Case Details
- Citation: [2022] SGHCF 27
- Title: WFT v WFS
- Court: High Court (Family Division)
- Division/Proceeding: General Division of the High Court (Family Division) — Originating Summons
- Originating Summons No: HCF/OSN 7/2022
- Underlying appeal: HCF/DCA 52/2022
- Registrar’s order striking out: HCF/ORC 276/2022 (“ORC 276”)
- Judgment date: 7 November 2022
- Hearing date: 2 November 2022
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Applicant/Plaintiff: WFT (husband)
- Respondent/Defendant: WFS (wife)
- Legal area: Civil procedure; striking out; security for costs; family law procedure
- Key procedural context: Divorce proceedings with interim judgment; appeal against interim judgment; failure to furnish security for costs
- Statutes referenced: Family Justice Rules 2014 (including s 824)
- Cases cited: [2022] SGHCF 27 (no other authorities identified in the provided extract)
- Judgment length: 6 pages; 1,583 words
Summary
WFT v WFS concerned an application to “reinstate” an appeal in the Family Division of the High Court after the appeal was struck off for failure to furnish security for costs. The applicant-husband had filed a Notice of Appeal against an interim judgment in divorce proceedings, but he did not pay the required $3,000 security within the time directed after legal aid was ultimately refused. A Registrar’s order struck off the Notice of Appeal. The husband then applied by Originating Summons for the appeal to be reinstated and for an extension of time to furnish security for costs.
The High Court (Family Division), per Choo Han Teck J, dismissed the application. While the judge accepted that there was no express provision in the Family Justice Rules for striking out a Notice of Appeal for non-compliance with security for costs, he emphasised that the requirement is axiomatic and prerequisite in nature: a notice without the requisite security cannot proceed. The court held that the correct procedural recourse was to set aside the Registrar’s order (if made without hearing the merits) and, in any event, to seek leave to file a fresh notice of appeal out of time upon payment of the security. The application was also dismissed for lack of clarity and, more substantively, because the applicant failed to demonstrate good grounds for the appeal.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The parties were husband and wife and were in the process of divorce in the Family Justice Courts. An interim judgment was granted on 13 April 2022. The divorce proceedings were at the stage where the parties were waiting to complete ancillary matters. Despite the interim judgment, the husband decided to appeal.
On 22 April 2022, the husband filed a Notice of Appeal in HCF/DCA 52/2022 (“DCA 52”). At the time of filing, he had been granted provisional legal aid. As a result, he was exempted from paying the $3,000 deposit that would otherwise be required as security for costs of the appeal. This exemption was temporary and depended on the legal aid position at the relevant time.
Legal aid was later refused on 21 June 2022. Following refusal, the husband was directed to pay the security for costs by 6 July 2022. He did not comply. He was reminded again on 13 July 2022 and told that if he did not pay by 22 July 2022, his Notice of Appeal would be struck out. He still did not pay. Consequently, on 28 July 2022, he was notified that DCA 52 had been struck off.
Three days later, the husband instructed his counsel, Ms Grace Tan (“Ms Tan”). Ms Tan then filed the present application in HCF/OSN 7/2022 (“OSN 7”). In OSN 7, the husband sought an order that DCA 52 be “reinstated” and that he be granted an extension of time to furnish the security for costs. The application was heard by Choo Han Teck J, who dismissed it.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The case raised two closely related procedural issues. First, the court had to consider the legal effect of non-compliance with the security-for-costs requirement under s 824 of the Family Justice Rules 2014. Specifically, the question was whether the court had power to strike out a Notice of Appeal (or whether the failure rendered the notice ineffective or “null” without the need for striking out), and what the consequences were for the appeal’s procedural status.
Second, the court had to determine the appropriate procedural route for the husband to seek relief after the Registrar’s order striking off. The husband framed his application as one to “reinstate” the appeal. The court needed to assess whether that was procedurally correct, and if not, what the proper application should have been—such as setting aside the Registrar’s order and/or seeking leave to file a fresh notice of appeal out of time.
Beyond these procedural matters, the court also considered whether the husband had shown “good grounds” for the appeal. The judge asked counsel for the reasons for appealing against the interim judgment. The husband’s stated reason was a desire to reconcile with the wife, but the wife’s counsel stated emphatically that she would not wish to reconcile. The court had to decide whether, in the absence of evidence supporting reconciliation or other grounds, it should exercise its discretion to set aside the order and permit the appeal to proceed.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Choo Han Teck J began by addressing the security-for-costs framework under s 824 of the Family Justice Rules 2014. The judge reproduced the provision, which requires an appellant to provide security for the respondent’s costs at the time of filing the notice of appeal (in the sum of $3,000 or such sum as the Chief Justice may fix). The rule also specifies the methods of providing security (deposit with the Accountant-General and obtaining a certificate in Form 166, or procuring a solicitor’s undertaking in Form 167 and filing a certificate in Form 168). Importantly, s 824(3) empowers the Family Division to order further security “at any time” where it thinks fit.
Ms Tan’s argument was that, because s 824 does not expressly authorise striking out a notice of appeal, the court below had no power to strike out the notice. She further submitted that the Registrar’s order contained an inadvertent wording error: it stated that the appeal be struck off, when what had been struck off was the notice of appeal. Ms Tan’s position was that an appeal is not “allowed, varied, or dismissed” unless it is properly before the court; therefore, where the notice is defective for failure to provide security, it is the notice that should be treated as ineffective or struck out as “debris” rather than as a substantive appeal outcome.
The judge accepted the thrust of Ms Tan’s point in a limited sense: there was no express provision in the rules for striking out a notice of appeal. However, he did not treat the absence of express language as decisive. Instead, he reasoned that some requirements are “axiomatic” and operate as prerequisites. If a condition is a prerequisite to the filing of an application or appeal and is not met, the application or appeal is null and has no effect. In that sense, striking it out is merely a procedural housekeeping step; the legal consequence flows from the failure to satisfy the prerequisite.
In the judge’s view, the husband’s notice could not proceed without security for costs. Whether the Registrar’s order was framed as striking off the appeal or the notice, the practical and legal reality was the same: the notice lacked the requisite security and therefore could not be maintained. This analysis also supported the judge’s conclusion that the husband’s attempt to “reinstate” the notice without first addressing the Registrar’s order and the underlying security requirement was conceptually flawed.
Turning to the procedural route, the judge emphasised that the Registrar’s order (ORC 276) had already been made and the notice was “gone.” The correct recourse depended on the nature of the order. If the order had been made without hearing the merits, the applicant should apply to set it aside. If it had been decided on the merits, the applicant should seek leave to appeal out of time. The judge held that the husband’s application to “reinstate the notice of appeal” was “loose and therefore inappropriate” because it required the court to insert an implied step: the order below would first have to be set aside before reinstatement could be considered.
Even if the court set aside the Registrar’s order, reinstatement was not automatic. The court might set aside the order with liberty to file a fresh appeal out of time. The judge also noted that s 824 did not provide for reinstatement of a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the proper application should have been for the order below to be set aside and for leave to file a fresh notice of appeal out of time, coupled with payment of the requisite security.
Finally, the judge addressed the substantive discretionary element. The court would not exercise its discretion to set aside an order absent good grounds for the appeal. The judge asked counsel for the reasons for appealing against the interim judgment. Ms Tan said the husband wished to reconcile with the wife. Counsel for the wife, Mr John Tay, stated emphatically that the wife would not wish to reconcile. The judge excused counsel’s evidence from the Bar, even though there was no affidavit evidence on the point, because the onus was on the applicant to satisfy the court that there were good grounds for an appeal.
In the judge’s reasoning, if reconciliation was genuinely the objective, the appeal would be unnecessary unless the wife might be amenable to reconciliation. Conversely, if the wife was not amenable, the appeal on that ground was “doomed to fail.” The judge found that there was no evidence the husband intended to reconcile, and no evidence the wife was amenable. The only apparent reason for the appeal was miscommunication between the husband and counsel: the husband had not informed Ms Tan that the court had directed him to pay security by 22 July 2022. He was notified on 28 July 2022 that the notice had been struck off, but it took three days for him to consult counsel and file the application. The judge did not treat this as sufficient to justify setting aside the order and allowing the appeal to proceed.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed OSN 7. The judge indicated that the application should be dismissed at least for want of clarity, but he dismissed it on broader grounds as well: the husband had not shown good grounds for the appeal, and the procedural mechanism sought (“reinstatement”) was not the proper route given the absence of a basis for reinstatement under s 824 and the need first to set aside the Registrar’s order and then seek leave to file a fresh notice out of time upon payment of security.
Practically, the effect was that the struck-off notice of appeal could not simply be revived. The husband would have needed to pursue the correct procedural steps—setting aside the Registrar’s order (if available), paying the security for costs, and seeking leave to file a fresh notice of appeal out of time—while also demonstrating substantive grounds for the appeal.
Why Does This Case Matter?
WFT v WFS is a useful authority on the procedural consequences of failing to comply with security-for-costs requirements in family appeals. While the court acknowledged that s 824 does not expressly provide for striking out a notice of appeal, it treated the security requirement as a prerequisite that goes to the viability of the appeal itself. For practitioners, this underscores that security for costs is not a mere technicality: non-compliance can prevent the appeal from proceeding, and the court may treat the notice as having no effect even if the striking-out language is imperfect.
The decision also clarifies the importance of choosing the correct procedural remedy. The applicant’s attempt to “reinstate” the notice of appeal was rejected as conceptually and procedurally loose. The judge’s guidance suggests that where a Registrar’s order has already been made, the applicant must address that order directly (for example, by seeking to set it aside where appropriate) and then consider whether leave is required to file a fresh notice out of time. This is particularly relevant in family proceedings where time-sensitive procedural steps can determine whether an appeal can be heard.
Finally, the case illustrates the court’s approach to discretionary relief in the family context. Even where procedural missteps are explained (here, by miscommunication and delay in instructing counsel), the court will still require evidence of good grounds for the appeal. The judge’s analysis of the reconciliation rationale demonstrates that the court will scrutinise the substance of the proposed appeal and will not grant relief based on unsubstantiated or implausible reasons.
Legislation Referenced
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014), s 824 (Security for costs)
Cases Cited
- [2022] SGHCF 27 (WFT v WFS)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2022] SGHCF 27 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.