Case Details
- Citation: [2015] SGHC 239
- Title: Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners v Kuntjoro Wibawa and other matters
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 14 September 2015
- Judges: Choo Han Teck J
- Coram: Choo Han Teck J
- Proceedings: Bill of Costs No 173 of 2013 (Summons No 3317 and 3318 of 2014), Originating Summons No 204 of 2014 and Bill of Costs No 173 of 2014 (Summons No 5186 of 2014)
- Case Numbers (as described): Bill of Costs No 173 of 2013; Summons No 3317 of 2014; Summons No 3318 of 2014; Originating Summons No 204 of 2014; Bill of Costs No 173 of 2014; Summons No 5186 of 2014
- Originating Summons: Originating Summons No 204 of 2014
- Applicant/Plaintiff (as to BC 173/2013): Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners
- Defendant/Respondent (as to BC 173/2013): Kuntjoro Wibawa @ Wong Kin Tjong — Veritas Law Corporation
- Applicant (as to BC 173/2014): Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners
- Respondent (as to BC 173/2014): Kuntjoro Wibawa and other matters (contextually, the client in the earlier retainer)
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Costs (Taxation and review)
- Statutes Referenced: Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1997 Rev Ed)
- Cases Cited (reported): [2014] SGHC 79; [2015] SGHC 239 (as referenced within the judgment); Lin Jian Wei and another v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2011] 3 SLR 1052
- Counsel: Singa Retnam (instructed counsel) and Ling Leong Hui (Tommy Choo Mark Go & Partners) for the applicant in BC 173/2013, the defendant in OS 204/2014; Ooi Oon Tat (Judy Cheng & Co) for the respondent in BC 173/2013, the plaintiff in OS 204/2014; Bachoo Mohan Singh (Bachoo Mohan Singh Law Practice) for the applicant in BC 173/2014; Singa Retnam (instructed counsel) and Ling Leong Hui (Tommy Choo Mark Go & Partners) for the respondent in BC 173/2014
- Parties (retainer context): Mr Kuntjoro Wibawa; Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners (TCMGP); Mr Ling Leong Hui (solicitor); Mr Bachoo Mohan Singh (counsel); Veritas Law Corporation (VLC)
Summary
This High Court decision concerns the taxation and review of solicitors’ bills of costs following the termination of a solicitor-client relationship in a complex Jersey trust-related dispute. The court was asked, among other things, to determine whether a written “warrant to act” governing the charging structure was displaced by an alleged oral agreement, and how (and to what extent) such agreements should affect the court’s assessment of whether costs claimed were fair and reasonable.
The court, applying the balance of probabilities standard, rejected the client’s case that there was an oral agreement that fundamentally altered the written charging terms. The court was not satisfied that the oral agreement existed as alleged, and it dismissed the client’s originating summons seeking declarations that the warrant to act was void and that all fees had already been paid. On the taxation review issues, the court reiterated that the taxation court’s task is to assess fairness and reasonableness of the amounts claimed, and that this assessment is made independently of the outcome of the underlying claim, while still allowing the costs agreement to be a relevant (but not determinative) factor.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
In July 2011, Mr Kuntjoro Wibawa engaged Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners (“TCMGP”) to act for him in a matter concerning his father’s estate and discretionary trusts in Jersey. Mr Ling Leong Hui was the solicitor at TCMGP who advised Mr Wibawa. Because Mr Ling felt insufficiently familiar with trusts law, he instructed Mr Bachoo Mohan Singh as counsel. In August 2011, Mr Wibawa signed a warrant to act authorising TCMGP to act and setting out the charging rates for both TCMGP and Mr Singh.
TCMGP commenced Suit 650 on 21 September 2011. Although Suit 650 itself was not before the High Court in these proceedings, it formed the factual backdrop for the costs dispute. Over the next two years, Mr Singh and TCMGP acted for Mr Wibawa in Suit 650 and related interlocutory matters, including applications for interim relief and applications for advancement of trust monies in the Royal Court of Jersey. The relationship was later terminated: on 3 June 2013, Mr Wibawa discharged TCMGP and Mr Singh. At that point, Suit 650 was still in the interlocutory stage, with general discovery completed and lists of documents filed.
After discharge, TCMGP prepared a bill of costs based on the rates in the warrant to act. Mr Wibawa’s new solicitors initially asked TCMGP to proceed with taxation but expressly qualified that this was subject to the client’s legal rights, including the agreement on costs. Mr Wibawa then resisted taxation, asserting that an oral agreement superseded the warrant to act. He claimed that under the oral agreement he would pay Mr Singh a fixed monthly sum—initially $5,000, later increased to $10,000—and that the written warrant’s terms would only be used as a basis for taxing party-and-party costs if he succeeded in Suit 650.
TCMGP applied for taxation on an indemnity basis and obtained an order that the bill be taxed. While taxation proceedings in Bill of Costs No 173 of 2013 (“BC 173/2013”) were ongoing, Mr Wibawa filed an originating summons (OS 204) seeking declarations that the warrant to act was void and that he had already paid all fees due in accordance with the alleged oral agreement. He also sought a stay of the taxation proceedings. The assistant registrar granted a stay, but this was overturned on appeal; the High Court ordered that taxation proceed. The assistant registrar then continued with BC 173/2013 and delivered a taxation decision on 24 June 2014. Both parties sought reviews: TCMGP argued the costs awarded were too low, while Mr Wibawa argued they were too high.
All related matters were fixed together before Choo Han Teck J. In addition to OS 204 and the two review summonses (SUM 3317 and SUM 3318), there was a separate taxation review concerning another set of client and former solicitors: Bill of Costs No 173 of 2014 (“BC 173/2014”) and SUM 5186. That later matter involved TCMGP and Veritas Law Corporation (“VLC”), which had represented TCMGP in OS 204 at an earlier stage but discharged itself in August 2014. The court dealt with SUM 5186 after addressing the main connected matters.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first central issue was whether Mr Wibawa had proved, on the balance of probabilities, that there was an oral agreement that superseded the written warrant to act. This issue mattered because if the warrant to act was displaced or rendered void, it would affect the contractual basis for charging and could potentially influence the taxation assessment of what costs were fair and reasonable.
The second issue concerned the interaction between costs agreements and the court’s taxation function. Even where solicitors rely on a costs agreement, the taxation court retains discretion to declare terms void if they are unfair or unreasonable under the Legal Profession Act. The court therefore had to consider how far the alleged oral agreement (or the warrant to act) should govern the taxation outcome, and whether taxation should proceed on the basis of the written charging structure or on the alleged oral arrangement.
A further issue arose from the procedural history: OS 204 overlapped with BC 173/2013, and the court had previously held (in an earlier decision) that the taxation proceedings were not directly affected by the outcome of OS 204. The High Court therefore had to apply that principle consistently and clarify the scope of what the taxation court decides—namely, whether the amounts claimed are fair and reasonable—regardless of the merits outcome in the underlying suit.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began with the OS 204 question: whether the warrant to act was void due to an alleged oral agreement. The judge emphasised that the warrant to act was a written agreement containing clear terms, including the charging structure. Mr Wibawa’s case was that the written terms were superseded by an oral agreement under which he would pay only monthly sums to Mr Singh, and that the warrant’s terms would only be used as a basis for party-and-party costs if he succeeded in Suit 650. The court applied the balance of probabilities standard and found that Mr Wibawa had not proved the oral agreement as alleged.
In assessing credibility and proof, the court considered the client’s language proficiency and understanding of the warrant. Although Mr Wibawa was not described as highly proficient in English, the evidence showed he was not someone who could not understand or was completely unfamiliar with the language. The judge was satisfied that he understood the terms when he signed the warrant. This supported the presumption that the written agreement reflected the parties’ bargain at the time of signing.
The court then scrutinised the evidential quality of the oral agreement narrative. The evidence was described as vague, including uncertainty about when and where the oral agreement was made and what its exact terms were. Mr Wibawa’s affidavit did not clearly reconcile the alleged oral terms with the earlier sections of his own evidence. The judge noted internal inconsistencies: Mr Wibawa deposed that on 8 February 2012 the monthly payment increased from $5,000 to $10,000 and that other terms were agreed, including a conditional approach to charging legal costs depending on whether he won or lost. Yet the earlier parts of his affidavit did not mention these “other terms,” which undermined the reliability of the oral agreement account.
Beyond affidavit evidence, the court examined corroborative materials. The client’s OS 204 case was contradicted by affidavits he had filed in the Jersey courts for advancement of $500,000 to pay legal fees in early 2012. In those Jersey affidavits, Mr Wibawa stated that he owed large sums charged by hourly rates—an account inconsistent with the alleged fixed monthly arrangement and the claimed limited payment obligation. The court also considered payment records: from August to December 2011, Mr Wibawa paid TCMGP a total of $55,000, which did not align with the alleged monthly-only obligation of $25,000 for that period. In March 2012, he paid an additional $75,000 on top of the $10,000 monthly sum. These objective payment patterns did not support the client’s version of the oral agreement.
The court further addressed audio transcripts relied on by Mr Wibawa. The judge found them of little assistance because they were incomplete, selectively transcribed, and not properly prepared, with many portions cut off and amendments made in the transcripts. Taken together, the court concluded it was not satisfied that such an oral agreement existed as alleged. The judge accepted that there might have been some arrangement allowing the client to pay monthly sums temporarily due to financial constraints, but this did not mean the written warrant’s terms were void. The court therefore dismissed OS 204.
Turning to BC 173/2013 and the review summonses, the judge relied on the earlier decision in Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners v Kuntjoro Wibawa @ Wong Kin Tjong [2014] SGHC 79. That earlier decision had held that taxation proceedings are not directly affected by the result of OS 204. The taxation court’s role is to decide whether the amounts claimed were fair and reasonable, and this is done irrespective of the rates stated in the warrant to act. If parties wanted to enforce a costs agreement (whether in the warrant or an alleged oral agreement), they needed to do so before the matter was fixed for taxation. Even then, the court has discretion under s 113(3) of the Legal Profession Act to declare costs agreement terms void if they are unfair or unreasonable.
Nevertheless, the judge clarified that the warrant to act (or other agreements) may be taken into consideration as a factor in taxation proceedings. The ultimate test remains fairness and reasonableness. In conducting this assessment, the court should have regard to proportionality, referencing Order 59 rule 31 read with Appendix 1 of Order 59 rule 31(1) of the Rules of Court (as then in force) and the Court of Appeal guidance in Lin Jian Wei and another v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2011] 3 SLR 1052. This framework ensures that taxation is not a mechanical application of contractual rates but a reasoned evaluation of the work done, the complexity of the matter, and the proportionality of the costs to the issues.
Although the judgment text provided is truncated after the discussion of the nature of the work in Suit 650, the analysis up to that point shows the court’s method: it separated the contractual dispute (OS 204) from the taxation function (BC 173/2013), applied evidential scrutiny to the alleged oral agreement, and then anchored the taxation review in the statutory and procedural principles governing fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality.
What Was the Outcome?
The court dismissed Mr Wibawa’s originating summons OS 204. It held that he failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that there was an oral agreement superseding the written warrant to act. The court was satisfied that Mr Wibawa understood the warrant’s terms when he signed it, and it found the client’s evidence—affidavits, payment records, and audio transcripts—insufficient to establish the alleged oral arrangement. Accordingly, the declarations sought in OS 204 were not granted.
On the taxation review matters in BC 173/2013 (SUM 3317 and SUM 3318), the court proceeded on the basis that taxation is governed by the fair and reasonable test, independent of the OS 204 outcome, while still allowing the costs agreement to be a relevant factor. The court’s approach reflects the established principle that the taxation court evaluates proportionality and reasonableness of the amounts claimed, rather than simply applying the parties’ asserted contractual terms.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how Singapore courts treat disputes over costs agreements in the context of taxation. First, it demonstrates the evidential burden on a client who alleges that a written costs agreement was superseded by an oral arrangement. Where a warrant to act is clear and signed, the court will scrutinise the client’s proof closely, especially where documentary evidence (such as contemporaneous affidavits in related proceedings and payment records) is inconsistent with the alleged oral terms.
Second, the decision reinforces the conceptual separation between (i) contractual enforcement and (ii) taxation. Even when a client seeks declarations that a warrant is void, the taxation court still must assess whether the costs claimed are fair and reasonable. The court’s reliance on the earlier decision in [2014] SGHC 79 confirms that taxation proceedings are not automatically “derailed” by overlapping declaratory relief, and that parties should raise and resolve enforcement issues at the appropriate procedural stage.
Third, the case underscores the role of proportionality in costs taxation. By referencing Order 59 rule 31 and Appendix 1, and the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Lin Jian Wei, the judgment signals that contractual rates are not the end of the inquiry. Practitioners should therefore expect taxation outcomes to turn on the reasonableness of the work and the proportionality of the costs to the matters in dispute, rather than on the mere existence of a charging agreement.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1997 Rev Ed), s 113(3)
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed), Order 59 rule 31 and Appendix 1 of Order 59 rule 31(1)
Cases Cited
- Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners v Kuntjoro Wibawa @ Wong Kin Tjong [2014] SGHC 79
- Lin Jian Wei and another v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2011] 3 SLR 1052
Source Documents
This article analyses [2015] SGHC 239 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.