Case Details
- Citation: [2022] SGHCF 1
- Title: VVB v VVA
- Court: High Court (Family Division)
- Division/Proceeding Type: Registrar’s Appeal from the Family Justice Courts
- Registrar’s Appeal No: 17 of 2021
- Originating Proceedings: FC/OSM 270/2020 (“the OSM”)
- Date of Decision: 6 January 2022
- Hearing Dates: 10 November 2021; 30 December 2021
- Judge: Debbie Ong J
- Plaintiff/Applicant: VVB (Appellant in this appeal)
- Defendant/Respondent: VVA (Respondent in this appeal)
- Parties’ Roles in the OSM: Respondent was the plaintiff in the OSM; appellant was the defendant in the OSM
- Relationship to Donor (P): Respondent was the son of the LPA Donor (“P”); appellant was the Donee under the LPA
- Instrument at Issue: Lasting Power of Attorney (“LPA”) No. LPA 30097NU20 dated 26 June 2020
- Core Substantive Relief Sought in OSM: Revocation of the appellant’s appointment as Donee under the LPA
- Key Procedural Event: Before the final hearing, the appellant disclaimed her appointment as Donee, causing the LPA to cease to have effect
- Costs Decision Appealed: District Judge ordered costs against the appellant; quantum to be taxed if not agreed
- Legal Areas: Family Law; Mental Capacity; Procedure; Costs
- Statutes Referenced: Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) (“MCA”)
- Subsidiary Legislation Referenced: Family Justice Rules 2014 (“FJR”)
- Cases Cited: [2022] SGHCF 1 (as the decision itself); UTOC Engineering Pte Ltd v ASK Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] 5 SLR 83; JBB v JBA [2015] 5 SLR 153
- Judgment Length: 15 pages; 4,368 words
Summary
VVB v VVA concerned a Registrar’s appeal in the Family Division arising from an application to revoke a Lasting Power of Attorney (“LPA”). The respondent (the son of the LPA donor) had sought, among other prayers, revocation of the appellant’s appointment as Donee on allegations of wrongdoing. Before the final hearing of the Originating Summons, the appellant disclaimed her appointment as Donee, with the result that the LPA ceased to have effect. The District Judge nonetheless ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs, with the quantum to be taxed if not agreed.
On appeal, the High Court (Debbie Ong J) upheld the District Judge’s approach to costs. The court emphasised that costs in Family Justice proceedings are discretionary and guided by the “costs follow the event” principle, but that the “event” and the fairness of compensating the other party must be assessed in light of the parties’ conduct and the practical manner in which the outcome was reached. The court rejected the appellant’s attempt to treat her voluntary disclaimer as a neutral procedural label that should prevent costs from being awarded against her.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute arose in the context of mental capacity and the management of a donor’s affairs. The LPA donor (“P”) had executed an LPA appointing the appellant (VVB) as Donee. The respondent (VVA), P’s son, brought an Originating Summons (FC/OSM 270/2020, “the OSM”) seeking, among other prayers, revocation of the appellant’s appointment as Donee under Lasting Power of Attorney No. LPA 30097NU20 dated 26 June 2020. The respondent’s case was that the appellant should be removed for wrongdoing.
At the conclusion of the OSM, the District Judge ordered costs against the appellant. The High Court’s grounds of decision summarised the District Judge’s “snapshot” of the background: the case involved an application for revocation of an LPA, and costs were ordered against the appellant. The substantive posture was that the respondent had initiated proceedings to remove the Donee, while the appellant was the Donee whose appointment was under challenge.
A crucial procedural development occurred before the final hearing. The appellant disclaimed her appointment as Donee. As a result, the LPA ceased to have effect. This meant that the OSM did not proceed to a full adjudication on the merits of the allegations of wrongdoing in the way it might have otherwise. The appellant’s disclaimer was therefore a decisive factor in how the dispute came to an end.
Despite the disclaimer, the District Judge ordered that the appellant pay costs to the respondent. The District Judge’s reasoning was that the respondent had sought to remove the appellant as Donee for wrongdoing, and there was “no justification” for the appellant’s costs (or costs ordered against her) to be borne by P’s estate. The District Judge also placed weight on the manner in which the appellant handled the proceedings: although the appellant later disclaimed her appointment, she had contested the matter “aggressively right until almost the very end,” rather than conceding early to avoid an acrimonious contest. The District Judge further noted that the potential for an in-principle agreement on costs had “fallen through,” and that the parties did not reach an agreement on a draft consent order.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The appeal primarily concerned costs. The appellant’s grounds of appeal challenged the District Judge’s reasoning on multiple fronts. First, the appellant argued that the District Judge erred in finding that she should bear costs because she “threw in the towel” and disclaimed her appointment prior to the hearing. Second, she argued that the District Judge erred in finding that she should bear costs because she had “aggressively contested” the application.
Third, the appellant contended that the District Judge erred in concluding that the parties’ in-principle agreement regarding costs “cut both ways.” Fourth, she argued that if costs were to be awarded, they should be borne by P’s estate rather than by her personally. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant clarified an alternative submission: if costs were awarded, they should be fixed rather than taxed.
Underlying these issues was a more general legal question: how the “costs follow the event” principle should operate where the outcome is reached not through full adjudication but through a party’s voluntary act (here, the disclaimer of the Donee appointment). The court also had to consider the statutory and procedural framework governing costs in Family Justice proceedings, including the relevance of party conduct.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The High Court began by locating the costs decision within the governing legal framework. The appellant accepted that costs were in the court’s discretion. In particular, s 40(1) of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) provides that, subject to the Family Justice Rules, the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the court are in its discretion. The court then referred to the Family Justice Rules 2014, which set out both the default approach and the factors relevant to the exercise of discretion.
Rule 852(2) of the FJR provides that where the court makes an order as to costs, it should order costs to follow the event, unless it appears that some other order should be made in the circumstances. Rule 854 further directs the court, in exercising its discretion, to take into account (among other matters) the conduct of all parties, including conduct before and during the proceedings, and the parties’ conduct in relation to attempts to resolve the matter by mediation or other dispute resolution. The court also noted the general rationale for “costs follow the event”: it is fair that the party whose conduct necessitated litigation bears the costs, because the successful party had to institute proceedings to obtain what it deserved.
On the appellant’s first issue—whether the District Judge was wrong to treat her disclaimer as “throwing in the towel”—the High Court emphasised that the basis for costs is not determined by the label of the procedural outcome. The court drew on UTOC Engineering Pte Ltd v ASK Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] 5 SLR 83, where the court observed that the basis for ordering costs is whether it is in the interest of justice that the respondent be compensated for costs incurred, rather than whether an application is labelled as dismissed or withdrawn. This principle was used to frame the analysis: the question was not merely whether the appellant’s disclaimer rendered the OSM otiose, but whether, in substance, the respondent obtained the practical outcome sought and whether the appellant’s conduct made it just for her to bear costs.
The High Court then addressed the “event” concept under r 852(2). The appellant argued that her resignation or disclaimer was legally entitled and independent, and that it did not necessarily mean the respondent proved the substantive allegations to the court’s satisfaction. The High Court accepted that the disclaimer was an independent act, but it reasoned that for costs purposes, the “event” could be understood in practical terms. The respondent’s substantive objective included removal of the appellant as Donee, and the appellant’s disclaimer achieved that outcome. The respondent had to institute proceedings and might not have achieved the desired outcome had the appellant not pursued the matter to the point where she resigned only shortly before the hearing.
In this sense, the court treated the practical result—no longer being the Donee—as the closest analogue to the “event” for costs purposes. The court also highlighted that the mode of reaching the outcome is relevant: whether by full adjudication, mutual agreement, early concession, or late voluntary resignation after adversarial exchanges. The High Court agreed with the District Judge that the appellant’s conduct mattered. It noted the District Judge’s observation that the result might have been different if the appellant had conceded at the beginning to avoid an acrimonious contest.
On the second issue—whether the District Judge erred in finding that the appellant “aggressively contested” the application—the High Court again focused on the statutory instruction to consider conduct. Rule 854(b) requires the court to take into account the conduct of all parties, including conduct before and during the proceedings. The court therefore treated the District Judge’s emphasis on the appellant’s adversarial posture as consistent with the governing rules. It was not a question of penalising a party for defending a case per se; rather, it was a question of whether the appellant’s litigation conduct, coupled with the late disclaimer, made it fair that she bear the costs.
The appellant’s submissions sought to reframe her conduct as protective and non-personal, asserting that she was defending P’s wishes and attempting to settle amicably. She also argued that the District Judge had found that neither side acted extremely unreasonably, and that ordering costs against her would dissuade parties from settling. While the extract provided is truncated, the High Court’s reasoning up to the point of truncation indicates that the court viewed the District Judge’s approach as properly grounded in the conduct-based framework under the FJR. The court’s analysis suggests that “not extremely unreasonable” does not automatically preclude an adverse costs order where the overall conduct and timing of the disclaimer justify compensation to the respondent.
Finally, the court addressed the appellant’s broader contention that costs should be borne by P’s estate. The District Judge had reasoned that it would be unjust for P’s estate to bear costs where the respondent’s application was directed at removing the appellant for wrongdoing and where the appellant’s own conduct contributed to the need for litigation. The High Court’s endorsement of the District Judge’s approach reflects a policy concern in mental capacity cases: while the donor’s estate should not be burdened lightly, it may be appropriate to allocate costs to the party whose conduct necessitated the proceedings and who effectively achieved the outcome sought through a late voluntary act.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the District Judge’s costs order. The practical effect was that the appellant remained liable to pay the respondent’s costs, with the quantum to be taxed if the parties could not agree.
In doing so, the court confirmed that in Family Justice proceedings under the Mental Capacity Act framework, costs discretion is exercised with close attention to party conduct and the practical “event” achieved, even where the substantive dispute is rendered moot by a party’s voluntary disclaimer rather than by a full merits determination.
Why Does This Case Matter?
VVB v VVA is significant for practitioners dealing with costs in mental capacity and LPA-related litigation. It clarifies that the “costs follow the event” principle under r 852(2) of the FJR is not applied mechanically by reference to procedural labels such as “withdrawn” or “settled.” Instead, courts will look at the practical outcome obtained and whether it is just that the other party be compensated for costs incurred.
The case also reinforces the centrality of party conduct in costs determinations. Rule 854 explicitly directs courts to consider conduct before and during proceedings, including how parties attempt to resolve disputes. For litigants and counsel, this means that timing and litigation posture can be decisive. A late disclaimer or concession may not avoid adverse costs if it occurs after prolonged adversarial exchanges and after the other party has incurred substantial costs to pursue the relief sought.
From a strategic perspective, the decision provides guidance on how to manage LPA disputes where a donee may consider resigning or disclaiming. If such a step is taken, counsel should consider whether it will be treated as the practical “event” for costs purposes, and whether the court may infer that the respondent was compelled to litigate until near the hearing. The case therefore has practical implications for settlement negotiations, consent orders on costs, and the documentation of any in-principle agreements that might otherwise “fall through.”
Legislation Referenced
- Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed), s 40(1)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (FJR), r 852(2)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 (FJR), r 854
Cases Cited
- UTOC Engineering Pte Ltd v ASK Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] 5 SLR 83
- JBB v JBA [2015] 5 SLR 153
Source Documents
This article analyses [2022] SGHCF 1 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.