Case Details
- Citation: [2022] SGHCF 1
- Title: VVB v VVA
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Family Division)
- Proceeding: Registrar’s Appeal from the Family Justice Courts
- Originating matter: FC/OSM 270/2020
- Registrar’s Appeal number: No 17 of 2021
- Date of decision: 6 January 2022
- Dates mentioned in the judgment: 10 November 2021; 30 December 2021
- Judge: Debbie Ong J
- Appellant: VVB (defendant in FC/OSM 270/2020; donee under a Lasting Power of Attorney)
- Respondent: VVA (plaintiff in FC/OSM 270/2020; son of the LPA donor)
- Legal areas: Family Law — Procedure; Mental Disorders and Treatment — Management of patients’ property and affairs
- Statutes referenced: Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) (“MCA”)
- Other rules referenced: Family Justice Rules 2014 (“FJR”)
- Key procedural point: Costs in proceedings concerning revocation of a Lasting Power of Attorney
- Judgment length: 15 pages; 4,248 words
- Cases cited (as provided): [2022] SGHCF 1; JBB v JBA [2015] 5 SLR 153; UTOC Engineering Pte Ltd v ASK Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] 5 SLR 83
Summary
VVB v VVA [2022] SGHCF 1 is a High Court (Family Division) decision on costs arising from proceedings in the Family Justice Courts concerning the revocation of a Lasting Power of Attorney (“LPA”). The appeal did not turn on whether the LPA should ultimately be revoked, but on whether the District Judge (“DJ”) was correct to order the donee, VVB, to pay costs to the donor’s son, VVA, after VVB voluntarily resigned as donee shortly before the hearing of the originating summons seeking revocation.
The High Court, per Debbie Ong J, emphasised that costs in Family Justice proceedings are discretionary and are governed by the “costs follow the event” principle, subject to the court’s ability to make some other order where the circumstances so require. Crucially, the court held that the “event” for costs purposes may be assessed by reference to the practical outcome achieved and the conduct of the parties, rather than by the formal label of how the matter ended (for example, whether the matter proceeded to full adjudication or became otiose due to a voluntary act).
Applying these principles, the High Court upheld the DJ’s approach: the respondent had been compelled to bring the proceedings to obtain the substantive outcome sought, and the appellant’s voluntary resignation—while not necessarily an admission of wrongdoing—occurred in a context where the appellant had contested the matter aggressively for a substantial period. The decision therefore illustrates how courts in Singapore evaluate both the procedural posture and the parties’ conduct when determining costs in mental capacity and LPA-related litigation.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The dispute arose from an application in the Family Justice Courts, FC/OSM 270/2020 (“the OSM”), brought by VVA, the son of the LPA donor (“P”). VVA sought, among other prayers, the revocation of P’s Lasting Power of Attorney, specifically revoking the appointment of VVB as donee under Lasting Power of Attorney No. LPA 30097NU20 dated 26 June 2020. The OSM was therefore directed at removing the donee from her role in managing P’s affairs under the LPA.
VVB was the donee under the LPA. Before the final hearing of the OSM, VVB disclaimed her appointment as donee. As a result, the LPA ceased to have effect. This procedural development meant that the originating summons seeking revocation became, in practical terms, unnecessary to continue insofar as the donee’s role had already ended by VVB’s own act.
At the conclusion of the matter in the Family Justice Courts, the DJ ordered that VVB pay costs to VVA. The DJ’s “snapshot” of the background recorded that costs were ordered against VVB at the conclusion of the matter. The DJ’s reasoning, as summarised in the High Court appeal, was that VVB was accused of wrongdoing and chose to voluntarily give up her appointment as donee just before the hearing. The DJ considered that it would not be appropriate for the donor’s estate to bear the costs of a contest that VVB had engaged in aggressively until near the end.
VVB appealed only against the costs order. She did not seek to relitigate the substantive merits of revocation. Instead, she argued that the DJ erred in reasoning that she “threw in the towel” or “disclaimed her appointment” prior to the hearing, and that the DJ erred in finding that she had “aggressively contested” the application. She also argued that any costs, if ordered, should be borne by P’s estate. In the alternative, she asked that costs be fixed rather than taxed.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue was whether the DJ had erred in ordering costs against VVB despite the fact that the LPA became inoperative due to VVB’s voluntary resignation as donee. This required the High Court to consider how the “event” for costs purposes should be identified in circumstances where the substantive outcome is achieved not through a full adjudication but through a party’s voluntary act.
A second issue concerned the relevance and weight of the parties’ conduct. The DJ had treated VVB’s litigation posture—particularly that she contested aggressively until almost the end—as a significant factor in the costs exercise. The High Court therefore had to assess whether the DJ’s approach to conduct was consistent with the Family Justice Rules and the overarching principle that costs are discretionary and should reflect fairness in the circumstances.
Third, the case raised a related issue about the proper allocation of costs between the parties and the donor’s estate. VVB’s position was that she should not be personally liable for costs where she resigned without admitting liability and where, in her view, she was acting to protect P’s wishes rather than for personal gain. The High Court had to determine whether the DJ’s reasoning that costs should not be borne by P’s estate was legally and factually justified.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The High Court began by situating the costs question within the statutory and procedural framework. Under s 40(1) of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) (“MCA”), “subject to the Family Justice Rules, the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the court are in its discretion.” This discretion is then structured by the Family Justice Rules 2014 (“FJR”). Rule 852(2) provides that where the court makes an order as to costs, it should order costs to follow the event, unless it appears that some other order should be made in whole or in part. Rule 854 further directs the court, in exercising its discretion, to take into account relevant factors including the conduct of all parties, including conduct before and during proceedings.
In addressing VVB’s submissions, the High Court placed particular emphasis on the principle that costs are not determined by the formal label of how the case ends. VVB argued that she resigned under legal advice without admission of liability and that a donee is legally entitled to resign at any time without legal liability. She contended that the respondent had not proven to the court’s satisfaction that the LPA ought to be revoked, and that her resignation was an independent event that rendered the OSM unnecessary rather than a concession to the merits.
The High Court found this argument insufficient to displace the DJ’s costs reasoning. It relied on the approach in UTOC Engineering Pte Ltd v ASK Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] 5 SLR 83, where the court observed that counsel sometimes treat withdrawn applications differently from dismissed applications, but the basis for ordering costs is not the label of the procedural outcome. Instead, the question is whether it is in the interest of justice that the respondent be compensated for costs incurred in relation to the application. This reasoning supported the view that the costs analysis should focus on substance and fairness rather than technical procedural categorisation.
Applying that principle, the High Court considered whether the “event” for costs purposes was the outcome that the respondent sought. The respondent’s substantive objective was to remove VVB as donee and to obtain related relief, including the appointment of a deputy for P. Even though the LPA ceased to have effect because VVB resigned, the practical outcome was that VVB was no longer the donee. The High Court reasoned that the respondent had to institute proceedings and might not have achieved the substantive outcome had VVB not pursued the matter to the point where she voluntarily resigned as donee. In this sense, the closest analogue to the “event” contemplated by r 852(2) was the substantive result achieved—removal of the donee—rather than whether the court made a final determination on revocation after a full hearing.
The High Court also endorsed the DJ’s focus on conduct. The DJ had considered that VVB contested the matter aggressively until almost the very end, and that this conduct was relevant to whether she should bear costs. The High Court noted that the mode of reaching the outcome matters: whether the matter ends by full adjudication, mutual agreement, or a voluntary resignation at different stages of the litigation. Here, the timing and context of VVB’s resignation supported the DJ’s conclusion that it was not appropriate for the respondent to bear the costs of a contest that VVB had actively engaged in.
Importantly, the High Court addressed VVB’s characterisation of the case as one that was “settled” or resolved amicably. The High Court observed that the case was not a typical settlement where parties negotiate and incorporate agreed terms into a consent order, including agreement on costs. Instead, the DJ had found that an in-principle agreement on costs (around $8,000) “fell through”, and the parties did not reach an agreement on any draft consent order. This supported the DJ’s view that the costs issue remained contested and that the litigation had not been resolved through a negotiated compromise that would justify a different costs allocation.
Finally, the High Court considered the argument that costs should be borne by P’s estate. While the judgment extract provided does not set out the full response to this point, the High Court’s reasoning indicates that the court was not persuaded that the estate should bear costs where the donee’s conduct and litigation posture made it fair for the donee to be responsible. The DJ’s rationale—that there was no justification for the donee’s costs (or costs ordered against her) to be borne by P’s estate in circumstances where she was accused of wrongdoing and chose to resign at a late stage—was treated as consistent with the conduct-based framework in r 854.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court upheld the DJ’s costs order. In practical terms, VVB remained liable to pay costs to VVA, and the matter proceeded on the basis that the respondent should be compensated for the costs incurred in bringing the OSM to the point where the substantive outcome was achieved.
The decision also confirmed that, for costs purposes, courts will look beyond procedural labels and focus on the substantive “event” and the parties’ conduct. The High Court’s approach therefore left intact the DJ’s direction that costs would be subject to taxation if not agreed, reflecting the discretionary nature of costs orders under the MCA and the FJR.
Why Does This Case Matter?
VVB v VVA is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how costs discretion operates in mental capacity and LPA-related proceedings. Donees and their counsel often assume that resignation without admission of liability should neutralise personal costs exposure. This case demonstrates that resignation does not automatically insulate a donee from costs consequences, especially where the donee has contested the matter aggressively and resignation occurs late in the litigation.
The decision is also useful as an authority on the “event” concept in r 852(2) of the FJR. Where the substantive outcome sought by the applicant is achieved through a voluntary act that renders adjudication unnecessary, the court may still treat the substantive outcome as the relevant “event” for costs. This is consistent with the broader principle from UTOC Engineering that costs are about justice and compensation, not about procedural labels such as “withdrawn” or “dismissed”.
For litigators, the case underscores the importance of conduct evidence in costs submissions. Under r 854, the court must take into account the conduct of all parties, including conduct before and during proceedings. Accordingly, parties should consider early, practical steps to de-escalate disputes, and where appropriate, to reach genuine agreements on costs and consent orders. Where negotiations fail and the matter proceeds adversarially, courts may be more willing to order costs against the party whose conduct contributed to the litigation’s continuation.
Legislation Referenced
- Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) — s 40(1)
- Family Justice Rules 2014 — r 852(2), r 854
Cases Cited
- VVB v VVA [2022] SGHCF 1
- JBB v JBA [2015] 5 SLR 153
- UTOC Engineering Pte Ltd v ASK Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] 5 SLR 83
Source Documents
This article analyses [2022] SGHCF 1 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.