Case Details
- Citation: [2024] SGHC 146
- Title: Tjiang Giok Moy and another v Ang Jimmy Tjun Min (Citibank NA, non-party)
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of decision: 5 June 2024
- Originating Claim No: OC 56 of 2022
- Summonses: SUM 308 of 2024 and SUM 1189 of 2024
- Judges: Kwek Mean Luck J
- Hearing dates: 22 April 2024, 23 May 2024, 29 May 2024
- Judgment reserved: 5 June 2024 (judgment reserved; delivered 5 June 2024)
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Tjiang Giok Moy and another (the “Claimants”)
- Defendant/Respondent: Ang Jimmy Tjun Min (the “Defendant/Applicant”)
- Non-party: Citibank NA
- Legal area: Civil Procedure — Costs
- Core procedural context: Application for production/discovery of documents against a non-party; subsequent costs determination after dismissal
- Statutes referenced: Rules of Court 2014 (“ROC 2014”); Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”); Order 21 (Costs); Order 24 (Discovery)
- Cases cited (as per provided extract): [2013] SGHC 274; [2022] SGHC 188; [2024] SGHC 146 (this case)
- Other authorities cited in the extract: Xing Rong Pte Ltd (formerly known as Huadi Projects Pte Ltd) v Visionhealthone Corp Pte Ltd [2010] 4 SLR 607; SEF Construction Pte Ltd v Skoy Connected Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 733; PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd v Rex Lam Paki and others [2022] SGHC 188; Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd v PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd [2016] 5 SLR 103; Tan Chin Yew Joseph v Saxo Capital Markets Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 274; Three Rivers District Council v The Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 6) [2006] EWHC 816 (Comm)
- Judgment length: 10 pages, 2,424 words (as stated in metadata)
Summary
This High Court decision addresses a narrow but practically important question in civil procedure: when a party to the main proceedings is not the subject of a discovery/production order sought against a non-party, does that party nevertheless have standing to be heard on the application, and if so, are they entitled to costs when the application is dismissed? The court held that the Claimants had locus standi to make submissions and participate in the hearing of the Defendant’s application for production of documents against Citibank NA, because such an order could affect their interests in the main suit.
On costs, the court applied the general rule that costs follow the event. Since the Claimants successfully opposed SUM 308 and SUM 1189, they were entitled to costs in their favour. However, the court declined to order indemnity costs, holding that the threshold for departing from the norm was not met. The decision therefore confirms both (i) the procedural fairness rationale for allowing parties to be heard on non-party discovery applications, and (ii) the high bar for indemnity costs under the ROC 2021 framework.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute was commenced by Originating Claim No 56 of 2022 (“OC 56”). In the course of that litigation, the Defendant/Applicant, Ang Jimmy Tjun Min, sought an order for production of documents against a non-party, Citibank NA. The application was brought in Summons No 308 of 2024 (“SUM 308”). The non-party objected to the production order and made submissions supporting its objections, while the Claimants also objected to the production order.
In addition to opposing the production order, the Defendant sought leave to amend SUM 308 in Summons No 1189 of 2024 (“SUM 1189”). The Claimants opposed this amendment as well. The court ultimately dismissed both SUM 308 and SUM 1189 on 23 May 2024. The present decision concerns the subsequent costs issue: whether the Claimants, who were parties to OC 56 but were not the direct target of the production order, were entitled to costs for SUM 308 and SUM 1189.
The procedural posture is significant. The Defendant’s application was directed at a non-party (Citibank NA). Yet, the Claimants’ interests in the main suit could be affected by the scope and effect of any production order. This is precisely the type of situation where standing and costs can become contentious: a party may be permitted to participate to protect its interests, but may then be argued to be “incidental” to the application and thus not entitled to costs if it succeeds.
Accordingly, the court framed the issue as one of standing and entitlement to costs. The court first determined whether the Claimants had locus standi to be heard in SUM 308 and SUM 1189. It then determined whether, having been heard and having succeeded, they were entitled to costs, and if so, whether those costs should be on the standard or indemnity basis.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
First, the court had to decide whether the Claimants had locus standi to be heard in the Defendant’s application for production of documents against a non-party. This required the court to consider the procedural rules governing discovery/production applications and the principle that parties whose interests may be affected should be given an opportunity to be heard.
Second, assuming the Claimants had standing, the court had to determine whether they were entitled to costs as a successful party. This involved applying the ROC 2021 costs provisions, particularly the general rule that costs are awarded to the successful party unless some other order is appropriate in the circumstances.
Third, the court had to consider the basis of costs: whether the Claimants should receive indemnity costs rather than standard costs. Indemnity costs are exceptional and require conduct or circumstances that take the case out of the norm. The court therefore had to assess whether the Defendant’s conduct in SUM 1189 and SUM 308 justified that exceptional treatment.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Standing and entitlement to be heard. The court began with the locus standi question and relied heavily on the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Xing Rong Pte Ltd (formerly known as Huadi Projects Pte Ltd) v Visionhealthone Corp Pte Ltd [2010] 4 SLR 607 (“Xing Rong”). In Xing Rong, the Court of Appeal held that where a discovery application is made against a person who is not a party, the application must be served on every party to the proceedings, and every party should therefore have locus standi to make submissions where its interests in the main suit may be affected by the discovery order.
The court in the present case treated Xing Rong as establishing a logical and fairness-based extension: if a party to the main suit is entitled to object to discovery sought by another party against it, then the same should apply when discovery is sought against someone who is not a party, because the order could still affect the interests of the parties to the main suit. The court noted that the Defendant initially objected to the Claimants making submissions in SUM 308 but later withdrew those objections. The Defendant also conceded in written submissions that every party to the proceedings may have locus standi to make submissions.
Natural justice and the ROC 2021 framework. The court further addressed the fact that the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) use different wording from the ROC 2014. Under ROC 2014, Order 24 r 6(2) required service of the summons on the non-party personally and on every party to the proceedings. Under ROC 2021, the relevant service provision is framed differently, with Order 3 r 5(8) providing that applications must be served on all other parties except where the other party cannot or need not be served. The court held that this change in phrasing did not undermine the underlying principle from Xing Rong.
Instead, the court treated the principle as rooted in natural justice—encapsulated in audi alteram partem—that parties whose property and interests are at stake should have an opportunity to be heard. The court cited SEF Construction Pte Ltd v Skoy Connected Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 733 at [49] and PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd v Rex Lam Paki and others [2022] SGHC 188 at [60] to support the general natural justice rationale. On this basis, the court concluded that the Claimants had locus standi to be heard in the Defendant’s application for production against Citibank NA because their interests as main parties were at stake.
Costs as a successful party. Having established standing, the court turned to costs. It relied on Order 21 r 2(1) of the ROC 2021, which empowers the court to determine all issues relating to costs with regard to all relevant circumstances. It then applied Order 21 r 3(2), which provides that the court must, subject to the Order, order costs in favour of a successful party except where some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs.
The court reasoned that because the Claimants had locus standi and exercised their right to appear and make submissions, they must be regarded as parties to SUM 308 and SUM 1189 for the purpose of assessing costs under Order 21 r 3(2). The court also drew support from commentary in Singapore Civil Procedure (Cavinder Bull gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2024), which states that a respondent who appears and opposes an application for leave to appeal is normally entitled to costs where its opposition is successful. By analogy, where the Claimants successfully opposed SUM 308 and SUM 1189, they would normally be entitled to their costs.
The Defendant argued that the Claimants should either pay the Defendant’s costs or bear their own costs because the Claimants’ decision to make submissions protracted the proceedings and required the Defendant to review the Claimants’ submissions. The court rejected this argument as untenable for two reasons: first, Order 21 r 3(2) requires costs generally to follow the event; and second, given that the Claimants had a right to be heard, their submissions could not be characterised as unnecessary protraction.
The Defendant also relied on Xing Rong at [34], where the Court of Appeal ordered parties to bear their own costs. The court distinguished Xing Rong on its facts and rationale. In Xing Rong, the defendant succeeded on the locus standi point, but even if it had locus standi, it would not have succeeded on the merits in its appeal against the discovery order. The Court of Appeal’s “no costs” approach was therefore tied to the particular circumstances and the merits outcome. In the present case, by contrast, the Claimants’ objections were successful, and the court held that the costs order in Xing Rong did not assist the Defendant.
Standard vs indemnity costs. Finally, the court addressed the Claimants’ request for indemnity costs. It reiterated that indemnity costs are an exception rather than a norm. It cited Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd v PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd [2016] 5 SLR 103 (“Airtrust”) at [17], and noted that under Order 21 r 2(2)(f) of the ROC 2021, the court must have regard to the conduct of the parties when fixing costs.
In Airtrust, Chan Seng Onn J identified broad categories of conduct that may justify indemnity costs, including: (a) bad faith or oppression; (b) speculative, hypothetical or clearly baseless actions; (c) dishonest, abusive or improper conduct; and (d) wasteful or duplicative litigation or abuse of process. The court also referred to the reasoning in Three Rivers District Council v The Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 6) [2006] EWHC 816 (Comm) at [25], as cited in Tan Chin Yew Joseph v Saxo Capital Markets Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 274 at [99], that indemnity costs require some conduct or circumstance that takes the case out of the norm.
Applying these principles, the court held that the threshold for indemnity costs was not met. The Claimants argued that the Defendant’s application was speculative/hypothetical/clearly without basis and amounted to wasteful or duplicative litigation. The court accepted that it dismissed SUM 1189 because the Defendant had not established the materiality of the entire categories of documents sought and had not shown that the documents existed or were bankers’ books subject to disclosure. However, the court did not consider that the Defendant’s conduct crossed the high threshold warranting indemnity costs. In other words, failure to satisfy the requirements for production did not automatically equate to the kind of exceptional conduct that justifies indemnity costs.
What Was the Outcome?
The court held that the Claimants had locus standi to be heard in SUM 308 and SUM 1189 and were entitled to costs as successful parties. Accordingly, costs were awarded to the Claimants in their favour for those summonses.
However, the court declined to order indemnity costs. It determined that the circumstances did not justify departing from the norm, and therefore the Claimants’ costs were not awarded on an indemnity basis. The judgment also indicates that the court proceeded to determine the quantum of costs, though the provided extract truncates the detailed quantum analysis.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is useful for practitioners because it clarifies two recurring issues in Singapore civil litigation: (i) standing to participate in non-party discovery/production applications, and (ii) the costs consequences of successful opposition. The court’s reliance on Xing Rong confirms that procedural fairness principles remain central even where the ROC 2021 has altered service language. Practically, parties should not assume that being “not the target” of a production order makes them cost-incidental; if their interests are affected and they are heard, they may be treated as parties for costs purposes.
From a costs perspective, the judgment reinforces the general rule that costs follow the event under Order 21 r 3(2) of the ROC 2021. It also provides a cautionary note on indemnity costs: even where an application is dismissed for failure to meet disclosure/production requirements, indemnity costs will not automatically follow. Practitioners seeking indemnity costs must identify conduct or circumstances that take the case out of the norm, consistent with Airtrust and the categories of conduct described therein.
Finally, the decision offers a litigation strategy lesson. If a party’s interests may be affected by a non-party production order, it should consider participating to protect those interests. Conversely, applicants for non-party discovery should recognise that unsuccessful applications may expose them to standard costs orders, and that attempts to characterise the opposing party’s participation as “protraction” are unlikely to succeed where the participation is grounded in a right to be heard.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 3 r 5(8)
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 21 r 2(1)
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 21 r 2(2)(f)
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 21 r 3(2)
- Rules of Court 2014 (ROC 2014), Order 24 r 6(2)
Cases Cited
- Xing Rong Pte Ltd (formerly known as Huadi Projects Pte Ltd) v Visionhealthone Corp Pte Ltd [2010] 4 SLR 607
- SEF Construction Pte Ltd v Skoy Connected Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 733
- PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd v Rex Lam Paki and others [2022] SGHC 188
- Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd v PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd [2016] 5 SLR 103
- Tan Chin Yew Joseph v Saxo Capital Markets Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 274
- Three Rivers District Council v The Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 6) [2006] EWHC 816 (Comm)
- [2013] SGHC 274
- [2022] SGHC 188
- [2024] SGHC 146
Source Documents
This article analyses [2024] SGHC 146 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.