WWM v WWN

"The affidavits of means envisaged under that rule are intended to be those of the parties themselves. Any others may be filed only with leave." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 5

Case Information

• Citation: [2024] SGHCF 27 (Para 1)
• Court: General Division of the High Court (Family Division) — District Court Appeals Nos 12 and 13 of 2024 (Para 1)
• Decision Date: 25 July 2024; judgment reserved on 5 August 2024 (Para 1)
• Coram: Choo Han Teck J (Para 1)
• Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: The judgment identifies the Wife’s counsel and the Husband’s counsel, but it does not name them. The judgment does not address this issue. (Paras 2, 4, 10)
• Counsel for Defendant/Respondent: The judgment identifies the Wife’s counsel and the Husband’s counsel, but it does not name them. The judgment does not address this issue. (Paras 2, 4, 10)
• Case Number: District Court Appeal No 12 of 2024 and District Court Appeal No 13 of 2024 (Para 1)
• Area of Law: Family law; matrimonial assets; division; ancillary matters; admissibility of affidavits (Para 1)
• Judgment Length: Approximately 4,000+ words in the supplied text; the full judgment appears longer than the excerpt provided. The judgment does not address this issue. (Paras 1-18)

Summary

This was a pair of cross-appeals arising from the division of matrimonial assets after a long marriage of 41 years between the Wife and the Husband. The parties were married on 16 May 1981, had two adult children, and the Wife commenced divorce proceedings on 11 April 2022, with interim judgment granted on 27 October 2022. The appeal concerned, among other things, the admissibility of the Children’s Affidavits, the treatment of a $130,000 withdrawal from the Wife’s CPF monies, the inclusion of joint bank accounts with the parties’ daughter, and the recalculation of direct and indirect contributions. (Para 2)

In DCA 12, the Wife sought a higher percentage of indirect contributions and argued that the District Judge should have considered the Children’s Affidavits. Choo Han Teck J held that r 89(2) and r 89(3) of the Family Justice Rules 2014 permit only two ancillary matters affidavits per party, and any further affidavits require leave of court. However, although the Judge did not accept the Wife’s interpretation, he also considered whether the affidavits should nevertheless be admitted under the court’s power to excuse non-compliance. He declined to admit them, finding that they would not justify increasing the Wife’s indirect contribution share beyond the 10% found below. (Paras 3-5)

In DCA 13, the Husband challenged several aspects of the asset pool and apportionment. The Judge held that half of the monies in the mother-daughter joint accounts should be returned to the matrimonial pool, but he rejected the Wife’s attempt to exclude the accounts entirely. He also held that $130,000 should not remain outside the pool, but for different reasons from those advanced below: he found that the Husband had consented to the $118,840 gift to the daughter and that the remaining $11,160 was not substantial enough to warrant a different conclusion. The judgment then turned to recalculating direct contributions, including the parties’ contributions to joint bank accounts and the matrimonial home. (Paras 6-10)

What Were the Parties to the Marriage and the Procedural Background?

The appeal concerned a marriage between the Wife and the Husband, who were 69 and 72 years old respectively at the time of judgment. They married on 16 May 1981 and had two adult children. The Wife worked as a personal assistant in the Ministry of Health and earned $4,311, while the Husband had retired in 2020 as an operation supervisor with Exxon Mobil and did not disclose his last-drawn salary. The Wife filed for divorce on 11 April 2022, and interim judgment was granted on an uncontested basis on 27 October 2022. (Para 2)

What Was the Central Issue in DCA 12?

The central issue in DCA 12 was whether the Wife should have received a higher proportion for indirect contributions, and whether the Children’s Affidavits should have been admitted to support her case. The Wife argued that the District Judge had wrongly struck out the affidavits because they were filed without leave under r 89(3) of the Family Justice Rules 2014. She also argued that the rule should be interpreted purposively so that non-parties could file affidavits without leave. (Para 3)

How Did the Court Interpret r 89 of the Family Justice Rules 2014?

The Judge held that the plain wording of rr 89(2) and 89(3) provides for a total of two ancillary matters affidavits by each party, and that any further affidavits beyond those two require leave of court. He rejected the Wife’s argument that the rule allowed two rounds of affidavits, and he also rejected the suggestion that the rule could be circumvented by exhibiting the Children’s Affidavits in a later affidavit. He stated that the affidavits of means contemplated by the rule are intended to be those of the parties themselves, and that any others may be filed only with leave. (Para 4)

Why Did the Court Refuse to Admit the Children’s Affidavits?

Although the Judge accepted that the court may excuse non-compliance with the Family Justice Rules under r 10(2)(b), he considered the relevance and necessity of the Children’s Affidavits to the ancillary matters hearing to be a key factor. He disagreed with the District Judge’s reasoning that the affidavits were unnecessary because a 41-year marriage would automatically attract a 50-50 ratio for indirect contributions, noting that the District Judge ultimately found a 60-40 ratio in the Wife’s favour. Even so, the Judge concluded that the affidavits did not warrant an increase in the Wife’s indirect contribution share, which remained at 10% in her favour. (Para 5)

What Did the Wife Argue About Indirect Contributions?

The Wife argued that the Children’s Affidavits supported her claim for a higher percentage of indirect contributions. She contended that the District Judge should have given greater weight to the evidence from the children, and that the affidavits were relevant to rebut the Husband’s factual allegations and to corroborate her own account of the marriage. The Judge noted that the written submissions below suggested that the affidavits mainly provided additional support for the Wife’s claims and rebuttals, but he found no basis to conclude that the District Judge had discounted her allegations because they lacked corroboration from the children. (Para 5)

What Was the Dispute Over the $130,000 Withdrawal?

The Wife also argued that the District Judge erred in adding $130,000 back into the matrimonial pool. The facts were that she withdrew $150,000 from her CPF on 30 August 2021; $118,840 was undisputedly given as a gift to the parties’ daughter for a condominium purchase, and $20,000 was returned to her CPF. The Wife said the remaining $11,160 was left in a joint bank account with the daughter, although the Husband’s counsel characterised that as evidence from the bar. (Para 6)

How Did the Court Apply TNL v TNK to the Withdrawal?

The Judge relied on TNL v TNK for the proposition that where a spouse expends a substantial amount of matrimonial money when divorce proceedings are imminent and the other spouse did not consent, the expended sum must be returned to the matrimonial asset pool. He found that divorce proceedings were imminent when the Wife withdrew the CPF monies and made the gift to the daughter, particularly because the parties had signed a Deed on 21 August 2021 that was designed to facilitate reconciliation while preserving the Wife’s ability to rely on the Husband’s association with another woman as a divorce ground. (Para 6)

Why Did the Court Find Divorce Proceedings Were Imminent?

The Judge reasoned that the Deed showed the parties were already contemplating the possibility of divorce from 21 August 2021 onwards. He explained that cl 2.1 of the Deed required one party to move out of the matrimonial home for six months while the parties attempted reconciliation, and that this arrangement was intended to ensure that s 95A(3) of the Women’s Charter would not bar the Wife from relying on the Husband’s association with B. On that basis, he concluded that the prospect of divorce was already on the parties’ minds when the Wife made the withdrawal and gift. (Para 6)

Did the Husband Consent to the Gift of $118,840?

The Judge held that the Husband had consented to the gift of $118,840 and that the District Judge erred in finding otherwise. He relied on the Husband’s own first affidavit of assets and means, in which the Husband said he believed the Wife had used $100,000 for the daughter’s condominium downpayment and that he had no objection, even stating that he would support the daughter financially and had no intention of treating the assistance as a loan. The Judge rejected the Husband’s later attempt to say he had not known of or consented to the withdrawal or dissipation of $150,000, describing that argument as contrived. (Para 7)

How Did the Court Deal With the Remaining $11,160?

As to the remaining $11,160, the Judge noted that the Wife’s assertion that it was deposited into the mother-daughter POSB account was unsupported by affidavit and therefore amounted to evidence from the bar. Even so, he considered the sum not substantial and said it could conceivably have been used for ordinary daily expenses. On that basis, he excluded the $130,000 from the matrimonial pool. (Para 7)

What Was the Issue Concerning the Mother-Daughter Joint Accounts?

In DCA 13, the Husband argued that the District Judge had erred in excluding the balances of two joint bank accounts held by the Wife and her daughter. Both parties agreed that the District Judge had erred in law in holding that the monies belonged to the daughter by reason of survivorship. The Wife, however, argued that the accounts should still be excluded from the matrimonial assets because both she and the daughter operated them, the daughter and son had made deposits, and the funds were commingled such that beneficial ownership could not be ascertained. (Para 8)

How Did the Court Determine Whether the Joint Accounts Were Matrimonial Assets?

The Judge disagreed with the Wife and held that the assets of parties to the marriage are generally treated as matrimonial assets unless a party proves otherwise on a balance of probabilities. He found that the Wife could not ascertain how much of the money belonged to her, and he also noted her admission that the money in the mother-daughter POSB account was used for household expenses. He therefore held that she had not discharged her burden of proof. (Para 8)

Why Did the Court Add Only Half of the Joint Account Monies Back Into the Pool?

Although the Wife failed to prove that the joint account monies were not matrimonial assets, the Judge held that only half of the monies in the mother-daughter joint accounts should be returned to the matrimonial pool. He relied on VQF v VQG for the proposition that, in such circumstances, the other half is deemed to belong to the other joint owner, namely the daughter. Since the accounts totalled $20,863.96, he ordered that $10,431.98 be added to the matrimonial pool and attributed to the Wife. (Para 8)

What Did the Court Say About the Parties’ Direct Contributions?

The Judge addressed the Husband’s complaint that the District Judge had wrongly apportioned the parties’ direct contributions. He noted that the Husband’s counsel submitted that the District Judge had treated certain joint bank accounts as joint assets and attributed them equally, even though the parties had allegedly agreed that some balances were contributed solely by one spouse. The Judge found it unclear how the District Judge arrived at the overall direct contributions ratio and therefore recalculated the matrimonial pool and the direct contribution ratio himself. (Para 9)

How Did the Court Treat the Joint Bank Accounts in the Direct Contributions Analysis?

The Judge accepted that the parties’ direct contributions to the joint bank accounts needed to be taken into account because they affected the overall direct contributions calculation. He rejected the Wife’s submission that the District Judge had already accounted for the Husband’s claim, explaining that the closure of the joint accounts and the allocation of the balances were separate from the question of who had contributed what to those accounts. He therefore took the Husband’s submissions into account when recalculating the figures. (Para 9)

What Was the Dispute Over the Matrimonial Home?

The parties also disagreed about their direct contributions to the matrimonial home. The Judge recorded that both parties agreed the District Judge had erred by failing to take into account their direct contributions toward the purchase of the matrimonial home, although they disagreed on the amount of cash each had contributed. The Wife said she contributed $10,000, while the Husband’s position was not fully set out in the excerpt provided. The judgment does not address this issue further in the supplied text. (Para 10)

What Did the Court Say About the Husband’s Medical Conditions?

The Husband argued that the District Judge failed to consider his prostate cancer and other medical ailments, including hypertension, diabetes, a coronary issue involving a stent, and high protein in the urine, and that he should have received a 5% uplift in the final division. The Judge listed this as one of the Husband’s complaints, but the supplied text does not show a final determination on this point. The judgment does not address this issue further in the excerpt provided. (Para 9)

What Did the Court Decide on the Wife’s Appeal in DCA 12?

The Judge declined to admit the Children’s Affidavits and declined to increase the Wife’s proportion for indirect contributions. He held that the affidavits were filed without leave, that the rule required leave for further affidavits, and that even if the affidavits were considered, they did not justify increasing the Wife’s indirect contribution share beyond the 10% found by the District Judge. (Paras 4-5)

What Did the Court Decide on the Husband’s Appeal in DCA 13?

The Judge held that half of the monies in the mother-daughter joint accounts should be added back into the matrimonial pool, amounting to $10,431.98. He also held that the $130,000 withdrawn from CPF should not remain outside the pool, though he reasoned that the Husband had consented to the $118,840 gift and that the remaining $11,160 was not substantial. He further indicated that he would recalculate the direct contributions, but the supplied text does not contain the final recalculated figures. (Paras 7-9)

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it clarifies the operation of r 89 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 in ancillary matters proceedings. The Judge’s interpretation confirms that parties are limited to two affidavits each unless leave is obtained, and that attempts to circumvent the rule by exhibiting third-party affidavits in later filings will not necessarily succeed. That is a practical point for family practitioners managing evidence in contested ancillary matters. (Paras 4-5)

The case is also significant for matrimonial asset division because it illustrates how the court approaches dissipation or expenditure of matrimonial funds when divorce is imminent. The Judge’s reasoning shows that the court will look closely at surrounding circumstances, including deeds and reconciliation arrangements, to determine whether a spouse’s expenditure should be brought back into the pool. It also demonstrates that consent, even if inferred from prior conduct and statements, can be decisive in determining whether a transfer to a child should be treated as a returnable matrimonial asset. (Paras 6-7)

Finally, the judgment is useful on the treatment of joint accounts held with adult children. The court reaffirmed that matrimonial assets are presumed to remain matrimonial unless proven otherwise, but it also recognised that where a joint account is held with a non-spouse, only the spouse’s share may be returned to the pool. That approach provides a practical framework for tracing and apportioning mixed family funds in future cases. (Para 8)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Family Justice Rules 2014, rr 89(2), 89(3), and 10(2)(b) (Paras 3-5)
• Women’s Charter, s 95A(3) (Para 6) [CDN] [SSO]

Source Documents

• Original Judgment (PDF) — Singapore Law Watch
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2024] SGHCF 27 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.