Case Details
- Title: Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners v Kuntjoro Wibawa and other matters
- Citation: [2015] SGHC 239
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 14 September 2015
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Coram: Choo Han Teck J
- Case Numbers: Bill of Costs No 173 of 2013 (Summons No 3317 and 3318 of 2014), Originating Summons No 204 of 2014 and Bill of Costs No 173 of 2014 (Summons No 5186 of 2014)
- Earlier Related Proceedings: Registrar’s Appeal No 94 of 2014; Bill of Costs No 173 of 2013; Originating Summons No 204 of 2014; Summons No 3068 of 2013; Summons No 1207 of 2014
- Tribunal Type: High Court (taxation/review of taxation and related declaratory relief)
- Parties: Tommy Choo Mark Go & Partners — Kuntjoro Wibawa @ Wong Kin Tjong — Veritas Law Corporation
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners (applicant in BC 173/2013; applicant in BC 173/2014)
- Defendant/Respondent: Kuntjoro Wibawa and other matters (respondent in BC 173/2013; plaintiff in OS 204/2014)
- Counsel for Applicant (BC 173/2013): Singa Retnam (instructed counsel) and Ling Leong Hui (Tommy Choo Mark Go & Partners)
- Counsel for Respondent (BC 173/2013): Ooi Oon Tat (Judy Cheng & Co)
- Counsel for Applicant (BC 173/2014): Bachoo Mohan Singh (Bachoo Mohan Singh Law Practice)
- Counsel for Respondent (BC 173/2014): Singa Retnam (instructed counsel) and Ling Leong Hui (Tommy Choo Mark Go & Partners)
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure – Costs – Taxation; Legal Profession – costs agreements and taxation discretion
- Statutes Referenced: Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1997 Rev Ed) (notably s 113(3)); Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed) (notably O 59 r 31 and Appendix 1)
- Cases Cited: [2014] SGHC 79; [2015] SGHC 239
- Judgment Length: 8 pages, 4,874 words
Summary
This High Court decision concerns the taxation and review of costs arising from a solicitor-client relationship that ended midstream. The client, Kuntjoro Wibawa, retained Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners (“TCMGP”) in July 2011 to act in a matter involving his father’s estate and discretionary trusts in Jersey. After the relationship was terminated in June 2013, TCMGP sought taxation of its bill of costs. The client resisted taxation and also commenced an originating summons seeking declarations that the written warrant to act was void and that he had already paid all fees under an alleged oral costs arrangement.
The court (Choo Han Teck J) dismissed the client’s originating summons. The judge was not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the alleged oral agreement existed in the manner claimed. The written warrant to act contained clear charging terms, and the client’s evidence—particularly on the timing, content, and supporting documentation—was vague and inconsistent with contemporaneous statements and payment records.
In parallel, the court addressed reviews of the assistant registrar’s taxation decisions in two bills of costs (BC 173/2013 and BC 173/2014). The court reiterated that taxation is fundamentally concerned with whether the amounts claimed are fair and reasonable, applying proportionality principles, and not merely whether the solicitor can rely on a costs agreement. The court’s approach underscores the discretionary and evaluative nature of taxation proceedings in Singapore.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
In July 2011, Mr Kuntjoro Wibawa engaged TCMGP to act for him in relation to his father’s estate and discretionary trusts in Jersey. The solicitor who advised him within TCMGP was Mr Ling Leong Hui. Because Mr Ling felt he was not sufficiently familiar with trusts law, he instructed another counsel, Mr Bachoo Mohan Singh, to assist. In August 2011, Mr Wibawa signed a warrant to act authorising TCMGP to act and setting out the charging rates for both TCMGP and Mr Singh.
TCMGP commenced Suit 650 in September 2011 on Mr Wibawa’s behalf. Although Suit 650 itself was not before the court in these proceedings, it generated extensive interlocutory activity and applications, including applications in the Royal Court of Jersey for advancement of trust monies. Over the next two years, Mr Singh and TCMGP acted for Mr Wibawa in Suit 650 and related matters. However, the parties later decided to terminate their solicitor-client relationship.
On 3 June 2013, Mr Wibawa discharged TCMGP and Mr Singh. At that time, Suit 650 was still in the interlocutory stage: general discovery had just been completed and the parties had filed their lists of documents. Following discharge, TCMGP prepared a bill of costs based on the rates in the warrant to act. Mr Wibawa’s new solicitors initially asked TCMGP to proceed with taxation, but they expressly qualified that the request was “subject to all of [Mr Wibawa’s] legal rights including the agreement on costs” between them.
Mr Wibawa then resisted taxation by asserting that an oral agreement superseded the written warrant to act. He claimed that under the oral agreement he would pay Mr Singh a monthly sum of $5,000, later increased to $10,000, and that the written warrant’s terms would only be used as a basis for taxing party-and-party costs if he succeeded in Suit 650. TCMGP applied for an order allowing it to draw up a bill of costs and for taxation on an indemnity basis. On 30 August 2013, Andrew Ang J ordered that the bill of costs be taxed, and TCMGP commenced Bill of Costs No 173 of 2013 on 21 October 2013.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first core issue was whether Mr Wibawa could obtain declaratory relief that the warrant to act was void and that he had already paid all fees due under the alleged oral agreement. This required the court to assess whether the oral agreement existed and, if so, what its terms were. The burden lay on Mr Wibawa to prove his case on the balance of probabilities.
The second issue concerned the review of the assistant registrar’s taxation decisions in BC 173/2013. Both sides sought review: TCMGP argued the costs awarded were too low, while Mr Wibawa argued they were too high. This raised the question of how taxation should treat costs agreements (written or alleged oral) and what the court should focus on when determining whether claimed costs are fair and reasonable.
A related but distinct issue arose in BC 173/2014 (Summons No 5186 of 2014), involving another set of client and former solicitors. Although the court indicated that this matter was not directly connected to the other matters, it still required the court to consider whether the assistant registrar’s taxation of that separate bill of costs should be reviewed.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
On OS 204, the judge’s analysis began with the evidential threshold. The court was not satisfied that Mr Wibawa proved the existence of the oral agreement as alleged. The warrant to act was a written agreement containing clear terms. While the judge accepted that Mr Wibawa might not be highly proficient in English, the evidence showed he was not unable to understand the language. The court was satisfied that he understood the terms when he signed the warrant.
However, the judge also recognised that even if the written warrant was signed, an oral agreement could potentially alter the parties’ arrangements. The judge therefore considered whether Mr Wibawa could prove, on the balance of probabilities, that it was orally agreed that he would pay $5,000 per month (later increased to $10,000) and that the warrant’s terms did not apply to him except as a basis for claiming party-and-party costs against the defendants if he succeeded. This is an important analytical point: the court did not treat the existence of a written agreement as automatically determinative of the parties’ final bargain, but it required clear proof of the alleged variation.
In evaluating proof, the judge found Mr Wibawa’s evidence to be vague and internally inconsistent. The affidavit evidence did not clearly explain when and where the oral agreement was made, nor did it precisely set out its terms. The judge noted that Mr Wibawa’s account evolved: he said that during the first meeting in July 2011, Mr Singh intended to help him raise funds, and that the day after the meeting Mr Singh asked him to raise $5,000 monthly. Yet Mr Wibawa signed the warrant containing the charging structure. He further claimed that on 8 February 2012 the monthly sum was increased to $10,000 and that the “other terms” were that if he won, Mr Singh would charge legal costs against the trustees, but if he lost, he would not pay further legal fees beyond the monthly sums. The judge observed that earlier portions of the affidavit did not mention these “other terms,” undermining the coherence of the narrative.
The judge also relied on objective contemporaneous materials. Mr Wibawa’s case in OS 204 was contradicted by affidavits he had deposed in the Jersey proceedings. In those affidavits, he stated that he owed his lawyers large sums charged by hourly rates. That was inconsistent with the claimed oral arrangement of fixed monthly sums and a conditional approach to further liability. In addition, payment records did not align with the alleged oral agreement. From August to December 2011, Mr Wibawa paid a total of $55,000, which did not tally with an arrangement under which only $25,000 would have been due. In March 2012, he paid an additional $75,000 on top of the $10,000 monthly sum. These discrepancies made it difficult for the court to accept that the oral agreement governed the parties’ financial obligations.
Finally, the judge considered audio transcripts relied upon by Mr Wibawa. The court found them of little assistance because they were incomplete, selectively transcribed, and not properly prepared, with amendments and cut-off portions. Taken together, these evidential weaknesses led the judge to conclude that Mr Wibawa had not proved the oral agreement on the balance of probabilities. The court therefore dismissed OS 204.
Turning to BC 173/2013, the judge relied on the earlier decision in Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners v Kuntjoro Wibawa @ Wong Kin Tjong [2014] SGHC 79. In that earlier judgment, the court had held that taxation proceedings are not directly affected by the outcome of OS 204. The judge reiterated the governing principle: the court that taxes a bill of costs must decide whether the amounts claimed are fair and reasonable, and this assessment is made irrespective of the rates stated in the warrant to act. If parties wish to enforce a costs agreement, they must do so before the matter is fixed for taxation. Even then, the court retains discretion to declare terms void if they are unfair or unreasonable, pursuant to s 113(3) of the Legal Profession Act.
In the present case, the judge accepted that the terms of the warrant (or any other agreement) may be taken into consideration as a factor during taxation. However, the ultimate test remains whether the amounts claimed are fair and reasonable. The judge also emphasised proportionality, referencing O 59 r 31 read with Appendix 1 of O 59 r 31(1) of the Rules of Court, and the decision in Lin Jian Wei and another v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2011] 3 SLR 1052. Proportionality operates as a constraint on what can be recovered as costs, ensuring that the taxed amount reflects the reasonable work done and the significance of the matter, rather than simply the contractual rates or the solicitor’s internal timekeeping.
Although the provided extract truncates the remainder of the judgment, the reasoning framework is clear from the portions quoted. The court’s approach would have required it to scrutinise the work performed in Suit 650 and related interlocutory applications, and then determine whether the assistant registrar’s assessment of fair and reasonable costs was correct. The judge also noted that TCMGP’s bill was mainly for proceedings in Suit 650, and that by the time of discharge in June 2013, general discovery had been completed and there had been 14 interlocutory applications, including applications for a Mareva injunction and an anti-suit injunction. Such matters typically involve significant effort and urgency, which may affect proportionality and the reasonableness of the costs claimed.
What Was the Outcome?
The court dismissed Mr Wibawa’s originating summons (OS 204). The judge held that Mr Wibawa failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that there was an oral agreement superseding the written warrant to act in the manner alleged, and therefore he could not obtain declarations that the warrant was void or that all fees had been paid under the claimed oral terms.
For the taxation reviews, the court proceeded to determine whether the assistant registrar’s taxation orders in BC 173/2013 (and subsequently BC 173/2014) should be disturbed. The decision confirms that taxation is not a mechanical exercise based on contractual rates, but a reasonableness and proportionality assessment. The practical effect is that the client’s attempt to reduce or negate liability by relying on an alleged oral arrangement failed, and the court’s taxation framework remained anchored in fair and reasonable costs.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates the evidential and procedural limits of challenging costs agreements in taxation proceedings. Even where a client alleges that a written costs warrant was superseded by an oral agreement, the court will require clear, coherent, and corroborated proof. Vague recollections, inconsistent affidavits, and payment records that do not match the alleged arrangement will likely be fatal.
More broadly, the decision reinforces the Singapore approach to taxation: the court’s focus is on whether the costs claimed are fair and reasonable, guided by proportionality. Contractual charging terms—whether in a warrant to act or an alleged oral agreement—may be relevant, but they are not determinative. This is consistent with the statutory discretion under s 113(3) of the Legal Profession Act to declare costs agreement terms void if unfair or unreasonable.
For law firms and litigators, the case also highlights the importance of timing and strategy. If a party intends to enforce or attack a costs agreement, it must do so before the taxation is fixed, and it must be prepared to meet the court’s reasonableness scrutiny. For clients, it underscores that taxation is not simply a forum to re-litigate the contract; it is an evaluative process that can reduce or adjust costs even where a costs agreement exists.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1997 Rev Ed): s 113(3)
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed): O 59 r 31; Appendix 1 of O 59 r 31(1)
Cases Cited
- Tommy Choo, Mark Go & Partners v Kuntjoro Wibawa @ Wong Kin Tjong [2014] SGHC 79
- Lin Jian Wei and another v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2011] 3 SLR 1052
Source Documents
This article analyses [2015] SGHC 239 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.