THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE v SEOW THENG BENG SAMUEL

"We are satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that there is due cause for disciplinary action against the respondent under s 83(2)(h) of the LPA." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 31

Case Information

• Citation: [2022] SGHC 112 (Para 0)
• Court: Court of Three Judges of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date of judgment: 18 May 2022; hearing date stated as 28 February 2022 (Para 0)
• Coram: Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA, and Steven Chong JCA (Para 0)
• Counsel for the applicant: Dhillon Dinesh Singh, Loong Tse Chuan, and Alisa Toh Qian Wen (Dai Qianwen) of Allen & Gledhill LLP (Para 0)
• Counsel for the respondent: Pereira Edmond Avethas and Cheung Shu Jia Jessica of Edmond Pereira Law Corporation (Para 0)
• Case number: Originating Summons No 4 of 2020 (Para 0)
• Area of law: Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings (Para 0)
• Judgment delivered by: Sundaresh Menon CJ, delivering the judgment of the court (Para 0)

Summary

This was a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Law Society of Singapore against a solicitor arising from eight instances of misconduct that occurred over a one-month period from 16 March 2018 to 17 April 2018. The court described the conduct as involving abusive language, threats, and physical and verbal abuse directed at employees, and it treated the incidents as part of a pattern of intemperate and boorish behaviour rather than isolated lapses. (Para 4) (Para 18)

The court held that there was due cause for disciplinary action under s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act because the respondent’s conduct evinced volatility and lack of self-control, detracted from his ability to discharge his professional functions, and caused grave dishonour to the standing of the legal profession. It also concluded that, in the circumstances, the presumptive penalty was striking off. (Para 31) (Para 44) (Para 45) (Para 46)

The respondent’s mitigation, including his reliance on medical evidence concerning Adjustment Disorder and his asserted remorse, did not persuade the court to depart from the presumptive sanction. The court ordered that he be struck off the roll and directed the parties to file submissions on costs if no agreement was reached. (Para 25) (Para 30) (Para 48) (Para 49)

What misconduct led the Court of Three Judges to discipline the respondent?

The respondent was a solicitor of 20 years’ standing and, at the material time, the Managing Director of Samuel Seow Law Corporation. He also owned and managed Beam Artistes Pte Ltd, which shared office premises with the law practice. The court’s account of the matter makes clear that the disciplinary case was not about a single lapse, but about a cluster of incidents occurring in a compressed period and involving employees in the respondent’s professional and business environment. (Para 3) (Para 4)

The court emphasised that the eight instances of misconduct occurred within one month, from 16 March 2018 to 17 April 2018. That temporal concentration mattered because it supported the conclusion that the conduct was not aberrational. The court later relied on this pattern to reject any suggestion that the incidents were isolated or accidental. (Para 4) (Para 18)

"The eight instances of misconduct which form the basis of the Law Society’s application occurred in a one-month period running from 16 March 2018 to 17 April 2018." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 4

The judgment records that the misconduct involved throwing objects, shouting, threats to kill, and physical assaults on employees. The court also noted that the incidents included both protracted physical and verbal abuse and extreme threats, including a threat on 3 April 2018 to take a knife to kill Ms Kang. Those facts were central to the court’s assessment of seriousness and to its conclusion that the respondent’s behaviour was egregious. (Para 4) (Para 44)

"His behaviour was egregious, involving both protracted instances of physical and verbal abuse (as was the case on 17 April 2018) and extreme threats (in particular, his threat on 3 April 2018 to take a knife to kill Ms Kang)." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 44

How did the court treat the evidence, including the video footage and witness testimony?

The court relied on video footage of the incidents on 17 April 2018, and it considered that footage more than sufficient to show abusive language and extremely unruly behaviour. That evidence was important because it provided direct visual confirmation of the respondent’s conduct, rather than leaving the court to infer misconduct solely from witness recollection. (Para 16)

"The video footage of the 17 April 2018 incidents to which we were directed was more than sufficient to indicate that both abusive language and extremely unruly behaviour were involved." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 16

The court also referred to testimony from other employees about the respondent’s general disposition. One employee described him as “a temperamental man who was prone to bouts of extreme emotion”. The court used this evidence not as a standalone basis for liability, but as corroboration of the broader picture of volatility that emerged from the incidents themselves. (Para 18)

"One employee testified that the respondent “was a temperamental man who was prone to bouts of extreme emotion”." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 18

On the medical evidence, the disciplinary tribunal had found the two medical reports to be of little assistance. The Court of Three Judges did not treat the reports as displacing the factual evidence of misconduct. Instead, the medical material was considered in the context of mitigation and culpability, and it did not prevent the court from finding due cause. (Para 25) (Para 30)

"The disciplinary tribunal therefore found the two medical reports to be of little assistance." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 25

What were the parties’ positions on due cause and sanction?

The Law Society submitted that there was due cause for disciplinary action and sought the respondent’s striking off, or alternatively a suspension of at least four years. Its position was that the misconduct was serious enough to warrant the severest professional consequence, or at minimum a lengthy period out of practice. (Para 12)

"The Law Society submits that there is due cause for disciplinary action, and seeks to have the respondent struck off the roll, or in the alternative to have the respondent suspended from practice for a minimum of four years." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 12

The respondent denied that there was due cause. However, he advanced an alternative position on sanction: if due cause were found, he contended that an appropriate sanction would be a penalty of $40,000 and censure. The court ultimately rejected that submission, both on liability and on sanction. (Para 12) (Para 48)

"The respondent, on the other hand, suggests that there is no due cause, though he submits that if due cause is found, an appropriate sanction would be a penalty of $40,000 and censure." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 12

The court’s analysis shows that the parties’ disagreement was not merely about the seriousness of the facts, but about the proper doctrinal route under the Legal Profession Act. The Law Society relied on the statutory grounds for disciplinary action and on the proposition that the respondent’s conduct warranted the profession’s strongest response. The respondent, by contrast, attempted to frame the matter as one that could be met with a financial penalty and censure rather than removal from the roll. (Para 11) (Para 12) (Para 46)

How did the court interpret s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act?

The court set out the statutory framework and focused in particular on s 83(2)(h), which concerns misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession. It also referred to s 83(2)(b)(i), which concerns fraudulent or grossly improper conduct or breach of rules of conduct made under the Act. (Para 13)

"Power to strike off roll, etc. 83.— …(2) ... such due cause may be shown by proof that an advocate and solicitor — … (b) has been guilty of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty or guilty of such a breach of any of the following as amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor: (i) any usage or rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council under section 71 or by the Council under the provisions of this Act; … (h) has been guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession; …" — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 13

In explaining the meaning of s 83(2)(h), the court adopted the practical guide from earlier authority: whether reasonable people, on hearing what the solicitor had done, would say without hesitation that as a solicitor he should not have done it. The court also noted that it is sufficient if the conduct brings the solicitor discredit as a lawyer or brings discredit to the legal profession as a whole. (Para 14)

"As a practical guide, it may be asked whether reasonable people, on hearing what the solicitor had done, would have said without hesitation that as a solicitor he should not have done it (Ng Chee Sing at [41], citing Wong Kok Chin v Singapore Society of Accountants [1989] 2 SLR(R) 633 at [17]). It is sufficient if his conduct brings him discredit as a lawyer or brings discredit to the legal profession as a whole." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 14

The court’s treatment of the provision was not abstract. It tied the statutory language to the respondent’s actual conduct and asked whether that conduct, viewed objectively, was the kind that would cause reasonable people to conclude that a solicitor should not have behaved that way. On that basis, the court answered the question in the affirmative. (Para 14) (Para 16) (Para 31)

Why did the court conclude that there was due cause for disciplinary action?

The court said that the factors it had identified were sufficient to establish due cause for disciplinary action. It relied on the abusive language, unruly behaviour, the respondent’s position of authority over the victims, and the pattern of misconduct over a short period. The court’s reasoning was cumulative: each feature reinforced the others, and together they showed conduct that fell within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the court. (Para 16)

"We agree that the foregoing factors suffice to establish that there is due cause for disciplinary action." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 16

The court also rejected the idea that the incidents could be treated as isolated and aberrant. It stated that the eight instances of misconduct were part of a pattern of intemperate and boorish behaviour. That finding was important because it transformed the case from one involving a few regrettable moments into one revealing a deeper problem of temperament and self-control. (Para 18)

"Further, it is plain, as the Law Society points out, that the eight instances of misconduct could not on any basis be regarded as isolated and aberrant incidents, but were instead part of a pattern of intemperate and boorish behaviour." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 18

The court’s conclusion on due cause was also informed by the respondent’s relationship to the victims. Because he was the Managing Director and in a position of authority, the misconduct had a particular professional significance. The court treated the abuse of that position as aggravating the seriousness of the conduct and as supporting the conclusion that the respondent’s behaviour was unbefitting of a solicitor. (Para 3) (Para 16) (Para 31)

How did the court deal with the respondent’s medical evidence and mitigation?

The respondent relied on medical reports concerning Adjustment Disorder, but the court did not accept that those reports materially assisted him. The disciplinary tribunal had already found the reports to be of little assistance, and the Court of Three Judges did not disturb that assessment. The medical evidence therefore did not prevent a finding of due cause. (Para 25) (Para 31)

"The disciplinary tribunal therefore found the two medical reports to be of little assistance." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 25

The court later addressed the role of psychiatric or medical conditions in the sentencing analysis. It referred to authority stating that the court has power, and indeed a duty, to have regard to such a condition if, and to the extent that, it diminishes the personal culpability of the solicitor. But the court did not treat the respondent’s condition as sufficient to displace the seriousness of the misconduct or to avoid striking off. (Para 30)

"it is within the ‘court’s power and indeed its duty to have regard to the [psychiatric] condition in question if, and to the extent that, it diminishes the personal culpability of the solicitor’." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 30

The judgment shows that mitigation was considered, but only within the framework of the court’s assessment of culpability and the need to protect the profession. The respondent’s asserted remorse and medical explanation did not outweigh the court’s view that his conduct reflected a serious character defect and caused grave dishonour. (Para 30) (Para 44) (Para 45)

What framework did the court use to decide whether striking off was the right sanction?

The court explained that it was taking the opportunity to consider in greater detail the principle expressed in Ismail bin Atan and the two distinct elements within it: whether the solicitor’s conduct fell below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, and whether it brought grave dishonour to the profession. This was the court’s way of structuring the sanction analysis in non-dishonesty cases. (Para 37)

"We take this opportunity to consider in greater detail the principle expressed in Ismail bin Atan at [21], and the two distinct elements therein, namely “fall[ing] below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness” and “bring[ing] grave dishonour to the profession”" — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 37

The court then stated that if the answer to either of the two questions was yes, striking off would be the presumptive penalty. The two questions were whether the respondent’s conduct evinced such volatility and lack of self-control that it detracted from his ability to discharge his professional functions, and whether it caused grave dishonour to the standing of the legal profession. (Para 41) (Para 44) (Para 45)

"If the answer to either of these two questions is “yes”, striking off will be the presumptive penalty." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 41

The court also made clear that this approach did not displace the sentencing principles in Ravi; rather, those principles informed the application of the approach at each stage. In other words, the court integrated the broader sentencing framework with the specific inquiry into whether the respondent’s conduct revealed a character defect and caused grave dishonour. (Para 42)

"The approach set out above does not displace the sentencing principles set out in Ravi at [31]; rather, those principles should inform the application of the approach set out above at each stage." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 42

Why did the court say the respondent’s conduct showed a character defect?

The court answered the first of its two questions by finding that the respondent’s conduct evinced such volatility and lack of self-control that it detracted from his ability to discharge his professional functions. This was not a finding about a momentary lapse alone; it was a conclusion about the respondent’s character as revealed by repeated misconduct. (Para 44)

"In respect of the first question, we are satisfied that the respondent’s conduct evinced such volatility and lack of self-control that it detracts from his ability to discharge his professional functions." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 44

The court’s reasoning was anchored in the nature of the incidents themselves. It pointed to protracted physical and verbal abuse on 17 April 2018 and to the extreme threat on 3 April 2018 to take a knife to kill Ms Kang. Those facts were not treated as merely unpleasant; they were treated as evidence of a serious lack of temperamental control incompatible with the standards expected of a solicitor. (Para 44)

"His behaviour was egregious, involving both protracted instances of physical and verbal abuse (as was the case on 17 April 2018) and extreme threats (in particular, his threat on 3 April 2018 to take a knife to kill Ms Kang)." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 44

The court’s conclusion on character defect was also reinforced by the evidence of the respondent’s general disposition and by the pattern of misconduct over the month. The court did not need to find dishonesty to conclude that the respondent’s conduct was professionally disqualifying in the relevant sense. (Para 18) (Para 44)

Why did the court say the respondent’s conduct caused grave dishonour to the legal profession?

On the second question, the court was equally satisfied that the respondent’s conduct had caused grave dishonour to the standing of the legal profession. The court’s reasoning was that conduct of this kind, especially when committed by a solicitor in a position of authority, undermines public confidence in the profession and falls far below what reasonable people would expect from an advocate and solicitor. (Para 45)

"In respect of the second question, we are equally satisfied that the respondent’s conduct has caused grave dishonour to the standing of the legal profession." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 45

The court’s conclusion was not limited to the immediate workplace context. It treated the respondent’s behaviour as conduct that reflected on the profession as a whole. That is why the court linked the facts to the statutory language of misconduct unbefitting a member of an honourable profession. (Para 13) (Para 14) (Para 45)

Once the court answered both questions in the affirmative, the sanction analysis became straightforward. The court stated that the presumptive penalty was striking off, and it ultimately ordered that result. The court’s approach shows that grave dishonour and serious volatility can be enough, even absent dishonesty, to justify the profession’s most severe disciplinary response. (Para 41) (Para 46) (Para 48)

"In the circumstances, the presumptive penalty is striking off." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 46

How did the court distinguish this case from other disciplinary precedents?

The court referred to a number of earlier decisions to explain the doctrinal landscape and to situate the present case within it. It cited authorities on due cause under s 83(2)(b) and s 83(2)(h), including Wong Sin Yee, Re Han Ngiap Juan, and Ng Chee Sing, and it also referred to cases dealing with striking off in dishonesty and conflict-of-interest contexts. (Para 14) (Para 36)

In particular, the court relied on Ismail bin Atan for the proposition that even non-dishonesty misconduct can justify striking off where the solicitor falls below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness and brings grave dishonour to the profession. It also referred to Ravindra Samuel for the idea that a lapse may indicate a lack of the qualities of character and trustworthiness necessary for a legal practitioner. (Para 36) (Para 38)

"even in cases that do not involve dishonesty, where a solicitor conducts himself in a way that falls below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, and brings grave dishonour to the profession, he will be liable to be struck off" — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 36

The court also rejected the respondent’s reliance on certain comparators. It said that Jasmine Gowrimani was concerned not with the imposition of a sanction on an errant solicitor, but with how a disciplinary tribunal should decide whether to refer a matter to the Court of Three Judges. It further said that Looi Wan Hui and Leonard Anthony Netto were entirely dissimilar, with Leonard Anthony Netto involving a solicitor convicted of consumption of cannabis. (Para 47)

"the decision in Jasmine Gowrimani was concerned not with the imposition of a sanction on an errant solicitor, but with how a disciplinary tribunal should decide whether to refer a matter to the Court of Three Judges." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 47

"the misconduct in Looi Wan Hui and Leonard Anthony Netto was entirely dissimilar to that which is before us in this matter." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 47

The court’s treatment of precedent was therefore selective and principled: it used earlier cases to articulate the governing test, but it refused to dilute the seriousness of the respondent’s conduct by analogising it to materially different situations. (Para 36) (Para 47)

What order did the court make, and what happened on costs?

The court concluded that there was due cause for disciplinary action and ordered that the respondent be struck off the roll. That was the substantive outcome of the proceeding and the clearest expression of the court’s view that the respondent’s conduct was incompatible with continued membership of the profession. (Para 48)

"For these reasons, we find that there is due cause for disciplinary action and order that the respondent be struck off the roll." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 48

On costs, the court did not make a final order in the judgment itself. Instead, it directed the parties to write to the court with submissions, limited to eight pages each, on the issue of costs within 14 days if no agreement was reached. That direction left the costs question open pending further submissions. (Para 49)

"The parties are to write to the court with submissions (limited to 8 pages each) on the issue of costs within 14 days of this judgment, if no agreement is reached." — Per Sundaresh Menon CJ, Para 49

The result was therefore twofold: immediate professional removal by way of striking off, and a deferred process for determining costs if the parties could not resolve that issue consensually. (Para 48) (Para 49)

Why does this case matter?

This case matters because it gives a detailed explanation of when striking off is appropriate for serious misconduct that does not involve dishonesty. The court made clear that volatility, lack of self-control, and conduct that brings grave dishonour to the profession can justify the most severe disciplinary sanction even where the misconduct is not framed as fraud or deceit. (Para 36) (Para 37) (Para 41)

It also matters because the court articulated a practical, two-question approach for non-dishonesty cases: whether the conduct evinces such volatility and lack of self-control that it detracts from the solicitor’s ability to discharge professional functions, and whether it causes grave dishonour to the profession. That framework is likely to be useful to practitioners and disciplinary bodies in future cases involving serious but non-fraudulent misconduct. (Para 41) (Para 44) (Para 45)

Finally, the case underscores that mitigation based on medical or psychiatric evidence will not necessarily avert striking off where the factual misconduct is grave and the court concludes that the respondent’s conduct reveals a serious character defect. The judgment therefore has practical significance for disciplinary strategy, mitigation evidence, and the assessment of sanction in professional misconduct proceedings. (Para 25) (Para 30) (Para 46)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Legal Profession Act, s 71 (Para 13)
• Legal Profession Act, s 83(1) (Para 11) (Para 48)
• Legal Profession Act, s 83(2)(b)(i) (Para 5) (Para 13) (Para 31)
• Legal Profession Act, s 83(2)(h) (Para 5) (Para 13) (Para 31)
• Legal Profession Act, s 93(1)(c) (Para 7)
• Legal Profession Act, s 94(1) (Para 7)
• Legal Profession Act, s 98(1) (Para 7)
• Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, r 8(3)(b) (Para 20)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2022] SGHC 112 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.