Case Details
- Citation: [2022] SGHC(A) 20
- Title: YEE HENG KHAY (ROGER) v ANGLISS SINGAPORE PTE LTD
- Court: Appellate Division of the High Court (Civil Appeal and Summons)
- Date: 9 May 2022
- Judges: Belinda Ang Saw Ean JAD, Woo Bih Li JAD and Quentin Loh JAD
- Appellant/Respondent (as applicable): Yee Heng Khay (alias Roger)
- Respondent/Applicant (as applicable): Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd
- Related Proceedings: Suit No 284 of 2018
- Appeal: Civil Appeal No 82 of 2021
- Summons: AD/SUM 4/2022
- Earlier Appeal/Trial Decision: Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd v Yee Heng Khay (alias Roger) [2021] SGHC 168
- Key Procedural Applications: AD/SUM 19/2021 (SUM 19) to adduce further evidence on appeal
- Legal Areas: Civil procedure; appeals; appellate jurisdiction; evidence; allegations of fraud; retrial/miscarriage of justice
- Statutes Referenced: Evidence Act; Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (noted in the grounds)
- Cases Cited: [2021] SGHC 168; [2022] SGCA 31; Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489; AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2019] 2 SLR 341; Bioconstruct GmbH v Winspear and another [2020] EWHC 2390 (QB); Pradeepto Kumar Biswas v Sabyasachi Mukherjee and another and another matter [2022] SGCA 31; Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and others [2010] 3 SLR 110; Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 737; AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2020] 1 SLR 1158; JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2020] 2 SLR 1256
- Judgment Length: 23 pages, 6,936 words
Summary
This decision of the Appellate Division of the High Court arose from an appeal by a former employee, Yee Heng Khay (alias Roger), against a trial judgment in favour of Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd. At trial, the Judge found that Yee breached duties of confidence and loyalty/fidelity, leading to Angliss’ loss of a distributorship arrangement and resulting in an award of damages. On appeal, Yee sought to challenge the trial outcome on the basis that the judgment was “obtained by fraud”, alleging suppression of discoverable documents and perjury by Angliss’ witnesses.
Procedurally, the Appellate Division had to decide whether Angliss should be allowed to adduce further evidence in response to Yee’s newly adduced evidence on appeal (the “SUM 19 Evidence”). The court allowed Angliss’ application (AD/SUM 4/2022). Substantively, the court also addressed the proper course of action where fraud is alleged, and whether the circumstances justified a retrial for “miscarriage of justice”. Ultimately, the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal and did not order a retrial.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd is a food distributor. Yee was its former employee. Angliss’ case was that Yee, without authorisation, copied and shared restricted files from Angliss’ information systems. Angliss alleged that this misuse of confidential information enabled a supplier, Arla Foods Ingredients Singapore Pte Ltd (“Arla”), to bypass Angliss and enter into a distributorship agreement with another distributor, Indoguna Singapore Pte Ltd (“Indoguna”), where Yee was employed at the time the suit commenced.
Angliss sued Yee on four causes of action: (a) breach of confidence; (b) breach of contractual duties of confidence; (c) breach of duty of loyalty and fidelity; and (d) breach of fiduciary duties. The trial Judge found in Angliss’ favour on the first three causes of action, but not on the fiduciary duty claim. The Judge concluded that Yee’s breaches caused Angliss to lose profits, and awarded damages accordingly.
Central to the trial Judge’s reasoning was a view of the commercial relationship between Arla and Angliss. The Judge characterised the relationship as “robust” and found that, but for Yee’s breaches, Angliss would have secured the Arla distributorship agreement. The damages awarded reflected the loss of profits said to have flowed from the loss of that distributorship.
After judgment, Yee advanced a new evidential strategy. He claimed that he showed the trial judgment to Arla, and that Arla then swore an affidavit in support of Yee. On 20 September 2021, Yee filed AD/SUM 19/2021 to adduce further evidence contained in an affidavit of Henrik Bo Peter Eidvall (“Eidvall”). The affidavit sought to explain the relationship between Arla and Angliss leading up to the cessation of their long distributorship arrangement and exhibited emails between Arla and Angliss from three periods: December 2016, May 2017, and January 2018 (the “Emails”). These Emails had not been disclosed by Angliss during the trial. The court allowed SUM 19 on 14 December 2021, reserving costs.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The Appellate Division identified three main issues. First, it had to determine whether Angliss’ application to adduce further evidence on appeal (AD/SUM 4/2022, “SUM 4”) should be allowed. This required consideration of the procedural framework governing the admission of further evidence on appeal, and whether the traditional criteria applied in the particular context.
Second, the court had to decide the appropriate course of action in light of Yee’s allegation that the trial judgment was obtained by fraud. This issue was not merely evidential; it engaged appellate jurisdiction and the scope of the Appellate Division’s powers, including whether and when a retrial could be ordered.
Third, the court had to consider whether there was a miscarriage of justice that justified a retrial. Yee’s fallback position was that, because the SUM 19 Evidence was not available before the trial Judge and because causation was not fully and properly tried by reference to all available evidence, the trial outcome should not stand.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Issue 1: Whether SUM 4 should be allowed
The Appellate Division began by recalling the well-established three cumulative requirements for admitting further evidence on appeal as set out in Ladd v Marshall: (1) the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at trial; (2) it would probably have an important influence on the result; and (3) it is apparently credible. These criteria are designed to balance fairness to parties with the need for finality.
However, the court treated the context as determinative. Angliss’ further evidence in SUM 4 was intended to address new points raised by Yee after SUM 19 was allowed. In other words, SUM 4 was not simply a separate attempt to reopen the evidential record; it was a response to the new evidential posture created by the SUM 19 Evidence. The court therefore held that the Ladd v Marshall criteria did not govern in the same way. The Appellate Division relied on comparative reasoning from Bioconstruct GmbH v Winspear and another, where the English High Court suggested that Ladd v Marshall is not applicable where the further evidence is in response to a new claim.
In the court’s view, finality concerns were less pressing because Angliss was responding to new evidence and new arguments. The court also emphasised fairness: it would be unfair to deny Angliss an opportunity to respond to the SUM 19 Evidence, particularly where Yee’s case on appeal differed materially from the case run at trial. The Appellate Division further noted that, where leave to adduce further evidence is granted, it is typical for the respondent to file affidavits in reply, reinforcing the procedural symmetry required by fairness.
Issue 2: The appropriate course of action in light of alleged fraud
On the fraud allegation, the Appellate Division stressed that jurisdiction must be established before the court considers what powers it may exercise. It cited Pradeepto Kumar Biswas v Sabyasachi Mukherjee and another and another matter for the proposition that an anterior inquiry on appellate jurisdiction must be answered before considering the court’s powers and the appropriate course of action.
The court then referred to the statutory framework for ordering a new trial. Section 43(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) confers power on the Appellate Division to order a new trial in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction. Section 43(4) further allows the court to order a new trial on limited questions without affecting other parts of the judgment. The court also cited Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and others, which discussed the fact that the grounds for ordering a new trial are not exhaustively set out in statute, though guidance exists from case law such as Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd.
Importantly, the Appellate Division also addressed the procedural evolution of Yee’s fraud case during the appeal. The court recorded that Yee’s counsel did not oppose SUM 4 after the court observed that the further evidence sought in SUM 4 was in response to SUM 19 Evidence. More significantly, counsel confirmed that fraud—specifically the deliberate suppression of discoverable documents—was no longer being alleged and pursued in the appeal. The court reasoned that, logically, perjury would also no longer be pursued.
This development mattered for the court’s analysis of the “fraud” allegation. While the appeal documents initially framed the challenge as one of fraud, the court treated the abandonment of the fraud/perjury pursuit as undermining the basis for ordering a retrial on that ground. The court nonetheless proceeded to explain why it would have dismissed the appeal even if Yee had persisted with the fraud arguments, and then why there was no miscarriage of justice justifying a retrial.
Issue 3: Whether there was a miscarriage of justice justifying a retrial
Yee’s retrial argument was essentially that the trial was conducted without the SUM 19 Evidence and that causation was not fully tried by reference to all available evidence. The Appellate Division approached this by considering the threshold for a miscarriage of justice in the appellate context and the role of further evidence admitted on appeal.
Although the extract provided does not include the full detailed reasoning on causation and the evidential impact of the SUM 19 Evidence, the court’s approach can be understood from its structure: it first determined that SUM 4 should be allowed so Angliss could respond to SUM 19 Evidence; it then addressed the fraud allegation and the statutory power to order a retrial; and finally it concluded that no miscarriage of justice existed that would justify a retrial. The court’s conclusion indicates that the admitted further evidence did not demonstrate that the trial outcome was unsafe in the relevant legal sense, nor that the causation analysis required reopening through a retrial.
In practical terms, the court’s reasoning reflects a cautious appellate stance: admitting further evidence on appeal does not automatically mean the trial was fundamentally flawed. A retrial is an exceptional remedy, and the appellate court must be satisfied that the interests of justice require it—particularly where the alleged basis for retrial is linked to fraud, suppression, or perjury, and where those allegations are not pursued or are not shown to have materially affected the trial’s outcome.
What Was the Outcome?
The Appellate Division allowed Angliss’ application to adduce further evidence on appeal (AD/SUM 4/2022). It dismissed Yee’s appeal against the trial judgment.
Crucially, the court did not order a retrial. The practical effect is that the trial Judge’s findings on breach of confidence and loyalty/fidelity, and the damages award for loss of profits, remained intact.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how appellate courts in Singapore manage evidential developments on appeal. The decision demonstrates that the strict Ladd v Marshall criteria may not apply in the same way where the further evidence is sought to respond to new points and new evidence introduced by the other party on appeal. This is a useful procedural guide for counsel planning the evidential strategy after an initial leave application (such as SUM 19) succeeds.
Substantively, the case also illustrates the high threshold for ordering a retrial based on allegations of fraud and the “miscarriage of justice” framework. The court’s emphasis on jurisdiction first, and then on the statutory power to order a new trial, reinforces the disciplined approach appellate courts take. It also shows the importance of how fraud/perjury allegations are maintained or abandoned: where counsel confirms that fraud and suppression/perjury are no longer pursued, the appellate court is unlikely to treat the matter as one warranting the exceptional remedy of a retrial.
For lawyers, the decision provides a roadmap for responding to newly admitted evidence. If one party introduces affidavits and documents on appeal, the opposing party should consider whether a responsive application for further evidence is necessary to preserve fairness and address new factual assertions. The court’s reasoning in allowing SUM 4 reflects a pragmatic concern for procedural balance and the avoidance of one-sided evidential developments.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), s 43(1) and s 43(4)
- Evidence Act (referenced in the case metadata; the extract provided does not specify particular provisions)
Cases Cited
- Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd v Yee Heng Khay (alias Roger) [2021] SGHC 168
- Yee Heng Khay v Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd [2022] SGHC(A) 20
- Pradeepto Kumar Biswas v Sabyasachi Mukherjee and another and another matter [2022] SGCA 31
- Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and others [2010] 3 SLR 110
- Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 737
- Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489
- AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2019] 2 SLR 341
- AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2020] 1 SLR 1158
- JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2020] 2 SLR 1256
- Bioconstruct GmbH v Winspear and another [2020] EWHC 2390 (QB)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2022] SGHCA 20 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.