Case Details
- Citation: [2020] SGHC 255
- Title: The Law Society of Singapore v Lee Suet Fern (Lim Suet Fern)
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Court of Three Judges)
- Originating Summons No: Originating Summons No 2 of 2020
- Date of Judgment: 20 November 2020
- Date Judgment Reserved: 13 August 2020
- Judges: Sundaresh Menon CJ, Judith Prakash JA and Woo Bih Li J
- Applicant/Plaintiff: The Law Society of Singapore
- Respondent/Defendant: Lee Suet Fern (alias Lim Suet Fern)
- Legal Area: Legal Profession; solicitor-client relationship; professional conduct; disciplinary sanctions
- Statutory Provisions Referenced: Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed), in particular ss 94(1), 98(1) and 83(1)
- Proceedings Below: Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”) proceedings; DT found cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action (see [2020] SGDT 1)
- Sanction Sought by Applicant: Striking off order under s 83(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act
- Key Outcome on Sanctions: Suspension from practice as a solicitor for 15 months
- Judgment Length: 100 pages; 33,459 words
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2020] SGDT 1, [2020] SGHC 166, [2020] SGHC 255
Summary
This decision of the High Court (Court of Three Judges) arose from disciplinary proceedings concerning an advocate and solicitor, Mrs Lee Suet Fern (alias Lim Suet Fern). The Law Society of Singapore applied to the High Court under s 98(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“LPA”) seeking an order that the respondent be subjected to sanctions under s 83(1). At the disciplinary tribunal stage, the DT had found that there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action and had made findings adverse to the respondent. On sanctions, the Law Society sought a striking off order.
On review, the High Court differed from certain findings made by the DT. In particular, the court held that the respondent did not receive instructions or directions directly from her putative client, and it did not find that there was an implied retainer between the respondent and the putative client. Despite these differences, the court agreed that the respondent was guilty of misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor. Given the circumstances and the nature of the misconduct, the court imposed a suspension from practice for 15 months rather than striking off.
The case is therefore significant not only for the sanction imposed, but also for its careful treatment of the solicitor-client relationship in disciplinary contexts, and for its emphasis on the standard of proof and the court’s approach to reviewing the DT’s findings.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The disciplinary dispute centred on the respondent’s participation, principally on 16 and 17 December 2013, in the preparation and execution of what became the last will of her father-in-law, the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew (“the Testator”). The respondent was an advocate and solicitor of 37 years’ standing and practised as a director of Morgan Lewis Stamford LLC. The Law Society alleged misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor connected to the will-making process.
Before the events in December 2013, the Testator had executed six wills between 20 August 2011 and 2 November 2012. These earlier wills were prepared by Ms Kwa Kim Li (“Ms Kwa”), a partner in the law firm Lee & Lee. The wills reflected changes in the Testator’s intentions regarding the distribution of his estate, including the bequest of the Oxley Road property (“the Oxley House”), and provisions relating to valuation and, in earlier versions, a “Demolition Clause” and rights of residence for Dr Lee Wei Ling (“Dr LWL”). The First Will (20 August 2011) provided for equal one-third shares to the Testator’s three children: Mr Lee Hsien Loong (“Mr LHL”), Dr LWL, and the respondent’s husband, Mr Lee Hsien Yang (“Mr LHY”). It also included a right for Dr LWL to reside rent-free at the Oxley House for as long as she desired, and a clause that the Oxley House be demolished either upon the Testator’s passing or after Dr LWL moved out, whichever was later.
Subsequent wills altered these arrangements. The Second Will (21 December 2011) removed Dr LWL’s right to reside at the Oxley House. The Third Will (6 September 2012) restructured the shares so that Mr LHL and Mr LHY each received three shares absolutely, while Dr LWL received four shares held on trust for her life and thereafter for Mr LHL and Mr LHY in equal shares. The Fourth Will (20 September 2012) reverted in substance to the Second Will’s equal one-third shares but removed the valuation clause. The Fifth Will (4 October 2012) again granted Dr LWL a right to reside at the Oxley House, but made it subject to the consent of Mr LHL and removed the Demolition Clause. Finally, the Sixth Will (2 November 2012) changed the share structure again, providing for seven shares: Mr LHL and Mr LHY each received two shares, while Dr LWL received three shares (one more than her brothers). Notably, the Sixth Will did not include the Demolition Clause.
While it was not clear whether the children knew the precise contents of each will, it was not disputed that they were aware they were beneficiaries under each will. After the Sixth Will was executed, the Testator’s health deteriorated markedly. Between September and October 2013, he was hospitalised for an extended period. Following discharge, he initiated discussions with Ms Kwa around 29 November 2013 about making changes to the Sixth Will.
These discussions were recorded in emails beginning 30 November 2013. In an email dated 30 November 2013, Ms Kwa summarised key provisions of the Sixth Will, including the bequest of the Oxley House to Mr LHL. She also recalled that the Testator had raised a concern about the Oxley House becoming “de-gazetted” after his passing, which might increase its value. The Testator wanted Dr LWL and Mr LHY to benefit from any increased value. Ms Kwa outlined options to address this concern. On 12 December 2013, Ms Kwa wrote again noting the Testator’s wish to revert to leaving equal shares to each child, meaning Dr LWL would not receive an additional share as under the Sixth Will. Ms Kwa stated she would prepare a codicil for the Testator to sign “this week, or when [he was] ready”, and she added that she had “some thoughts” regarding the Oxley House and would call him later that day.
The Testator replied on 13 December 2013 at 10.50pm, stating that the codicil was to specify that two carpets would go to Mr LHY. The email correspondence between the Testator and Ms Kwa ceased with that message. At that point—three days before the Testator received a draft of what became his last will from the respondent—the Testator’s professed intention, based on his discussions with Ms Kwa, was to execute a codicil to the Sixth Will that would (a) revert to equal shares among the three children and (b) make provision for two carpets to be bequeathed to Mr LHY. Although there had been discussion about escalation of the Oxley House value if it became de-gazetted, there had been no discussion about replacing the Sixth Will with another will or reinstating the First Will as a whole, including the Demolition Clause.
As to the weekend of 14 and 15 December 2013, the judgment records that no evidence was led as to what transpired. On 16 December 2013, the respondent sent an email to the Testator at 7.08pm, copying her husband, Mr LHY, and evidently (based on the list of addressees) also Ms Kwa, although Ms Kwa did not receive that email for unknown reasons. The respondent attached a draft will that appeared to have been dated 19 August 2011. In the email, she told the Testator that it was the “original agreed Will” ensuring equal shares for all three children, and asked Ms Kwa to “engross” the enclosed draft.
It was against this factual backdrop—where the Testator had been working with his solicitor on a codicil to the Sixth Will, but where the respondent introduced a draft will and sought to have it engrossed—that the disciplinary allegations arose. The High Court’s analysis ultimately turned on the respondent’s role in the will-making process, and whether she had received instructions directly from the Testator or had a retainer (express or implied) with him.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue concerned the nature of the solicitor-client relationship, if any, between the respondent and the Testator. The High Court had to consider whether the respondent received instructions or directions directly from the Testator and whether there was an implied retainer. These questions mattered because the misconduct alleged was closely tied to the respondent’s involvement in the preparation and execution of the will, and the court needed to determine the legal character of her role.
A second issue concerned whether, notwithstanding the absence of a direct instruction or implied retainer, the respondent’s conduct amounted to “misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor” under the LPA disciplinary framework. The court had to assess the respondent’s actions in context, including her professional status, her communications with the Testator and the solicitor, and the effect of her involvement on the will-making process.
A third issue related to sanctions. The Law Society sought striking off under s 83(1)(a), but the High Court had to decide the appropriate sanction having regard to the seriousness of the misconduct, the circumstances, and the need for proportionality and consistency in disciplinary outcomes.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The High Court began by reiterating that disciplinary proceedings can adversely affect a solicitor’s livelihood and reputation, and therefore the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. The court cited its earlier decisions in Law Society of Singapore v Ahmad Khalis bin Abdul Ghani, Law Society of Singapore v Wan Hui Hong James, and Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju to support this approach. This standard shaped how the court treated contested facts and required a careful evaluation of the evidence.
On the solicitor-client relationship, the court differed from certain findings of the DT. The High Court held that the respondent did not receive instructions or directions directly from her putative client. The court also did not find that there was an implied retainer between the respondent and the Testator. In practical terms, this meant that the respondent’s involvement could not be characterised as acting as the Testator’s solicitor in the conventional sense, nor could the court treat the relationship as one that would automatically attract duties arising from a retainer.
However, the absence of a direct instruction or implied retainer did not end the analysis. The court emphasised that professional misconduct can arise even where a formal solicitor-client relationship is not established. The question remained whether the respondent’s conduct, viewed objectively and in context, was misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor. The court agreed with the DT that the respondent was guilty of such misconduct, indicating that the court’s focus was on professional propriety and the integrity of legal processes rather than solely on the existence of a retainer.
In analysing the respondent’s conduct, the court considered the timeline and the content of communications. The Testator’s discussions with Ms Kwa in late 2013 showed a clear intention to execute a codicil to the Sixth Will, with specific changes: equal shares and the two-carpet bequest. There was no evidence that the Testator had discussed replacing the Sixth Will with another will or reinstating the First Will in its entirety, including the Demolition Clause. Against this, the respondent’s 7.08pm email on 16 December 2013 attached a draft will dated 19 August 2011 and described it as the “original agreed Will” ensuring equal shares. The respondent also asked Ms Kwa to engross the enclosed draft. The High Court’s reasoning suggests that the court viewed this as an inappropriate intervention in the will-making process, particularly given that the Testator’s solicitor had been engaged on a codicil and the respondent was not shown to have been acting on direct instructions from the Testator to substitute a different will.
Although the judgment extract provided is truncated after the 7.08pm email, the High Court’s stated conclusions are clear: it did not accept the DT’s findings on direct instructions and implied retainer, but it upheld the core finding of misconduct. The court then moved to sanctions, applying principles of disciplinary sentencing under the LPA. It considered the nature of the misconduct and the circumstances in which it occurred. The court rejected the Law Society’s request for striking off, indicating that while the conduct was serious enough to warrant discipline, it did not warrant the most extreme sanction.
In arriving at a 15-month suspension, the court implicitly balanced factors such as the respondent’s long standing in practice, the professional context, and the impact of the misconduct. The court’s approach reflects a disciplinary framework that aims to protect the public and maintain confidence in the administration of justice, while also ensuring that sanctions are proportionate to the misconduct found.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court ordered that the respondent be suspended from practising as a solicitor for a period of 15 months. This replaced the Law Society’s application for a striking off order. The practical effect is that the respondent was barred from practising during the suspension period, subject to the usual regulatory and procedural consequences that follow from a suspension order.
Although the court differed from the DT on certain findings relating to the solicitor-client relationship—specifically, that there was no direct instruction and no implied retainer—it affirmed that the respondent’s conduct amounted to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor. The sanction therefore reflected the court’s view of the seriousness of the misconduct while still calibrating the penalty to the circumstances.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case matters for practitioners because it clarifies that disciplinary liability for misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor is not confined to situations where a formal solicitor-client relationship is established. Even where the court does not find a direct instruction or an implied retainer, professional misconduct can still be made out based on the lawyer’s conduct and its impact on the integrity of legal processes.
For lawyers advising on estate planning and will execution, the decision underscores the importance of maintaining clear professional boundaries. Where a testator is represented by a solicitor, other family members who are themselves lawyers must be cautious about intervening in the drafting and execution process. The court’s reasoning demonstrates that actions which may appear to “steer” the will-making process—particularly by introducing drafts and asking the testator’s solicitor to engross them—can attract disciplinary scrutiny even if the intervening lawyer is not formally retained.
From a disciplinary law perspective, the case also illustrates the High Court’s approach to reviewing DT findings. The court applied the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to contested facts and carefully separated issues of relationship (instructions and retainer) from issues of misconduct (professional propriety). Finally, the sanction outcome provides guidance on proportionality: striking off is not automatic even where misconduct is found; suspension may be appropriate depending on the nature and circumstances of the conduct.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed), s 83(1)
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed), s 94(1)
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed), s 98(1)(a)
Cases Cited
- Law Society of Singapore v Ahmad Khalis bin Abdul Ghani [2006] 4 SLR(R) 308
- Law Society of Singapore v Wan Hui Hong James [2013] 3 SLR 221
- Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju [2013] 3 SLR 875
- The Law Society of Singapore v Lee Suet Fern (Lim Suet Fern) [2020] SGDT 1
- [2020] SGHC 166
- [2020] SGHC 255
Source Documents
This article analyses [2020] SGHC 255 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.