Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGFC 104
- Court: Family Justice Courts (Family Court)
- Case Title: XSF v XSG
- District Judge: Tan Shin Yi
- Date of Decision: 2 October 2025
- Hearing Dates: 20 February 2025, 11 March 2025, 25 March 2025
- Proceeding No (SS): SS No 2093 of 2024
- Proceeding No (HCF/DCA): HCF/DCA 44 of 2025
- Applicant/Plaintiff: XSG
- Respondent/Defendant: XSF
- Legal Area: Family violence; Personal Protection Orders (PPO); Domestic Exclusion Orders (DEO); Women’s Charter
- Statutes Referenced: Women’s Charter 1961 (pre-amendment provisions)
- Cases Cited: UNQ v UNR [2020] SGHCF 21; Yue Tock Him @ Yee Chok Him v Yee Ee Lim [2011] SGDC 99
- Judgment Length: 20 pages, 5,017 words
Summary
In XSF v XSG ([2025] SGFC 104), the Family Court considered an application by the wife (XSG) for a Personal Protection Order (“PPO”) and a Domestic Exclusion Order (“DEO”) against her husband (XSF). The parties were Malaysian citizens when they married in May 2014 and had three children. By 2024, the marriage had broken down, and the parties’ living arrangements and custody-related disputes became intertwined with allegations of family violence and coercive control, including threats and interference with the wife’s ability to work and care for the children.
The court granted the wife a PPO but dismissed the application for a DEO. The decision turned on the statutory requirements under the pre-amendment Women’s Charter 1961 regime applicable because the application was filed in November 2024. The court held that the wife proved, on a balance of probabilities, that family violence was committed (and/or was likely to be committed) and that a PPO was necessary for the protection of the family member. The court’s reasoning also reflects how “continual harassment” and “necessity” are assessed in the context of the parties’ relationship and the totality of the incidents relied upon.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The parties were originally Malaysian citizens and married in May 2014. They had three children: M (aged 9), S (aged 7), and O (aged 3). The family lived in Malaysia, then moved to Australia for about a year from 2023 to May 2024. After returning to Malaysia, they lived in a house with the husband’s family members until around September 2024, when the wife and children moved out.
By November 2024, the wife and the two elder children (M and S) moved to Singapore, while the husband remained in Malaysia with O. The judgment records that the circumstances surrounding the wife’s move to Singapore and the husband’s de facto care of O were disputed. The wife’s position was that the husband had pressured her to sell their Singapore flat and, after she refused, he escalated harassment and threats, including telling her to leave the family home and cutting off financial support.
In support of her application, the wife relied on a series of incidents spanning several years and culminating in late 2024. These included physical assaults (such as punching and pushing), acts that restrained or prevented her from leaving (including blocking her car and taking her keys and bag), and conduct directed at controlling her access to the children (including withdrawing O from preschool and threatening to send O away). The wife also alleged continual harassment and threats connected to the Singapore flat, as well as interference with her employment prospects.
The husband’s responses varied across incidents. For the 14 December 2019 incident, he initially denied key elements, but later admitted that he “smashed” the wife’s phone on the floor when cross-examined. For the 14 June 2024 incident, he admitted a scuffle but claimed the wife was the aggressor and that she had caused him injury. For later incidents, he sometimes denied occurrence, sometimes reframed them as unrelated or as exercises of parental rights, and he also admitted logging into the wife’s personal email account without consent and sending emails to potential employers containing police reports and proceedings.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The court had to determine whether the wife satisfied the statutory threshold for a PPO under the pre-amendment Women’s Charter 1961. Specifically, under s 65(1) of the former Charter, the court could grant a PPO only if (i) family violence was committed or was likely to be committed, and (ii) the PPO was necessary for the protection of the family member. These conditions had to be proven on a balance of probabilities.
A second issue concerned the wife’s request for a DEO. Although the truncated extract does not set out the full DEO analysis, the court’s final disposition indicates that the evidence and/or statutory criteria for a DEO were not met to the court’s satisfaction. In practice, DEO applications often require the court to consider whether exclusion of the respondent from the family home is necessary and proportionate in light of the circumstances, including safety and practical arrangements for the family.
Finally, the court had to address how to characterise the wife’s allegations—particularly those involving threats, coercion, and repeated conduct—as “family violence” within the meaning of s 64 of the pre-amendment Women’s Charter. This required careful analysis of limbs such as wilfully placing a family member in fear of hurt, causing hurt, wrongful confinement or restraint, and continual harassment with intent to cause anguish or knowledge that it is likely to cause anguish.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court first identified the applicable legal framework. Amendments to the family violence provisions in the Women’s Charter came into force on 2 January 2025. However, because the wife filed her application in November 2024, the pre-amendment provisions applied. The court therefore applied the former ss 64 and 65, rather than the amended regime. This matters because the statutory definitions and thresholds determine what the applicant must prove and how the court structures its reasoning.
Under s 64 of the pre-amendment Women’s Charter, “family violence” included, among other things: (a) wilfully or knowingly placing, or attempting to place, a family member in fear of hurt; (b) causing hurt by acts known or ought to have been known would result in hurt; (c) wrongful confinement or restraint against the family member’s will; and (d) causing continual harassment with intent to cause anguish or knowing that it is likely to cause anguish. The court treated these limbs as conceptually distinct but capable of being satisfied by the same factual matrix, depending on how the evidence is assessed.
On the “continual harassment” limb, the court relied on authority addressing how intention or knowledge can be inferred. The judgment cited UNQ v UNR [2020] SGHCF 21, where the High Court held that whether the necessary intention or knowledge existed at the time can be inferred from all the circumstances, including the state of the parties’ relationship and evidence of communications. The court also referenced Yue Tock Him @ Yee Chok Him v Yee Ee Lim [2011] SGDC 99 for the proposition that “harassment” involves a course of conduct. These principles guided the court in evaluating whether the husband’s repeated conduct—threats, interference, and coercive demands—amounted to continual harassment rather than isolated disagreements.
In applying these principles, the court assessed the incidents chronologically and in totality. The wife’s evidence included multiple physical assaults: the 14 December 2019 punching and phone-smashing incident; the 14 June 2024 scuffle involving pushing and pulling; the 6 July 2024 act of pushing her out of the room and throwing her phone from the second storey; and the 19 September 2024 kicking and throwing a pillow with force. The court also considered conduct that restrained or prevented her from leaving, such as the 3 October 2024 blocking of her car and taking her keys and bag, and the 19 October 2024 prevention of her taking O with her coupled with threats about returning her belongings.
Beyond physical incidents, the court examined the coercive and controlling aspects of the husband’s conduct. The wife alleged that the husband repeatedly pressured her to sell the Singapore flat and, upon refusal, stopped paying expenses, harassed her, and told her to leave. The court also considered allegations that the husband kept the children’s passports and withdrew O from preschool, threatening to send O away to Hong Kong and to prevent the wife from seeing her unless she complied with demands related to the flat or payment for the husband’s share. These allegations were relevant not only to fear and threats, but also to wrongful restraint and continual harassment.
Importantly, the court also addressed the husband’s admission that he logged into the wife’s personal email account without consent and sent emails to her potential employers with police reports and proceedings to prevent her from obtaining job offers. Even though the husband framed his actions as arising from anger and anxiety, the court treated the conduct as part of a broader pattern of interference with the wife’s ability to settle and work in Singapore. This supported the conclusion that the wife was subjected to a course of conduct likely to cause anguish and fear, and that such conduct fell within the statutory definition of family violence.
Having found that the statutory “family violence” threshold was met, the court then turned to the second requirement: necessity for the protection of the family member. The court’s reasoning reflects that necessity is not a mere formality; it requires the court to consider whether a PPO is required to protect the applicant from further violence or harassment. In this case, the court’s grant of a PPO indicates that the court was satisfied that the risk was not merely historical but connected to ongoing disputes and the husband’s demonstrated willingness to use threats, interference, and physical acts to control the wife and affect the children’s arrangements.
As for the DEO, the court dismissed the application. While the extract does not provide the full DEO analysis, the outcome suggests that the court was not persuaded that exclusion of the husband from the family home was necessary on the evidence presented, or that the statutory criteria and proportionality considerations were not satisfied. In many PPO/DEO cases, the court may find that protection orders are warranted to restrain conduct, while still concluding that exclusion from the home is either not necessary or not sufficiently supported by the factual matrix.
What Was the Outcome?
The court granted the wife’s application for a PPO and dismissed the application for a DEO. The PPO was granted on the basis that family violence was established on a balance of probabilities and that the PPO was necessary for the protection of the wife.
The husband appealed against the decision. The judgment provides the District Judge’s reasons for the orders made on 25 March 2025, with the final grounds of decision dated 2 October 2025.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how the pre-amendment PPO framework operates in practice, particularly where allegations span both physical violence and coercive, controlling conduct. The court’s approach demonstrates that “family violence” is not confined to overt assaults; it can also be established through wrongful restraint, threats, and a course of conduct amounting to continual harassment intended to cause anguish or known to be likely to do so.
For lawyers advising applicants, the decision underscores the importance of presenting a coherent narrative supported by specific incidents, dates, and evidence of patterns. The court’s reliance on UNQ v UNR for inference of intention/knowledge and on Yue Tock Him for the concept of harassment indicates that courts will look at the relational context and communications, not merely the applicant’s subjective fear.
For respondents, the case highlights the evidential consequences of inconsistent explanations and admissions. The husband’s partial admissions—such as smashing the phone and logging into the wife’s email account without consent—were treated as corroborative of a broader pattern. Even where conduct is framed as “parental rights” or “unrelated,” the court may still integrate it into the overall assessment of family violence and necessity.
Legislation Referenced
Cases Cited
- UNQ v UNR [2020] SGHCF 21
- Yue Tock Him @ Yee Chok Him v Yee Ee Lim [2011] SGDC 99
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGFC 104 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.