Case Details
- Citation: [2020] SGHCF 4
- Title: VET v VEU
- Court: High Court (Family Division)
- Originating process: Originating Summons (Guardianship of Infants Act) No 1 of 2019
- Date of hearing: 27 November 2019; 29 November 2019
- Date of decision: 14 February 2020
- Judge: Debbie Ong J
- Plaintiff/Applicant: VET
- Defendant/Respondent: VEU
- Legal area: Family law (Guardianship; welfare of the child; parental responsibility)
- Statutes referenced: Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 122, 1985 Rev Ed); Interpretation Act; Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed); Children and Young Persons Act (Cap 38, 2001 Rev Ed)
- Foreign legislation referenced: UK Guardianship of Minors Act 1971
- Cases cited: [2019] SGHCF 24; [2020] SGHCF 4
- Judgment length: 28 pages, 8,571 words
Summary
VET v VEU concerned an application under Singapore’s Guardianship of Infants Act (“GIA”) seeking the appointment of a non-parent as guardian of two children born to a same-sex couple through surrogacy. The plaintiff, VET, was the biological father of both children and had adopted the boy in Singapore. He sought to appoint the defendant, VEU, who had no biological link to either child, as guardian and to share custody and care and control. The defendant consented to the application and did not contest it.
The High Court (Family Division), however, dismissed the application. The court held that parental responsibility is fundamental and, as a matter of principle, is not voluntarily delegable to a non-parent through a guardianship appointment in a way that effectively “clothes” the guardian with the parent’s long-term decision-making authority. While day-to-day caregiving can be delegated, the appointment of a guardian without meaningful limits would, in substance, place the guardian “in the shoes of a parent” and transfer authority over major decisions with long-term consequences. Since the proposed appointment would operate as an unqualified delegation of parental authority, it was inconsistent with the philosophy and nature of parental responsibility and the statutory welfare framework.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The parties were a same-sex couple who married in the United States in 2018. VET is the biological father of two children. The first child, a boy, was conceived through in-vitro fertilisation and born in the United States in 2013 via a surrogate mother. VET later applied to adopt the boy in order to obtain Singapore citizenship for the child. That adoption was granted by a three-judge coram of the High Court (Family Division) in December 2018: UKM v Attorney-General [2019] 3 SLR 874 (“UKM v Attorney-General”). With the adoption order, VET also successfully applied for a student pass for the boy.
After the boy’s birth, the couple decided to have a second child. They entered into another surrogacy arrangement, this time with a surrogate mother based in California. In early 2019, a girl was born. VET, again as the biological father, legally adopted the girl in the United States. The family subsequently moved to and now lives in Singapore with both children, supported by a domestic helper.
In practical terms, both parties provide care for the children. VEU had resigned from his previous employment to care for the children full-time. VET emphasised that VEU, despite being the day-to-day caregiver, is neither the biological nor the legal parent of either child in Singapore. As a result, VET argued that VEU could not provide legally effective consent for certain medical procedures. VET also pointed to immigration-related practicalities: the girl’s tourist visa required periodic renewal, involving “visa-runs” (leaving and returning to Singapore). VET contended that he would need to be personally present for these processes and for medical procedures such as vaccinations.
To address these difficulties, VET applied to the Family Court for VEU to be appointed guardian of both children under s 5 of the GIA. He also sought joint custody and shared care and control. Although VEU consented and did not contest the application, the matter was transferred to the High Court because it raised significant questions of law concerning whether, and when, a fit parent may delegate or share parental responsibility with a non-parent through guardianship.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue was whether a parent’s parental responsibility can be voluntarily delegated or shared with a non-parent by appointing that non-parent as guardian under the GIA. The court framed the question in terms of the “philosophy and nature of parental responsibility”: parental responsibility is not merely a set of practical tasks, but a fundamental obligation tied to the parent-child relationship and the child’s welfare.
A related issue concerned the scope of authority that would flow from a guardianship appointment. The court had to consider whether appointing VEU as guardian would merely formalise day-to-day caregiving authority, or whether it would, in substance, transfer long-term decision-making authority over major matters with lasting consequences. This included questions such as education choices and consent to major medical treatment.
Finally, the court had to apply the statutory welfare framework. Under the GIA, the welfare of the infant is the court’s paramount consideration. The court therefore had to determine how the welfare principle interacts with the legal nature of parental responsibility and the statutory effect of guardianship appointments.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by identifying the statutory basis for the application. Section 5 of the GIA empowers the court, upon application by a parent or a guardian appointed under the Act, to make orders regarding custody, access, and maintenance, and to alter, vary, or discharge such orders. The court noted that s 5 is an enabling provision through which parents and court-appointed guardians may apply for custody, access, and maintenance. VET, as the biological parent (and as the adoptive parent of the boy in Singapore), had locus standi to invoke s 5.
Next, the court emphasised the welfare principle. Under s 3 of the GIA, where custody or upbringing of an infant is in question, the court must regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consideration. The court also relied on its earlier jurisprudence to define “welfare” broadly as the child’s well-being in every aspect—physical, intellectual, psychological, emotional, moral, and religious—both in the short term and the long term. The court further recognised that welfare includes enabling parents to carry out parental responsibility without unnecessary interference from third parties.
The court then turned to the concept of parental responsibility. It treated parental responsibility as one of the most fundamental obligations in family law and drew support from s 46(1) of the Women’s Charter, which imposes mutual duties on spouses to cooperate in caring for and providing for children. The court observed that this duty applies regardless of whether parents are married or unmarried, citing the broader principle that parents—natural or potential—must care for their children. On the facts, there was no dispute that VET, as a parent, has parental responsibility.
Crucially, the court held that parental responsibility is not voluntarily delegable. The court reasoned that parental responsibility cannot be transferred to a non-parent through guardianship in a way that undermines the parent’s fundamental obligations. The court explained that delegation is possible in a limited sense: parents often entrust children to other adults for physical care, and those adults may make day-to-day decisions while the child is in their care. However, the court distinguished between day-to-day caregiving authority and long-term decision-making authority.
Applying this distinction to the proposed guardianship, the court scrutinised the nature of the orders sought. VET’s position was that he was not seeking to remove himself as a parent. He intended to retain parental rights and obligations but wanted VEU to have “similar rights and obligations” so that the couple could “co-parent.” The court accepted that VEU’s role as day-to-day caregiver was real and that practical issues existed, particularly around medical consent and immigration processes.
However, the court found that VET’s application went beyond formalising day-to-day caregiving. While a guardianship instrument can set limitations on a guardian’s authority, the parties did not propose any restrictions. The court held that where a guardian’s authority is not limited, the appointment results in the guardian stepping into the shoes of a parent to exercise the authority that the parent naturally possesses. In that scenario, the guardian’s authority would include long-term decisions with long-term consequences, such as education choices and consent to major and serious medical treatment, including consent to organ donation.
In other words, even if VET remained a parent with continuing responsibility, the legal effect of an unqualified guardianship appointment would be to transfer substantial decision-making power to the non-parent guardian. The court therefore concluded that parental responsibility is not voluntarily delegable in the manner sought. The court’s reasoning reflected a concern that the statutory guardianship mechanism should not be used to create a de facto second parent with full parental authority where the law does not recognise such a transfer.
The court also addressed the possibility that the welfare of the child could be served by enabling co-parenting arrangements. It acknowledged that welfare includes reducing unnecessary interference and supporting parents in carrying out their responsibilities. Yet, the court treated this as insufficient to override the legal nature of parental responsibility and the statutory consequences of guardianship appointments. The court’s approach suggests that welfare considerations must operate within the boundaries of the legal framework governing parental authority.
Although the excerpt provided is truncated, the court’s analysis clearly proceeded from principle to application: first, identify the welfare standard; second, define parental responsibility as fundamental and non-delegable; third, distinguish day-to-day caregiving from long-term authority; and fourth, evaluate the legal effect of the proposed guardianship appointment in light of whether limitations were sought. The absence of limitations was decisive because it meant the guardian would receive broad authority inconsistent with the court’s understanding of parental responsibility.
Finally, the court’s reasoning was informed by comparative and interpretive considerations, including references to the Interpretation Act and the UK Guardianship of Minors Act 1971. These references supported the court’s view that guardianship is a legal status with significant authority, and that any expansion of that status must be carefully aligned with the underlying philosophy of parental responsibility and the statutory welfare framework.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed VET’s application for VEU to be appointed guardian of both children under s 5 of the GIA, and consequently did not grant the ancillary orders sought for joint custody and shared care and control on the basis of that guardianship appointment.
Practically, the decision meant that VEU could continue to provide day-to-day care as a caregiver, but he could not be vested with the legal authority that would flow from an unqualified guardianship appointment. The court’s dismissal thus preserved the legal distinction between parental responsibility and the authority of a non-parent guardian.
Why Does This Case Matter?
VET v VEU is significant because it addresses a modern family-law reality—same-sex parenting and surrogacy arrangements—while reaffirming a foundational legal principle: parental responsibility is fundamental and not voluntarily delegable through guardianship in a way that effectively transfers long-term parental authority to a non-parent. For practitioners, the case clarifies that consent and willingness of the parties, while relevant to welfare, cannot by themselves justify a legal mechanism that changes the allocation of parental authority beyond what the statute permits.
The decision also provides guidance on how guardianship applications should be structured if they are to be considered. The court’s reasoning indicates that if a non-parent caregiver is to be appointed as guardian, the appointment would likely need to be carefully limited so that it does not place the guardian in the shoes of a parent for long-term decisions. While the judgment dismissed the application on the facts, it implicitly signals that the legal form and scope of the orders sought are crucial.
From a welfare perspective, the case balances the child’s practical needs—such as ensuring timely medical consent and smooth caregiving continuity—with the legal architecture governing parental responsibility. Lawyers advising parents in similar circumstances should therefore consider alternative legal tools for authorising a caregiver’s participation in specific decisions (for example, limited authorisations or other procedural mechanisms) rather than seeking broad guardianship that confers full parental authority.
Legislation Referenced
- Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 122, 1985 Rev Ed), in particular ss 3 and 5
- Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) (referenced for interpretive approach)
- Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed), s 46(1)
- Children and Young Persons Act (Cap 38, 2001 Rev Ed) (referenced in relation to parental responsibility and potential consequences)
- UK Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 (referenced comparatively)
Cases Cited
- UKM v Attorney-General [2019] 3 SLR 874
- UMF v UMG and another [2019] 3 SLR 640
- TAU v TAT [2018] 5 SLR 1089
- TSF v TSE [2018] 2 SLR 833
- TSF v TSE [2018] 2 SLR 833
- TSF v TSE [2018] 2 SLR 833
- L v L [1996] 2 SLR(R) 529
- Lim Chin Huat Francis and another v Lim Kok Chye Ivan and another [1999] 2 SLR(R) 392
- [2019] SGHCF 24
- [2020] SGHCF 4
Source Documents
This article analyses [2020] SGHCF 4 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.