Case Details
- Citation: [2020] SGHCF 4
- Title: VET v VEU
- Court: High Court (Family Division)
- Division/Proceeding: Originating Summons (Guardianship of Infants Act)
- Originating Summons No: No 1 of 2019
- Date of Hearing: 27 November 2019; 29 November 2019
- Date of Decision: 14 February 2020
- Judge: Debbie Ong J
- Plaintiff/Applicant: VET
- Defendant/Respondent: VEU
- Legal Area(s): Family Law — Guardianship — Welfare of the child
- Statutes Referenced: Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 122, 1985 Rev Ed); Interpretation Act; Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed); Children and Young Persons Act (Cap 38, 2001 Rev Ed)
- Foreign/Comparative Legislation Referenced: UK Guardianship of Minors Act 1971
- Cases Cited: [2019] SGHCF 24; [2020] SGHCF 4 (this case)
- Judgment Length: 28 pages, 8,571 words
Summary
VET v VEU concerned an application under Singapore’s Guardianship of Infants Act (“GIA”) for the appointment of a non-biological, non-adoptive partner as guardian of two children conceived and born via surrogacy. The applicant, VET, was the biological father of both children and had adopted the boy in Singapore. The respondent, VEU, was the applicant’s same-sex spouse and had no biological link to either child. Although the respondent consented to the application and wished to be appointed guardian, the High Court (Family Division) dismissed the application.
The central issue was whether, and if so when, a fit parent may voluntarily delegate or share parental responsibility by appointing a non-parent as guardian. The court held that parental responsibility is not a voluntarily delegable responsibility in the way the applicant sought. While day-to-day caregiving authority can be entrusted to others, an appointment of guardian without meaningful limits would effectively place the guardian “in the shoes of a parent” for long-term and consequential decisions. Because the proposed guardianship would extend beyond permissible delegation of routine care, it was inconsistent with the nature and philosophy of parental responsibility under Singapore law.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The parties were a same-sex couple married in the United States in 2018. VET was the biological father of two children. The first child, a boy, was conceived through in-vitro fertilisation and born in the United States in 2013 via a surrogate mother. VET later applied to adopt the boy in Singapore in order to obtain Singapore citizenship. That adoption application was granted by a three-judge coram of the High Court (Family Division) in December 2018: UKM v Attorney-General [2019] 3 SLR 874 (“UKM v Attorney-General”). With the adoption order, VET successfully applied for a student pass for the boy.
After the boy’s birth and adoption, the couple decided to have a second child. They entered into another surrogacy arrangement. In early 2019, a girl was born through a surrogate mother based in California. VET, as the biological father, legally adopted the girl in the United States. The family subsequently moved to Singapore and now lives in Singapore with both children, supported by a domestic helper. VET intended to apply for a visa arrangement to enable his daughter to reside in Singapore in the long term.
In terms of day-to-day care, both parties provided care for the children. The respondent, VEU, had resigned from his previous employment in order to care for the children. The applicant’s motivation for seeking guardianship was practical and administrative as well as relational: VET pointed out that VEU, as neither biological nor legal parent, could face difficulties in exercising authority over the children. For example, VEU could not provide consent for medical procedures on behalf of the children. VET also described the need for him to be personally present for immigration “visa-runs” for the daughter, which involved leaving and returning to Singapore to renew a tourist visa on a quarterly basis.
VET applied to the Family Court for VEU to be appointed guardian of both children under s 5 of the GIA, and for joint custody and shared care and control. VEU did not contest the application and consented. The parties submitted a draft consent order. However, because the application raised important questions of law—particularly the legal nature of parental responsibility and whether it could be voluntarily shared with a non-parent—the matter was transferred to the High Court (Family Division) for determination.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue was the proper interpretation and application of s 5 of the GIA in the context of a fit parent seeking guardianship appointment for a non-parent. Section 5 empowers the court, on application by a parent or guardian appointed under the Act, to make orders regarding custody, access, and maintenance, and to alter or discharge such orders. While the welfare of the child is paramount, the court had to determine whether the requested guardianship arrangement was legally permissible given the respondent’s status.
The second issue was doctrinal: whether parental responsibility is a voluntarily delegable responsibility that can be shared with a non-parent through the appointment of a guardian. The court framed the question around the “philosophy and nature of parental responsibility”. In particular, it had to decide whether appointing a guardian would merely authorise day-to-day decisions while leaving parental responsibility intact with the parent, or whether it would effectively transfer long-term decision-making authority to the guardian.
Related to these issues was the court’s concern about the legal consequences of an appointment where the guardian’s authority is not meaningfully limited. If the guardian’s authority is broad and unqualified, the court needed to assess whether such an appointment would undermine the legal structure that places parental responsibility with the parent, rather than with a third party, even where the third party is willing and caring.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began with the statutory framework. The application was brought under s 5 of the GIA. The judge explained that s 5 is an enabling provision through which parents and court-appointed guardians may apply for custody, access, and maintenance. The applicant, being the biological parent of both children (and having adopted the boy in Singapore), had locus standi to invoke s 5. The court emphasised that, in determining any application under s 5, the welfare of the infant is the court’s paramount consideration, consistent with s 3 of the GIA.
In discussing welfare, the court relied on its prior jurisprudence. The judge reiterated that “welfare of the infant” refers to the child’s well-being in the most exhaustive sense—physical, intellectual, psychological, emotional, moral and religious well-being—both in the short and long term. The court also recognised that welfare includes the need to enable parents to carry out their parental responsibility without unnecessary interference from third parties. This welfare analysis, however, had to be reconciled with the legal nature of parental responsibility itself.
The court then turned to parental responsibility. It drew on s 46(1) of the Women’s Charter, which provides that upon marriage, the husband and wife are mutually bound to cooperate in safeguarding the interests of the union and in caring and providing for the children. The judge noted that this principle applies to all parents, whether married or unmarried, and cited commentary and Court of Appeal authority to support the premise that parental responsibility is not dependent on marital status. Accordingly, the applicant, as a parent, had parental responsibility over the children.
Crucially, the court held that parental responsibility is not voluntarily delegable. The judge reasoned that parental responsibility is fundamental and anchored in the legal status of parenthood. The court acknowledged that some aspects of caregiving can be delegated in practice—such as entrusting a child to a grandparent, aunt or uncle, or school teachers during school hours. Those persons may make day-to-day decisions while the child is in their physical care. However, the court distinguished between delegating routine caregiving authority and delegating parental responsibility in a legal sense.
Applying that distinction to the proposed guardianship, the court found that the applicant’s request went beyond day-to-day delegation. The applicant argued that he was not seeking to remove himself as a parent and that he intended to retain parental rights and obligations while “clothing” the respondent with similar rights and obligations to enable co-parenting. Yet the court observed that the orders sought would not be confined to routine decisions. Although a guardianship instrument can set limitations, the parties did not suggest restrictions on the respondent’s authority. Where the guardian’s authority is not limited, the appointment results in the guardian stepping into the shoes of a parent to exercise the authority that the parent naturally possesses over the child. The court explained that this would include long-term decision-making with significant consequences, such as education choices and consent to major medical treatment, including serious procedures and organ donation.
In other words, the court treated guardianship under the GIA as a mechanism that can carry substantial legal authority, not merely a practical caregiving arrangement. The judge therefore concluded that parental responsibility cannot be voluntarily delegated to a non-parent through an appointment of guardian where the guardian’s authority is effectively broad and unqualified. The court’s reasoning also reflected a concern about legal coherence: if parental responsibility were delegable in this manner, it would blur the legal boundary between parents and third parties, contrary to the statutory and doctrinal structure that places parental responsibility with the parent (or, in the adoption context, with adoptive parents).
Although the respondent was willing and the applicant’s motivations were understandable, the court’s analysis focused on legal principle rather than on the parties’ intentions. The court’s approach suggests that the welfare of the child must be assessed within the constraints of the legal framework governing parental responsibility and guardianship authority. The court did not accept that the proposed arrangement could be characterised as merely enabling the respondent to perform caregiving tasks without legal transfer of consequential authority.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed VET’s application for VEU to be appointed guardian of both children under s 5 of the GIA. While the respondent consented and the court acknowledged the practical caregiving role VEU played, the court held that the legal effect of an appointment without meaningful limitations would improperly delegate parental responsibility to a non-parent.
Practically, the decision meant that VEU would not obtain the legal status of guardian that would allow him to exercise parental authority in the broad sense contemplated by the application. The applicant remained the parent with the relevant legal responsibilities and decision-making authority, and any participation by VEU in medical and other consequential decisions would continue to depend on the applicant’s consent and the legal mechanisms available for third-party involvement.
Why Does This Case Matter?
VET v VEU is significant for practitioners because it clarifies the legal limits of guardianship appointments in Singapore, particularly where the applicant is a fit parent seeking to formalise co-parenting with a non-parent. The decision underscores that guardianship is not simply a “recognition” of a caregiving relationship. Instead, it can confer substantial authority that, if unbounded, effectively places the guardian in the position of a parent for long-term and high-stakes decisions.
The case also provides doctrinal guidance on the non-delegability of parental responsibility. Even where a non-parent is willing, competent, and deeply involved in the children’s lives, the court will scrutinise whether the proposed guardianship arrangement would legally transfer parental authority beyond permissible day-to-day delegation. This has implications for same-sex families, blended families, and any family structure where a non-parent partner or caregiver seeks formal legal authority.
For lawyers advising clients, the decision suggests that if a party seeks legal recognition for a non-parent caregiver, the application must be carefully structured to align with the legal nature of parental responsibility. Where limitations are possible, counsel should consider whether the requested orders can be confined to routine caregiving authority rather than consequential decision-making. The judgment also highlights the importance of framing relief in a way that does not inadvertently seek an outcome that the court views as inconsistent with the statutory philosophy of parental responsibility.
Legislation Referenced
- Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 122, 1985 Rev Ed), in particular ss 3 and 5
- Interpretation Act (relevant for statutory interpretation principles)
- Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed), s 46(1)
- Children and Young Persons Act (Cap 38, 2001 Rev Ed)
- UK Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 (comparative reference)
Cases Cited
- UKM v Attorney-General [2019] 3 SLR 874
- UMF v UMG and another [2019] 3 SLR 640
- TAU v TAT [2018] 5 SLR 1089
- TSF v TSE [2018] 2 SLR 833
- TSF v TSE [2018] 2 SLR 833
- L v L [1996] 2 SLR(R) 529
- Lim Chin Huat Francis and another v Lim Kok Chye Ivan and another [1999] 2 SLR(R) 392
- [2019] SGHCF 24
- VET v VEU [2020] SGHCF 4
Source Documents
This article analyses [2020] SGHCF 4 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.