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Wee Kim San Lawrence Bernard v Robinson & Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 279

In Wee Kim San Lawrence Bernard v Robinson & Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of Civil Procedure — striking out, Contract — contractual terms.

Case Details

  • Citation: [2013] SGHC 279
  • Title: Wee Kim San Lawrence Bernard v Robinson & Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
  • Date of Decision: 26 December 2013
  • Judge: Woo Bih Li J
  • Case Number: Suit No 1036 of 2012 (Registrar’s Appeal No 286 of 2013 and No 287 of 2013)
  • Tribunal/Proceedings: High Court (hearing of Registrar’s Appeals)
  • Coram: Woo Bih Li J
  • Plaintiff/Applicant: Wee Kim San Lawrence Bernard (“P”)
  • Defendant/Respondent: Robinson & Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Employer”)
  • Counsel: Plaintiff in person; M K Eusuff Ali and Lucinda Lim (Tan Rajah & Cheah) for the Employer
  • Legal Areas: Civil Procedure (striking out); Contract (contractual terms; implied terms); Employment Law (contract of service; constructive dismissal)
  • Statutes Referenced: None stated in the provided extract
  • Cases Cited: Alexander Proudfoot Productivity Services Co S’pore Pte Ltd v Sim Hua Ngee Alvin and another appeal [1992] 3 SLR(R) 933; Teh Guek Ngor Engelin nee Tan and others v Chia Ee Lin Evelyn and another [2005] 3 SLR(R) 22; Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in compulsory liquidation) [1997] 3 WLR 95; Cheah Peng Hock v Luzhou Bio-Chem Technology Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 577
  • Judgment Length: 4 pages, 2,140 words

Summary

In Wee Kim San Lawrence Bernard v Robinson & Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 279, the High Court dismissed an employee’s claims arising from his resignation, which he characterised as a form of constructive dismissal. The employee alleged that the Employer persecuted him because he was homosexual. The Employer applied to strike out the action, and the Assistant Registrar (AR) granted the application and also expunged parts of the employee’s affidavit. On appeal, Woo Bih Li J upheld both decisions.

The court’s central reasoning was that, even assuming constructive dismissal for the purpose of the striking-out application, the employee’s contractual entitlement for termination by notice (or salary in lieu) governed the measure of damages. The employee’s attempt to claim additional damages for alleged “stigma” and discriminatory persecution was found to be inadequately pleaded and legally irrelevant on the facts as presented. The court also held that the employee had attempted to circumvent an earlier discovery order by citing the contents of redacted documents in his affidavit, justifying expungement of the relevant paragraphs.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The plaintiff, Wee Kim San Lawrence Bernard (“P”), was employed by Robinson & Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd, a department store (“Employer”). P tendered his resignation on 24 August 2012. Under his contract of employment, the Employer was required to pay him a specified amount in lieu of notice upon termination. In practice, the Employer paid P four months’ salary in lieu of notice and also paid cash for unconsumed annual leave.

P’s position was that although he tendered his resignation, the resignation should be treated as a constructive dismissal. He alleged that the Employer persecuted him because he is homosexual. On that basis, he commenced an action on 6 December 2012 seeking damages for constructive dismissal.

Procedurally, the Employer responded with two applications. First, on 18 June 2013, it filed Summons No 3064 of 2013 with supporting affidavit to strike out P’s claim. Second, on 31 July 2013, it filed Summons No 3969 of 2013 to expunge paragraphs 28 and 29 of P’s affidavit. The expungement application was linked to an earlier discovery order made by an AR on 24 June 2013.

At the AR hearing on 6 August 2013, the AR ordered that paragraphs 28 and 29 of P’s affidavit be expunged and also struck out P’s claim in the main action. P then filed two Registrar’s Appeals: Registrar’s Appeal No 286 of 2013 against the striking out of his claim, and Registrar’s Appeal No 287 of 2013 against the expungement order. Woo Bih Li J heard both appeals together on 9 September 2013 and dismissed them. P subsequently filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal, but the High Court noted that the notice was unclear as to whether it challenged both decisions or only one.

The first legal issue concerned civil procedure: whether P’s affidavit should have certain paragraphs expunged because they cited the contents of documents that had been subject to a discovery order restricting how those documents could be referenced. The AR had previously ordered that P may make reference to the documents but shall not exhibit them, and the High Court had to decide whether P’s affidavit breached that order by indirectly reproducing the contents.

The second, more substantive issue concerned employment contract damages and the proper measure of damages in a constructive dismissal scenario. Even if the court assumed (for the purpose of the striking-out application) that P was constructively dismissed, the question was whether P could claim damages beyond what the employment contract provided for termination by notice or salary in lieu. This required the court to consider how contractual terms and implied terms (including mutual trust and confidence) affect damages, and whether P had pleaded a sufficient and legally relevant case.

A further issue was whether P could rely on the doctrine of implied terms and the “stigma” type of losses discussed in Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in compulsory liquidation) to recover damages over and above the contractual notice entitlement. The court needed to assess whether P’s pleadings and evidence, as framed, disclosed a reasonable cause of action for such additional losses.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

On the expungement issue, Woo Bih Li J focused on the scope and purpose of the AR’s earlier discovery order dated 24 June 2013. The AR had allowed P’s application for discovery of certain documents with redactions. The AR ordered disclosure of the redacted portions to P’s solicitors, but with an important restriction: P “may make reference to the said documents, but shall not exhibit the said documents, in any affidavit filed henceforth”. The High Court treated this as a carefully calibrated permission to refer to the existence or general context of the documents, while preventing P from reproducing or relying on the redacted contents in affidavits.

P’s affidavit filed on 15 July 2013 contained paragraphs 28 and 29 that cited passages from the two documents. The Employer argued that although P did not “directly” exhibit the documents, he had effectively done so indirectly by reiterating the contents. The High Court agreed. Woo Bih Li J reasoned that P’s attempt to cite the contents was a circumvention of the AR’s order. While P was allowed to make reference to the documents, that permission had to be read together with the prohibition on exhibiting the documents and, more importantly, the limitation on citing actual contents that the Employer had not consented to being used in that manner.

Turning to the striking-out application, the court proceeded on the assumption that P was constructively dismissed, because the Employer had adopted that approach for the purpose of the application. The employment terms were contained in a Letter of Appointment (“LOA”) dated 2 October 2006, which P had counter-signed. Clause 4 of the LOA provided that after confirmation, written notice of termination from either party would be two calendar months or two months’ salary in lieu of notice, without assigning reasons.

Accordingly, the Employer argued that even if P was constructively dismissed, the measure of damages was limited to two months’ salary (subject to mitigation, which the court did not need to resolve on the striking-out posture). The Employer relied on Alexander Proudfoot Productivity Services Co S’pore Pte Ltd v Sim Hua Ngee Alvin [1992] 3 SLR(R) 933, where the Court of Appeal explained that the normal measure of damages for wrongful summary dismissal is the amount the employee would have earned under the contract for the period until the employer could lawfully have terminated it, less what the employee could reasonably earn in other employment. Where the contract expressly provides for termination on a month’s notice, damages ordinarily equal the relevant month’s wages.

Woo Bih Li J also referred to the Court of Appeal’s reiteration of this approach in Teh Guek Ngor Engelin nee Tan v Chia Ee Lin Evelyn [2005] 3 SLR(R) 22. The High Court accepted the Employer’s submission that, as a matter of contract law, the employee could not recover more than the contractual notice entitlement simply by characterising the termination as constructive dismissal and then alleging additional wrongdoing.

The court then addressed P’s attempt to claim additional damages on the basis that the Employer persecuted him because he was homosexual. The High Court found that P’s allegations and the evidence he sought to rely on to prove that point were irrelevant to the damages question at the striking-out stage. The court’s reasoning was that, absent a properly pleaded and particularised contractual basis for additional losses, the “bare fact” of termination cannot itself justify damages beyond the contractually stipulated amount for lawful termination.

P sought to rely on Malik to argue that he was entitled to damages over and above what clause 4 stipulated. In Malik, the House of Lords allowed recovery for losses arising from stigma associated with a bank’s corruption, grounded in an implied obligation not to conduct a dishonest or corrupt business—an aspect of the trust and confidence required for the employment relationship. However, Woo Bih Li J emphasised that Malik arose in a context where the court was dealing with whether the evidence disclosed a reasonable cause of action on implied terms and foreseeability of serious losses.

Crucially, Woo Bih Li J held that Malik did not assist P because P was required to show a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, and P’s pleadings did not disclose particulars relevant to establishing such a breach. Although P pleaded breach of an implied term in his statement of claim, it was described as a bare allegation without particulars. The court further noted that P did not plead that the circumstances leading to termination were known to others or that they put him at a disadvantage in seeking employment elsewhere—both of which would be relevant to the “stigma” theory of recoverable loss.

In addition, P’s claim for “stigma” damages was not particularised as a breach of contract giving rise to financial loss. The High Court therefore concluded that P had not pleaded a coherent contractual theory that would bring his case within the logic of Malik. The court also warned against allowing employees to recover more than the contractual notice entitlement by simply alleging breach of trust and confidence whenever termination occurs. Otherwise, every employee could claim additional damages by reframing the dispute as one involving implied terms, undermining the contractual allocation of risk and the agreed notice regime.

Finally, the court observed that P had already received more than what clause 4 required. While the extract provided truncates the remainder of the judgment, the reasoning up to that point indicates that the court found no arguable basis to award further damages beyond what had already been paid under the contract for termination by notice or salary in lieu.

What Was the Outcome?

Woo Bih Li J dismissed both Registrar’s Appeals. The first appeal failed because paragraphs 28 and 29 of P’s affidavit were properly expunged as an improper circumvention of the earlier discovery order. The second appeal failed because P’s claim was struck out: even assuming constructive dismissal, the measure of damages was governed by the contractual notice entitlement in clause 4, and P’s attempt to claim additional “stigma” damages was legally and factually insufficiently pleaded.

Practically, the effect of the decision was that P’s action did not proceed to trial. The Employer avoided exposure to a full merits hearing on the alleged persecution and constructive dismissal narrative, and the court reinforced the importance of pleading implied-term breaches with sufficient particulars and relevance to the claimed heads of loss.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This decision is significant for employment litigation in Singapore because it clarifies the relationship between constructive dismissal claims and contractual damages. Even where an employee alleges discriminatory or persecutory conduct, the court will scrutinise whether the claim is properly anchored in the employment contract’s termination provisions and whether any additional damages are supported by a properly pleaded breach of an implied term capable of generating the claimed losses.

For practitioners, the case underscores two practical lessons. First, where a contract specifies notice or salary in lieu, the default measure of damages for wrongful termination typically aligns with the contractual notice period, subject to mitigation. Second, attempts to move beyond contractual notice damages—particularly by invoking implied terms such as mutual trust and confidence—require careful pleading of the factual matrix that makes the additional losses foreseeable and recoverable. Bare allegations will not suffice, and courts will resist converting every termination dispute into a broader damages claim by invoking implied terms.

From a civil procedure perspective, the expungement ruling also illustrates the court’s willingness to enforce discovery and affidavit-use restrictions. Orders limiting how redacted documents may be referenced are not merely technical; they protect the integrity of the litigation process and ensure that parties do not indirectly reintroduce restricted material in affidavits.

Legislation Referenced

  • No specific statutes were identified in the provided judgment extract.

Cases Cited

  • Alexander Proudfoot Productivity Services Co S’pore Pte Ltd v Sim Hua Ngee Alvin and another appeal [1992] 3 SLR(R) 933
  • Teh Guek Ngor Engelin nee Tan and others v Chia Ee Lin Evelyn and another [2005] 3 SLR(R) 22
  • Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in compulsory liquidation) [1997] 3 WLR 95
  • Cheah Peng Hock v Luzhou Bio-Chem Technology Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 577

Source Documents

This article analyses [2013] SGHC 279 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

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