Case Details
- Citation: [2023] SGHCF 20
- Title: WLR and another v WLT and another and other matters
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Family Division)
- Decision Date: 3 May 2024
- Judgment Reserved: 2 May 2024
- Judges: Choo Han Teck J
- Proceedings: Originating Summons (Mental Capacity Act) Nos 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 2022
- Originating Summons (Mental Capacity Act) No 2 of 2022: In the Matter of Section 20 of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A) and in the matter of P, a person alleged to lack capacity (Deputyship Applications)
- Originating Summons (Mental Capacity Act) No 3 of 2022: In the Matter of Section 20 of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A) and in the matter of P, a person alleged to lack capacity (Deputyship Applications)
- Originating Summons (Mental Capacity Act) No 4 of 2022: In the Matter of Section 20 of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A) and in the matter of P, a person alleged to lack capacity (Deputyship Applications)
- Originating Summons (Mental Capacity Act) No 5 of 2022: In the Matter of Section 20 of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A) and in the matter of P, a person alleged to lack capacity (LPA Revocation Application)
- Plaintiffs/Applicants: WLR and another (and, in the consolidated matters, siblings J, W and T)
- Defendants/Respondents: WLT and another and other matters (and, in the consolidated matters, siblings J, W and T)
- Legal Area: Family Law — Procedure (Costs in MCA proceedings)
- Statutes Referenced: Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A) (including Mental Capacity Act 2008 (2020 Rev Ed))
- Rules Referenced: Family Justice Rules 2014 (“FJR”)
- Key Prior Judgment Referred To: WLR and another v WLT and another and other matters [2023] 5 SLR 1372 (“the Judgment”)
- Cases Cited: [2023] SGHCF 20; [2024] SGHCF 20; VVB v VVA [2022] 4 SLR 1181; Chan Choy Lin v Chua Che Teck [1995] 3 SLR(R) 310
- Judgment Length: 12 pages, 2,774 words
Summary
This High Court decision concerns the costs arising from consolidated proceedings under Singapore’s Mental Capacity Act framework, involving an elderly mother, P, who suffered from severe Alzheimer’s disease and lacked mental capacity. The litigation was not merely a technical contest about appointment of decision-makers; it reflected an acrimonious sibling dispute. The court had earlier granted and dismissed various applications in the substantive phase, including deputyship applications and an application to revoke a Lasting Power of Attorney (“LPA”). This judgment addresses how costs should be allocated among the siblings and, critically, whether costs should be borne by P’s estate or by particular family members.
Applying the statutory and procedural principles governing costs in Mental Capacity Act proceedings, the court held that costs should generally follow the event. However, the court departed from the default rule that costs of MCA proceedings are to be borne by P (or charged to her estate) where the proceedings, though framed as being for P’s benefit, were effectively driven by the siblings’ personal interests and distrust. The court ordered that the successful LPA revocation applicant (T) should be entitled to costs, but that the deputyship-related costs should not be charged to P’s estate in circumstances where the litigation had been subverted into an adversarial crusade.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
P was the subject of multiple applications under the Mental Capacity Act because she suffered from severe Alzheimer’s disease and lacked mental capacity. The proceedings were initiated by three siblings (referred to in the judgment as J, W and T) in relation to their mother. The applications were consolidated and heard in April 2023, with the substantive judgment delivered in May 2023. The present decision focuses on the costs consequences of that earlier substantive outcome.
In broad terms, the siblings’ disputes centred on two connected but distinct issues. First, there were “Deputyship Applications” seeking the appointment of a deputy (or deputies) to make decisions for P under the statutory regime. These applications were brought under the Mental Capacity Act and were framed as necessary to ensure that P’s affairs were managed lawfully and in her best interests. Second, there was an “LPA Revocation Application” brought in June 2022, seeking to revoke P’s Lasting Power of Attorney executed in 2019 on the basis that P lacked capacity at the time the LPA was made.
The court’s earlier substantive findings (as referenced in the costs judgment) indicated that the siblings’ relationship was marked by deep distrust. Although the deputyship applications were, on paper, a contest among the siblings, the court observed that the real conflict was between J and T, with W playing a more peripheral role. The dispute was further complicated by the size of P’s estate and by family business interests, which surfaced in the siblings’ opposition to one another’s applications.
Importantly for costs, the LPA revocation application could have been avoided. The judgment noted that J proceeded to have P’s LPA executed despite professional observations by Dr Adrian Wang in consultations in December 2018 and January 2019 that P lacked mental capacity to execute an LPA. While revocation ultimately benefitted P by removing an instrument that did not satisfy the legal requirements under the Mental Capacity Act, the court considered that the revocation proceedings were precipitated by J’s disregard of the professional opinion. This factual matrix became central to the court’s allocation of costs.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The principal legal issues were cost allocation questions arising from Mental Capacity Act proceedings. The court had to decide, first, who should bear the costs of the LPA revocation application (OSM 5) and, second, who should bear the costs of the deputyship applications (OSM 2, OSM 3 and OSM 4). These issues required the court to interpret and apply the cost principles in the Mental Capacity Act and the Family Justice Rules.
Related to those allocation questions was a further issue: whether the default rule that costs of MCA proceedings are to be paid by P or charged to her estate should apply in full, or whether the court should depart from it in light of the circumstances. The court had to assess whether the proceedings were genuinely for P’s benefit throughout, or whether they had been transformed into adversarial litigation driven by the siblings’ personal interests and distrust.
Finally, the court had to determine the appropriate quantum of costs for the successful party in each application, including whether the costs claimed were proportionate to the nature and extent of the work required, and whether certain components of the dispute were relatively minor within the overall litigation.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by restating the parties’ agreement on the governing principles for costs in MCA proceedings. It emphasised that costs are in the court’s discretion, with statutory and procedural authority to determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid. The court also reiterated the general rule that costs should follow the event, subject to the court’s power to make some other order where appropriate. In addition, the court highlighted the specific rule that costs of proceedings under the MCA shall be paid by P or charged to her estate unless the court otherwise directs. The court further noted that it must have regard to the relevant circumstances, including those identified in the Mental Capacity Act and the Family Justice Rules.
For the LPA revocation application (OSM 5), the court treated the issue as relatively straightforward because the applicant (T) was successful. Costs therefore followed the event, and T was entitled to costs. The more nuanced question was whether those costs should be borne by J (the sibling whose conduct precipitated the revocation) or by P’s estate. Counsel for T argued that costs should be borne by P’s estate under the relevant rule, while J sought no order as to costs. The court’s reasoning turned on causation and fairness: J had proceeded to have P’s LPA executed despite Dr Wang’s professional opinion that P lacked capacity. Although the revocation benefitted P, the court considered that the revocation proceedings could have been avoided had J not disregarded the medical assessment.
Accordingly, the court held that J, and not P’s estate, should bear the costs of OSM 5. This approach reflects a pragmatic and moral dimension to costs in therapeutic justice contexts: where a party’s actions create or prolong litigation that should not have been necessary, it is not appropriate for the vulnerable person’s estate to bear the financial consequences. The court did not treat the success of the application as the sole determinant; it also assessed the conduct that led to the application and the extent to which the proceedings were truly required for P’s protection.
On quantum, the court considered the work involved, including pre-action interrogatories used to uncover the truth. However, it characterised the LPA revocation application as a relatively minor part of the overall dispute. While T’s counsel suggested $12,000 all-in, the court considered $8,000 a more reasonable sum. This indicates that the court applied proportionality and relative significance: even where a party is successful, costs should reflect the actual contribution of that application to the overall litigation burden.
Turning to the deputyship applications, the court addressed a second key issue: the “event” for costs. Counsel for T suggested that none of the applicants were entirely successful. The court rejected a purely formal approach to “event” and instead adopted a substantive approach, consistent with authority. It held that the determination of the event goes beyond the labelling of outcomes; it depends on the substantive success in the proceedings. In the consolidated matters, J and W succeeded in their applications, while T’s application was dismissed. Therefore, J and W should be entitled to costs of the deputyship applications.
The court then addressed who should bear those deputyship costs. Counsel for W argued that costs should be borne by P under the rule that costs of MCA proceedings are to be paid by P or charged to her estate. Counsel for W also sought additional costs from J and T for their opposition to W’s application. J’s position was that T should bear the costs of certain applications, and that no order should be made as to costs regarding W’s application. The court’s analysis focused on the rationale behind the rule: where MCA proceedings are instituted for P’s benefit, the party acting in P’s best interests should not be unduly burdened with costs.
However, the court recognised that family disputes often begin with a stated intention to act in P’s best interests but can deteriorate into adversarial conflict. It invoked its earlier observations from the substantive judgment: in long-standing familial disputes, the truth is often submerged in self-serving oral evidence, and the best-interest inquiry can be resolved by looking to who has actually been caring for P. In this case, the court had found that J had been looking after P’s well-being. In such circumstances, the court considered it appropriate to depart from the default rule that P’s estate should bear the costs, because P’s best interests had been subjugated to the siblings’ self-interests throughout the proceedings.
In applying this reasoning, the court drew a contrast between W and J/T. It found that W’s application was motivated predominantly by P’s best interests, and thus the costs of W’s application (OSM 3) should be borne by P under the default rule. By contrast, J and T’s applications were characterised as driven by distrust and personal grievances, complicated by the estate and family business. The court also addressed the therapeutic justice dimension: it referred to authority emphasising that awarding costs in fact signals that adversarial stances are not acceptable in family justice systems that adopt therapeutic justice. The court therefore concluded that the costs of OSM 2 and OSM 4 should be borne by T, not by P.
Finally, the court dealt with W’s contention that W should also receive costs from J and T in respect of OSM 3 because J and T had made “invalid objections.” The court rejected the idea that costs should automatically be ordered against objectors merely because their objections failed. Instead, it required an assessment of whether the objections were made in a manner that unnecessarily protracted the proceedings, thereby making it unfair for W’s legal costs to be borne by P. Given the court’s finding that W was always at the periphery and that J and T’s objections were a necessary corollary of their own applications, the court declined to make personal costs orders against J and T for OSM 3.
What Was the Outcome?
The court ordered that, for the LPA revocation application (OSM 5), T was entitled to costs because T succeeded. However, those costs were to be borne by J rather than by P’s estate, reflecting the court’s view that J’s conduct in disregarding professional medical opinion precipitated the need for revocation proceedings. The court assessed the quantum at $8,000 all-in.
For the deputyship applications, the court held that the substantive “event” favoured J and W, such that they were entitled to costs. Yet, the court allocated the burden differently: P’s estate was to bear the costs of W’s application (OSM 3) because it was motivated by P’s best interests, while T was ordered to bear the costs of J’s and T’s contested deputyship applications (OSM 2 and OSM 4). The court also declined to order additional costs against J and T in relation to OSM 3, finding that their objections did not unnecessarily complicate or protract the proceedings.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how Singapore courts will apply the cost regime in Mental Capacity Act proceedings in a family context. While the rules provide a default position that costs of MCA proceedings are to be paid by P or charged to her estate, the court demonstrated that this is not an automatic entitlement. Where the proceedings are effectively driven by personal interests, distrust, or conduct that should not have been necessary, the court may depart from the default and shift costs to the responsible sibling.
From a procedural and strategic standpoint, the case underscores that “therapeutic justice” is not merely a rhetorical principle; it influences costs outcomes. The court’s reasoning indicates that adversarial behaviour in family justice settings can have financial consequences, particularly where it undermines the best-interest purpose of MCA applications. Practitioners should therefore advise clients that costs exposure may arise not only from losing an application, but also from the manner in which the litigation is pursued and the extent to which it is genuinely necessary for the protection of the vulnerable person.
The case also provides useful guidance on how courts determine the “event” for costs in consolidated MCA matters. The court adopted a substantive approach rather than a formal one, focusing on who succeeded in the proceedings in substance. This is helpful for counsel preparing cost submissions, especially where multiple applications are heard together and outcomes are mixed.
Legislation Referenced
- Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A) — s 20 (context of deputyship and related MCA applications)
- Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A) — s 40(1) and s 40(2) (discretionary costs and power to determine who pays and to what extent)
- Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A) — s 40(3) (relevant circumstances for costs)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (“FJR”) — r 851(2) (costs discretion)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (“FJR”) — r 852(2) (costs follow the event)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (“FJR”) — r 190(1) (costs of MCA proceedings to be paid by P or charged to P’s estate unless the court otherwise directs)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (“FJR”) — rr 854 and 856 (relevant circumstances for costs)
Cases Cited
- VVB v VVA [2022] 4 SLR 1181
- Chan Choy Lin v Chua Che Teck [1995] 3 SLR(R) 310
- WLR and another v WLT and another and other matters [2023] 5 SLR 1372
- [2023] SGHCF 20
- [2024] SGHCF 20
Source Documents
This article analyses [2023] SGHCF 20 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.