ELI MYDLARZ v SADAPAY TECHNOLOGIES [2025] DIFC CFI 035 — Refusal of permission to appeal regarding employment limitation periods (20 November 2025)

What is the specific nature of the dispute between Eli Mydlarz and Sadapay Technologies and why is it being contested?

The lawsuit concerns a dispute over the valuation of shares granted to the Claimant, Eli Mydlarz, by the Defendant, Sadapay Technologies. The core of the conflict lies in the Claimant’s assertion that the Administrator responsible for the share scheme breached express contractual provisions when determining the fair market value of those shares. The Defendant sought to contest the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts, arguing that the claim was subject to the limitation periods prescribed by the DIFC Employment Law.

The Defendant’s attempt to characterize the dispute as one falling strictly under the DIFC Employment Law was rejected by the Court. As noted in the judgment:

The Defendant seeks permission to appeal against the Order whereby I dismissed the Defendant’s application seeking to contest the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts.

The Defendant argued that the claim was employment-related and therefore subject to the strict six-month limitation period found in Article 10 of the DIFC Employment Law. The Court, however, maintained that the claim was fundamentally a contractual dispute regarding share valuation, rather than a claim for statutory rights provided by the Employment Law.

Which judge presided over the application for permission to appeal in CFI 035/2025?

The application for permission to appeal was heard by H.E. Justice Roger Stewart, sitting in the Court of First Instance. The order refusing permission to appeal was issued on 20 November 2025, following the Defendant’s appeal notice filed on 14 October 2025.

What were the primary legal arguments advanced by Sadapay Technologies in their application for permission to appeal?

The Defendant, Sadapay Technologies, advanced two primary grounds for appeal against the Order of 19 September 2025. First, they contended that the Court erred in its classification of the claim, arguing that the dispute was "employment-related" and therefore should have been categorized as a claim "under" the DIFC Employment Law. By framing the dispute this way, the Defendant sought to invoke the statutory limitation period of six months post-termination, which would have effectively barred the claim.

The Defendant further attempted to support this position by citing various international authorities, including Samengo-Turner [2007] EWCA Civ 723 and Petter v EMC Europe Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 828. However, the Court noted a significant procedural and substantive gap in these arguments:

The cases sought to be relied on by the Defendant were not cited in argument at the hearing prior to the Order.

The Defendant’s second ground of appeal, while not fully detailed in the provided excerpt, focused on the categorization of the claim, which the Court dismissed as a misinterpretation of the jurisdictional test under Article 10.

What is the precise doctrinal question the Court had to resolve regarding Article 10 of the DIFC Employment Law?

The central legal question was whether a claim that is "employment-related" necessarily qualifies as a claim "under" the DIFC Employment Law for the purposes of the limitation period set out in Article 10. The Court had to determine if the statutory limitation period applies to all disputes arising between an employer and employee, or if it is restricted to claims seeking to enforce specific statutory rights granted by the Employment Law itself.

The Court identified the Defendant’s error in framing this question:

This mis-states the relevant question which is whether, for the purposes of Article 10 of the DIFC Employment Law, the claim is “under this Law”.

By distinguishing between "employment-related" claims and claims "under" the law, the Court addressed whether the legislature intended to capture private contractual disputes—such as share valuation—within the restrictive limitation regime of the Employment Law.

How did Justice Roger Stewart apply the "real prospect of success" test to the Defendant's application?

Justice Stewart applied the test set out in RDC 44.19, which requires that an appeal must have a "real prospect of success" or that there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. The Court found that the Defendant’s application failed on both counts. Furthermore, the Court noted that the application was procedurally deficient, as it was filed four days late without a formal application for an extension of time.

The Court’s reasoning emphasized that the nature of the claim was purely contractual:

Rather it is a claim, as set out in the Order, that in breach of the express contractual provisions under which the Claimant was granted shares, the Administrator wrongly determined the fair market value of the shares.

Justice Stewart concluded that because the claim did not arise from a statutory right under the Employment Law, the limitation period in Article 10 was inapplicable. Consequently, the appeal lacked any legal merit:

However, for reasons set out below, I do not consider that the PTA Applicationhas a real prospect of success, and I do not consider that there is some other reason why the appeal should be heard.

Which specific statutes and rules did the Court rely upon to reach its decision?

The Court’s decision was primarily grounded in Article 10 of the DIFC Employment Law, which governs the limitation periods for claims brought "under" that law. Procedurally, the Court relied on the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), specifically:

• RDC 44.19: The threshold test for granting permission to appeal (real prospect of success).
• RDC 44.10: The requirement to file an appellant’s notice within 21 days.
• RDC 44.13: The requirement to file an application for an extension of time when the appeal period has expired.
• RDC 44.14(1): The right of a respondent to submit written opposition.
• RDC 44.25: The Court’s discretion to award costs against an unsuccessful applicant for permission to appeal.

How did the Court distinguish the precedents cited by the Defendant?

The Defendant relied on several English and international cases, including Samengo-Turner [2007] EWCA Civ 723, Petter v EMC Europe Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 828, Gagliardi v Evolution Capital Management LLC [2023] EWHC 1608(Comm), and Ponticelli v Gallagher [2023] IRLR 934. Justice Stewart dismissed these authorities on the basis that they concerned the interpretation of section 5 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, which deals with jurisdiction in "matters relating to individual contracts of employment" for policy-based protective reasons.

The Court held that these cases do not analyze what is meant by a claim being "under" a specific statutory employment law equivalent to Article 10 of the DIFC Employment Law. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Defendant’s proposed construction would unfairly restrict employee rights without any clear legislative purpose. The Court also observed that the case shared principles with CFI 030/2025, noting:

At the hearing before me it was accepted that this case involved consideration of the same principles as in CFI 030/2025.

What was the final disposition of the application and the order regarding costs?

The Court refused the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal. Consequently, the Defendant was ordered to pay the Claimant’s costs associated with responding to the PTA application. The Court mandated a specific timeline for the assessment of these costs: the Claimant must file a Statement of Costs within 21 days, the Defendant has 14 days to respond, and the Claimant has 7 days to reply, after which the quantum will be assessed on the papers.

What are the wider implications for DIFC employment practitioners following this ruling?

This decision serves as a critical reminder that the DIFC Employment Law does not act as a catch-all for every dispute between an employer and an employee. Practitioners must distinguish between claims that arise from the statutory provisions of the Employment Law and those that are merely "employment-related" but grounded in contract or other areas of law.

Litigants should anticipate that the Court will strictly interpret the phrase "under this Law" in Article 10. Attempting to apply the Employment Law’s limitation periods to contractual disputes, such as share schemes or bonus plans, is unlikely to succeed if those claims do not specifically invoke statutory rights. Furthermore, the Court’s refusal to grant an extension of time for a four-day delay underscores the importance of strict adherence to RDC 44.10 and 44.13 when seeking permission to appeal.

Where can I read the full judgment in Eli Mydlarz v Sadapay Technologies [2025] DIFC CFI 035?

The full judgment can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-first-instance/cfi-0352025-eli-mydlarz-v-sadapay-technologies-ltd-1

Cases referred to in this judgment:

Legislation referenced:

• DIFC Employment Law, Article 10
• Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC): 44.10, 44.13, 44.14(1), 44.19, 44.25
• Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (Brussels I Recast), Section 5