Case Details
- Citation: [2022] SGHC 54
- Title: Wang Xiaopu v Koh Mui Lee and others
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of decision: 11 March 2022
- Date heard: 8 February 2022
- Judge: Lee Seiu Kin J
- Suit No: 636 of 2020
- Summons No: 5185 of 2021
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Wang Xiaopu
- Defendants/Respondents: (1) Koh Mui Lee; (2) Goh Ming Yi, Melissa (Wu Mingyi); (3) Goh Keng Meng, Jeremy (Wu Qingming)
- Legal area: Evidence — Witnesses
- Procedural context: Application for leave under s 62A of the Evidence Act for a witness to give evidence via video-link
- Statutes referenced: Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed), in particular s 62A; and “A of the Evidence Act” (as reflected in the provided metadata)
- Cases cited (as provided): [2018] SGDC 133; [2019] SGHC 284; [2021] SGDC 159; [2022] SGHC 54
- Judgment length: 19 pages, 5,227 words
Summary
In Wang Xiaopu v Koh Mui Lee and others [2022] SGHC 54, the High Court considered whether a witness who was outside Singapore should be permitted to give evidence by live video-link. The application was brought under s 62A of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“EA”). The court emphasised that, although remote testimony has become more common, the default position remains that witnesses should testify in person so that the court and parties can observe demeanour and conduct effective cross-examination.
The plaintiff, Wang Xiaopu, was ordinarily resident in Guangzhou and had never resided in Singapore despite holding permanent resident status. She sought leave for herself to testify by video-link for a trial in Singapore. Her reasons were essentially that (i) travel was uncertain due to the COVID-19 pandemic and (ii) she faced a substantial risk of contracting COVID-19 if she travelled. The defendants opposed the application, contending that Wang was not “unable” to travel but rather unwilling, that they would be substantially prejudiced without her physical presence for cross-examination, and that Wang had not shown adequate technical arrangements for remote testimony.
Lee Seiu Kin J dismissed the application. The court held that Wang had not demonstrated circumstances outside her control that rendered her unable to travel to Singapore. The availability of indirect flights meant she could travel, albeit inconveniently. Further, the evidence did not establish health-related vulnerability that would make the risk of COVID-19 a factor of inability rather than choice. The court also underscored that the COVID-19 pandemic should not be invoked in a generic manner; the inquiry must focus on the precise facts explaining why the witness cannot attend physically. The result was that Wang was required to attend in person to give evidence.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute concerned alleged asset transfers by a debtor, Dr Goh Seng Heng. Wang Xiaopu had previously sued Dr Goh and obtained judgment against him. When the judgment debt remained unpaid, Wang commenced the present action against Dr Goh’s family members—Koh Mui Lee and two other defendants—on the allegation that Dr Goh had transferred and/or acquired assets or properties in their names to place them beyond the reach of creditors. The present summons arose in the course of that litigation and concerned the manner in which Wang would give evidence at trial.
Wang is a Chinese national ordinarily resident in Guangzhou. She is the director of Guangdong Marubi Biotechnology Co Ltd, a China-incorporated company engaged in the manufacture, marketing and sale of facial and skincare products in China. Although Wang has held permanent resident status in Singapore since October 2013, she had never resided in Singapore. Accordingly, her evidence would necessarily involve travel from China to Singapore if she were to testify physically.
On 12 November 2021, Wang filed an application for leave to give evidence via video-link. She relied on s 62A of the EA, which permits remote testimony in specified circumstances, including where the witness is outside Singapore and the court is satisfied that it is expedient in the interests of justice. Wang’s application was supported by her affidavit evidence and written submissions. Her core position was that she could not travel to Singapore at the relevant time because of the uncertain travel climate and the real and substantial risk of contracting COVID-19, coupled with onerous travel requirements from Guangzhou to Singapore.
In response, the defendants opposed the application. They argued that Wang was not “unable” to travel but rather unwilling. They also submitted that they would suffer substantial prejudice if Wang were not present in court, particularly because their counsel would be deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine her effectively in person. Finally, they contended that Wang had not proved that adequate and sufficient technical arrangements existed to enable reliable remote testimony from Guangzhou.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The principal legal issue was whether the court should grant leave under s 62A of the EA for Wang to give evidence via live video-link. While s 62A(1)(c) is satisfied where the witness is outside Singapore, the court still must consider, under s 62A(2), all the circumstances of the case. This includes the reasons for the witness being unable to give evidence in Singapore, the administrative and technical facilities and arrangements at the place where the witness will give evidence, and whether any party would be unfairly prejudiced.
A second issue was the interpretation of “unable” in s 62A(2)(a). Wang’s case depended on the proposition that COVID-19-related travel uncertainty and health risk made her unable to travel. The defendants challenged this by arguing that Wang’s reasons amounted to unwillingness rather than inability. The court therefore had to determine whether Wang’s evidence showed circumstances outside her control that prevented her from attending physically.
A third issue concerned prejudice and fairness. Even if remote testimony could be arranged, the court had to assess whether the defendants would be unfairly prejudiced by Wang’s absence from the courtroom, particularly in relation to cross-examination and the court’s ability to evaluate her evidence.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Lee Seiu Kin J began by restating the general principle that witnesses must physically be in court to testify. This principle is reflected in the court’s approach in earlier authority, including Anil Singh Gurm v J S Yeh & Co and another [2020] 1 SLR 555 (“Anil Singh”), where the Court of Appeal explained that s 62A creates an exception to the physical attendance norm. The judge then set out the statutory framework: s 62A(1) allows a person to give evidence via live video or live television link with leave of the court, and s 62A(2) requires the court to have regard to the reasons for the witness being unable to give evidence in Singapore, the administrative and technical facilities and arrangements, and whether any party would be unfairly prejudiced. The court also noted the fairness constraint in s 62A(5), which prohibits orders that would be inconsistent with the court’s duty to ensure fair proceedings.
On the first substantive inquiry—whether Wang was “unable” to travel—the court applied the reasoning in Anil Singh. The Court of Appeal in Anil Singh held that s 62A(2)(a) does not cover situations where the witness is able but unwilling to attend. The word “unable” implies a lack of choice. Therefore, the reasons advanced must relate to circumstances outside the witness’s control.
Wang advanced two reasons. First, she argued that the uncertain travel climate meant it was uncertain whether she would be able to travel to Singapore at the time of trial. Second, she argued that requiring her to come to Singapore would expose her to a substantial risk of contracting COVID-19. The court was not satisfied that either reason showed inability. Regarding travel logistics, Wang stated that there were no direct flights between Guangzhou and Singapore scheduled for late February to early March 2022. However, she also acknowledged that indirect travel appeared possible, though it would involve two stopovers and longer travel time. The judge treated the existence of indirect flights as decisive: if travel is possible, even if inconvenient, the witness is not “unable” but at most unwilling. The court relied on the logic in Bachmeer Capital Ltd v Ong Chih Ching and others [2018] 4 SLR 29 and Anil Singh that inconvenience does not equate to inability.
On the COVID-19 point, the court similarly rejected a generic reliance on the pandemic. While the judge accepted that COVID-19 had caused disruptions, the court cautioned against “blindly citing” the pandemic as the reason for remote testimony. The pandemic had been ongoing for over two years, and the court expected precise factual explanation of why the witness could not attend physically. In Wang’s submissions, the risk of flight delays or cancellations due to COVID-19 symptoms or changing travel restrictions was framed as uncertainty rather than an absolute barrier. The judge held that this uncertainty made travel difficult but not impossible.
As to the “substantial risk” of contracting COVID-19, the court indicated that this would be more compelling if there were evidence of health-related issues that would put the witness at risk of serious complications. In the absence of such evidence, the risk meant Wang was unwilling to travel rather than unable to travel. The court therefore concluded that Wang had not met the threshold requirement under s 62A(2)(a) for reasons outside her control.
Wang also relied on a district court decision, Chua Eng Kok (Cai Rongguo) v Douglas Chew Kai Pi [2021] SGDC 159, where the court had granted leave for remote testimony in the context of the pandemic. The High Court observed that Wang’s reliance on the district judge’s remarks appeared to be taken out of context. The High Court noted that the district judge’s subsequent remarks suggested the application had been dismissed in that case and that the court was not accurately apprised of the extent of travel restrictions or travel bubble arrangements. The High Court’s point was not that Chua Eng Kok was irrelevant, but that the factual and evidential basis for the district court’s decision mattered, and Wang had not provided the kind of specific, substantiated constraints that would justify remote testimony.
Although the truncated extract does not reproduce the entirety of the High Court’s analysis on technical arrangements and prejudice, the structure of the judgment indicates that the court considered the remaining statutory factors under s 62A(2). In particular, the court addressed whether adequate administrative and technical facilities existed for remote testimony from Guangzhou, and whether any party would be unfairly prejudiced. The court’s dismissal reflects a holistic assessment of fairness and practicality: remote testimony is not an entitlement but a discretionary exception, and the court will not grant it where the statutory prerequisites are not satisfied or where fairness concerns remain unresolved.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed Wang Xiaopu’s application for leave to give evidence via video-link. The practical effect of the decision was that Wang would have to attend physically in Singapore to testify at trial, rather than providing her evidence remotely from Guangzhou.
For the defendants, the outcome preserved their ability to cross-examine Wang in person in the courtroom setting. For the plaintiff, it meant incurring the burdens of travel and attendance, notwithstanding the pandemic-related concerns she raised. The decision thus reinforces that remote testimony under s 62A is exceptional and must be justified by evidence of true inability, adequate technical arrangements, and absence of unfair prejudice.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how Singapore courts interpret “unable” under s 62A(2)(a). The High Court’s reasoning aligns with the Court of Appeal’s approach in Anil Singh: the statutory language is not satisfied by inconvenience, uncertainty, or general pandemic conditions. A witness must show circumstances outside their control that prevent physical attendance. This is a high evidential threshold, and parties seeking video-link testimony should prepare detailed, fact-specific material rather than relying on broad assertions about travel disruption.
Second, the decision highlights the court’s insistence on fairness and the integrity of the adversarial process. Cross-examination is a central mechanism for testing credibility and reliability. While video-link technology can facilitate remote testimony, the court will be alert to whether the defendants’ ability to cross-examine effectively is compromised and whether the court can properly assess the witness’s evidence. Even where technology exists, the court will not treat remote testimony as a default convenience.
Third, the judgment provides practical guidance for litigators on how to frame and substantiate applications for remote evidence. Evidence should ideally address: (i) why travel is not merely difficult but genuinely impossible or prevented by external constraints; (ii) what health or safety factors apply, supported by relevant medical or risk evidence if COVID-19 risk is invoked; and (iii) what technical arrangements are in place to ensure reliable transmission, sound quality, and the ability to conduct meaningful cross-examination. The case therefore serves as a roadmap for both applicants and opponents in future disputes about remote testimony.
Legislation Referenced
- Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed), s 62A (Evidence through live video or live television links)
- Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (metadata reference: “A of the Evidence Act” as provided)
Cases Cited
- Wang Xiaopu v Goh Seng Heng and another [2019] SGHC 284
- Anil Singh Gurm v J S Yeh & Co and another [2020] 1 SLR 555
- Bachmeer Capital Ltd v Ong Chih Ching and others [2018] 4 SLR 29
- Chua Eng Kok (Cai Rongguo) v Douglas Chew Kai Pi [2021] SGDC 159
- R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256
- [2018] SGDC 133 (as provided in metadata)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2022] SGHC 54 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.