WYNO Marine Pte Ltd (In Liquidation) v Lim Teck Cheng and Others (Koh Chye Heng and Others, Third Parties)

"It follows therefore, that unless a wrong principle was applied in the assessment of the costs, the award should stand." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 5

Case Information

• Citation: [2000] SGHC 10 (Para 0)
• Court: High Court (Para 0)
• Date of Decision: 18 January 2000 (Para 0)
• Coram: Choo Han Teck JC (Para 0)
• Case Number: Suit 2274/1993, BOC 328, 572 and 573 of 1999, SIC 6867, 6892, 6893 and 6894 of 1999 (Para 0)
• Area of Law: Taxation and review of costs in civil litigation (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Plaintiffs: K Shanmugam SC and Ashok Kumar of Allen & Gledhill (Para 0)
• Counsel for the 1st, 2nd and 6th Defendants: S Selvam of Ramdas & Wong (Para 0)
• Counsel for the 1st Third Party: Monoj Kumar Roy of Roy & Partners (Para 0)
• Counsel for the 3rd Third Party: Benjamin Goh Kay Poh of Bernard, Rada & Partners (Para 0)

Summary

This was an oral judgment on a review of the taxation of costs arising out of a civil matter in which the plaintiffs, the first defendant, and third parties each had bills of costs assessed by the assistant registrar. The judge was asked to decide whether the assistant registrar had applied the correct principle in arriving at the awards, and whether the resulting figures should be disturbed on review. The judge began from the established principle that a taxation award should not be interfered with unless a wrong principle was applied, but noted that the absence of written grounds made it impossible to know precisely how the assistant registrar had approached the assessment. (Paras 1, 5, 6)

The factual dispute centred on whether the assistant registrar had assessed a global sum and then apportioned it among the successful parties. The plaintiffs argued that the work done justified a much higher award, while the first defendant sought to reduce the third parties’ awards if the plaintiffs’ award was increased. The judge accepted that the plaintiffs had borne the main burden of the litigation, that the trial lasted 38 days after deducting wasted time-off, and that the third parties had a more limited role. On that basis, he reassessed the awards himself and concluded that the plaintiffs’ costs should be increased from $485,000 to $560,000, while the third parties’ awards should remain unchanged. (Paras 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14)

The judgment is significant because it shows how a reviewing judge may proceed where the taxing officer has not provided written reasons. Rather than speculate about the assistant registrar’s reasoning, the judge applied the governing principle from Diversey and then made his own assessment of what was fair and just, using the length of trial, the getting-up work, and the relative roles of the parties as the main benchmarks. The result was a partial revision: the plaintiffs succeeded, but the first defendant’s attempt to reduce the third parties’ awards failed. (Paras 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14)

How did the court approach a review of taxed costs when the assistant registrar gave no written grounds?

The judge framed the review by identifying the governing principle from the Court of Appeal in Diversey: a taxation award should ordinarily stand unless a wrong principle was applied. He then immediately confronted the practical difficulty in this case, namely that there were no written grounds from the assistant registrar to show what principle had been used. That absence mattered because the reviewing court could not simply assume the basis on which the global figures had been reached. (Paras 5, 6)

"However, there are instances such as this in which there are no written grounds to indicate what principles had been applied." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 6

Because the assistant registrar’s reasoning was not recorded, the judge said he could not assume what approach had been taken. Instead, he treated the review as an exercise in independently working out what the costs ought to be, while still respecting the non-interference principle unless a wrong principle was shown or strongly suggested. This is an important procedural point: the court did not treat the review as a fresh taxation in the abstract, but as a review informed by the absence of reasons and by the need to test whether the awards were anchored in a proper principle. (Paras 6, 7)

"Since there are no written grounds, I cannot assume what approach the learned assistant registrar took." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 6

The judge’s method was therefore twofold. First, he asked whether the awards could be justified by a proper principle. Second, where the figures appeared to diverge substantially from what he considered fair, he was prepared to revise them. He expressly stated that if the differences were small, the awards should not be disturbed; if substantial, revision might be warranted. That approach allowed him to preserve deference to the taxing officer while still correcting awards that, in his view, did not reflect the proper basis of assessment. (Paras 5, 7)

"If the differences are small then the awards of the assistant registrar ought not be disturbed. If the differences are substantial then the reviewing judge may be entitled to revise the awards." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 7

What were the parties’ competing positions on the proper quantum of costs?

The plaintiffs, through Mr Shanmugam SC, argued for a substantially higher award than the assistant registrar had allowed. Their position was that the work done would easily justify up to $900,000 for the plaintiffs alone, though counsel said that a fairer figure would be around $750,000. This submission was important because it showed that the plaintiffs were not merely seeking a modest adjustment; they were contending that the original award was materially too low in light of the scale of the litigation. (Para 2)

"Mr Shanmugam SC submits that the work done would easily justify an award of up to $900,000 for the plaintiffs alone, but he says that in any event it should be more fairly pegged around $750,000." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 2

The first defendant, represented by Mr Selvam, took the opposite position. He sought lower awards, especially if the plaintiffs’ costs were to be increased. The third parties, by contrast, were content with their revised awards and did not press for further relief. That alignment of positions mattered because it meant the court had to decide not only whether the plaintiffs were undercompensated, but also whether the third parties’ awards should be reduced in response to any upward revision for the plaintiffs. (Para 3)

"The two Third Parties are content with their revised awards, but Mr Selvam for the first defendant asks that these awards be revised lower especially if the plaintiffs’ costs are revised upwards." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 3

The judge’s eventual resolution of these competing positions was asymmetrical. He accepted that the plaintiffs’ award should be increased, but rejected the first defendant’s attempt to push the third parties’ awards down. In other words, the review did not operate as a zero-sum redistribution among all successful parties; instead, the judge assessed each bill by reference to the work done and the role played by the relevant party. (Paras 11, 12, 13, 14)

Did the assistant registrar assess a global sum and apportion it, and why did that matter?

A central submission advanced by the plaintiffs was that the assistant registrar had assessed the overall costs payable at $920,000 and then apportioned that sum among the three claiming parties. The judge recorded that this submission was made without challenge by Mr Selvam. This mattered because, if true, it suggested a methodology that might be vulnerable to criticism: rather than assessing each bill on its own merits, the taxing officer may have started with a global figure and divided it among the parties. (Para 4)

"It was submitted by Mr Shanmugam SC, without challenge by Mr Selvam that the learned assistant registrar assessed the overall costs payable to be $920,000 and then proceeded to apportion this sum among the three claiming parties." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 4

The judge treated that possibility as potentially problematic because it would mean the assessment proceeded without a proper basis for the global sum. He stated that if that was indeed what had happened, it would be an application of the wrong principle. The reason was not merely technical; it went to the integrity of the taxation exercise. A global figure without an articulated foundation risks obscuring the relationship between the work actually done and the amount awarded. (Para 6)

"If, that is so, in my humble view, it would be an application of a wrong principle for the simple reason that it proceeded with no basis for arriving at the global sum." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 6

Because there were no written grounds, the judge did not purport to make a definitive finding that the assistant registrar had in fact adopted that exact method. Instead, he used the possibility as part of the reason for undertaking his own assessment. The absence of reasons, combined with the apparent global approach, justified closer scrutiny and, ultimately, a revision of the plaintiffs’ award. (Paras 6, 7, 14)

How did the court apply Diversey to the review of costs?

The judge expressly identified Diversey (Far East) Pte Ltd v Chai Chung Ching Chester & Ors (No. 2) as the governing authority. He described the decision as favouring a non-interference approach to the awards of the taxation officer because such awards are matters of judicial discretion. That framing is important because it shows the judge was not treating the review as an invitation to substitute his own view lightly; rather, he was anchoring his analysis in the established appellate guidance on when intervention is justified. (Para 5)

"The governing principle in a review of the taxation of costs is clearly set out in the Court of Appeal decision in Diversey (Far East) Pte Ltd v Chai Chung Ching Chester & Ors (No. 2) [1993] 1 SLR 542." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 5

He then explained the practical consequence of that principle: unless a wrong principle was applied, the award should stand. He also noted that the Diversey approach discourages a protracted and minute examination of the evidence or issues of the trial. That observation is significant because it limits the scope of a review of costs; the reviewing judge is not to re-litigate the entire case, but to assess whether the taxation result is defensible in principle and proportionate in amount. (Paras 5, 8)

"The decision delivered by the learned Rajendran J. favours a non-interference approach to the awards by the taxation officer on the basis that such awards are matters of judicial discretion." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 5

At the same time, the judge did not read Diversey as forbidding intervention in every case. He accepted that where the difference between the assistant registrar’s award and the reviewing judge’s own assessment is substantial, revision may be justified. That is how the judge reconciled deference with correction: the reviewing court should not micromanage costs, but it may intervene where the award appears materially out of line with the work done and the proper basis of assessment. (Paras 7, 8)

"as Rajendran J says in the Diversey case, it is not appropriate in a review of this sort to indulge in protracted and minute examination of the evidence or the issues of the trial." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 8

Why did the judge increase the plaintiffs’ costs from $485,000 to $560,000?

The judge’s assessment of the plaintiffs’ costs was built around the scale and duration of the trial. By mutual agreement, the parties conceded that 38 days were spent at trial after deducting wasted time-off. The judge used that figure as the starting point for a daily rate, concluding that $10,000 per day for 38 days was appropriate for the plaintiffs. This produced $380,000 for trial attendance alone. (Para 9)

"By mutual agreement, the parties conceded that a total of 38 days were spent at trial after deducting wasted time-off." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 9

He then added $120,000 for getting up. He acknowledged that this might be slightly on the low side, but explained that he was constantly keeping in mind the approaching overall sum total. This shows that the judge was not mechanically applying a formula; he was balancing the components of the award against the overall fairness of the final figure. The resulting total for the plaintiffs was $560,000, made up of $380,000 plus $120,000 plus $60,000. (Para 10)

"I would also award him $120,000 for getting up; perhaps slightly on the low side, but I am constantly keeping in mind the approaching overall sum total" — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 10

The judge then expressly stated that this total was fair and just. He allowed the plaintiffs’ application and revised the total costs awarded from $485,000 to $560,000. The significance of this conclusion is that the judge did not merely identify a theoretical error; he translated his reasoning into a concrete upward revision. The difference of $75,000 was, in his view, sufficiently substantial to warrant intervention. (Paras 10, 14)

"The total award to the plaintiffs which I think would be fair and just is therefore $560,000 ($380,000 + $120,000 + $60,000)." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 10

Why did the court refuse to reduce the third parties’ awards?

The first Third Party’s role was treated separately from the plaintiffs’ role. The judge said he was concerned with fewer issues than the plaintiffs and that the bulk of the work at trial was carried by Mr Shanmugam SC. On that basis, the judge awarded the first Third Party $5,000 a day for the 38-day trial, plus $40,000 for getting up and $10,000 for each of three refreshers. This produced a total of $240,000, which matched the revised award already in place. (Paras 11, 12)

"He was concerned with fewer issues than the plaintiffs, and the bulk of the work at trial was carried by Mr Shanmugam SC." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 11

For the third Third Party, the judge considered the role even smaller than that of the first Third Party. He noted that the third Third Party’s trial action was similarly reduced, and he awarded $4,000 a day for 38 days, $40,000 for getting up, and $10,000 for each of three refreshers. That again produced a total of $210,000, which was left unchanged. The judge’s reasoning shows that he did not view the third parties as interchangeable with the plaintiffs; their more limited involvement justified lower daily rates and lower overall awards. (Para 12)

"In respect of the third Third Party, his role was even smaller than that played by the first Third Party and his trial action was similarly reduced." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 12

Having reached those figures, the judge concluded that there should be no revision in respect of the third parties’ costs. Mr Selvam’s application was dismissed. The practical effect was that the third parties retained the revised awards already fixed by the assistant registrar, while only the plaintiffs obtained an increase. This outcome reflects a party-specific approach to costs review rather than a blanket recalibration of all awards in the case. (Para 13)

"There will therefore be no revision in respect of their costs. Mr Selvam’s application is dismissed." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 13

What role did the length of trial and the parties’ relative burdens play in the court’s reasoning?

The length of trial was a key objective measure used by the judge. The parties agreed that 38 days were spent at trial after deducting wasted time-off, and the judge used that figure to anchor his daily rates. This approach allowed him to translate the scale of the litigation into a concrete costs assessment. It also provided a rational basis for distinguishing between the plaintiffs and the third parties, whose involvement differed in scope and intensity. (Paras 9, 11, 12)

The judge’s language makes clear that he saw the plaintiffs as bearing the main burden of the litigation. He said they were “charged with the supreme command of the war” and bore “the brunt of the fight in the many fronts that were opened.” That vivid description is not merely rhetorical; it explains why the plaintiffs’ award was increased while the third parties’ awards were not. The plaintiffs were the principal litigants, and their costs reflected that central role. (Para 16)

"But the plaintiffs were charged with the supreme command of the war, and bore the brunt of the fight in the many fronts that were opened." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 16

By contrast, the first and third Third Parties were involved in fewer issues and a reduced trial action. The judge’s analysis therefore turned on comparative litigation burden: the more central the party’s role, the greater the justified costs. This comparative method is consistent with the judge’s broader insistence on fairness and proportionality in the absence of written grounds from the taxing officer. (Paras 11, 12, 16)

What exactly did the court order at the end of the review?

The final orders were straightforward but important. The plaintiffs’ application was allowed, and their total costs were revised from $485,000 to $560,000. The first defendant’s application, insofar as it sought to reduce the third parties’ awards, was dismissed. There was therefore no revision in respect of the third parties’ costs. The judgment thus produced a partial success for the plaintiffs and a complete failure for the first defendant’s challenge to the third parties’ awards. (Paras 13, 14)

"I, therefore, allow the plaintiffs’ application and revise the total costs awarded to him from $485,000 to $560,000." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 14

The judge’s order also confirms that the review was not a wholesale reopening of the taxation exercise. He did not disturb the third parties’ awards, and he did not accept the first defendant’s invitation to reduce them. Instead, he made a targeted correction where he considered the difference substantial enough to justify intervention. That selective approach is consistent with the governing principle he had earlier identified. (Paras 5, 7, 13, 14)

In practical terms, the judgment left the third parties where they were after review, but increased the plaintiffs’ recovery by $75,000. The result underscores that a reviewing judge may adjust one bill without necessarily altering others, even where all arise from the same litigation. The decisive question remains whether each award is defensible on its own terms. (Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 14)

Why does this case matter for modern costs taxation practice?

This case matters because it illustrates the limits of deference in costs review. The judge reaffirmed that taxation awards should not be disturbed unless a wrong principle was applied, but he also showed that the absence of written grounds can justify a more searching review. Where the taxing officer’s method is opaque, the reviewing judge may have to reconstruct what a fair award should be from the trial’s length, the work done, and the parties’ relative roles. (Paras 5, 6, 7)

It also matters because it demonstrates a practical judicial technique for quantifying costs in a complex civil case. The judge used a daily rate, added getting-up, and allowed for refreshers, while keeping an eye on the overall total. That method is especially useful in long trials where the work is substantial but not easily reduced to a single formula. The judgment therefore offers a concrete example of how proportionality and fairness can be operationalised in costs assessment. (Paras 9, 10, 11, 12)

Finally, the case is significant because it shows that a reviewing court may distinguish sharply between different successful parties. The plaintiffs, who bore the main burden of the litigation, received an increase; the third parties, whose roles were narrower, did not. For practitioners, the lesson is that costs arguments should be tailored to the actual litigation burden and not merely to the fact of success or participation. (Paras 11, 12, 13, 14, 16)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• None expressly referenced in the extracted judgment. (Paras 0-16)

"I am asked to review the award of costs by the learned assistant registrar in respect of the bills of costs by the plaintiffs, first Third Party and third Third Party." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 1

"His initial awards were $390,000, $290,000 and $240,000 respectively. At the parties’ request for a review, the learned assistant registrar revised his awards to $485,000, $270,000 and $210,000 respectively." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 1

"The two Third Parties are content with their revised awards, but Mr Selvam for the first defendant asks that these awards be revised lower especially if the plaintiffs’ costs are revised upwards." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 3

"On this basis, I would award a sum of $10,000 a day for 38 days to the plaintiffs." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 9

"In respect of the first Third Party, I am of the view that he should be awarded $5,000 a day for the 38 days trial." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 11

"I would award him $4,000 a day for 38 days. I would award a sum of $40,000 for the getting up and $10,000 for each of the three refreshers." — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 12

"- Sgd - Choo Han Teck Judicial Commissioner" — Per Choo Han Teck JC, Para 16

Why Does This Case Matter?

WYNO Marine Pte Ltd (In Liquidation) v Lim Teck Cheng and Others is a useful authority on the review of taxed costs because it shows the boundary between deference and intervention. The court reaffirmed that a reviewing judge should not lightly disturb a taxing officer’s award, but it also recognised that a lack of written grounds can make intervention necessary where the basis of the award is unclear. That is a practical lesson for both judges and practitioners: reasons matter, especially when the award is substantial. (Paras 5, 6, 7)

The case also matters because it demonstrates how a court may assess costs in a large civil trial by reference to concrete litigation metrics. The judge used the agreed trial length, the getting-up work, and the relative burden borne by each party to arrive at differentiated awards. This is a reminder that costs are not merely a mechanical consequence of success; they are a reflection of the actual work and responsibility involved in the litigation. (Paras 9, 10, 11, 12, 16)

For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of making a clear record on taxation review. If a party contends that the taxing officer has adopted a global-sum approach or otherwise applied the wrong principle, that contention should be supported by the available materials. Conversely, if a party seeks to resist revision, it is helpful to show that the award is anchored in the proper principle and that any difference from the reviewing judge’s view is not substantial. (Paras 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 14)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2000] SGHC 10 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.