Case Details
- Citation: [2026] SGFC 28
- Title: XZI v XZJ
- Court: Family Court of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 27 February 2026
- Decision Type: Grounds of Decision (ex parte application)
- Judges: Assistant Registrar Soh Kian Peng
- Case/Proceeding Number: Divorce No 4098 of 2025
- Summons Number: SUM 2201 of 2025
- Applicant/Plaintiff: XZI (Wife)
- Respondent/Defendant: XZJ (Husband)
- Legal Areas: Family Law; Divorce procedure; Service of process; Costs
- Statutes Referenced: Family Justice (General) Rules 2024 (“FJ(G)R”)
- Cases Cited: [2026] SGFC 28 (as reported in the extract)
- Judgment Length: 4 pages; 772 words
Summary
In XZI v XZJ ([2026] SGFC 28), the Family Court dealt with an ex parte application by the wife for substituted service of the Originating Application for Divorce and the Notice of Proceedings on the husband. The court granted the application, holding that personal service of the originating documents was impractical on the husband and that substituted service by email and via Singpass would be effective to bring the documents to the husband’s attention.
The decision is primarily procedural, but it is important for practitioners because it illustrates how the Family Justice Courts approach the statutory requirement of personal service for originating applications, and the circumstances in which substituted service may be ordered. The court also addressed costs in a nuanced way: it reserved costs of the substituted service application to the judge hearing any application to stay the proceedings, or, if no stay application was filed, to the judge hearing the ancillary matters. This reflected the court’s view that the costs question depended on whether the substituted service application was necessary in the first place.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute was a divorce proceeding commenced by the wife, XZI, against the husband, XZJ, in Divorce No 4098 of 2025. As is typical in divorce proceedings, the wife needed to serve the Originating Application for Divorce and the Notice of Proceedings on the husband to bring the divorce application properly before the court and to ensure procedural fairness.
The wife brought SUM 2201 of 2025 as an ex parte application seeking substituted service. She proposed two alternative modes: (a) sending the divorce documents to two email addresses of the husband which she asserted were still active; and (b) in the alternative, effecting substituted service via Singpass. The application was supported by affidavit evidence explaining why personal service could not be effected.
First, the wife’s evidence described attempts by a process server to serve the documents at the husband’s registered address. On two separate occasions, the process server attended the premises and was informed by the occupants that the husband was not at home. These attempts did not result in personal service, and the court accepted that the husband could not be served personally through the ordinary process.
Second, the wife’s affidavit evidence also included confirmation from the husband’s solicitors that they did not have instructions from the husband to accept service. The husband’s position, as communicated through his solicitors, was that he “did not accept service of Singapore matrimonial proceedings”. Taken together, these circumstances led the court to conclude that personal service was not practically achievable.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue was whether the court should order substituted service for the originating divorce documents. Under the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024, service of an originating application must be done personally. The legal question therefore became whether the wife had established that personal service was impractical, thereby justifying an order for substituted service under the applicable rules and practice directions.
The second issue concerned costs. The court had to decide how costs should be dealt with for SUM 2201. In particular, the court considered whether it was necessary for the wife to apply for substituted service at all, which in turn depended on the husband’s conduct and the correspondence between the parties’ solicitors.
Although the application was ex parte and the court’s decision was procedural, the costs issue required the court to engage with the “texture” of the evidence: whether the husband’s refusal to accept service was legitimate or whether it suggested an attempt to evade or frustrate service. The court ultimately took a cautious approach by reserving costs for later determination by the judge handling subsequent applications or ancillary matters.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by identifying the governing procedural framework. It referred to the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024 (“FJ(G)R”), emphasising that service of the originating application must be done personally. This is a baseline requirement reflecting the importance of ensuring that a respondent receives notice of the commencement of proceedings. The court then addressed the exception: where personal service is impractical, a party may apply for substituted service.
In assessing impracticality, the court relied on the evidence of two failed attempts at personal service at the husband’s registered address. The process server’s attendance on two occasions, coupled with the occupants’ statements that the husband was not at home, supported the conclusion that personal service could not be effected through the ordinary method. The court treated these attempts as sufficient to show that the wife had taken reasonable steps to attempt personal service.
The court also considered the husband’s solicitors’ confirmation that they did not have instructions to accept service. The husband’s communicated stance—that he did not accept service of Singapore matrimonial proceedings—was relevant to the practical question of whether personal service could be achieved. Even if personal service could theoretically be attempted again, the court’s reasoning indicates that where the respondent’s position makes acceptance of service unlikely, the practical route to notice may shift toward substituted service.
Having concluded that personal service was impractical, the court turned to the proposed modes of substituted service. The court was satisfied that the two modes—email and Singpass—would be effective in bringing the documents to the husband’s notice. This reflects a key principle in substituted service applications: the court must be satisfied not merely that personal service is impractical, but also that the substituted method is reasonably likely to inform the respondent of the proceedings. The court therefore granted the order in terms of the prayers sought.
On costs, the court adopted a structured approach. It reserved costs of SUM 2201 to the judge hearing any application to stay the present proceedings, or, if no stay application was filed, to the judge hearing the ancillary matters. The court explained that the costs issue depended on whether it was necessary for the wife to apply for substituted service in the first place.
To evaluate necessity, the court examined correspondence exhibited in the wife’s supporting affidavit. The court noted that in a letter dated 8 May 2025, the husband’s solicitors had communicated that the husband was, “in the interest of time and costs”, prepared to consent to the proposed divorce being granted on parties’ mutual agreement. This suggested a willingness to proceed without contesting the divorce on the merits, at least at that earlier stage.
However, the court also noted that about three months later, in a letter dated 22 August 2025, the husband’s solicitors wrote that the husband did not accept service of Singapore matrimonial proceedings and that they did not have instructions to accept service on his behalf. The court observed that the “texture” of the correspondence, when viewed against the broader facts, hinted at the possibility that the husband might be trying to evade or frustrate service.
Despite this, the court did not make a definitive finding on the husband’s motives. It considered that the husband could have had legitimate reasons for instructing his solicitors not to accept service. Because the costs determination would require a more contextual assessment—particularly in light of any application to stay proceedings—the court considered it best left to the judge who would hear the relevant subsequent applications.
This reasoning demonstrates a careful balance between procedural enforcement and fairness in costs. The court recognised that substituted service is a significant step that can affect a respondent’s ability to participate. Accordingly, costs should not be decided in a vacuum where the necessity and fairness of the substituted service may be revisited in later proceedings, including stay applications.
What Was the Outcome?
The court granted SUM 2201 of 2025, ordering substituted service of the Originating Application for Divorce and the Notice of Proceedings on the husband. The order was made on the basis that personal service could not be practically effected, and that substituted service via email and/or Singpass would be effective to bring the documents to the husband’s attention.
As to costs, the court reserved the costs of SUM 2201. The practical effect is that the wife would not receive an immediate costs order in relation to the substituted service application. Instead, the question of costs would be determined later by the judge hearing any stay application, or if none was filed, by the judge hearing the ancillary matters in the divorce proceedings.
Why Does This Case Matter?
XZI v XZJ is a useful procedural authority for family practitioners in Singapore dealing with service issues in divorce proceedings. It confirms that the Family Justice Courts treat personal service of originating applications as the default position under the FJ(G)R, but it also clarifies that substituted service may be ordered where personal service is impractical. The decision therefore provides guidance on what evidence will satisfy the “impracticality” threshold—namely, documented attempts at personal service and confirmation that the respondent’s solicitors will not accept service.
Substituted service is often contested because it can raise concerns about whether the respondent truly received notice. This case is instructive because the court did not merely grant substituted service as a matter of convenience; it expressly considered the effectiveness of the proposed substituted methods (email and Singpass) in bringing the documents to the respondent’s attention. Practitioners can take from this that substituted service orders should be supported by evidence demonstrating the likelihood of actual notice.
The costs aspect is also significant. By reserving costs pending a stay application or ancillary matters, the court signalled that costs should be assessed in light of the respondent’s conduct and the procedural necessity of substituted service. The court’s approach—recognising the possibility of evasion but declining to make a final determination on motive—suggests that costs outcomes in service-related applications may depend on later judicial findings about fairness and necessity. Lawyers should therefore consider how evidence of correspondence and the respondent’s shifting position may affect costs, but also recognise that the court may defer costs decisions until the procedural posture is clearer.
Legislation Referenced
- Family Justice (General) Rules 2024 (“FJ(G)R”), in particular:
- Rule 11 (personal service of originating application)
- Rule 6 (application for substituted service where personal service is impractical)
- FJC Practice Directions 2024 (para 72 on requirements for substituted service)
Cases Cited
- [2026] SGFC 28 (XZI v XZJ)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2026] SGFC 28 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.