The Law Society of Singapore v K V Sudeep Kumar & Anor

"It is therefore completely inimical to these concerns when a disbarred lawyer is allowed to practise despite having been struck off the roll. That was precisely what the respondents knowingly permitted to happen in this case." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 1

Case Information

• Citation: [2026] SGHC 9 (Para 0)
• Court: Court of 3 Supreme Court Judges (Para 0)
• Date of judgment: 13 January 2026 (Para 0)
• Coram: Tay Yong Kwang JCA, Steven Chong JCA and Ang Cheng Hock JCA; Ang Cheng Hock JCA delivered the grounds of decision of the court (Para 0)
• Case number: Originating Application No 2 of 2025 (Para 0)
• Counsel for the applicant: Jill Ann Koh Ying and Zhan Xiangyun (WongPartnership LLP) (Para 0)
• Counsel for the first respondent: Mahadevan Lukshumayeh (Lukshumayeh Law Corporation) and Adam Chong Yew Woon (LYTAG Law LLP) (Para 0)
• Counsel for the second respondent: The second respondent in-person (Para 0)
• Area of law: Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings; Legal Profession — Professional conduct — Breach (Para 0)
• Judgment length: Not stated in the extraction (Para 0)

Summary

This disciplinary reference concerned two solicitors who permitted a struck-off lawyer, Mr Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju (“Mr Kumar”), to continue acting in substance as the person controlling a litigation matter and dealing with the client. The court described the misconduct as grave because it involved allowing an unauthorised person to represent himself as an advocate and solicitor and to have de facto control over the conduct of a case, contrary to the statutory scheme governing legal practice. The respondents faced a charge under s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LPA”), and the Law Society sought sanctions under s 83(1) following the disciplinary process under ss 94(1) and 98(1). (Paras 1-3)

The court ultimately ordered that the first respondent be suspended from practice for five years, with the suspension to commence from the date of his discharge from bankruptcy, and that the second respondent be struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors. In reaching that result, the court treated the respondents’ conduct as more serious than the misconduct in Troy Yeo, emphasised the public interest in ensuring that only duly qualified and authorised persons give legal advice, and found that the second respondent’s conduct involved dishonesty and a complete disregard of the court’s earlier striking-off order against Mr Kumar. (Paras 5, 35-37, 65)

The judgment also addressed aggravating and mitigating factors in detail, including the second respondent’s antecedents, seniority, and prior disciplinary history, as well as the limited mitigating value of a plea of guilt in disciplinary proceedings. The court further discussed the role of s 83(5) of the LPA, which permits the court to take past conduct into account, and it expressed misgivings about an earlier observation in Christopher Yap concerning consecutive suspension periods and the five-year cap. (Paras 45, 55, 57, 75)

How did the respondents allow a struck-off lawyer to control the client’s matter?

The factual core of the case was straightforward but serious. The complainant was introduced to Mr Kumar in or around December 2017, met him at the Firm’s premises on 13 March 2018, and then appointed the Firm to take over DC 2662 from his previous solicitors. The extraction makes clear that Mr Kumar had already been struck off on 23 March 2017, yet he was the person who largely dealt with the complainant, attended to him at the Firm’s premises, and was involved in the conduct of the matter. (Paras 8-10, 16(a))

"In or around December 2017, the complainant was introduced to Mr Kumar, who was also known as “S K Kumar”. He eventually met Mr Kumar in person at the Firm’s premises on 13 March 2018, where they discussed the merits of DC 2662. During this meeting, the Firm was appointed to take over the conduct of DC 2662 from the complainant’s previous solicitors." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 8

The court emphasised that Mr Kumar was not merely a former partner or a background adviser. He had been struck off before the relevant events, and at the time of his striking off he had been in practice for about 29 years and was the founder and managing partner of the Firm, which was named after him. That context mattered because it showed that the respondents were not dealing with a stranger whose status might have been unclear; they were dealing with a person whose disbarment was a matter of record and whose continued involvement in the Firm was plainly incompatible with the statutory regime. (Para 9)

"Unbeknownst to the complainant, Mr Kumar had been struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors on 23 March 2017 … At the time of his striking off, Mr Kumar had been in practice for about 29 years and was the founder and managing partner of the Firm, which was named after him." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 9

The misconduct was not limited to passive association. The extraction records that Mr Kumar personally collected $2,300 in cash from the complainant in respect of outstanding costs ordered in the proceedings, even though the costs order totalled only $2,000. The complainant later discovered the discrepancy and eventually complained to the Law Society on 28 November 2022. Those facts were important because they illustrated that Mr Kumar was not only visible to the client but was also handling money and acting in a manner consistent with a practising solicitor. (Paras 12, 18)

"On or around 13 March 2018, Mr Kumar personally collected a sum of $2,300 in cash from the complainant in respect of outstanding costs in DC 2662 that had been ordered against the complainant in the course of those proceedings (“Costs Order”). The complainant later became aware that the sum in the Costs Order only totalled $2,000." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 12

What was the legal basis of the disciplinary reference and which statutory provisions mattered?

The Law Society brought the matter as a disciplinary reference under ss 94(1) and 98(1) of the LPA, seeking sanctions under s 83(1). The respondents each faced a charge under s 83(2)(h) for misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor, and the extraction also shows that the court considered s 83(2)(b), s 83(5), s 32(2), and s 83(1)(b) in its analysis. The legal framework therefore combined the disciplinary jurisdiction, the substantive misconduct provision, and the court’s power to consider past conduct when deciding the appropriate order. (Paras 2-3, 57, 67)

"The Law Society of Singapore (“Law Society”) filed the present application under s 94(1) read with s 98(1) of the LPA for an order that the respondents be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the LPA." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 3

The judgment reproduced the text of s 83(2)(b) and s 83(2)(h), and it quoted s 83(5) as follows: “In any proceedings under this Part, the court may in addition to the facts of the case take into account the past conduct of the person concerned in order to determine what order should be made.” That statutory language was central to the court’s treatment of the second respondent’s antecedents, because the court expressly relied on prior disciplinary matters in assessing whether striking off was warranted. (Paras 57, 67)

"In any proceedings under this Part, the court may in addition to the facts of the case take into account the past conduct of the person concerned in order to determine what order should be made." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 57

The court also referred to r 35(7) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, which it described as requiring the management of a law practice to ensure compliance with the LPA and the LPPCR. That rule mattered because the respondents’ conduct was not an isolated lapse by a junior employee; it was a failure of management and supervision in a law practice, and the court treated that as part of the gravity of the misconduct. (Para 63)

"pursuant to r 35(7) of the LPPCR, the management of a law practice must ensure that the law practice complies with the requirements of the LPA (including the LPPCR)." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 63

What issues did the court identify as the real dispute?

The court stated that the only issue before it was the appropriate sanctions to be imposed, because the respondents accepted that the charges were proven and that there was sufficient cause for sanctions. That framing narrowed the dispute to the disciplinary consequences rather than liability. The court then organised its analysis by first assessing the overall gravity of the misconduct and then turning to the specific aggravating and mitigating factors applicable to each respondent. (Paras 29, 33)

"Thus, the only issue before this court pertained to the appropriate sanctions to be imposed." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 29

The parties’ positions on sanction were sharply different. The Law Society submitted that substantial suspension was warranted for both respondents, proposing four years for the first respondent and four-and-a-half years for the second respondent, and it took the position that the second respondent should be struck off. The first respondent argued for a materially shorter suspension of between 18 months and two-and-a-half years, while the second respondent argued that striking off was not mandated or warranted and that any suspension should run concurrently with the suspension imposed in Dhanwant Singh (2025). (Paras 30-32)

"The Law Society submitted that a substantial period of suspension was warranted for both respondents – four years for the first respondent, and four-and-a-half years for the second respondent." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 30

"The second respondent argued that striking off was “not mandated nor warranted”, and that any suspension period imposed in these proceedings ought to run concurrently with the suspension period imposed on him in Dhanwant Singh (2025)." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 32

The court’s approach was therefore not to revisit the factual findings on liability, but to determine where the misconduct sat on the disciplinary spectrum. That required the court to compare the case with prior authorities, assess the seriousness of allowing a struck-off lawyer to continue practising, and decide whether the second respondent’s conduct crossed the line into dishonesty warranting striking off. (Paras 33, 35, 64-65)

Why did the court regard the misconduct as especially grave?

The court began by comparing the case with Troy Yeo and concluded that the gravity here was greater. It noted that, unlike in Troy Yeo, the respondents had allowed Mr Kumar to practise even though he had been struck off for being found unfit to act as an advocate and solicitor. The court treated that as a fundamental affront to the disciplinary system because the respondents were not merely negligent in supervision; they knowingly permitted a disbarred lawyer to continue functioning as though he were authorised. (Paras 35-36)

"We considered that the gravity of the respondents’ misconduct in this case was greater than that of the misconduct in Troy Yeo" — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 35

"the respondents had allowed Mr Kumar to practise even though he had been struck off the roll for the very reason that he was found unfit to act as an advocate and solicitor." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 36

The court also emphasised the public-interest dimension. It observed that there is a larger public interest in ensuring that clients receive legal advice only from those duly qualified and authorised to carry on legal work, and that public confidence in the legal profession and the legal process is undermined if such misconduct is permitted. That reasoning was not abstract; it was tied directly to the facts, because the complainant was dealing with a person who had no right to practise, yet was presented as if he were still a lawyer. (Para 37)

"there is a larger public interest in ensuring that clients receive legal advice only from those duly qualified and authorised to carry on legal work. And here, too, public confidence in the legal profession as well as the legal process will be undermined if such misconduct is permitted." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 37

The court further found that the respondents’ conduct involved an undeniable element of dishonesty because they deceived the complainant regarding Mr Kumar’s status as an unauthorised person. That finding was central to the sanction analysis, because dishonesty is treated as a particularly serious disciplinary wrong. The court’s reasoning was that the complainant was led to believe that Mr Kumar was a practising lawyer when, in fact, he had been struck off and was not authorised to act. (Para 41)

"There was an undeniable element of dishonesty, in so far as they had deceived the complainant regarding Mr Kumar’s status as an unauthorised person." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 41

How did the court assess the first respondent’s culpability and why was a five-year suspension imposed?

The first respondent’s position was that a suspension of between 18 months and two-and-a-half years should be imposed, but the court rejected that as too lenient in light of the seriousness of the misconduct. The court’s analysis of the first respondent focused on the fact that he was part of a law practice that allowed Mr Kumar to continue exercising de facto control over the matter, and that the practice’s management had a duty to ensure compliance with the LPA and the professional conduct rules. (Paras 32, 63)

The court also considered the first respondent’s bankruptcy status, because the order it ultimately made was that the suspension would commence from the date of his discharge from bankruptcy. The extraction does not provide a detailed breakdown of the first respondent’s personal mitigation beyond the fact that he sought a shorter suspension, but the court’s final order shows that it considered suspension appropriate and substantial. The five-year period reflects the court’s view that the misconduct was serious enough to warrant a lengthy exclusion from practice, while the commencement date tied the sanction to the respondent’s discharge from bankruptcy. (Paras 5, 80)

"We ordered that the first respondent be suspended from practice for a period of five years, with the period of suspension to commence from the date of his discharge from bankruptcy" — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 5

The court’s comparison with Troy Yeo is important here. It did not merely say that the present case was similar; it said the present misconduct was greater. That comparative assessment explains why the court did not accept the first respondent’s proposed range and why it imposed a sanction at the higher end of the disciplinary scale. The court’s reasoning was that the respondents’ conduct struck at the integrity of the profession because it involved a deliberate tolerance of unauthorised practice rather than a mere failure of oversight. (Paras 35-37, 63)

Why did the court strike off the second respondent instead of suspending him?

The second respondent’s case was materially worse because the court found that he was patently dishonest and that his conduct showed complete disregard for the court’s earlier striking-off order against Mr Kumar. The court said that by allowing a lawyer whom he knew to have been struck off to keep practising, the second respondent demonstrated nothing less than a complete disregard of the court’s order and of the law more generally. That was the language of moral condemnation, and it was the foundation for the ultimate sanction of striking off. (Paras 64-65)

"In our view, this was a situation where the second respondent was patently dishonest." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 64

"By allowing a lawyer whom he knew to have been struck off to keep practising, the second respondent demonstrated nothing less than a complete disregard of this court’s order that Mr Kumar be struck off, and of the law more generally." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 65

The court stated the governing principle that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, striking off will typically be the sanction where an advocate and solicitor is shown to have been dishonest. It then concluded that striking off was the only sensible and appropriate sanction in the circumstances. This was not a case where the court found any exceptional mitigation capable of displacing the ordinary consequence of dishonesty. (Paras 64-65)

"save in the most exceptional circumstances, striking off will typically be the sanction where an advocate and solicitor is shown to have been dishonest" — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 64

"In the circumstances, striking off was the only sensible and appropriate sanction." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 65

The court’s conclusion was reinforced by the second respondent’s antecedents. The extraction records that the court took into account his prior disciplinary matters, including Law Society of Singapore v Dhanwant Singh [2025] 4 SLR 1443, Law Society of Singapore v Dhanwant Singh [1996] 1 SLR(R) 1, and Law Society of Singapore v Dhanwant Singh [2020] 4 SLR 736. Those prior matters were relevant because they showed a pattern of misconduct and diminished the force of any argument that the present case was an isolated lapse. (Paras 55-57)

How did the court treat the second respondent’s antecedents and seniority as aggravating factors?

The court expressly relied on s 83(5) of the LPA to take the second respondent’s past conduct into account. It noted that the fact that an advocate and solicitor had previously committed a similar disciplinary offence is a significant aggravating factor, and it cited authorities including Ravi s/o Madasamy and Ng Bock Hoh Dixon for that proposition. The court also referred to Nathan Edmund and Ang Peng Tiam for the broader point that seniority can increase the damage done to the profession and to public confidence. (Paras 55-57)

"the fact that an advocate and solicitor had previously committed a similar disciplinary offence is a “significant aggravating factor”" — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 55

The court’s reasoning was that a senior practitioner who has already been disciplined and yet repeats misconduct causes greater harm than a less experienced practitioner. The extraction shows that the court considered the second respondent’s antecedents in a cumulative way: prior striking off, a later fine, and the present misconduct together demonstrated a serious disregard for professional obligations. That cumulative assessment supported the conclusion that a mere suspension would not adequately reflect the gravity of the conduct or protect the profession’s reputation. (Paras 55-57)

The court also treated the second respondent’s seniority as aggravating because he was not a novice. The extraction notes that the court referred to the principle that seniority increases damage to the profession, and it used that principle to explain why the second respondent’s conduct was especially damaging. In a profession that depends on trust, a senior lawyer’s willingness to facilitate unauthorised practice is more corrosive than the same conduct by someone with less experience and responsibility. (Paras 55, 57)

What role did the court say dishonesty played in the sanction analysis?

Dishonesty was the decisive feature of the second respondent’s sanction. The court found an “undeniable element of dishonesty” in the deception of the complainant regarding Mr Kumar’s status, and later described the second respondent as “patently dishonest.” Those findings brought the case within the principle that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, striking off is typically the sanction where dishonesty is shown. (Paras 41, 64)

"There was an undeniable element of dishonesty, in so far as they had deceived the complainant regarding Mr Kumar’s status as an unauthorised person." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 41

The court’s reasoning shows that dishonesty was not treated as a mere label. It was linked to the actual mechanics of the misconduct: the complainant was led to believe that Mr Kumar was a legitimate practitioner, when he was not. The deception was compounded by the fact that Mr Kumar was personally handling the matter, drafting documents, and collecting money. That combination of false appearance and practical control made the dishonesty especially serious. (Paras 16(d), 25(b), 40-41)

"As pointed out by the Law Society, the emails were in fact sent to the Firm’s e-mail address (“skumar24@singnet.com.sg”)." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 40

In disciplinary terms, the court’s approach reflects the strong protective function of the jurisdiction. The purpose is not merely to punish but to maintain the integrity of the profession and public confidence in the administration of justice. Once dishonesty was established, the court considered striking off to be the norm unless exceptional circumstances existed, and it found none. (Paras 37, 64-65)

How did the court deal with mitigation, and why was the plea of guilt not enough?

The extraction shows that the court considered the limited mitigating effect of a plea of guilt in disciplinary proceedings. It cited Subbiah Pillai for the proposition that considerations which usually weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect in disciplinary jurisdiction than in criminal sentencing. It also referred to Tham Yu Xian Rick in that context. The point was that even if a respondent accepts wrongdoing, that acceptance does not necessarily translate into a materially reduced sanction where the misconduct is serious and the public interest is engaged. (Para 45)

"considerations which usually weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect on the exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction than on sentences imposed in criminal cases" — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 45

That principle mattered particularly for the second respondent because the court found dishonesty and a pattern of prior misconduct. In such a case, a plea of guilt or acceptance of the charge cannot neutralise the need for a sanction that protects the public and the profession. The court therefore did not treat mitigation as sufficient to displace the ordinary consequence of striking off for dishonesty. (Paras 45, 55, 64-65)

The extraction does not identify any exceptional personal mitigation that the court considered compelling enough to alter the sanction analysis. Instead, the court’s reasoning moved in the opposite direction: the seriousness of the misconduct, the prior disciplinary history, the seniority of the second respondent, and the dishonesty all pointed toward the most severe sanction. (Paras 55-57, 64-65)

Why did the court discuss Christopher Yap, and what did it say about consecutive suspension periods?

The court discussed Christopher Yap because the second respondent had argued that any suspension imposed in these proceedings should run concurrently with the suspension period imposed in Dhanwant Singh (2025). The court did not finally decide the correctness of the earlier observation in Christopher Yap, but it expressly stated that it had misgivings about whether that observation reflected a correct interpretation of s 83(1)(b) of the LPA. That discussion matters because it signals that the court was not prepared to assume that consecutive suspension periods are always available or always appropriate in the way suggested by the earlier case. (Paras 32, 75)

"We have some misgivings as to whether the observation in Christopher Yap reflects a correct interpretation of s 83(1)(b) of the LPA" — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 75

The extraction also notes that the court referred to the five-year cap and the legislative history discussion involving Tan Yock Lin and the Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 1993. Although the extraction does not provide the full reasoning chain, it is clear that the court was considering the structure of the statutory sentencing powers and whether the disciplinary regime permits or contemplates consecutive periods of suspension in the way previously suggested. (Para 75)

For practitioners, the significance is that the court did not simply apply Christopher Yap mechanically. It flagged a possible interpretive problem and thereby left open a point of doctrinal uncertainty. That is important in disciplinary practice because the availability and structure of suspension orders can materially affect sanction strategy and the practical consequences for respondents with overlapping disciplinary proceedings. (Para 75)

What did the court say about the public interest in regulating legal practice?

The court’s public-interest analysis was one of the most important parts of the judgment. It said that there is a larger public interest in ensuring that clients receive legal advice only from those duly qualified and authorised to carry on legal work, and that public confidence in the legal profession and the legal process will be undermined if such misconduct is permitted. This was not a generic statement; it was the normative foundation for the court’s severe response to the respondents’ conduct. (Para 37)

"there is a larger public interest in ensuring that clients receive legal advice only from those duly qualified and authorised to carry on legal work. And here, too, public confidence in the legal profession as well as the legal process will be undermined if such misconduct is permitted." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 37

The court’s concern was heightened by the fact that the complainant was not merely dealing with an unqualified person in the abstract. He was dealing with a person who had been struck off, who was still operating from the Firm’s premises, and who was collecting money and drafting documents. That kind of conduct risks misleading clients, undermining the authority of court orders, and eroding confidence in the profession’s ability to police itself. (Paras 9, 12, 16(d), 37)

The judgment therefore stands as a strong reaffirmation that disciplinary sanctions are not only about the respondent’s personal culpability. They are also about preserving the integrity of the legal system and ensuring that the public can trust that those who hold themselves out as lawyers are in fact authorised to do so. (Paras 37, 63-65)

Why does this case matter for disciplinary practice in Singapore?

This case matters because it draws a hard line against allowing a struck-off lawyer to continue functioning in practice through a law firm’s internal arrangements. The court treated that conduct as fundamentally incompatible with the statutory and professional framework, and it imposed a severe sanction on the senior respondent while striking off the respondent whose conduct it found dishonest. The message is that formal disbarment must be respected in substance, not merely in name. (Paras 1, 5, 36-37, 65)

It also matters because the court used the case to reinforce several disciplinary principles: prior similar misconduct is a significant aggravating factor; seniority can increase the damage to the profession; and a plea of guilt has limited mitigating force in disciplinary proceedings. Those principles will be important in future cases where the court must calibrate sanction in light of repeated misconduct or abuse of professional status. (Paras 45, 55, 57)

Finally, the judgment is notable for its treatment of sanction architecture. The court’s misgivings about Christopher Yap suggest that the law on consecutive suspension periods may not be settled in the way some practitioners assumed. That makes the case important not only for its outcome, but also for the doctrinal questions it raises about the proper interpretation of the LPA’s disciplinary powers. (Para 75)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed): ss 32(2), 83(1), 83(1)(b), 83(2)(b), 83(2)(h), 83(5), 94(1), 98(1) (Paras 2-3, 57, 67)
• Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015: r 35(7) (Para 63)
• Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules (Para 20)
• Conveyancing and Law of Property (Conveyancing) Rules 2011 (Para 20)
• Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 1993 (Act No 41 of 1993) (Para 20)

"After hearing the parties, we ordered that the first respondent be suspended from practice for a period of five years, with the period of suspension to commence from the date of his discharge from bankruptcy, and that the second respondent be struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 5

"The respondents, Mr K V Sudeep Kumar (the “first respondent”) and Mr Dhanwant Singh (the “second respondent”), each faced a charge under s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LPA”) for allowing one Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju (“Mr Kumar”), an unauthorised person under s 32(2) of the LPA, to represent himself as an advocate and solicitor and to have de facto control over the conduct of a case for which the respondents were the solicitors on record." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 2

"The complainant attended at the premises of the Firm on multiple occasions. Most of the time, Mr Kumar was the person who attended to the complainant in respect of DC 2662." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 16(a)

"Mr Kumar drafted various cause papers and legal documents relating to DC 2662, whether by himself or with either or both the respondents." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 16(d)

"The first respondent was documented as replying: “Mr SK Kumar (Big Boss). [Mr Kumar] directed/managed Firm”." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 25(b)

"We begin by assessing the overall gravity of the respondents’ misconduct, before turning to address the specific aggravating and mitigating factors applicable to each respondent." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 33

"The Law Society was of the position that the second respondent should be struck off the roll." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 31

"In the circumstances, striking off was the only sensible and appropriate sanction." — Per Ang Cheng Hock JCA, Para 65

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2026] SGHC 9 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.