Case Details
- Citation: [2023] SGHCF 20
- Title: WLR and another v WLT and another and other matters
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Family Division)
- Date of Judgment: 3 May 2024
- Judgment Reserved: 2 May 2024
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Proceedings: Originating Summons (Mental Capacity Act) Nos 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 2022
- Originating Summons (MCA) No 2 of 2022: In the Matter of Section 20 of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A); In the Matter of P, a person alleged to lack capacity; Between (1) WLR (2) WLS … Plaintiffs and (1) WLT (2) WLU … Defendants
- Originating Summons (MCA) No 3 of 2022: In the Matter of Section 20 of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A); In the Matter of P, a person alleged to lack capacity; Between WLT … Plaintiff and (1) WLR (2) WLU … Defendants
- Originating Summons (MCA) No 4 of 2022: In the Matter of Section 20 of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A); In the Matter of P, a person alleged to lack capacity; Between (1) WLU (2) WMB … Plaintiffs and (1) WLR (2) WLT … Defendants
- Originating Summons (MCA) No 5 of 2022: In the Matter of Section 20 of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A); In the Matter of P, a person alleged to lack capacity; Between WLU … Plaintiff and WLR … Defendant
- Legal Area: Family Law — Procedure (Costs in MCA proceedings)
- Statutes Referenced: Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A) (including Mental Capacity Act 2008 (2020 Rev Ed)); Family Justice Rules 2014 (FJR) (referenced in the judgment extract)
- Key Substantive Context: Deputyship applications and an LPA revocation application concerning P, who suffers from severe Alzheimer’s disease and lacks mental capacity
- Earlier Related Judgment: WLR and another v WLT and another and other matters [2023] 5 SLR 1372 (the “Judgment”)
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2023] SGHCF 20; [2024] SGHCF 20; VVB v VVA [2022] 4 SLR 1181; Chan Choy Lin v Chua Che Teck [1995] 3 SLR(R) 310
- Judgment Length: 12 pages; 2,774 words
Summary
This decision concerns the costs arising from consolidated proceedings under the Mental Capacity Act (“MCA”) in relation to P, an elderly woman suffering from severe Alzheimer’s disease and alleged to lack mental capacity. The proceedings were initiated by three siblings who were embroiled in competing applications for deputyship and, separately, an application to revoke P’s Lasting Power of Attorney (“LPA”). After the court had earlier determined the substantive issues in a related judgment, the present decision addresses how costs should be allocated among the siblings and whether costs should be borne by P’s estate.
The High Court (Family Division) accepted the general principle that costs follow the event, but emphasised that the MCA/FJR framework contains a specific protective rationale: where MCA proceedings are brought for P’s benefit, costs are generally to be paid by P or charged to her estate unless the court directs otherwise. The court departed from that default in circumstances where the litigation, though framed as acting in P’s best interests, was effectively driven by the siblings’ personal distrust and self-interests.
Ultimately, the court ordered that the sibling who succeeded in revoking the LPA should receive costs (with costs not borne by P’s estate in that instance), while in the deputyship applications, the sibling who was more clearly motivated by P’s welfare should have costs borne by P. Conversely, the siblings whose conduct and adversarial posture undermined the therapeutic purpose of family justice were ordered to bear costs personally.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The factual background is rooted in a family dispute involving P, who was diagnosed with severe Alzheimer’s disease and was unable to manage her affairs. The siblings commenced multiple MCA proceedings to secure legal authority for decisions affecting P. The applications were consolidated and heard in April 2023, with the court delivering its substantive judgment in May 2023 (reported as WLR and another v WLT and another and other matters [2023] 5 SLR 1372). The present decision, dated 3 May 2024, focuses specifically on costs arising from those applications.
There were two main categories of proceedings. First, the “Deputyship Applications” sought the appointment of deputies for P under s 20 of the MCA. These deputyship applications were brought by different siblings in different combinations, reflecting competing views about who should manage P’s personal welfare and/or property and affairs. The court granted some deputyship applications in part, dismissed one, and made orders reflecting the substantive “best interests” analysis required under the MCA.
Second, there was an “LPA Revocation Application” commenced in June 2022. This application sought to revoke P’s LPA executed in 2019 on the basis that P lacked mental capacity at the time of execution. The court ultimately granted this application, meaning that the LPA was revoked because it did not meet the legal capacity requirements under the MCA at the relevant time.
The costs dispute arose because the siblings’ positions were not merely procedural. The court found that the family conflict had a long history and was marked by distrust. In particular, the court observed that one sibling (J) had proceeded to have the LPA executed despite medical observations in consultations in December 2018 and January 2019 where a doctor (Dr Adrian Wang) opined that P lacked the mental capacity to execute an LPA. This conduct became central to the court’s approach to costs: while revocation benefitted P by removing an invalid instrument, the court considered that the revocation could have been avoided had the sibling not disregarded professional advice.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The primary legal issue was how to allocate costs in MCA proceedings under the Mental Capacity Act and the Family Justice Rules 2014. Although the parties agreed on the general principles governing costs—namely the court’s discretion, the “costs follow the event” approach, and the default rule that costs of MCA proceedings are paid by P or charged to her estate—the court still had to decide whether the default should apply in the particular circumstances of this acrimonious family dispute.
A second key issue concerned the “event” for costs purposes. In the deputyship applications, the outcomes were not perfectly aligned with each applicant’s expectations: some applications were granted in part, others were dismissed, and the siblings’ submissions suggested that no one was “entirely successful.” The court had to determine what constituted the relevant “event” in substance, not merely in formal labelling of outcomes.
Third, the court had to decide, for each application, whether costs should be borne by P’s estate or by particular siblings personally. This required careful application of the rationale behind r 190(1) of the FJR, which is designed to prevent a person alleged to lack capacity from bearing the costs of proceedings brought for their benefit, while also ensuring that adversarial conduct does not shift the financial burden onto P where the litigation is driven by personal motives rather than P’s welfare.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by restating the agreed legal framework for costs in MCA proceedings. It emphasised that costs are discretionary under ss 40(1) and 40(2) of the MCA and r 851(2) of the FJR. It also reiterated that costs generally follow the event under r 852(2) of the FJR, while noting that the court may depart from that rule where circumstances justify a different order. Importantly, the court highlighted r 190(1) of the FJR, which provides that costs of MCA proceedings are to be paid by P or charged to her estate unless the court otherwise directs. Finally, the court noted that the court must have regard to relevant circumstances, including those identified in s 40(3) of the MCA and rr 854 and 856 of the FJR.
For the LPA Revocation Application (OSM 5), the court treated the issue as “isolated” and separate from the deputyship applications. Since T was successful in revoking the LPA, the court applied the costs-follow-the-event principle and concluded that T was entitled to costs. The more nuanced question was whether those costs should be borne by P’s estate or by J personally. The court answered that question by focusing on causation and blameworthiness in the litigation context: J had proceeded to have the LPA executed despite Dr Wang’s professional opinion that P lacked capacity. The court accepted that revocation benefitted P by removing an instrument that failed to satisfy MCA requirements, but it held that the revocation could have been avoided if J had not unilaterally disregarded the medical advice.
Accordingly, the court ordered that J—not P’s estate—should bear the costs of OSM 5. This approach reflects a pragmatic and policy-sensitive view: while the MCA/FJR framework protects P from bearing costs, it does not immunise parties whose conduct necessitates litigation that could have been avoided. The court also addressed quantum. Counsel for T sought $12,000 all-in, but the court considered the LPA revocation application to be a relatively minor part of the overall dispute. It therefore reduced the figure to $8,000, illustrating that even where costs are awarded against a sibling, the court will calibrate the amount to the actual work and significance of the application.
Turning to the deputyship applications (OSM 2, OSM 3, and OSM 4), the court addressed the “event” question first. It rejected the notion that the “event” should be determined by whether applicants were “entirely successful” in a superficial sense. Instead, the court held that the substantive outcome governs. It relied on VVB v VVA for the proposition that the determination of the “event” goes beyond formal labelling and requires attention to the substantive outcome of the proceedings. On that basis, the court found that J and W succeeded substantively, while T’s application was entirely dismissed. Therefore, J and W were entitled to costs of the deputyship applications.
The court then addressed the more difficult issue: who should bear those costs. Counsel for W argued that costs should be borne by P under r 190(1) of the FJR, suggesting that the provision is mandatory. Counsel for W also sought additional relief, arguing that W should be entitled to costs from J and T for their opposition of W’s application. J’s position was that T should bear the costs of certain applications, while no order should be made as to costs for W’s application. The court’s analysis focused on the rationale behind r 190(1): where proceedings are instituted under the MCA for P’s benefit, the party acting in P’s best interests should not unduly shoulder costs.
However, the court recognised that family disputes can transform “best interests” litigation into adversarial battles driven by distrust, ego, and competing narratives. The court observed that in such situations, the protective purpose of r 190(1) is undermined. It therefore held that r 190(1) should be departed from where the proceedings, though ostensibly about P, are effectively subjugated to the self-interests of applicants. The court’s reasoning drew on its earlier observations in the substantive judgment: the truth in family disputes is often obscured by self-serving oral evidence, and the “best interests” determination can be resolved by looking at who has actually been caring for P over time.
Applying these principles, the court found that W’s application (OSM 3) was motivated predominantly by P’s best interests and was not entangled with the family business or estate-related concerns that fuelled J and T’s opposition. In contrast, J and T’s cases were framed in a way that reflected deep distrust and personal confrontation, complicated by the size of P’s estate and the family business. The court therefore concluded that the costs of OSM 3 should be borne by P under r 190(1), because W’s role aligned with the protective rationale of the rule.
As for J and T, the court held that their adversarial posture and subjective personal viewpoints were not sufficient to justify shifting costs to P. It emphasised that awarding costs in fact signals that adversarial stances are not acceptable in a family justice system that adopts therapeutic justice. The court ordered that the costs of OSM 2 and OSM 4 should be borne by T, not by P, reflecting the court’s view that T’s unsuccessful application and the manner in which the dispute was conducted warranted a departure from the default protective rule.
Finally, the court addressed W’s contention that J and T should be ordered to pay W’s costs in OSM 3 because their objections were invalid. The court rejected this as a basis for personal costs. It held that the question is not whether objections were ultimately unsuccessful, but whether they were made in a manner that unnecessarily protracted proceedings and made it unfair for W’s legal costs to be borne by P. Given that W was peripherally involved and that J and T’s objections were connected to the positions they advanced in their own applications, the court found that their objections did not unduly complicate the proceedings. It therefore declined to order personal costs against J and T for OSM 3.
What Was the Outcome?
The court made targeted costs orders across the four consolidated applications. In the LPA Revocation Application (OSM 5), it ordered that J should bear the costs of that application, awarding T costs on the basis that T succeeded and that the litigation could have been avoided had J not disregarded medical advice about P’s lack of capacity. The court assessed the quantum at $8,000 for OSM 5.
For the deputyship applications, the court ordered that the costs of OSM 3 should be borne by P, reflecting that W’s application was predominantly motivated by P’s best interests. Conversely, the court ordered that the costs of OSM 2 and OSM 4 should be borne by T, departing from the default r 190(1) approach because the court found that J and T’s conduct and the underlying motivations of the dispute were not aligned with the therapeutic and protective purpose of MCA proceedings.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how Singapore courts will apply the costs regime in MCA proceedings in the context of family conflict. While r 190(1) of the FJR provides a default protective rule that costs are paid by P or charged to P’s estate, the court demonstrates that this protection is not absolute. Where the litigation is driven by distrust, personal agendas, or conduct that necessitates avoidable disputes, the court may order costs against the sibling(s) responsible rather than against P’s estate.
The judgment also provides practical guidance on how to determine the “event” for costs purposes. It reinforces that courts will look at the substantive outcome of the proceedings rather than the formal success or partial success of each application. This matters in multi-application MCA litigation where different siblings seek different deputyship arrangements and where outcomes may be “granted in part” but still reflect a clear substantive winner.
Finally, the decision underscores the therapeutic justice ethos in family proceedings. By linking costs orders to the acceptability of adversarial stances, the court signals that costs are not merely compensatory but also serve as a behavioural signal. Lawyers advising parties in MCA disputes should therefore consider not only the legal merits of their clients’ positions but also how the manner of advancing those positions may affect costs exposure.
Legislation Referenced
- Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A), including ss 3(5), 20, 40(1), 40(2), 40(3)
- Mental Capacity Act 2008 (2020 Rev Ed)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (FJR), including rr 190(1), 851(2), 852(2), 854, 856
Cases Cited
- WLR and another v WLT and another and other matters [2023] 5 SLR 1372
- WLR and another v WLT and another and other matters [2023] SGHCF 20
- WLR and another v WLT and another and other matters [2024] SGHCF 20
- VVB v VVA [2022] 4 SLR 1181
- Chan Choy Lin v Chua Che Teck [1995] 3 SLR(R) 310
Source Documents
This article analyses [2023] SGHCF 20 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.