Case Details
- Citation: [2022] SGHC(A) 20
- Title: YEE HENG KHAY (ROGER) v ANGLISS SINGAPORE PTE LTD
- Court: Appellate Division of the High Court (Civil Appeal and related Summons)
- Date: 9 May 2022
- Judges: Belinda Ang Saw Ean JAD, Woo Bih Li JAD and Quentin Loh JAD
- Appellant/Respondent (in Civil Appeal): Yee Heng Khay (alias Roger)
- Respondent/Applicant (in Summons): Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd
- Procedural Context: Civil Appeal No 82 of 2021; Summons No 4 of 2022; Suit No 284 of 2018
- Plaintiff in Suit: Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd
- Defendant in Suit: Yee Heng Khay (Roger)
- Legal Areas: Civil procedure; appeals; evidence; fraud allegations; new trial/miscarriage of justice
- Statutes Referenced: Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (s 43(1), s 43(4)); Evidence Act (as referenced in the judgment)
- Cases Cited: [2021] SGHC 168; [2022] SGCA 31; Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489; AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2019] 2 SLR 341; AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2020] 1 SLR 1158; JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2020] 2 SLR 1256; Bioconstruct GmbH v Winspear and another [2020] EWHC 2390 (QB); Pradeepto Kumar Biswas v Sabyasachi Mukherjee and another and another matter [2022] SGCA 31; Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and others [2010] 3 SLR 110; Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 737
- Judgment Length: 23 pages, 6,936 words
Summary
This Appellate Division decision concerns an appeal arising from Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd’s successful suit against its former employee, Yee Heng Khay (alias Roger). The trial judge found that Yee breached duties of confidence in equity and contract, as well as contractual duties of loyalty and fidelity, and awarded damages for loss of profits. On appeal, Yee attempted to characterise the trial outcome as having been procured by fraud, relying heavily on newly adduced evidence permitted on appeal (the “SUM 19 Evidence”).
The Appellate Division also dealt with a related application (AD/SUM 4/2022) by Angliss to adduce further evidence in response to Yee’s new fraud-based arguments. The court allowed Angliss’s application, explaining that where the respondent’s further evidence is directed at responding to new points and new evidence introduced by the appellant, the strict Ladd v Marshall criteria may not govern in the same way as they do for preserving finality. On the substantive appeal, the court dismissed Yee’s appeal and declined to order a retrial, finding no miscarriage of justice that warranted reopening the case.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Angliss is a food distributor. Yee was its former employee. Angliss alleged that Yee, without authorisation, copied and shared restricted files from its information systems. Angliss further contended that Yee’s misuse of confidential information enabled a supplier, Arla Foods Ingredients Singapore Pte Ltd (“Arla”), to bypass Angliss and enter into a distributorship agreement with another distributor, Indoguna Singapore Pte Ltd (“Indoguna”), where Yee was employed at the time the suit commenced.
Angliss sued Yee on four causes of action: (a) breach of confidence; (b) breach of contractual duties of confidence; (c) breach of duty of loyalty and fidelity; and (d) breach of fiduciary duties. The trial judge dismissed the fiduciary duty claim but found for Angliss on the first three causes of action. The trial judge’s reasoning included findings about the strength of the relationship between Arla and Angliss, describing it as “robust”, and concluding that but for Yee’s breaches, Angliss would have secured the Arla distributorship agreement. Damages were awarded for loss of profits.
After judgment, Yee claimed that he showed the trial judgment to Arla, and that Arla then swore an affidavit on Yee’s behalf. On 20 September 2021, Yee filed AD/SUM 19/2021 (“SUM 19”) to adduce further evidence contained in an affidavit of Henrik Bo Peter Eidvall (“Eidvall”) of Arla. The affidavit sought to explain the relationship between Arla and Angliss leading up to the cessation of their long distributorship arrangement and exhibited emails between Arla and Angliss from three periods: December 2016, May 2017, and January 2018 (the “Emails”). These Emails had not been disclosed by Angliss during the trial.
On 14 December 2021, the court allowed SUM 19. Yee then filed his Appellant’s Case in January 2022, treating the SUM 19 Evidence as the “central pillar” of his appeal. Yee’s argument was that the SUM 19 Evidence showed the Arla–Angliss relationship was not “robust” and that Angliss’ witnesses had lied on oath. Yee therefore alleged that Angliss committed fraud on the trial judge, including through concealment of critical documentary evidence and perjury by its witnesses.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The Appellate Division identified three principal issues. First, it had to decide whether AD/SUM 4/2022 (“SUM 4”) should be allowed—namely, whether Angliss should be permitted to adduce further evidence on appeal in response to the SUM 19 Evidence and the new fraud-related arguments advanced by Yee.
Second, the court had to determine the appropriate course of action in light of Yee’s allegation that the trial judgment was obtained by fraud. This required the court to consider not only the procedural posture of an appeal but also the jurisdictional basis for ordering remedies such as a retrial, and how the court should approach fraud allegations in the appellate context.
Third, the court considered whether there was a miscarriage of justice that justified a retrial. This issue is closely tied to the standards governing when appellate courts will reopen concluded litigation, particularly where the appellant seeks to rely on evidence not available at trial or where the appellant alleges that the trial process was compromised.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Issue 1: Whether SUM 4 should be allowed
The court began by recalling the well-established three cumulative requirements for adducing further evidence on appeal from Ladd v Marshall. Those requirements include: (1) the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at trial; (2) the evidence would probably have an important influence on the result; and (3) the evidence is apparently credible. These criteria are often applied to protect finality and ensure fairness.
However, the court emphasised that the Ladd v Marshall criteria did not necessarily govern the particular situation before it. Angliss’s SUM 4 evidence was intended to address new points raised by Yee after SUM 19 was allowed. The court noted that Angliss’s further evidence responded not only to new arguments but also to new evidence introduced by Yee—specifically, Arla’s internal communication and Eidvall’s assertions in his affidavit. In that context, the court reasoned that finality was less pressing and fairness required that Angliss be allowed to respond.
The court also relied on persuasive reasoning from Bioconstruct GmbH v Winspear, where the English High Court observed that Ladd v Marshall criteria are not applicable in relation to further evidence in response to a new claim. The Appellate Division further observed that where leave to adduce further evidence is granted, it is typical for the respondent to file affidavits in reply, and denying Angliss an opportunity to respond would be unfair and contrary to common sense—particularly because Yee’s appeal case differed materially from the case he ran at trial.
Issue 2: The appropriate course of action in light of fraud allegations
Before considering what powers it might exercise, the court addressed jurisdiction. It cited the Court of Appeal’s statement in Pradeepto Kumar that a court’s jurisdiction must be established before it can consider the powers it possesses. This structured approach mattered because Yee’s requested remedy—effectively a retrial—depended on the appellate court’s statutory authority.
The Appellate Division then referred to s 43(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969, which gives the Appellate Division power to order a new trial in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction. It also referred to s 43(4), which allows the court to order a new trial on limited questions without affecting other parts of the judgment. The court cited Basil Anthony Herman for the proposition that the grounds for ordering a new trial are not exhaustively set out in statute, but guidance exists from earlier authorities such as Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd.
Importantly, the court also addressed the procedural evolution of Yee’s fraud case. At the hearing, Yee’s counsel did not oppose SUM 4 after the court observed that the further evidence sought in SUM 4 was in response to SUM 19 Evidence. More significantly, counsel confirmed that fraud—including deliberate suppression of discoverable documents—was no longer being alleged and pursued in the appeal. Logically, perjury was also not pursued. This development narrowed the court’s task: while Yee had initially framed his appeal as a fraud challenge, the court proceeded on the basis that the fraud/perjury allegations were not being pressed in the same way.
Issue 3: Whether there was a miscarriage of justice justifying a retrial
Yee’s fallback position was that there had been a miscarriage of justice because the SUM 19 Evidence was not available before the trial judge and the issue of causation was not fully and properly tried by reference to all available evidence. The court therefore had to consider whether the introduction of the SUM 19 Evidence, and the way it was said to affect causation, met the threshold for a retrial.
The court’s reasoning, as reflected in the grounds provided, proceeded in two steps. First, it explained why it would have dismissed the appeal even if Yee had persisted with fraud-related arguments about suppression and perjury. This indicates that the court did not view the fraud framing as determinative of the appeal’s merits. Second, it addressed the miscarriage of justice argument and concluded that there was no basis to order a retrial.
Although the excerpt provided is truncated, the court’s approach can be understood from its emphasis on (i) the procedural fairness of allowing responsive evidence (SUM 4), (ii) the jurisdictional prerequisites for ordering a new trial, and (iii) the absence of a miscarriage of justice despite the new evidence. The court’s conclusion that Yee should not be liable for damages of S$729,423 was rejected; instead, the court maintained the trial judge’s findings on breach and causation, subject to the appellate review framework.
What Was the Outcome?
The Appellate Division allowed Angliss’s application to adduce further evidence on appeal (SUM 4). It also dismissed Yee’s appeal against the trial judge’s decision awarding damages for loss of profits arising from breaches of confidence and loyalty/fidelity duties.
Crucially for practitioners, the court declined to order a retrial. It held that there was no miscarriage of justice that justified reopening the case, even though the SUM 19 Evidence had not been available at trial and was central to Yee’s appellate theory.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for two practical reasons. First, it clarifies how appellate courts may treat applications to adduce further evidence in response to new evidence or new arguments introduced on appeal. While Ladd v Marshall remains a foundational authority, the court’s reasoning shows that its strict application may be tempered where the respondent’s proposed evidence is genuinely responsive to new points and new evidence introduced by the appellant. This is particularly relevant in Singapore’s appellate practice where parties may seek to expand the evidential record after the trial.
Second, the case illustrates the procedural and jurisdictional discipline required when an appellant seeks a retrial on the basis of alleged fraud or compromised trial fairness. The court’s insistence on addressing jurisdiction first (following Pradeepto Kumar) and its reference to the statutory framework in s 43 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 underscore that a retrial is not a routine remedy. Even where new evidence is admitted on appeal, the appellant must still demonstrate a miscarriage of justice at a level that warrants the extraordinary step of ordering a new trial.
For lawyers, the case also highlights the importance of how fraud allegations are pleaded and pursued. Yee’s counsel ultimately confirmed that fraud and perjury were no longer being alleged in the appeal. That shift likely affected the court’s assessment of what remedy was appropriate and reinforces that appellate strategy should be carefully calibrated: maintaining or abandoning allegations can materially change the scope of the court’s inquiry.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed): s 43(1), s 43(4) [CDN] [SSO]
- Evidence Act: referenced in the judgment (context not fully reproduced in the excerpt provided)
Cases Cited
- Yee Heng Khay v Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd [2021] SGHC 168
- Pradeepto Kumar Biswas v Sabyasachi Mukherjee and another and another matter [2022] SGCA 31
- Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and others [2010] 3 SLR 110
- Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 737
- Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489
- AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2019] 2 SLR 341
- AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2020] 1 SLR 1158
- JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2020] 2 SLR 1256
- Bioconstruct GmbH v Winspear and another [2020] EWHC 2390 (QB)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2022] SGHCA 20 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.