The DIFC Court of First Instance has granted the Claimants permission to appeal a prior order that dismissed an ex parte application for interim relief, signaling a critical judicial review of the jurisdictional scope of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025.
How did the dispute between Nadil and Nameer regarding interim relief escalate to a permission to appeal application?
The underlying dispute involves an urgent ex parte application filed by the Claimants, Nadil and Noshaba, against the Respondents, Nameer and Naseema. The Claimants sought interim relief to prevent the dissipation of assets, which the Court of First Instance initially dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The Claimants subsequently filed a Permission Application, arguing that the Court’s interpretation of the newly enacted Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 (the “New Law”) was overly restrictive and failed to account for established precedents regarding the Court’s power to grant interim remedies.
As noted in the Court’s schedule of reasons:
This Application is brought by the Claimants seeking permission to appeal the Order dated April 2025, refusing the ex parte application dated April 2025 for lack of jurisdiction as per Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 (the “New Law”).
The core of the dispute centers on whether the DIFC Courts possess the jurisdiction to grant interim relief for claims brought outside the DIFC, particularly when the assets in question are located within the Emirate of Dubai but outside the DIFC’s physical boundaries.
Which judge presided over the Nadil v Nameer permission to appeal hearing in the DIFC Court of First Instance?
The application for permission to appeal was heard and determined by H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani. The order was issued on 02 April 2025 within the DIFC Court of First Instance, following the Claimants' challenge to the Deputy Chief Justice’s own previous order from April 2025 that had initially denied the ex parte application.
What specific legal arguments did Nadil and Noshaba advance to challenge the dismissal of their ex parte application?
The Claimants, represented by their legal team, advanced two primary grounds of appeal. First, they contended that the Court erred in its finding that the DIFC Court lacked jurisdiction under the New Law. Second, they argued that the question of jurisdiction is, at the very least, "reasonably arguable," thereby meeting the threshold for appellate review.
The Claimants specifically argued that the Court’s reliance on Article 14(7) of the New Law was misguided, as their case was not premised on an international treaty or convention. Instead, they maintained that the DIFC Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for interim relief for claims brought outside the DIFC, mirroring the scope of the previous legislative framework. They further submitted that the interpretation of the New Law should be consistent with the "old law" (the JAL), as the legislative language remains materially unchanged.
What is the precise doctrinal issue regarding the interpretation of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 that the Court must now resolve?
The central legal question is whether the enactment of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 has fundamentally altered the DIFC Court’s power to grant interim relief in aid of foreign proceedings. Specifically, the Court must determine if the New Law imposes a new requirement for a "direct link" to the DIFC—such as the location of assets—or if the Court retains its broad, established power to grant interim remedies to prevent the dissipation of assets regardless of their location within Dubai. The issue is whether the "gateways" for jurisdiction under the New Law are as restrictive as the initial order suggested, or if they preserve the Court’s previous authority to act in the interest of public policy and the enforcement of future foreign judgments.
How did H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani justify the decision to grant permission to appeal?
The Court’s reasoning focused on the necessity of clarifying the transition between the old jurisdictional framework and the New Law. The Deputy Chief Justice acknowledged that the Claimants raised a significant point regarding the continuity of the Court’s powers. The Court recognized that the interpretation of the New Law presented a "compelling reason" for an appeal, as it involves a matter of public policy and the potential restriction of the Court’s remedial powers.
In his reasoning, the Deputy Chief Justice stated:
In accordance with RDC 44.19(2), a compelling issue has been raised regarding the correct interpretation of the New Law and its application to the enforcement of foreign orders
Furthermore, the Court noted that the initial ex parte application may have been unnecessarily complicated by the reliance on specific jurisdictional gateways, and that a more consolidated interpretation of the old and new laws is required to resolve the uncertainty.
Which specific statutes and DIFC laws were cited as the basis for the jurisdictional challenge?
The legal arguments and the Court’s reasoning were grounded in the following legislative instruments:
* Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 (the “New Law”): Specifically Articles 14(A)(7), 15(4), and 31(4), which define the jurisdictional gateways for the DIFC Courts.
* Dubai Law No. 12 of 2004 (the “JAL”): Articles 5(A)(1)(e) and 7(6), which provided the historical basis for the Court’s jurisdiction over interim relief.
* DIFC Law No. 10 of 2004: Article 24, concerning the Court’s general powers.
* Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC): Part 44, specifically RDC 44.19(2), which sets the test for granting permission to appeal based on a "compelling reason," and RDC 20.7(2) regarding the addition of parties.
How did the Court apply the precedent of Carmon Reestrutura-Engenharia E Serviços Técnicos Especiais (SU) LDA v Cuenda [2024] CA 003 to the current application?
The Claimants utilized the Carmon decision to argue that the DIFC Court’s power to recognize and enforce foreign judgments inherently includes the power to prevent that jurisdiction from being thwarted by the dissipation of assets. The Court acknowledged the Claimants' submission that the Carmon principle—that the Court has the power to prevent asset dissipation whether the assets are within the DIFC or otherwise—remains a vital consideration. The Claimants argued that this precedent should continue to inform the Court’s approach under the New Law, as the underlying policy of protecting the efficacy of the Court’s enforcement powers has not changed.
What was the final disposition of the Permission Application and the associated costs order?
H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani granted the Claimants' application for permission to appeal. The Court determined that the Claimants successfully demonstrated a compelling reason for the appeal to be heard, particularly regarding the interpretation of the New Law. Regarding the costs of the application, the Court ordered that the costs of the Permission Application shall be "costs in the appeal," meaning the ultimate liability for these costs will be determined by the outcome of the substantive appeal.
What are the wider implications of this decision for practitioners seeking interim relief in the DIFC?
This decision indicates that the DIFC Courts are prepared to engage in a rigorous interpretation of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 to ensure that the Court’s remedial powers are not inadvertently curtailed. Practitioners should note that while the Court is currently scrutinizing the jurisdictional gateways under the New Law, there is a clear judicial appetite to ensure that the "old law" jurisprudence—which favored broad powers to grant interim relief—is properly reconciled with the new legislative text. Litigants must anticipate that the Court will prioritize public policy and the efficacy of enforcement when interpreting these new jurisdictional provisions.
Where can I read the full judgment in Nadil v Nameer [2025] DIFC CFI 001?
The full order can be accessed via the DIFC Courts website: https://www.difccourts.ae/rules-decisions/judgments-orders/court-first-instance/1-nadil-2-noshaba-v-1-nameer-2-naseema-1
Cases referred to in this judgment:
| Case | Citation | How used |
|---|---|---|
| Carmon Reestrutura-Engenharia E Serviços Técnicos Especiais (SU) LDA v Cuenda | [2024] CA 003 | Cited to support the argument that the Court has the power to prevent asset dissipation to protect enforcement jurisdiction. |
Legislation referenced:
- Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 (Articles 14(A)(7), 15(4), 31(2), 31(4))
- Dubai Law No. 12 of 2004 (Articles 5(A)(1)(e), 7(6))
- DIFC Law No. 10 of 2004 (Article 24)
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC 44.19(1), 44.19(2), 20.7(2))