Case Details
- Citation: [2015] SGHC 239
- Title: Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners v Kuntjoro Wibawa and other matters
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 14 September 2015
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Coram: Choo Han Teck J
- Proceedings / Case Numbers: Bill of Costs No 173 of 2013 (Summons No 3317 and 3318 of 2014), Originating Summons No 204 of 2014; and Bill of Costs No 173 of 2014 (Summons No 5186 of 2014)
- Related Earlier Proceedings: Registrar’s Appeal No 94 of 2014; Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners v Kuntjoro Wibawa @ Wong Kin Tjong [2014] SGHC 79
- Applicant / Plaintiff in BC 173/2013: Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners
- Respondent / Defendant in BC 173/2013: Kuntjoro Wibawa @ Wong Kin Tjong — Veritas Law Corporation
- Applicant / Respondent in BC 173/2014: Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners (seeking review of taxation order); Veritas Law Corporation (VLC) involved in earlier representation
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Costs (taxation and review of bills of costs)
- Statute Referenced: Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1997 Rev Ed) — including s 113(3)
- Rules Referenced (as described in the judgment extract): Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed) — O 59 r 31 and Appendix 1 of O 59 r 31(1)
- Cases Cited (as per metadata): [2014] SGHC 79; [2015] SGHC 239 (this decision)
- Judgment Length: 8 pages, 4,810 words (as stated in metadata)
- Counsel: Singa Retnam (instructed counsel) and Ling Leong Hui (for Tommy Choo Mark Go & Partners) for the applicant in BC 173/2013 and the defendant in OS 204/2014; Ooi Oon Tat (Judy Cheng & Co) for the respondent in BC 173/2013 and the plaintiff in OS 204/2014; Bachoo Mohan Singh (Bachoo Mohan Singh Law Practice) for the applicant in BC 173/2014; Singa Retnam (instructed counsel) and Ling Leong Hui for the respondent in BC 173/2014
Summary
This decision concerns the taxation and subsequent review of two bills of costs arising from a solicitor-client relationship that ended midstream. The High Court (Choo Han Teck J) dealt with (i) an originating summons seeking declarations that a warrant to act was void and that the client had already paid all sums due under an alleged oral costs arrangement, and (ii) summonses by both the former solicitors and the client seeking review of the assistant registrar’s taxation orders on the ground that the taxed costs were respectively too low or too high.
The court dismissed the client’s attempt to invalidate the warrant to act and to replace its written charging terms with an alleged oral agreement. On the evidence, the client failed to prove the oral agreement on the balance of probabilities. The court also reaffirmed that taxation is fundamentally concerned with whether the amounts claimed are fair and reasonable, assessed independently of the parties’ private cost agreement—though the agreement may be a relevant factor. Ultimately, the court’s approach emphasised proportionality and the proper scope of costs for the work done up to the point of discharge.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The dispute traces back to July 2011, when Kuntjoro Wibawa engaged Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners (“TCMGP”) to act for him in a matter involving his father’s estate and discretionary trusts in Jersey. The solicitor in TCMGP was Mr Ling Leong Hui, who advised the client but felt insufficiently familiar with trust law. Mr Ling therefore instructed Mr Bachoo Mohan Singh as counsel. In August 2011, the client signed a warrant to act authorising TCMGP to act and setting out the charging rates for both TCMGP and Mr Singh.
Suit 650 was commenced on 21 September 2011. Although the merits of Suit 650 were not directly before the court, they formed the background for the costs dispute. Over the next two years, Mr Singh and TCMGP acted for the client in Suit 650 and related interlocutory matters, including applications in the Royal Court of Jersey for advancement of trust monies. The solicitor-client relationship was eventually terminated: on 3 June 2013, the client discharged TCMGP and Mr Singh while Suit 650 was still at the interlocutory stage. General discovery had just been completed and the parties had filed their lists of documents.
After discharge, TCMGP prepared a bill of costs based on the written warrant to act. The client’s new solicitors initially asked for taxation but reserved the client’s “legal rights including the agreement on costs.” The client later resisted taxation, asserting that the written warrant’s terms were superseded by an oral agreement. He claimed that he only had to pay Mr Singh a monthly sum—initially $5,000 and later increased to $10,000—and that the written warrant’s charging structure would only be used as a basis for party-and-party costs if he succeeded in Suit 650.
TCMGP applied for an order to draw up and tax the bill on an indemnity basis. On 30 August 2013, Andrew Ang J ordered that the bill be taxed. TCMGP then commenced Bill of Costs No 173 of 2013 (“BC 173/2013”) on 21 October 2013. While taxation was ongoing, the client filed OS 204 on 6 March 2014 seeking declarations that the warrant to act was void and that he had already paid all legal fees incurred under the alleged oral agreement. He also sought a stay of the taxation proceedings. The assistant registrar granted the stay, but TCMGP appealed and the High Court ordered that BC 173/2013 should resume, holding that OS 204 did not directly affect the taxation proceedings.
After the assistant registrar continued hearing BC 173/2013, both sides were dissatisfied with the taxation outcome. TCMGP filed SUM 3317 seeking review on the basis that the taxed costs were too low; the client filed SUM 3318 seeking review on the basis that the taxed costs were too high. OS 204 was also fixed together with these summonses because it involved overlapping issues. A separate but related matter, SUM 5186, concerned another set of client and former solicitors: TCMGP and Veritas Law Corporation (“VLC”). VLC had represented TCMGP in OS 204 initially but discharged itself in August 2014. A separate bill of costs (BC 173/2014) was then taxed, and TCMGP sought review of that taxation order on the ground that the costs were too high.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first major issue was whether the client had proved, on the balance of probabilities, that there was an oral agreement superseding the written warrant to act. This issue mattered because the client sought declarations that the warrant was void and that he had already paid all sums due under the alleged oral arrangement. In effect, the court had to determine whether the written charging terms could be displaced by oral evidence and whether the warrant’s terms were unenforceable.
The second issue concerned the scope and method of taxation and review. Even if the parties had a costs agreement, the court had to decide whether the amounts claimed in the bill of costs were fair and reasonable. The court also had to consider the relevance of the parties’ cost agreements to taxation, and whether the assistant registrar’s approach properly reflected the governing principles, including proportionality.
Finally, the court had to address the procedural and substantive relationship between OS 204 and the taxation proceedings. Earlier, the High Court had already ruled on the stay and the non-direct effect of OS 204 on taxation. In this decision, the court proceeded on the basis that taxation would be determined by fairness and reasonableness, even if OS 204 raised disputes about the underlying costs agreement.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
On the oral agreement issue, Choo Han Teck J focused on the evidential quality and internal consistency of the client’s account. The warrant to act was a written agreement containing clear terms. The judge accepted that the client might not have been highly proficient in English, but found that he was not someone who could not understand or was completely unfamiliar with the language. The court was satisfied that the client understood the terms when he signed the warrant.
Even so, the judge recognised that the client could still succeed if he proved, on the balance of probabilities, that there was an oral agreement to pay monthly sums to Mr Singh and that the warrant’s terms were not to apply in the way the solicitors contended. However, the judge found the client’s evidence to be vague and insufficiently specific. The client’s affidavit did not clearly identify when and where the oral agreement was made, nor did it set out the terms with the clarity expected for a purported supersession of a written charging structure.
The judge also examined the client’s narrative for coherence. The client said that Mr Singh had intended to “help” him raise funds, and that the day after the first meeting Mr Singh asked for $5,000 monthly. The client then signed the warrant containing the charging structure. He claimed that on 8 February 2012 the monthly sum was increased to $10,000 and that the “other terms” remained that if he won, costs would be charged against the trustees, but if he lost, he would not pay further legal fees beyond the monthly sums. The judge noted that the earlier portions of the affidavit did not mention these “other terms,” undermining the credibility of the alleged oral arrangement.
Further, the judge found the client’s case contradicted by contemporaneous evidence from the Jersey proceedings. In affidavits filed in Jersey in connection with the advancement of $500,000 to pay legal fees, the client had deposed that he owed his lawyers large sums charged on hourly rates. This was inconsistent with the client’s later claim that his obligation was limited to monthly sums under an oral arrangement.
The court also assessed payment records and found them inconsistent with the alleged oral agreement. From August to December 2011, the client paid a total of $55,000 to TCMGP, which did not tally with an arrangement under which only $25,000 would have been due for that period. In March 2012, the client paid an additional $75,000 on top of the monthly $10,000. The judge concluded that the payment records did not support the client’s version of the oral agreement.
Finally, the judge considered audio transcripts relied upon by the client. The court found them of little assistance because they were incomplete, selectively transcribed, and improperly prepared, with portions cut off and amendments made in the margins. Taken together, the judge was not satisfied that the client had proved the oral agreement. The judge therefore dismissed OS 204.
On the taxation and review issues, the court relied on its earlier reasoning in Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners v Kuntjoro Wibawa @ Wong Kin Tjong [2014] SGHC 79. The judge reiterated that taxation proceedings are not directly affected by the outcome of OS 204. The taxing court must decide whether the amounts claimed are fair and reasonable, and that finding is made irrespective of the rates stated in the warrant to act. If either party wished to enforce the cost agreement, it had to be done before the matter was fixed for taxation. Even where solicitors rely on a costs agreement, the court has discretion under s 113(3) of the Legal Profession Act to declare terms void if they are unfair or unreasonable.
Nevertheless, the court accepted that the warrant’s terms may be taken into consideration as a factor during taxation. The ultimate test remains fairness and reasonableness, assessed with regard to proportionality. The judge referred to O 59 r 31 read with Appendix 1 of O 59 r 31(1) of the Rules of Court, and to Lin Jian Wei and another v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2011] 3 SLR 1052, for the proportionality principle. In practical terms, this meant that even if the written charging structure existed, the court would still scrutinise whether the work performed and the resulting costs were proportionate to the matters at hand.
Although the extract provided is truncated after the discussion of the bills’ components, the court’s approach is clear from the reasoning that is visible: it would examine the nature of the work done (including interlocutory applications and discovery-related work), the stage at which the solicitors were discharged, and whether the taxed sums reflected work that was necessary and proportionate. The judge’s earlier holding that taxation is independent of the merits of OS 204 also signals that the court would not allow the client’s attempt to relitigate the underlying contractual basis to override the statutory and procedural framework governing taxation.
What Was the Outcome?
The court dismissed the client’s OS 204 application. The judge found that the client failed to prove the alleged oral agreement on the balance of probabilities and therefore refused the declarations sought that the warrant to act was void and that all costs had already been paid under the oral arrangement.
As for the summonses relating to review of taxation (SUM 3317 and SUM 3318), the court’s decision proceeded on the taxation principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, with the warrant’s terms treated as a relevant factor rather than a determinative rule. The court’s ultimate orders (including whether the taxed amounts were adjusted) would follow from that proportionality-focused assessment of the assistant registrar’s taxation decisions.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates the evidential burden on a client who seeks to displace a written costs agreement with an alleged oral arrangement. The court’s analysis shows that where a warrant to act is clear and signed, a client must provide cogent, consistent, and contemporaneous evidence to prove any alleged variation or supersession. Vague testimony, inconsistencies with earlier sworn statements, and payment records that do not align with the alleged oral terms will likely be fatal.
From a costs practice perspective, the decision also reinforces a key procedural point: taxation proceedings are not simply a forum to enforce or invalidate the underlying costs contract. Even where an originating summons raises disputes about the validity of a costs agreement, the taxing court will still apply the statutory and procedural framework to determine whether the claimed costs are fair and reasonable. This is consistent with the court’s earlier decision in [2014] SGHC 79 and with the discretion under s 113(3) of the Legal Profession Act.
Finally, the emphasis on proportionality under O 59 r 31 and Appendix 1 is practically useful. It signals that solicitors should maintain detailed records and be prepared to justify not only the rates but also the necessity and proportionality of the work performed—especially where the matter settles or the solicitor-client relationship ends at an interlocutory stage. For law students, the case provides a clear example of how contractual charging terms interact with the independent judicial function of taxation.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1997 Rev Ed) — s 113(3)
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed) — O 59 r 31 and Appendix 1 of O 59 r 31(1)
Cases Cited
- Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners v Kuntjoro Wibawa @ Wong Kin Tjong [2014] SGHC 79
- Lin Jian Wei and another v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2011] 3 SLR 1052
Source Documents
This article analyses [2015] SGHC 239 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.