over the application for permission to appeal in Stelian Gheorghe v BSA Ahmad Bin Hezeem & Associates [2026] DIFC CFI 045?

The application for permission to appeal was heard and determined by H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani in the DIFC Courts, Court of First Instance. The order was issued on 6 April 2026, following the Claimant’s appeal notice filed on 27 January 2026, which sought to challenge the Court’s earlier Order dated 16 December 2025.

What were the specific legal arguments advanced by Stelian Gheorghe regarding the burden of proof under RDC 38.2?

The Claimant argued that the Court fundamentally misapplied the burden of proof required for the assessment of costs. He contended that the Respondents, as the receiving parties, failed to satisfy the evidentiary threshold for their claims. The Claimant’s argument was rooted in the principle that the Court cannot simply assume the reasonableness of costs when the underlying documentation is unclear.

(2) Failure to Apply the Burden of Proof under RDC 38.2
(i) Pursuant to RDC 38.2, the burden lies on the receiving party to demonstrate that costs were:
a.

The Claimant asserted that because the Court had previously identified the Defendants' descriptions of expenses as "unclear and not entirely consistent," it was legally impermissible to proceed to award those costs by assuming equal sharing of fees or justifying disbursements without further evidence. He argued that this approach effectively reversed the burden of proof, forcing the Claimant to disprove costs that had not been adequately substantiated by the Defendants in the first instance.

What was the precise doctrinal issue the Court had to answer regarding the Claimant’s Application for Permission to Appeal?

The Court was required to determine whether the Claimant’s grounds of appeal possessed a "real prospect of success" or if there was any other compelling reason for an appeal to be heard. Specifically, the Court had to decide if the initial assessment of costs—conducted on a "broad-brush" basis—constituted an error of law or a procedural irregularity sufficient to warrant appellate review. The Court had to balance the need for finality in costs proceedings against the Claimant's assertion that the Court had exceeded its case management powers under RDC 4.2 by "curing" evidential defects in the Respondents' cost claims.

How did H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani justify the use of the "broad-brush" approach in the immediate assessment of costs?

Justice Jhangiani rejected the Claimant’s assertion that the Court had adopted an improper methodology to compensate for defective claims. The Court clarified that the "broad-brush" approach is a recognized tool within the Court's discretion to calibrate costs that are broadly established but require adjustment, rather than a mechanism to validate fundamentally flawed claims.

There is no suggestion that a broadbrush approach was adopted by the Court “to address defects in the Respondents’ costs claims”, as contended by the Claimant.

The Court further reasoned that the Claimant’s failure to file submissions in response to the Statements of Costs had left the Court with limited options. Justice Jhangiani emphasized that the Claimant’s argument regarding "material prejudice" was insufficient to establish an error in the Court’s procedural approach, particularly when the initial assessment was conducted in accordance with the general rule under RDC 38.30(1) for hearings lasting less than one day.

Which specific RDC rules and statutory provisions were applied by the Court in determining the costs assessment?

The Court relied heavily on the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) to manage the assessment process. Key provisions included:

• RDC 4.2: Used to exercise the Court’s wide case management powers, specifically to treat the appeal notice as an application for permission to appeal against the correct order date.
• RDC 38.2: The central provision cited by the Claimant regarding the burden of proof for costs being reasonably incurred and proportionate.
• RDC 38.30(1): The basis for the Court’s decision to conduct an immediate assessment, as the hearing lasted less than one day.
• RDC 38.23(2)–(4): Cited by the Claimant regarding the factors the Court must consider, such as the nature, importance, and complexity of the matter, which the Claimant argued were not properly reflected in the costs awarded for a jurisdiction-only challenge.

How did the Court distinguish the precedents and authorities cited in the context of the costs assessment?

The Court’s reasoning focused on the application of the RDC rather than a reliance on external case law. The Court maintained that the assessment of costs is a discretionary exercise. By referencing the findings in the earlier Judgment (CFI 045/2025 at [8]), the Court reaffirmed that the skill, effort, and responsibility of the legal team were appropriately reflected in the assessment. The Court dismissed the Claimant's attempt to use the "broad-brush" doctrine as a shield against costs, clarifying that the doctrine is intended to facilitate the Court's duty to assess costs efficiently, not to provide a loophole for parties to avoid paying reasonable legal fees.

What was the final outcome and relief ordered by the Court in the April 2026 order?

The Court refused the Claimant’s Application for Permission to Appeal in its entirety. The Court held that none of the grounds raised had a real prospect of success. Consequently, the previous order for the immediate assessment of costs remained in force, requiring the Claimant to pay the First Defendant AED 137,000.00 and the Second Defendant AED 88,000.00 within 14 days. The Court also ordered that there be no order as to costs regarding the application for permission to appeal itself.

(b) The Second Defendant’s costs are immediately assessed in the sum of AED 88,000.00.
The Claimant shall pay that sum to the First Defendant within 14 days.

What are the wider implications of this decision for practitioners regarding the immediate assessment of costs in the DIFC?

This decision serves as a stern reminder of the high bar for challenging procedural costs orders. Practitioners should anticipate that the DIFC Courts will prioritize the "overriding objective" of efficiency, particularly when a party fails to engage with the costs assessment process at the appropriate time. The Court’s refusal to entertain an appeal based on the "broad-brush" approach confirms that judges have significant latitude to resolve costs disputes summarily.

Likewise, the suggestion that the Claimant “suffered material prejudice” as a result of immediate assessment does not support a finding that the Court erred in ordering immediate assessment in accordance with RDC 38.30(1).

Litigants must ensure that any objections to costs are raised substantively during the initial assessment phase, as the Court is unlikely to permit a "second bite at the cherry" via an appeal. For further context on the initial costs order, see STELIAN GHEORGHE v BSA AHMAD BIN HEZEEM & ASSOCIATES [2025] DIFC CFI 045 — Immediate assessment of costs following successful defense (16 December 2025).

Where can I read the full judgment in Stelian Gheorghe v BSA Ahmad Bin Hezeem & Associates [2026] DIFC CFI 045?

The full text of the Order with Reasons can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-first-instance/cfi-0452025-stelian-gheorghe-v-1-bsa-ahmad-bin-hezeem-associates-llp-2-jimmy-haoula-2 or via the CDN link: https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/court-first-instance/cfi-0452025-stelian-gheorghe-v-1-bsa-ahmad-bin-hezeem-associates-llp-2-jimmy-haoula-2.txt.

Cases referred to in this judgment:

Legislation referenced:

• Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC): RDC 1.6, RDC 4.2, RDC 38.2, RDC 38.23, RDC 38.23(1), RDC 38.23(2)–(4), RDC 38.30(1).