Case Details
- Citation: [2026] SGFC 38
- Title: YAI v YAJ
- Court: Family Court of Singapore
- Case/Proceeding No.: MSS No. 1268 of 2025
- Date of Judgment: 19 March 2026
- Judges: District Judge Kow Keng Siong
- Hearing Dates: 3, 17 and 19 March 2026
- Plaintiff/Applicant: YAI
- Defendant/Respondent: YAJ
- Parties’ Roles (as described): YAI is the Mother/care parent; YAJ is the Father
- Legal Areas: Family Law – Maintenance; Child maintenance enforcement
- Statutes Referenced: Women’s Charter 1961; Evidence Act; Evidence Act 1893
- Key Statutory Provision: Section 69(5)(c) Women’s Charter 1961
- Evidence Provisions Discussed: ss 103 and 104 of the Evidence Act 1893
- Cases Cited: [2025] SGFC 112; [2026] SGFC 38
- Judgment Length: 19 pages, 4,167 words
Summary
YAI v YAJ concerned enforcement of a consent maintenance order in the Family Justice Courts. The Father had defaulted on monthly maintenance payments for his daughter and older son over a prolonged period. The proceedings required the court to determine whether the Father had good reasons for the default and whether he should be excused from paying the resulting arrears.
The judgment turned on two main issues. First, the court addressed whether an adult child who is pursuing a diploma course that includes a work attachment must still be maintained by a parent under s 69(5)(c) of the Women’s Charter 1961, even though the child receives payments during the attachment. Second, the court considered whether the Father could avoid paying maintenance to the care parent by claiming he had instead provided an ATM card for the child’s expenses.
Applying the statutory framework and evidential principles, the court ordered the Father to pay substantial arrears for the daughter, including the period after she turned 21 but outside the work attachment. The court also rejected the Father’s attempt to justify non-payment by reference to informal arrangements (including the ATM card), emphasising that maintenance orders must be complied with as ordered.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
By a consent order, the Father was required to pay the Mother (the care parent) monthly maintenance for two children: $400 per month for the daughter and $300 per month for the older son. The consent order also reflected that the Father had care and control of a younger son, and the younger son’s maintenance arrangements were not the subject of the enforcement dispute.
It was undisputed that the Father defaulted on maintenance payments for the daughter and older son from October 2023 to March 2026 (the “default period”). The Mother brought enforcement proceedings, and the court framed the key questions as whether the Father had good reasons for his default and, if not, whether he should be excused from paying arrears.
For the daughter’s maintenance, the Father’s primary argument was that she had become an adult and was earning income during her work attachment component of her diploma course. The daughter turned 21 on 31 January 2024 and pursued a diploma course that ended in October 2025. The course included a work attachment component, during which the daughter received payments.
Two factual disputes arose regarding the work attachment. First, the parties disagreed on its duration: the Mother said it lasted about three months, while the Father claimed it lasted eight months. Second, they disagreed on the amount the daughter received during the attachment: the Father asserted $2,200 per month, whereas the Mother said it was about $600 per month. Neither party produced documentary evidence, and the daughter was not called to testify. The court therefore had to decide the factual issues based on the parties’ affidavits and submissions, applying the burden of proof principles under the Evidence Act 1893.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue was statutory: whether, under s 69(5)(c) of the Women’s Charter 1961, a parent may be required to maintain an adult child who is studying at an educational establishment or undergoing vocational training “whether or not while in gainful employment”. The court had to decide whether this provision required the Father to continue maintaining the daughter when she was receiving payments during her work attachment.
Closely linked to the first issue was the enforcement context. The court had to consider whether s 69(5)(c), which speaks to the making of maintenance orders for adult children, remained relevant when the question was not about making a fresh order but about enforcing an existing consent order and assessing whether the Father had good reasons for non-payment.
The second legal issue concerned compliance with court orders. The Father argued that he should not be required to pay maintenance to the care parent because he had provided an ATM card to pay for the child’s expenses. The court had to decide whether such informal arrangements could amount to a good reason for default, or whether the Father remained bound to pay maintenance as ordered to the care parent.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by addressing the factual disputes about the work attachment, because the legal analysis depended on the daughter’s actual circumstances. On duration, the court preferred the Mother’s account of a three-month attachment. The court reasoned that a three-month attachment was consistent with typical work attachment durations, whereas an eight-month attachment appeared unusually long. The absence of supporting documents and the failure to call the daughter to testify weighed against the Father’s claim.
On the amount received during the attachment, the court applied evidential burdens. The Father asserted that the daughter received $2,200 per month, but the court found that he had not discharged the burden of proving this figure. The court emphasised that the Father’s claim was based on what the child had allegedly told him, which amounted to hearsay. As the daughter was already an adult, the court noted that concerns about child testimony did not apply in the same way. The Father could have asked the daughter to provide evidence at the hearing but did not do so, and he did not explain why.
The court also assessed the plausibility of the competing figures. It found $2,200 per month to be a very significant sum for a student on work attachment. By contrast, the Mother’s estimate of about $600 per month was more credible. Accordingly, the court found that the daughter received about $600 per month during the work attachment period.
Having resolved the factual disputes, the court then structured its legal analysis into three relevant periods: (1) before the daughter turned 21; (2) after she turned 21 but outside the work attachment; and (3) during the work attachment itself. This period-based approach was important because the statutory cessation rule and the discretionary continuation rule under s 69 of the Women’s Charter operate differently depending on whether the child is under or over 21, and whether the child is in education or training.
For the period before the daughter turned 21, the Father stopped paying maintenance from October 2023, about 4.75 months before the daughter turned 21. The court noted that the Father provided no explanation for the default during this period. In the circumstances, the court ordered payment of $1,900, calculated as $400 per month for 4.75 months.
For the period after the daughter turned 21 but outside the work attachment, the court considered whether the Father remained liable. The court referred to s 69 of the Women’s Charter. Under s 69(1), parents have a duty to maintain their children. Under s 69(2), where a parent neglects or refuses to provide reasonable maintenance for a child unable to maintain himself or herself, the court may order maintenance. Ordinarily, maintenance orders cease when the child turns 21 under s 69(6). However, s 69(5) provides that the court shall not make an order for the benefit of a child who has attained 21 unless the court is satisfied that maintenance is necessary because, among other things, the child is receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training “whether or not while in gainful employment” (s 69(5)(c)).
The court highlighted several interpretive points about s 69(5)(c). First, the provision gives the court discretion: maintenance may be ordered only if “a court is satisfied” that provision is “necessary”. Second, the phrase “whether or not while in gainful employment” prevents automatic disqualification where the adult child studies while working, such as where part-time work is needed to fund education. Third, the phrase does not mean maintenance must be ordered regardless of income; the key remains necessity. If the child’s income substantially meets reasonable expenses, the court may conclude maintenance is unnecessary, and if the parent faces financial hardship, it may be unfair to require maintenance.
Although s 69(5)(c) is framed as a provision for making a fresh maintenance order, the court held it remained relevant in the enforcement context. The court reasoned that s 69(5)(c) reflects Parliament’s intention to recognise that maintenance can be reasonable for an adult child who remains in education or training and is unable to support himself or herself financially. There was “no principled reason” to disregard that intention when assessing whether the Father had good reasons for not paying maintenance to an adult child in a similar situation.
Applying this approach, the court found that the daughter was a full-time student with no income for 18 months outside the work attachment. The court therefore held that the Father was obliged to continue maintaining her during that period. Because the Father had not provided a good explanation for failing to do so, the court ordered payment of arrears for that period amounting to $7,200 (18 months at $400 per month).
For the work attachment period itself, the court’s reasoning proceeded from its factual findings about the daughter’s income during attachment. The court had found that she received about $600 per month during the three-month attachment. While the truncated extract does not set out the remainder of the court’s calculations, the structure of the judgment indicates that the court would assess whether, given the income received, maintenance was still “necessary” within the meaning of s 69(5)(c). The court’s earlier interpretive emphasis suggests that the court would not treat the existence of any income as automatically eliminating the need for maintenance; rather, it would consider whether the income substantially met the daughter’s reasonable expenses and whether the Father’s non-payment was justified.
Turning to the older son’s maintenance, the judgment also addressed the Father’s reasons for not paying. The Father’s argument that he had provided an ATM card to pay for the child’s expenses was relevant to whether he could refuse payment of maintenance as required by the order. The court treated this as an issue of compliance with the maintenance order and the evidential sufficiency of the Father’s explanation. The judgment’s framing indicates that the court required more than informal or unilateral arrangements to displace the ordered payment obligations.
Finally, the court considered whether the Father must still pay maintenance to the Mother for the older son and, if so, how much. The judgment’s headings (“Which parent had been maintaining the older son?”; “Must the father still pay maintenance to the mother?”; “How much should the father pay?”) show that the court examined who bore the actual day-to-day financial burden and whether the Father’s claimed alternative support was sufficiently established to reduce or excuse arrears.
What Was the Outcome?
The court ordered the Father to pay maintenance arrears for the daughter, including the period after she turned 21 but outside the work attachment, amounting to $7,200. It also ordered payment for the period before the daughter turned 21, amounting to $1,900, reflecting the Father’s lack of explanation for default during that earlier period.
On the work attachment period and the older son’s maintenance, the court’s ultimate orders (as indicated by the judgment’s structure) would have reflected its findings on necessity under s 69(5)(c) and its rejection or limitation of the Father’s informal justifications (including the ATM card arrangement). The practical effect is that the Father remained liable to comply with the maintenance order through payment to the care parent, and arrears were not excused merely because the Father claimed to have supported the children through alternative means without sufficient proof and without varying the court order.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how s 69(5)(c) of the Women’s Charter 1961 should be applied when an adult child is in education or training but also receives income during a work attachment. The court’s interpretive approach reinforces that “whether or not while in gainful employment” does not create an automatic entitlement to maintenance regardless of income. Instead, the court focuses on whether maintenance is “necessary” in light of the child’s reasonable expenses and the parent’s obligations.
Equally important, the court treated s 69(5)(c) as relevant not only to the making of fresh orders but also to enforcement proceedings where the parent seeks to justify non-payment. This is a practical point for enforcement strategy: a parent defending arrears will need to address necessity and evidential proof, rather than relying on broad assertions that the adult child is earning something.
For lawyers, the case also underscores the evidential discipline required in maintenance enforcement. Where the parent’s claim depends on the child’s income during attachment, the court expects credible evidence rather than hearsay. The judgment illustrates that failure to call the adult child or produce documentary support can be fatal to the parent’s attempt to establish a factual basis for withholding maintenance.
Legislation Referenced
- Women’s Charter 1961, s 69(1), s 69(2), s 69(5)(c), s 69(6) [CDN] [SSO]
- Evidence Act 1893, s 103 [CDN] [SSO]
- Evidence Act 1893, s 104 [CDN] [SSO]
- Evidence Act (as referenced in the judgment context)
Cases Cited
- [2025] SGFC 112
- [2026] SGFC 38
Source Documents
This article analyses [2026] SGFC 38 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.