What was the nature of the procedural dispute between Sam Precious Metals FZ-LLC and Snyder Prime Limited regarding the filings of 3 June 2024?
The dispute arose from the Defendants' failure to adhere to the strict limitations imposed by the Court’s order dated 29 May 2024. Following that order, the Defendants—Snyder Prime Limited, Phoebe Leah Tooker, and Shakthi Chauhan—filed an Amended Defence and a fourth witness statement of the Third Defendant, Shakthi Chauhan, on 3 June 2024. The Claimants, Sam Precious Metals FZ-LLC, Sami Riyad Mahmoud Abu Ahmad, and Rosyson FZE, objected to these filings, asserting that they exceeded the scope of the permission granted by the Court.
The Claimants argued that the Defendants’ filings were in clear breach of the Court’s prior directions, necessitating a formal objection. The core of the conflict centered on whether the Court should strike out these late and excessive filings or allow them to stand to ensure the case could proceed to trial. Justice Moran noted the legitimacy of the Claimants' grievances, stating:
I am satisfied that they express or articulate a defence and provide evidence in support of it, that the Defendants legitimately seek to advance in response to the claims made against them.
The Court had to balance the need for strict procedural compliance against the overriding objective of determining the dispute on its merits. The full order can be reviewed at the DIFC Courts website.
Which judge presided over the CFI 030/2023 ruling on 1 July 2024?
Justice Andrew Moran presided over this matter in the DIFC Court of First Instance. The ruling was issued on 1 July 2024, following a series of procedural filings and objections submitted throughout June 2024.
How did the parties’ counsel, Mr. Anuj Garg and Mr. Santanu Ghosh, differ in their approach to the procedural objections?
The Claimants were represented by Mr. Anuj Garg, who filed a fourth witness statement on 26 June 2024 to reply to the Defendants' response. Mr. Garg’s position was that the Defendants had flagrantly breached the Court’s 29 May 2024 order and that the Defendants' counsel, Mr. Santanu Ghosh, had acted improperly by filing a witness statement rather than legal submissions. Mr. Garg argued that this conduct created a conflict of interest, as counsel had effectively become a witness in his own clients' case.
Conversely, Mr. Santanu Ghosh, representing the Defendants, attempted to justify the late and excessive filings by submitting his own witness statement dated 21 June 2024. Rather than providing traditional legal submissions, Mr. Ghosh’s statement served as a mixture of evidence and argument. Justice Moran found this approach highly irregular, noting:
The complaint and objections in the fourth witness statement of Mr Garg, that counsel has put himself in a position of conflict of interest and duty, are justified and accepted.
What was the precise doctrinal issue the Court had to resolve regarding the conduct of counsel in CFI 030/2023?
The Court was tasked with determining whether it should permit filings that were in clear breach of a prior court order, while simultaneously addressing the professional impropriety of counsel who had "descended into the evidential fray." The doctrinal issue was whether the Court could—or should—admit evidence and pleadings that were procedurally non-compliant, particularly when the justification for those filings was presented through a witness statement authored by the advocate on record. The Court had to weigh the "overriding objective" of the DIFC Courts against the necessity of maintaining professional standards for legal practitioners.
How did Justice Moran apply the "overriding objective" to justify the admission of the Defendants' non-compliant filings?
Justice Moran adopted a pragmatic approach to resolve the impasse. While he expressed significant disapproval of the Defendants' breach of the 29 May 2024 order and the improper conduct of Mr. Ghosh, he concluded that striking out the filings would be counterproductive to the interests of justice. He reasoned that the Claimants could be adequately protected through costs orders and the opportunity to file a response.
The Court emphasized that it was forced into an "invidious position" by the conduct of the Defendants' counsel. Justice Moran stated:
It is most unfortunate that the mode of responding, and the content of the response to the objection made by the Defendants’ counsel, has put the Court in an invidious position in dealing with it.
He further explained the necessity of his decision:
It must do so in the interests of justice, for the avoidance of another wasteful adjournment and in pursuit of attainment of the overriding objective.
By allowing the filings, the Court ensured that the trial could proceed without further delay, while signaling that such procedural breaches would not be tolerated without financial consequences for the offending party.
Which specific DIFC Rules and legal principles were invoked in the Court's assessment of the procedural breach?
The Court’s reasoning was anchored in the "overriding objective" of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC), which mandates that the Court deal with cases justly and at a proportionate cost. Justice Moran’s decision to allow the filings was a direct application of the Court's case management powers to ensure that the substantive merits of the dispute were not obscured by procedural failures. While specific RDC rules were not cited by number in the short ruling, the Court relied on the inherent jurisdiction to manage the trial process and the professional duties of counsel as established in common law practice.
How did the Court utilize the principles from Browne v Dunne (1893) in the context of counsel's conduct?
Although the judgment does not explicitly detail the application of Browne v Dunne (1893) 6 R.67 HL, the Court’s critique of Mr. Ghosh’s conduct reflects the fundamental principle that counsel must remain an advocate and not become a witness. By filing a witness statement, Mr. Ghosh breached the boundary between legal representation and evidence, effectively preventing the Claimants from cross-examining him on his assertions. Justice Moran’s rejection of Mr. Ghosh’s statement as a valid form of submission underscores the Court’s adherence to the principle that counsel’s role is to present arguments, not to provide testimony that is not subject to the standard rules of evidence.
What was the final disposition of the Court regarding the Defendants' filings and the associated costs?
Justice Moran granted retrospective permission for the Defendants to file the Amended Defence and the fourth witness statement of Shakthi Chauhan, despite acknowledging they were in breach of the 29 May 2024 order. To mitigate the prejudice to the Claimants, the Court granted them permission to produce additional witness statements and an amended reply by 5 July 2024. Regarding costs, the Court ordered:
The Claimants will therefore suffer no prejudice that cannot be compensated in costs, by permitting the amendment, and admitting the evidence the Defendants seek to rely on.
Consequently, the Defendants were ordered to pay the Claimants' costs of the objection on an indemnity basis, in addition to any previous costs orders.
What are the practical implications for DIFC practitioners regarding the filing of witness statements by counsel?
This ruling serves as a stern warning to practitioners that the DIFC Courts will not tolerate counsel "descending into the evidential fray." Practitioners must ensure that all arguments are presented through formal legal submissions or skeleton arguments, rather than through witness statements. The Court made it clear that it lacks the time to convene hearings to address the impropriety of counsel acting as witnesses, and will instead act swiftly to penalize such conduct. Litigants should anticipate that any attempt to bypass procedural limits through counsel-authored evidence will likely result in indemnity costs orders, even if the Court ultimately allows the evidence to be admitted for the sake of the trial's progress.
Where can I read the full judgment in Sam Precious Metals FZ-LLC v Snyder Prime [2024] DIFC CFI 030?
The full judgment can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-first-instance/cfi-0302023-1-sam-precious-metals-fz-llc-2-sami-riyad-mahmoud-abu-ahmad-3-rosyson-fze-v-1-snyder-prime-limited-2-phoebe-leah-too-1 or via the CDN link: https://littdb.sfo2.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/litt/AE/DIFC/judgments/court-first-instance/DIFC_CFI-030-2023_20240701.txt.
Cases referred to in this judgment:
| Case | Citation | How used |
|---|---|---|
| Browne v Dunne | (1893) 6 R.67 HL | Cited as the standard for counsel conduct and the prohibition against counsel acting as a witness. |
Legislation referenced:
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) — Overriding Objective
- Order of the Court dated 29 May 2024