What was the core dispute between IGPL General Trading and the Hortin Holdings defendants regarding the London Properties and the restraining orders?
The litigation centers on a Tenancy Agreement concerning premises in London, which the Claimant, IGPL General Trading, sought to enforce through specific performance. Following the initiation of proceedings, the Claimant successfully obtained ex parte restraining orders to prevent the Defendants and the court-appointed Receiver, Paul Pretlove, from evicting the Claimant or selling the properties.
As noted in the court’s schedule of reasons:
"In CFI-016-2021, on 31 January 2021, it obtained ex parte orders restraining the Defendants and the Receiver with control of the Defendants, Mr Paul Pretlove, from acting in breach of the Tenancy Agreement, including by eviction or by sale of the London Properties. In CFI-023–2021, issued on 14 February 2021 as the substantive proceedings following the grant of the restraining orders, the Claimant sought specific performance of the Tenancy Agreement."
The dispute escalated when the Defendants applied for and were granted immediate judgment, leading to the discharge of the previously granted restraining orders. The Claimant subsequently sought to stay the discharge of these orders pending an appeal, fearing that the sale or eviction would render any potential appellate success moot.
Which judge presided over the IGPL General Trading v Hortin Holdings application, and in which division of the DIFC Courts was this heard?
The matter was heard by Justice Roger Giles in the DIFC Court of First Instance. The order was issued on 20 September 2021, following a series of applications regarding the stay of execution and the extension of time for costs submissions.
What arguments did IGPL General Trading and the Hortin Holdings defendants advance regarding the stay of the costs submissions?
The Claimant argued that filing costs submissions while an appeal was pending would be a redundant and inefficient exercise. They contended that if the appeal were successful, the entire basis for the costs order would be undermined, thus wasting the time of both the Court and the parties.
The Defendants, conversely, maintained that the procedural requirements set out in the original order should be respected. They had already complied with the timeline for filing their own submissions on costs. As the court record indicates:
"The Defendants filed the Submissions on Costs within the period stated in order 6 in the Order, and the Claimant needs an extension of the period in order so that it can make its submissions now."
The Claimant’s failure to file was a direct consequence of their strategic decision to seek a stay of the entire order, including the procedural costs directions.
What was the precise legal question the court had to answer regarding the interplay between a pending appeal and the obligation to file costs submissions?
The Court had to determine whether the existence of an appeal notice constitutes sufficient grounds to stay procedural directions—specifically the filing of costs submissions—or whether such procedural steps must proceed to ensure the finality of the first-instance judgment. The doctrinal issue involved the court’s discretion to manage its own process under the Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) versus the Claimant’s desire to avoid "inefficient" litigation steps pending an uncertain appellate outcome.
How did Justice Roger Giles apply the test of "relative risk of injustice" to the Claimant’s stay application?
Justice Giles distinguished between the substantive relief (the restraining orders) and the procedural relief (the costs submissions). While he acknowledged the Claimant's concern regarding the efficiency of the proceedings, he prioritized the orderly conclusion of the first-instance matter. He determined that the Claimant should not be excused from the obligation to address costs simply because an appeal was contemplated.
The reasoning for denying the stay of costs submissions while granting the stay of the substantive order is captured here:
"The nub of the Claimant’s submissions was that it would be an inefficient use of the time of the Court and the parties to file submissions on costs when there is the prospect of a successful appeal."
Ultimately, the Court held that the Claimant must participate in the costs process, though it granted a brief extension to allow the Claimant to catch up to the Defendants’ filing schedule.
Which specific RDC rules and DIFC statutes were cited by the court in its determination of the stay and costs applications?
The court’s authority to manage these proceedings is rooted in the DIFC Court Law, specifically Article 44, which governs the court's general powers. Regarding the procedural management of the costs submissions and the stay application, the court referenced several Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC):
- RDC r. 44.29 and r. 44.30: These rules were cited regarding the requirements for the Appeal Notice and the filing of grounds of appeal and skeleton arguments.
- RDC r. 38.30: This rule was referenced in the context of the Defendant’s Statement of Costs, specifically concerning the court’s ability to make an immediate assessment of costs.
How did the court utilize the cited precedents and rules to manage the costs submissions?
The court used RDC r. 38.30 to evaluate the nature of the costs submissions filed by the Defendants. Justice Giles noted that while the rule contemplates an immediate assessment of costs, the current filings were not in a state that allowed for such a summary determination.
As the court noted:
"Assuming an order is made in favour of the Defendants, the Defendant’s Statement of Costs is in the briefest form, and although RDC r. 38.30 contemplates that it may occur, I do not consider that I am in a position to make an immediate assessment."
This reasoning served to justify why the court required the parties to proceed with the exchange of written submissions rather than summarily disposing of the costs issue at the hearing.
What was the final disposition of the stay application and the extension of time request?
Justice Giles granted a partial stay. He extended the suspension of the order discharging the restraining orders until the decision on the application for permission to appeal (and, if granted, until the final decision of the Court of Appeal). However, he dismissed the application to stay the costs submissions. Instead, he granted the Claimant an extension of time to file their costs submissions.
The court’s order regarding the costs submissions was:
"The Claimant should have the opportunity to make its submissions on costs, and the period should be extended such that its submissions are to be filed and served within seven days from the date of issue of this judgment."
No order was made as to the costs of the stay and extension applications themselves.
What are the practical implications of this ruling for DIFC practitioners regarding stays of execution?
This case establishes that the DIFC Court will not reflexively stay procedural obligations, such as costs submissions, simply because a party has filed an appeal notice. Practitioners must distinguish between substantive orders—where a stay may be granted to prevent irreparable harm (such as the loss of the London Properties)—and procedural orders, which the court expects to be finalized to ensure the first-instance record is complete. Litigants should anticipate that the court will favor the orderly progression of costs assessments even while the substantive merits of the case are being challenged in the appellate court.
Where can I read the full judgment in IGPL General Trading v Hortin Holdings [2021] DIFC CFI 016/023?
The full judgment can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-first-instance/cfi-016-2021-cfi-0232021-igpl-general-trading-llc-v-1-hortin-holdings-limited-2-lodge-hill-limited-3-westdene-investment-limited
Cases referred to in this judgment:
| Case | Citation | How used |
|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | No external case law was cited in this specific order. |
Legislation referenced:
- DIFC Court Law, DIFC Law No. 10 of 2004, Article 44
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) r. 4.51
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) r. 38.30
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) r. 44.29
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) r. 44.30