Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGFC 121
- Court: Family Justice Courts (Family Court)
- Case Title: XUD v XUE
- OSM Number: OSM 218/2024
- HCF/DCA Number: HCF/DCA 104/2025
- Judgment Date: 1 December 2025
- Hearing Dates: 13 March, 6 May, 18 July, 18 August, 16 September 2025
- Judge: District Judge Shobha Nair
- Plaintiff/Applicant: XUD
- Defendant/Respondent: XUE
- Parties: Sisters
- Legal Area: Family Law – Mental Capacity; Revocation of Lasting Power of Attorney
- Statutes Referenced: Mental Capacity Act 2008 (2020 Rev Ed.)
- Cases Cited: Re BKR [2013] 4 SLR 1257 (HC); Re BKR [2015] 4 SLR 81 (CA)
- Judgment Length: 42 pages, 9,434 words
Summary
XUD v XUE concerned an application to revoke a Lasting Power of Attorney (“LPA”) executed by the parties’ elder sister, “P”. The LPA appointed the defendant sister, XUE, as donee of power for P’s personal welfare and property and affairs in the event P lost mental capacity. The plaintiff, XUD, challenged the validity of the Singapore LPA on two broad grounds: first, that P lacked mental capacity at the time of execution; and second, that XUE procured the LPA through fraud and/or undue pressure, and thereafter failed to act in P’s best interests.
The Family Court approached the case by treating P’s mental capacity at the time of execution as the core issue, noting that a compromised cognitive state can make a donor more vulnerable to requests, confusion, and acquiescence. Applying the statutory framework under the Mental Capacity Act 2008 (“MCA”), the court held that the presumption of capacity was not displaced on the evidence. It therefore dismissed the application to revoke the LPA. The court further rejected the allegations of fraud/undue pressure and did not find sufficient basis to conclude that the donee had failed to act in P’s best interests.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The parties are sisters. P, the eldest sister, spent much of her adult life in the United Kingdom (“UK”), having moved there in the 1970s for hairdressing and later theological studies. She returned to Singapore in June 2019 and lived in her Queenstown apartment. P’s husband, who was significantly older than her, remained in the UK until his death in March 2021. The parties’ relationship was not in dispute: prior to the litigation, the sisters had a “very good relationship”.
In 2019, P’s health and care needs in the UK became a concern. During a visit by XUE to the UK in 2019, it was decided that P would move to Singapore to be cared for by XUE. P’s move was agreed within the family context, although the judgment records that the husband’s position was not expressly approved before P relocated. P’s relationship with her husband was described as disharmonious, and there were allegations that P was fearful of him; divorce proceedings had been initiated by the husband before his death.
Before the Singapore LPA, P had executed an LPA in the UK in September 2016 (“UK LPA”), appointing both sisters as joint donees for personal welfare and property/affairs in the UK. With P’s move to Singapore, the sisters agreed that XUD would assist with management of P’s UK assets, while XUE would assist P in Singapore. P also executed wills: on 12 November 2019, she appointed both sisters as joint executrices, and the UK will provided for UK properties to be divided equally. Separately, P executed a Singapore will on 19 July 2016 naming XUE as executrix and both sisters as beneficiaries of the Queenstown apartment.
On 8 March 2021, P executed a later Singapore will revoking the first Singapore will. In that later will, XUE was named the sole beneficiary of the Queenstown property and also as beneficiary of P’s assets outside Singapore. The defendant expressed surprise at this change, indicating that she had believed the UK assets would be dealt with under the UK will. Around June 2021, the plaintiff alleged that XUE blocked XUD’s access to P and impeded XUD’s ability to manage P’s UK assets, including by attempting to sever joint tenancies in the UK. XUE’s position was that XUD was attempting to sever joint tenancies unilaterally and to activate the UK LPA when P was not mentally incapacitated at the time.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The court identified three main issues. The first was whether P had mental capacity to create and execute the Singapore LPA (executed on 10 January 2022, after an earlier LPA dated 2 August 2021 was rejected by the Office of the Public Guardian (“OPG”) due to an irregularity in P’s signature). The irregularity was addressed by having P affix her thumbprint to the LPA on 10 January 2022.
The second issue was whether XUE had procured the creation and execution of the Singapore LPA through fraud and/or undue pressure. This required the court to examine not only the conduct of the donee but also P’s state of mind and vulnerability at the time of execution, because a poor cognitive state can increase the likelihood of compliance with requests or quick execution without proper understanding.
The third issue was whether XUE had failed to act (or would fail to act) in P’s best interests. This issue is closely connected to the MCA’s “best interests” framework, which requires the donee to act in a manner that promotes the donor’s welfare and takes into account the donor’s past and present wishes and feelings, as well as other relevant factors.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by explaining its approach. Although fraud and undue pressure are independent grounds for revocation, the judge considered that the “core issue” was P’s mental capacity at the time of execution. The reasoning was pragmatic and legally grounded: if P lacked capacity, she would be more vulnerable to influence, and the factual matrix surrounding alleged pressure would be more likely to succeed. Conversely, if P had capacity, the court would be less inclined to infer that the donee’s conduct amounted to fraud or undue pressure.
In analysing capacity, the court relied on the statutory structure of the MCA. It emphasised that the execution of an LPA is an important expression of autonomy: when a person has capacity, they may choose someone to act for them if capacity is later lost. The court also noted the challenge of determining whether a person was truly asserting a rational will when suffering from a neurodegenerative illness. The law, however, does not treat neurodegenerative conditions as automatically disabling. Instead, it requires careful assessment of capacity at the relevant time.
The judge referred to the presumption of capacity in s 3(2) of the MCA and to the principle in s 3(3) that a person should not be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps to help the person to do so have been taken without success. The court then set out the statutory definition of “lack of capacity” in s 4 and the functional test in s 5. Under s 5, a person is unable to make a decision if they cannot understand relevant information, retain it, use or weigh it as part of the decision-making process, or communicate the decision.
Capacity under the MCA was treated as having both a functional and clinical component, consistent with the authorities cited by the court, including Re BKR [2013] 4 SLR 1257 (HC) and Re BKR [2015] 4 SLR 81 (CA). The court’s analysis therefore turned on evidence from medical practitioners, observations by those who had contact with P around the time of execution, and P’s own actions before and after the LPA. The judgment also records that there was some conflict regarding when P began experiencing symptoms associated with Parkinson’s disease (or related neurodegenerative conditions), which made the timing of capacity particularly important.
Although the provided extract truncates the detailed medical and evidential discussion, the court’s overall conclusion is clear from the introduction and the dismissal of the application: the plaintiff did not establish, on the balance of probabilities, that P lacked capacity at the time she executed the Singapore LPA. The court therefore did not revoke the LPA on the capacity ground. This outcome reflects the MCA’s design: capacity is decision-specific and time-specific, and the presumption of capacity must be displaced by evidence showing inability to perform the functional elements of the decision-making process.
On fraud and undue pressure, the court treated these as requiring proof of improper procurement. The judge’s earlier framing—that P’s mental state is inextricably linked to vulnerability—indicates that the court would scrutinise whether P’s cognitive condition made her susceptible to influence. However, because the court found that P had capacity, it was less likely that the execution could be characterised as the product of fraud or undue pressure rather than a genuine choice. The court also considered the broader context: P had executed multiple instruments (UK LPA, Singapore wills, and a POA) and had a history of making decisions about her property and care arrangements. The court’s reasoning suggests that the plaintiff’s narrative did not sufficiently overcome the presumption of capacity or establish improper conduct to the required standard.
Finally, on the best interests issue, the court would have assessed whether XUE’s actions as donee aligned with the MCA’s best interests requirements. The extract indicates that the plaintiff alleged that XUE compromised P’s interests and that the LPA should be revoked accordingly. The court, however, did not accept that the evidence showed a failure to act in P’s best interests, or at least not to the threshold required for revocation. In practical terms, this means the court did not find that XUE’s conduct demonstrated a pattern of acting against P’s welfare, wishes, or relevant considerations.
What Was the Outcome?
The Family Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application to revoke the Singapore LPA. The court held that P had mental capacity to create and execute the LPA at the relevant time, and it rejected the allegations of fraud/undue pressure. It also found no sufficient basis to conclude that the donee had failed, or would fail, to act in P’s best interests.
As a result, the Singapore LPA remained in force, preserving XUE’s authority to act as donee for P’s personal welfare and property and affairs in the event P lost capacity. The practical effect is that decisions made by XUE under the LPA would continue to be legally effective, subject to the MCA’s safeguards and oversight mechanisms.
Why Does This Case Matter?
XUD v XUE is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how the MCA’s presumption of capacity operates in real disputes involving neurodegenerative conditions and family conflict. The decision reinforces that courts will not treat illness or cognitive decline as automatically negating capacity. Instead, capacity must be assessed functionally and temporally, based on evidence around the time the LPA was executed.
For lawyers advising on LPAs—either donors, donees, or those seeking revocation—this case underscores the importance of contemporaneous evidence. Medical opinions, observations, and the donor’s ability to understand, retain, weigh, and communicate the relevant decision are central. Where there is a challenge based on fraud or undue pressure, the court will likely examine whether the donor’s capacity made them vulnerable, but capacity findings will often be determinative in practice.
From a family law perspective, the case also highlights the court’s approach to competing narratives about access, asset management, and family dynamics. Even where there are allegations that a donee restricted another relative’s access or acted strategically in asset administration, revocation is not automatic. The applicant must still meet the MCA thresholds for capacity and improper procurement, and must show a failure to act in best interests at the level required for the drastic remedy of revocation.
Legislation Referenced
- Mental Capacity Act 2008 (2020 Rev Ed.)
- Section 3(2) – Presumption of capacity
- Section 3(3) – Requirement to take practicable steps before concluding incapacity
- Section 4 – Statutory definition of lack of capacity
- Section 4(2) – Impairment or disturbance of mind or brain
- Section 5 – Functional test for inability to make a decision
- Section 19 – Court declarations as to capacity
Cases Cited
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGFC 121 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.