WILLIAM ALLAN JONES v ROBERT ANTHONY JONES [2022] DIFC CFI 043 — Jurisdiction for freezing orders in support of foreign proceedings (14 September 2022)

The DIFC Court of First Instance confirmed its authority to grant interim freezing injunctions to preserve assets, even when substantive proceedings are pending before the onshore Dubai Courts, provided the claimant seeks reciprocal provisional measures in the primary forum.

Does the DIFC Court have jurisdiction to grant a freezing order in support of proceedings pending in the Dubai Court under CFI 043/2022?

The dispute centers on whether the DIFC Court possesses the jurisdictional "gateway" to issue a freezing injunction when the underlying substantive litigation is being conducted in the onshore Dubai Courts. The Claimants, William Allan Jones, Coffee Planet LLC, and Coffee Planet Roastery FZE, sought to maintain a freezing order originally granted by Justice Robert French on 29 June 2022. The Defendant, Robert Anthony Jones, challenged this, arguing that the DIFC Court lacked the authority to act as a supportive forum for ongoing foreign or onshore proceedings in the absence of a specific jurisdictional gateway under Article 5(A)(1)(a)-(d) of the Judicial Authority Law (JAL).

The core of the dispute involved assets primarily located in onshore Dubai, with only a minor connection to the DIFC via shares in a DIFC-registered entity. The Defendant contended that the DIFC Court’s intervention was an overreach, as the substantive claims were already being litigated in the Dubai Court. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke addressed this by examining the scope of the Court’s injunctive powers, ultimately affirming that the DIFC Court is not restricted to acting only when it is the primary forum for the substantive dispute. As noted in the judgment:

I conclude therefore that this Court has jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction freezing assets in the hands of a defendant in support of proceedings taking place abroad or in the Dubai Court.

The full judgment can be reviewed at the DIFC Courts website.

Which judge presided over the jurisdictional challenge in CFI 043/2022 and when was the order issued?

The application was heard by Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke in the Court of First Instance. The hearing took place on 8 September 2022, and the formal Order with Reasons was issued on 14 September 2022.

What were the specific legal arguments advanced by Mr Tom Montagu-Smith QC and Mr Richard Hill QC regarding the DIFC Court’s jurisdictional reach?

Mr Tom Montagu-Smith QC, representing the Claimants, argued that the DIFC Court’s injunctive powers are broad and not strictly tethered to the "gateway" provisions of Article 5(A)(1)(a)-(d) of the JAL. He maintained that the Court has an inherent and statutory duty to ensure the efficacy of potential future enforcement, particularly where assets are at risk of dissipation.

Conversely, Mr Richard Hill QC, for the Defendant, argued that the Claimants’ reliance on Article 5(A)(1)(e) was misplaced. He contended that no DIFC law or regulation explicitly granted the Court the power to issue freezing orders in support of proceedings pending elsewhere before a judgment had been issued and recognized. He warned that accepting the Claimants' position would create an "alarmingly wide" jurisdiction. As the court noted regarding the Defendant's position:

None of the provisions relied on by the Claimant were apt to confer jurisdiction and the effect of the Claimants’ argument would be to create an alarmingly wide jurisdiction which undermined the gateway provisions of Article 5 A(1).

What was the precise doctrinal issue the court had to resolve regarding the interpretation of Article 22(2) of the Courts Law?

The court had to determine whether Article 22(2) of the DIFC Courts Law (DIFC Law No. 10 of 2004) acts as a standalone source of jurisdiction for granting injunctions, or whether it is merely a procedural power that requires an independent jurisdictional nexus. The Defendant argued that the absence of a "gateway" under the JAL precluded the Court from exercising its powers under Article 22(2). The court was tasked with deciding if the power to grant an injunction is "unqualified" or if it is constrained by the same jurisdictional requirements that apply to substantive claims.

How did Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke apply the "Enforcement Principle" to justify the continuation of the freezing order?

Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke reasoned that the DIFC Court’s power to grant injunctions is not limited by the restrictive gateways applicable to substantive claims. He emphasized that the Court’s role includes protecting the integrity of the judicial process and ensuring that any future judgment—whether from the DIFC or a foreign/onshore court—is not rendered nugatory by the dissipation of assets. He relied on the "Enforcement Principle" to explain the purpose of such orders:

Lord Leggatt expressed the “Enforcement Principle” in this way:
“the first and primary principle is that the purpose of a freezing order is to stop the injuncted defendant dissipating or disposing of property which could be the subject of enforcement if the claimant goes on to win the case it has brought.”
The principle justified the scope of the jurisdiction to grant a freezing injunction against a third party against whom no claim for substantive relief lay.

Furthermore, the judge contrasted the language of Article 20(1) with Article 22(2), noting that the latter lacks the restrictive jurisdictional requirements the Defendant sought to impose. As the judge observed:

Contrary to the submissions of the Defendant, the point works against his submissions inasmuch as Article 20 (1) refers to the need for some sort of jurisdictional requirement, whereas Article 22 (2) contains no such reference and merely provides that the court can grant an injunction or make an order that the Court considers appropriate.

Which specific statutes and RDC rules were central to the court’s analysis of its injunctive authority?

The court’s analysis focused on Article 5(A)(1)(e) of the Judicial Authority Law (Law No. 12 of 2004), which provides jurisdiction for claims over which the Courts have jurisdiction in accordance with DIFC Laws and Regulations. Additionally, the court relied heavily on Article 22(2) of the DIFC Courts Law (Law No. 10 of 2004), which explicitly grants the Court of First Instance the power to order injunctions. The court also referenced RDC 20.7, which governs the court's power to grant interim remedies.

How did the court utilize precedents like Nest Investments v Deloitte & Touche and Lateef v Liela in its reasoning?

The court utilized Nest Investments v Deloitte & Touche [2018] CA 011 to confirm that RDC 20.7 serves as a relevant regulation under Article 5(A)(1)(e) to provide a jurisdictional basis for interim relief. It further cited Lateef v Liela [2020] ARB 017 to reinforce the principle that the DIFC Courts possess "ample jurisdiction" to exercise their "unqualified injunctive powers" in accordance with the enforcement principle. While the Defendant attempted to rely on Akhmedova v Akhmedov [2018] CA 003, the court distinguished it, noting that the current position was more aligned with the broader interpretation of the Court's powers established in subsequent jurisprudence.

What was the final disposition of the application and what conditions were imposed on the Claimants?

Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke dismissed the Defendant’s application, confirming the DIFC Court’s jurisdiction. He ordered the continuation of the freezing order, but imposed a strict condition: the Claimants must apply to the onshore Dubai Court for provisional attachment of the assets within 21 days. The court also addressed costs:

The Defendant shall pay the Claimants 80% of their costs on the standard basis but there shall be no enforcement of such a costs order until these proceedings are concluded, when the overall success or failure of the Parties and their respective liabilities, if any, can be set off, one against the other.

What are the wider implications of this ruling for practitioners seeking interim relief in the DIFC?

This decision solidifies the DIFC Court’s reputation as a pro-enforcement, supportive forum. Practitioners should note that the DIFC Court is willing to act as a "guardian" of assets even when the substantive dispute is being heard in the Dubai Courts or abroad. However, this power is not absolute; the court will likely require the claimant to demonstrate that they are actively seeking similar protective measures in the primary forum to ensure the DIFC Court does not usurp the authority of the court seized with the merits.

Where can I read the full judgment in William Allan Jones v Robert Anthony Jones [2022] DIFC CFI 043?

The full judgment is available on the DIFC Courts website and via the CDN link.

Cases referred to in this judgment:

Legislation referenced:

• Judicial Authority Law, Law No. 12 of 2004, Article 5(A)(1)(a)-(e)
• DIFC Courts Law, Law No. 10 of 2004, Article 22(2)
• RDC 20.7