Case Details
- Title: THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE v CNH
- Citation: [2021] SGHC 212
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Court of Three Judges)
- Date: 15 September 2021 (grounds delivered); hearing date indicated as 6 September 2021
- Judges: Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA, Tay Yong Kwang JCA
- Originating Process: Originating Summons No 3 of 2021 (Summons No 1 of 2021)
- Plaintiff/Applicant: The Law Society of Singapore
- Defendant/Respondent: CNH
- Legal Areas: Legal Profession; Disciplinary procedures; Civil procedure (service of originating process)
- Statutes Referenced: Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed); Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed); Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed)
- Key Statutory Provisions: LPA ss 83(1), 83(2)(h), 85(3), 98(2); SCJA s 16; Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) O 10 r 1; Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules (2010 Rev Ed) r 6
- Cases Cited: [2021] SGHC 212 (as reported); Consistel Pte Ltd and another v Farooq Nasir and another [2009] 3 SLR(R) 665; Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore [2021] 1 SLR 874
- Judgment Length: 15 pages, 4,422 words
Summary
This decision concerns the procedural question of whether the High Court should grant an order for substituted service of documents commencing “Show Cause Proceedings” in solicitor disciplinary matters, where the respondent solicitor appears to be out of Singapore and personal service has repeatedly failed. The Law Society of Singapore applied under s 98(2) of the Legal Profession Act (LPA) for substituted service by posting the originating process and supporting affidavit to the respondent’s last known residential address.
The respondent, CNH, had pleaded guilty to and been convicted of two offences under s 509 of the Penal Code for insulting the modesty of a colleague. A Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) was convened under the LPA and found that there was cause of sufficient gravity to refer the matter to the High Court. The Law Society then commenced Show Cause Proceedings to establish that the respondent was guilty of misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor, and sought to require him to show cause why he should not be punished under s 83(1) of the LPA.
The Court of Three Judges allowed the Law Society’s application for substituted service. In doing so, the Court addressed the relationship between the High Court’s civil jurisdiction requirements for service of originating process and the distinctive nature of disciplinary jurisdiction under the LPA. The Court emphasised that, although disciplinary proceedings are part of the High Court’s civil jurisdiction, the statutory framework for disciplinary matters and the LPA’s service provisions govern the practical approach to ensuring that the respondent is properly brought before the court, even where personal service is not feasible.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The respondent, CNH, was admitted to the roll of advocates and solicitors on 27 August 2016. At the material time, he was employed by a local law firm (“the Firm”) as a legal associate. In 2017, while employed at the Firm, he committed sexual offences against a female colleague. On 8 June 2020, he pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, two offences under s 509 of the Penal Code for insulting the modesty of his colleague.
After conviction, the respondent was sentenced to four weeks’ imprisonment. He indicated in his mitigation plea that he had moved to Indonesia in January 2020 to work as an in-house counsel for a listed company. This information became relevant later when service attempts were made and when the Law Society faced difficulties locating him within Singapore.
Following the conviction, the Law Society received information from the Attorney-General on 16 June 2020 pursuant to s 85(3) of the LPA, together with a request that the matter be referred to a Disciplinary Tribunal. On 1 September 2020, the Law Society wrote to the Chief Justice for a DT to be appointed, and on 3 September 2020 the Chief Justice appointed the DT to investigate and hear the matter.
For the DT proceedings, the Law Society sought to serve a list of documents intended to be relied upon at the DT hearing. The Law Society relied on the respondent’s last known residential address (“the Premises”), which it said was reflected in applications made by the respondent for practising certificates under s 25 of the LPA and in a Notice of Charge of Particulars filed in 2017. When service was attempted, the respondent was not present. Instead, an elderly couple informed the process server that they were the respondent’s parents, that the respondent was away from Singapore, and that they did not know when he would return. They accepted the documents and cover letter but refused to sign the acknowledgment.
On 23 November 2020, the DT hearing proceeded in the respondent’s absence. The DT was satisfied that the documents had been duly served and brought to the respondent’s knowledge and attention in accordance with r 6 of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules (2010 Rev Ed). On 8 February 2021, the DT found that the respondent’s conduct established cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under s 83(2)(h) of the LPA.
On 8 March 2021, the Law Society commenced the Show Cause Proceedings. In the period leading up to, and even after, the present application for substituted service was filed on 16 April 2021, the Law Society made multiple unsuccessful attempts to effect personal service of the documents on the respondent at the Premises. These attempts occurred on 10 March 2021 (around 8.45pm), 11 March 2021 (around 7.00pm), 15 March 2021 (around 10.50am and 11.20am), 15 March 2021 (around 11.20am), and 18 August 2021 (around 7.30pm and 8.30pm).
On the first four occasions, the process server rang the doorbell several times but received no response. On the fifth occasion, the door was opened by an elderly man who abruptly slammed the door shut when he saw the process server. The Law Society relied on photographs taken by another process server on a prior occasion to attest that this elderly man was the same person who had answered the door on 2 October 2020 and identified himself as the respondent’s father. Subsequent attempts to ring the doorbell again met with no response. The Law Society stated that it had no further information about the respondent’s whereabouts.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central issue was whether the High Court should grant substituted service under s 98(2) of the LPA for the originating process and supporting affidavit commencing the Show Cause Proceedings. This issue arose in circumstances where the respondent appeared to be out of jurisdiction at the time the Show Cause Proceedings were commenced, and where personal service at the last known address had failed despite repeated attempts.
A related issue concerned jurisdictional characterisation: whether the general civil jurisdiction framework in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (SCJA) and the Rules of Court governing service of originating process (including the hierarchy of service and the requirement to seek leave for out-of-jurisdiction service) applied in the same way to disciplinary proceedings. The Court needed to clarify how the statutory disciplinary regime under the LPA interacts with the general civil procedure principles.
In particular, the Court had to consider whether the “touchstone” for the High Court’s in personam civil jurisdiction—namely, due service of originating process—operates identically in disciplinary proceedings, given that disciplinary jurisdiction is not concerned with adjudicating private rights and liabilities inter se, but instead with the court’s supervisory and regulatory role over advocates and solicitors as officers of the Supreme Court.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court began by addressing the High Court’s jurisdictional basis for hearing matters and, specifically, the role of service in establishing jurisdiction. It referred to s 16 of the SCJA, which provides that the General Division has jurisdiction to hear and try any action in personam where the defendant is served with a writ or other originating process in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court or Family Justice Rules, including where service is effected outside Singapore in authorised circumstances, or where the defendant submits to the jurisdiction.
The Court emphasised that, generally speaking, the touchstone of in personam civil jurisdiction is service. It also noted that O 10 r 1(1) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) requires personal service of a writ on each defendant, reflecting the fairness rationale that a defendant should have knowledge of the commencement of proceedings so that he can decide how to exercise legal rights, including contesting the propriety of service and whether to contest the proceedings. The Court cited Consistel Pte Ltd and another v Farooq Nasir and another for the proposition that it would be unfair to order judgment in default where the defendant did not know that legal proceedings had been brought against him.
However, the Court then distinguished disciplinary proceedings from ordinary in personam civil actions. It reasoned that disciplinary jurisdiction is not concerned with determining private rights and obligations between parties. Accordingly, it does not fit neatly within the in personam civil jurisdiction framework in the same way as a typical civil claim. The Court relied on Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore, where the Court of Appeal had held that disciplinary jurisdiction is descriptive of the body of law dealt with, and that it remains within the High Court’s civil jurisdiction under s 16(2) of the SCJA as a matter of written law.
In other words, while disciplinary proceedings fall within the High Court’s civil jurisdiction, the statutory disciplinary framework under the LPA governs the procedural and substantive requirements. This meant that the Court’s approach to service should be informed by the LPA’s own provisions and objectives, rather than by importing the full structure of the Rules of Court hierarchy for ordinary civil actions.
Having clarified the jurisdictional context, the Court turned to the practical question: whether substituted service was appropriate in the circumstances. The Court noted that the Law Society had already taken steps to serve the respondent’s documents in the DT proceedings, and that the DT had proceeded in his absence after being satisfied that the documents were duly served and brought to his knowledge and attention. This supported the inference that the respondent was aware of the disciplinary process or at least that the Law Society had taken reasonable steps to bring the matter to his attention.
For the Show Cause Proceedings, the Law Society had made multiple attempts at personal service at the Premises, including at various times of day and on different dates, and had encountered either no response or active refusal to engage (as evidenced by the elderly man slamming the door). The Law Society also had no further information about the respondent’s whereabouts. The Court therefore considered whether the statutory threshold for substituted service—designed to prevent disciplinary proceedings from being stymied where personal service is impracticable—was satisfied.
The Court’s analysis reflected a balance between procedural fairness and the need for effective disciplinary enforcement. Substituted service is not a substitute for diligence; rather, it is a mechanism to ensure that proceedings can continue where a respondent cannot be personally served despite reasonable efforts. The Court accepted that the Law Society had attempted personal service repeatedly and that those attempts had failed in a manner consistent with the respondent being absent from Singapore and uncontactable at the last known address.
In allowing substituted service, the Court effectively concluded that the respondent’s apparent out-of-jurisdiction status, combined with the documented history of unsuccessful personal service attempts and the prior DT service outcome, justified the order sought under s 98(2) of the LPA. The Court’s reasoning also aligned with the broader disciplinary objective: to protect the public and maintain confidence in the legal profession, while ensuring that the respondent is given a fair opportunity to respond through the mechanisms provided by the LPA.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court allowed the Law Society’s application for substituted service. Practically, this meant that the Law Society could serve the originating summons commencing the Show Cause Proceedings and the supporting affidavit by posting the documents together with the order for substituted service at the respondent’s last known residential address.
As a result, the Show Cause Proceedings could proceed notwithstanding the respondent’s absence and the failure of personal service attempts. The decision therefore removed a procedural obstacle and enabled the court to move forward with the disciplinary process aimed at determining whether the respondent should be punished under s 83(1) of the LPA.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how service principles operate in solicitor disciplinary proceedings. While ordinary civil litigation is strongly anchored to personal service and the fairness rationale that a defendant must know of proceedings, disciplinary proceedings are governed by a specialised statutory framework. The Court’s discussion of jurisdiction and service underscores that disciplinary jurisdiction, though located within the High Court’s civil jurisdiction, is not identical to in personam adjudication of private rights and liabilities.
For the Law Society and for respondents, the decision provides practical guidance on what courts may consider sufficient to justify substituted service. The Court’s acceptance of substituted service was grounded in evidence of repeated, well-documented attempts at personal service at the last known address, the respondent’s apparent absence from Singapore, and the prior DT service outcome. This evidential approach is instructive: applicants should maintain detailed records of attempts, times, and outcomes, and should be prepared to explain why personal service is no longer realistically achievable.
From a compliance and risk-management perspective, the case also highlights the importance of accurate and updated address information in practising certificate applications and related filings. Where a respondent’s last known address becomes stale and the respondent is uncontactable, disciplinary proceedings may still proceed through substituted service mechanisms, ensuring that misconduct allegations are not indefinitely delayed.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 16 [CDN] [SSO]
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed), ss 82(1), 83(1), 83(2)(h), 85(3), 98(2), 25 [CDN] [SSO]
- Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed), O 10 r 1(1)
- Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules (2010 Rev Ed), r 6
- Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), s 509 [CDN] [SSO]
Cases Cited
- Consistel Pte Ltd and another v Farooq Nasir and another [2009] 3 SLR(R) 665
- Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore [2021] 1 SLR 874
- [2021] SGHC 212 (this case)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2021] SGHC 212 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.