ORAN v OVED [2025] DIFC CA 004 — The limits of DIFC injunctive power (28 October 2025)

The Court of Appeal has clarified that the DIFC Court’s power to grant anti-suit injunctions is strictly ancillary to its substantive jurisdiction, rejecting the notion that Article 32 of the DIFC Court Law provides a standalone basis for such relief.

Did the DIFC Court have jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction in the dispute between Oved and the Estate of the Late Mr Oran regarding air ambulance service fees?

The lawsuit centers on a contractual dispute arising from air ambulance services provided by Oved, a UK-incorporated company, to the late Mr Oran and his agent, Mr Oaken. Following a disagreement over substantial fees paid for the transport of the late Mr Oran’s wife from Switzerland to South Korea, the Appellants initiated proceedings in the English High Court. Oved, seeking to prevent the English litigation, applied for an anti-suit injunction (ASI) in the DIFC Court, asserting that the parties were bound by an arbitration agreement. The core of the dispute involves whether the DIFC Court can restrain foreign proceedings when the underlying arbitration agreement—originally referencing the now-abolished DIFC-LCIA—is contested and the seat of arbitration is not clearly established within the DIFC.

The stakes involve the enforceability of arbitration clauses in the wake of Dubai Decree No. 34 of 2021 and the jurisdictional reach of the DIFC Courts over parties with no physical presence in the Centre. As the Court of Appeal noted regarding the lower court’s initial grant of the injunction:

"On 20 January 2025, I was satisfied that the conditions to grant an interim injunction were met; I am satisfied here again for the anti-suit injunction to be granted, restraining the Defendants from initiating or continuing proceedings before any court or tribunal in the United Kingdom, or any other alternative jurisdiction outside the DIFC.”

https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-appeal/ca-0042025-1-oran-2-oaken-v-oved

Which judges presided over the Court of Appeal hearing in CA 004/2025 and when was the final order issued?

The appeal was heard by a distinguished bench comprising H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin, H.E. Justice Robert French, and H.E. Justice Sir Peter Gross. The Court of Appeal issued its final order on 28 October 2025, following the conclusion of the hearing on 16 October 2025, effectively discharging the anti-suit injunction previously granted by the Court of First Instance.

What were the primary legal arguments advanced by the Estate of the Late Mr Oran and Mr Oaken against Oved’s application for an anti-suit injunction?

The Appellants (the Estate and Mr Oaken) argued that the DIFC Court lacked the requisite substantive jurisdiction to entertain Oved’s application. They contended that the DIFC Court cannot grant an anti-suit injunction in a vacuum; there must be a primary head of jurisdiction—such as a substantive claim or a clear connection to the DIFC—to support the exercise of injunctive power. They maintained that the mere existence of a disputed arbitration agreement, particularly one referencing the defunct DIFC-LCIA, did not grant the Court plenary authority to interfere with proceedings in the English High Court. Conversely, Oved argued that the Court possessed broad powers under Article 32 of the DIFC Court Law to grant interim relief to protect the integrity of the arbitration process, regardless of whether a substantive claim was currently before the DIFC Court.

Did the Court of Appeal determine that Article 32 of the DIFC Court Law provides a standalone source of jurisdiction for anti-suit injunctions?

The central legal question was whether Article 32 of the DIFC Court Law 2004 acts as a "freestanding" source of jurisdiction or merely as a source of "power" to be exercised only when the Court already possesses substantive jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. The Court had to decide if the DIFC Court could act as a global supervisor of arbitration agreements without a nexus to the DIFC, or if the absence of such a nexus rendered the grant of an ASI an impermissible overreach of judicial authority.

How did the Court of Appeal distinguish between the Court’s "power" to grant an injunction and its "jurisdiction" to hear a case?

The Court of Appeal emphasized that jurisdiction and power are distinct concepts. Relying on the principles articulated in Broad Idea v Convoy Collateral Ltd, the Court held that while the DIFC Court has the power to grant injunctions, that power is not plenary. It must be tethered to a substantive claim or an established jurisdictional basis. The Court clarified that Article 32 does not grant the Court a roving commission to issue injunctions in any matter brought before it. As the Court noted:

"It is clear from his reasons that the Judge considered that Article 32 was a source of jurisdiction, not merely power, and that it was freestanding, in the sense that there was plenary power to grant an interim injunction in any case brought before the Court irrespective of whether there was any other source of jurisdiction."

The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would allow the DIFC Court to assert jurisdiction over any dispute globally, provided an applicant could frame a request for an injunction, which would be inconsistent with the limited nature of the Court’s statutory mandate.

Which specific DIFC statutes and RDC rules were central to the Court’s analysis of its injunctive authority?

The Court’s analysis focused heavily on Article 32 of the DIFC Court Law 2004, which outlines the Court’s powers, and Article 22, which defines its jurisdiction. The Court also considered the implications of the DIFC Arbitration Law (2008) regarding the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Procedurally, the Court examined RDC 25.1(6) and RDC 25.3, which govern the Court’s power to grant interim remedies, concluding that these rules are procedural mechanisms that cannot expand the Court’s substantive jurisdiction beyond the limits set by the DIFC Court Law.

How did the Court of Appeal apply the precedents of Siskina and Broad Idea to the facts of the Oran v Oved dispute?

The Court utilized Siskina (Cargo Owners) v Distos Compania Naviera SA to reinforce the principle that an injunction is an ancillary remedy that requires a substantive cause of action within the court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court applied Broad Idea v Convoy Collateral Ltd to clarify that while the Court has the power to grant freezing orders or ASIs, these are "incidents" of the Court’s jurisdiction to enforce judgments or resolve substantive disputes. The Court noted:

"Of course, those powers must be exercised within the jurisdiction of the court, but it is common ground and beyond doubt that the Court has jurisdiction to enforce foreign judgments. Broad Idea authoritatively establishes that the grant of freezing orders pursuant to the enforcement principle is an incident of that jurisdiction."

By citing Brookfield Multiplex Constructions LLC v DIFC Investments LLC, the Court reaffirmed that the power to grant an ASI is exceptional and cannot be invoked simply because the Court has the general power to grant injunctions.

What was the final disposition of the Court of Appeal in CA 004/2025 regarding the anti-suit injunction?

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals filed by the Estate of the Late Mr Oran and Mr Oaken. It ordered the discharge of the anti-suit injunction that had been granted by the Court of First Instance and upheld the Appellants’ objection to jurisdiction. Consequently, Oved’s application for an ASI was dismissed, and the Court effectively removed the restraint preventing the Appellants from continuing their proceedings in the English High Court.

What are the practical implications of this judgment for practitioners seeking anti-suit injunctions in the DIFC?

This judgment serves as a critical reminder that the DIFC Court’s injunctive powers are not plenary. Practitioners must ensure that there is a clear, substantive head of jurisdiction—such as a seat of arbitration within the DIFC or a direct connection to the Centre—before applying for an anti-suit injunction. The decision effectively closes the door on using Article 32 as a "shortcut" to obtain injunctive relief in disputes that lack a sufficient nexus to the DIFC. Future litigants must anticipate that the Court will rigorously scrutinize the jurisdictional basis of any application for an ASI, and failure to establish a substantive connection will likely result in the dismissal of the application.

Where can I read the full judgment in Oran v Oved [2025] DIFC CA 004?

The full judgment can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-appeal/ca-0042025-1-oran-2-oaken-v-oved

Cases referred to in this judgment:

Legislation referenced:

• DIFC Court Law 2004, Article 22
• DIFC Court Law 2004, Article 32
• DIFC Arbitration Law (2008)
• DIFC Contract Law, Articles 130 and 131
• RDC 25.1(6), 25.3, 25.24
• Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), s 9
• Dubai Decree No. 34 of 2021