Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHCF 46
- Title: WVD and others v WUR and others
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Family Division)
- Date of Decision: 7 August 2025
- Judgment Reserved: 31 July 2025
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Originating Process: Originating Summons (Probate) No 6 of 2024
- Summons: Summons No 116 of 2025
- Parties (Applicants/Claimants): WVD; WVE; WVF
- Parties (Respondents/Defendants): WUR; WUS; WUT; WUU; WUV; WUW; WUX; WUY; WUZ; WVA; WVB; WVC
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Costs
- Key Issue: Whether the High Court (Family Division) has power to order instalment payment of costs awarded by the High Court
- Statutes Referenced: Family Justice Act 2014 (including ss 29C and s 4(1)); State Courts Act 1970 (including s 43(1)(b)); Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (including s 27); State Courts Act (including s 68); Supreme Court of Judicature Act (including s 27); Family Justice Act 2014 (including s 45(1))
- Prior Related Decisions: WUR and others v WVD and others [2024] SGFC 13; WVD and others v WUR and others [2025] SGHCF 46 (this decision)
- Cases Cited: [2023] SGHC 286; [2024] SGFC 13; [2025] SGHCF 46
- Reported/Unreported Note: Judgment subject to final editorial corrections and redaction for publication in LawNet/Singapore Law Reports
- Procedural Posture: Application to vary/enable payment of costs in instalments following an earlier costs order
- Representation: Applicants in person; Ramesh s/o Varthappan (Legal Minds Practice LLC) and Dew Wong (Dew Chambers) for the respondents
Summary
This High Court (Family Division) decision concerns an application by judgment debtors to pay costs awarded against them in instalments. The applicants (including a minor represented through her litigation representative) had previously been found in breach of fiduciary duties in probate proceedings and were ordered to pay costs after their late attempt to seek leave to appeal was dismissed. After the costs order was made, the applicants applied for an instalment payment arrangement.
The respondents objected on a threshold ground: they argued that the General Division of the High Court lacks statutory power to order instalment payments for judgments and orders for payment of money generally. Relying on Tan Meow Hiang (trading as Chip Huat) v Ong Kay Yong (trading as Wee Wee Laundry Service) [2023] SGHC 286, the respondents contended that instalment powers are conferred on the State Courts and Family Courts, not on the High Court.
Choo Han Teck J rejected the procedural objection. The court held that, although the power to order instalments is expressly conferred on lower courts, the High Court can exercise an inherent power (and/or supervisory/revisionary powers in the family context) to make instalment orders where justice so requires. On the merits, the court found that the applicants faced genuine hardship and that a structured instalment plan would balance the judgment creditors’ entitlement with the risk of impoverishment to the debtors. The court granted instalments of $500 per month, with a strict default mechanism.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The dispute arose from probate proceedings in the Family Justice Courts. In FC/S 1/2020, the respondents obtained judgment against the applicants. The 1st applicant was the sole executor and trustee of his late mother’s estate. The 2nd and 3rd applicants were the 1st applicant’s children and the deceased’s grandchildren, and they were named as nominal defendants in the earlier proceedings. The 3rd applicant was a minor and was represented by her mother, who acted as the litigation representative.
In FC/S 1/2020, the District Judge found that the 1st applicant had breached his fiduciary duties as executor and trustee. The District Judge also directed the 1st applicant to produce the accounts of the deceased’s estate. The applicants were dissatisfied and wished to appeal, but they were out of time to file the necessary appeal documents.
To address the lateness, the applicants filed HCF/OSP 6/2024 seeking an extension of time to file an application for leave to file a notice of appeal out of time. That application was dismissed by the High Court on 6 March 2025. Importantly for present purposes, the High Court also ordered costs against the applicants. The costs order required: (a) the 1st applicant to pay $5,000; (b) the 2nd applicant to pay $1,500; and (c) the litigation representative of the 3rd applicant to pay $1,500.
After the costs order was made, the applicants brought the present application (HCF/SUM 116/2025) to pay the costs in instalments. The respondents opposed the application both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, they argued that the High Court had no power to order instalment payments for costs. Substantively, they argued that the applicants had not provided full and frank disclosure of their financial position to justify a departure from the usual expectation that costs be paid promptly.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue was whether the High Court (Family Division) has jurisdiction or power to order instalment payment of costs awarded by the High Court. This issue was framed as a question of statutory authority and the limits of the High Court’s powers. The respondents relied on Tan Meow Hiang (trading as Chip Huat) v Ong Kay Yong (trading as Wee Wee Laundry Service) [2023] SGHC 286, where the court had observed that the High Court does not have statutory power to order instalment payments in relation to judgments and orders for payment of money generally.
The second legal issue was whether, even if the High Court has power to make instalment orders, the applicants had established the kind of hardship or special circumstances required to justify such an order. The court needed to balance the judgment creditors’ right to immediate payment against the risk that enforcing the costs as a lump sum would render the debtors impoverished and deprive them of livelihood.
Related to this was the question of disclosure and evidential sufficiency. The respondents contended that the applicants had not made full and frank disclosure of their financial position. The court therefore had to assess the adequacy of the applicants’ evidence, including whether the applicants’ financial circumstances were sufficiently particularised to justify instalments.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
On the procedural objection, the court engaged directly with the reasoning in Chip Huat. In that earlier case, the High Court had noted that instalment powers are expressly conferred on the State Courts and Family Courts by s 43(1)(b) of the State Courts Act 1970 and s 29C of the Family Justice Act 2014, respectively. The respondents argued that the absence of an express provision for the High Court meant that the High Court could not order instalments for judgments and costs.
Choo Han Teck J did not accept that conclusion. The judge reasoned that the High Court’s supervisory and revisionary powers in family matters are expressly empowered by s 4(1)(c) of the Family Justice Act 2014 read with s 27 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969. The judge considered it unlikely that Parliament intended the High Court to be able to order instalments when exercising supervisory/revisionary powers, but not when the matter comes directly before the High Court by way of an application. In other words, the court treated the statutory framework as supporting a broader remedial capacity in the family context, rather than a rigid exclusion.
The judge also relied on the concept of inherent power. The court observed that instalment orders are typically a mechanism to ameliorate hardship. In situations where justice requires such amelioration, the High Court can exercise inherent powers to grant instalment relief. This approach aligns with the general principle that courts may possess inherent jurisdiction to ensure that their processes are not used to produce injustice, particularly where strict enforcement would cause undue hardship.
To reinforce the inherent power analysis, the judge drew an analogy to the treatment of immunity in superior courts. He referenced s 68(1) of the State Courts Act (and s 45(1) of the Family Justice Act) which expressly provides immunity for judges of lower courts, and contrasted this with the absence of an equivalent statutory provision for superior courts. The judge reasoned that superior courts nonetheless enjoy similar protections as a matter of common law. This analogy supported the proposition that the absence of an express instalment provision in the Supreme Court/High Court legislation does not necessarily mean the power is absent.
In addition, the judge addressed the respondents’ reliance on the UK Civil Procedure Rules. While Chip Huat had cited rule 40.11(a) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, the judge accepted the point made by academic commentary (Prof Benjamin Ong) that the rule does not itself confer power; it only facilitates the process where power exists. The judge further referred to Prof Ong’s discussion of the High Court’s inherent power, including the older Malayan authority Phan Pow v Tuck Lee Mining & Co (1959) 25 MLJ 32, where instalment payment of damages was ordered even after express instalment legislation had been abolished. The court treated this as persuasive support that courts can order instalments notwithstanding legislative silence.
Having concluded that the High Court is empowered to make instalment orders where appropriate, the court turned to the substantive merits. The judge described instalment relief as a “balancing act” between the judgment creditor’s entitlement and the judgment debtor’s hardship. The court emphasised that only in special circumstances of hardship would it be just and equitable to make an instalment order. This reflects the general principle that judgments and costs orders should ordinarily be complied with promptly, and instalments are an exception rather than the norm.
On the evidence, the respondents argued that the applicants had not provided full and frank disclosure of their financial position. The judge, however, found that the applicants produced screenshots of bank balances showing they did not have the means to pay the costs in full in one payment. The applicants also offered to provide further information if required. The judge considered that, given the applicants were immediate family members, the court could assess their individual financial circumstances based on the evidence before it.
The court then assessed the risk of impoverishment. The 1st applicant had been unemployed since 2021. Although he held a master’s degree, he faced difficulty finding employment due to age (64). The 2nd applicant, aged 23, was also unemployed. He had previously worked as a data entry clerk earning $12 per hour, with a last drawn monthly salary of $700. The litigation representative of the 3rd applicant had two jobs: a document controller position in a statutory board paying $3,000 per month, and part-time work in a convenience store. The judge framed the test as whether the debtor is at risk of being rendered impoverished and deprived of all means of livelihood.
On these facts, the judge found that enforcing the costs as a lump sum may impoverish the applicants. By contrast, the respondents were more likely to recover their costs fully if the applicants were given time to pay. This reasoning reflects a pragmatic approach: instalment orders can preserve the creditors’ ultimate recovery while preventing disproportionate harm to debtors.
Finally, the judge addressed the applicants’ payment history. The court noted that the applicants were late in payment on their original repayment plan. This influenced the structure of the order. The court therefore granted instalments of $500 per month, but required the plan to commence on the 15th day of the month of the judgment. The court also imposed a strict default clause: if the applicants defaulted in any one payment, even by a day, the entire balance would become due and payable within seven days, failing which the respondents would be at liberty to enforce the remaining judgment debt.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court granted the application for instalment payment of the costs ordered on 6 March 2025. The court ordered that the total debt be paid by instalments of $500 per month, commencing on the 15th day of the month of the judgment.
The order included a stringent default mechanism. If the applicants defaulted on any instalment, even by one day, the entire outstanding balance would become due and payable within seven days. If the applicants failed to pay within that period, the respondents were at liberty to enforce the balance of the judgment debt.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies the High Court’s capacity to grant instalment orders for costs in appropriate circumstances, despite the earlier line of authority suggesting a lack of statutory power for the High Court to order instalments in general. By grounding its conclusion in the Family Justice Act’s supervisory/revisionary framework and the High Court’s inherent powers, the court provides a doctrinal route for debtors seeking instalment relief where hardship is real and evidence is credible.
For litigators, the case also underscores the evidential and discretionary nature of instalment orders. The court did not treat instalments as automatic. Instead, it required “special circumstances of hardship” and assessed whether the judgment debtors faced a genuine risk of impoverishment. The decision therefore signals that applicants should prepare detailed financial disclosure and be ready to explain how lump-sum enforcement would affect livelihood.
Practically, the court’s strict default clause is equally important. Even where instalment relief is granted, the court may impose tight compliance conditions, particularly where there has been prior lateness. This means that counsel advising judgment debtors should consider not only the likelihood of obtaining instalments but also the operational feasibility of meeting the instalment schedule to avoid acceleration of the entire debt.
Legislation Referenced
- Family Justice Act 2014 (including s 4(1)(c), s 29C, and s 45(1))
- State Courts Act 1970 (including s 43(1)(b) and s 68(1))
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (including s 27)
Cases Cited
- Tan Meow Hiang (trading as Chip Huat) v Ong Kay Yong (trading as Wee Wee Laundry Service) [2023] SGHC 286
- WUR and others v WVD and others [2024] SGFC 13
- Phan Pow v Tuck Lee Mining & Co (1959) 25 MLJ 32
- AHQ v Attorney-General and another appeal [2015] 4 SLR 760
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHCF 46 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.