THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE v ANDREW JOHN HANAM

"Having considered the parties’ submissions including the evidence before the DT, we hold that in respect of the two primary charges, due cause has been shown for Mr Hanam to be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the LPA and order that he be suspended for a period of 9 months." — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 3

Case Information

• Citation: [2023] SGHC 132 (Para 0)
• Court: Court of Three Judges (Para 0)
• Date of Judgment: 10 May 2023 (Para 0)
• Coram: Tay Yong Kwang JCA, Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, and Andrew Phang Boon Leong SJ (Para 0)
• Case Number: Originating Application No 5 of 2022 (Para 0)
• Area of Law: Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings; Professional conduct — Breach; Professional conduct — Improper conduct or practice; Show cause action (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Law Society: Not stated in the extraction (NOT ANSWERABLE)
• Counsel for Mr Andrew John Hanam: Not stated in the extraction (NOT ANSWERABLE)
• Judgment Length: Not stated in the extraction (NOT ANSWERABLE)

Summary

This was a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Law Society of Singapore against Mr Andrew John Hanam in relation to his handling of P&P’s dispute with Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd over unpaid invoices arising from two subcontracts for the Marina Bay Mass Rapid Transit station project. The court described the misconduct as arising from Mr Hanam’s handling of P&P’s dispute and the alleged breaches of the PCR, and it noted that the matter concerned his conduct across three sets of proceedings: Suit 1255, DC 1043, and Suit 1167. (Paras 1-2, 5)

The central factual and evidential theme was that Mr Hanam claimed to have given oral advice and to have engaged in litigation strategy discussions with his client, but he kept no attendance notes or timesheets throughout the litigation. The court treated that absence of contemporaneous records as highly significant, and it accepted the disciplinary tribunal’s evidential concern that the defence was not properly supported by objective documentation. (Paras 6, 40, 53)

Ultimately, the court held that due cause had been shown under s 83(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 and ordered that Mr Hanam be suspended for nine months. Although some of the tribunal’s findings were set aside, the court concluded that the remaining misconduct in the two primary charges was sufficient to justify disciplinary sanction. (Paras 3, 45, 48)

What Was the Disciplinary Complaint Against Mr Hanam?

The complaint arose from Mr Hanam’s role as solicitor for P&P in its dispute with Kori over unpaid invoices connected to two subcontracts for the Marina Bay Mass Rapid Transit station. The court recorded that he was appointed on 25 November 2016, and that the dispute later generated three sets of proceedings, namely Suit 1255, DC 1043, and Suit 1167. The disciplinary case therefore did not concern a single isolated event, but a sequence of litigation and related advice over an extended period. (Paras 5, 2)

The court also noted that the misconduct alleged before it was tied to breaches of the PCR and to the standard expected of a solicitor of Mr Hanam’s standing. In particular, the judgment emphasized that the conduct in issue required him to demonstrate a minimum standard of competence and experience in rendering legal advice, including advice on ADR options such as adjudication under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act. That framing is important because it shows that the case was not merely about tactical disagreement, but about whether the solicitor met the professional standard expected in advising on litigation and settlement strategy. (Para 2)

"The misconduct that is in issue before us arose out of Mr Hanam’s handling of P&P’s dispute for unpaid invoices where it is alleged that he had acted in breach of the PCR." — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 2

The court’s description of the matter also makes clear that the disciplinary process was concerned with professional conduct rather than the merits of the underlying commercial dispute. The focus was on whether Mr Hanam properly advised his client, properly evaluated the litigation and ADR options available, and maintained the records that would ordinarily be expected of a solicitor handling such matters. (Paras 2, 6, 53)

How Did the Underlying Litigation Unfold Across Suit 1255, DC 1043, and Suit 1167?

The extraction shows that the dispute unfolded through multiple proceedings, and the judgment recounts a chronology beginning with the appointment of Mr Hanam and moving through interlocutory applications, settlement issues, and later disciplinary proceedings. The court specifically noted that P&P’s dispute with Kori concerned two subcontracts, and that the litigation spanned three separate matters. This chronology matters because the disciplinary allegations were assessed against the backdrop of repeated legal steps rather than a single decision point. (Paras 5, 6)

The extracted material also records several costs orders made in the underlying proceedings, which illustrate that the litigation was active and contested. For example, the court noted that P&P failed to resist SUM 431 and was ordered to pay costs of $3,200, and that SUM 1394 was dismissed with costs of $3,700 ordered against P&P on 9 April 2018. The extraction further mentions other adverse costs orders of $2,000, $500, $2,300, $1,513.70, and $6,000. These details show the procedural density of the dispute, although the extraction does not provide enough to reconstruct every application in full. (Paras 9, 13, 16)

"On 25 November 2016, Mr Hanam was appointed by Mr Pugazendhi to represent his company, P&P, in its dispute with Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd (“Kori”) in relation to two subcontracts for the construction of the Marina Bay Mass Rapid Transit station." — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 5

The court’s treatment of the chronology is also significant because it linked the later disciplinary findings to the solicitor’s conduct at different stages of the dispute. The judgment expressly referred to the need for a proper risk-benefit evaluation at each stage of legal proceedings, which indicates that the court viewed the solicitor’s obligations as continuing and iterative rather than confined to one initial advice session. (Para 48)

Why Did the Court Place So Much Weight on the Absence of Attendance Notes and Timesheets?

A central evidential issue was that Mr Hanam kept no attendance notes or timesheets throughout the conduct of the litigation on behalf of P&P. The court recorded this fact in categorical terms, and it became a major reason why the disciplinary tribunal drew an adverse inference against him. In a case turning on what advice was given orally and what strategic discussions occurred, the absence of contemporaneous records was especially damaging. (Paras 6, 40, 53)

The tribunal’s reasoning, as summarized by the court, was that the absence of attendance notes and contemporaneous documents was inconsistent with Mr Hanam’s account of numerous meetings and discussions with Mr Pugazendhi. The court accepted that this evidential gap justified an adverse inference, and it treated the lack of records as the primary basis for the tribunal’s decision. That is a recurring theme in professional discipline: where a solicitor’s defence depends on oral advice, contemporaneous records often become decisive. (Paras 40, 53)

"Throughout the conduct of the litigation on behalf of P&P (ie, over the span of the three suits), Mr Hanam did not keep any attendance notes or timesheets of his meetings and discussions with Mr Pugazendhi." — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 6

The court also linked this evidential deficiency to broader professional expectations. It referred to authorities emphasizing the importance of proper notes and records, including cases used to show that records assist in clarifying matters, corroborating testimony, and protecting lawyers against unwarranted allegations. In that sense, the absence of records was not merely a factual weakness in Mr Hanam’s defence; it was also treated as a professional failing with disciplinary significance. (Paras 53, 48)

How Did the Court Deal With the Argument That the Charges Were Irregular or Too Vague?

Mr Hanam argued that the Second and Third Charges were irregular because they had been unjustifiably broadened and were framed “very generally.” The court rejected that submission. It held that the inclusion of the phrase “properly and periodically” did not detract from the substance of the allegations and did not render the charges incompetent or incomprehensible. The court’s approach was practical rather than technical: the question was whether the respondent had adequate notice of the case he had to meet. (Paras 44, 48, 50)

The court’s reasoning on this point was anchored in the principle that disciplinary charges must contain adequate particulars to enable the subject of the charge to prepare a defence. It cited authority for the proposition that charges should give details of the nature of the offence and the particulars of time and place, so that the respondent is not left guessing about the case against him. On that basis, the court concluded that the charges here were sufficiently clear. (Para 50)

"We agree generally with the DT that the charges are not irregular. In our view, the inclusion of the phrase “properly and periodically” to the Second and Third Charges neither detracts from the nub of the allegations against Mr Hanam nor does it render the charges incompetent or incomprehensible." — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 48

This part of the judgment is important because it shows that disciplinary proceedings are not defeated by minor drafting additions if the essential allegation remains intelligible. The court did not accept that the charges had been impermissibly expanded in a way that prejudiced the respondent. Instead, it treated the charges as sufficiently focused to permit a fair defence, which allowed the court to move on to the substantive merits. (Paras 48, 50)

What Legal Standard Did the Court Apply to the Adequacy of Disciplinary Charges?

The court stated the governing principle in clear terms: disciplinary charges must provide adequate details of the alleged offending, including the nature of the offence and the particulars of the time and place of the alleged offence, so that the respondent can prepare a defence adequately. That principle was used to assess whether the Second and Third Charges were too vague or irregular. The court’s analysis therefore turned on procedural fairness as well as substantive misconduct. (Para 50)

"charges in disciplinary proceedings must give adequate details of the alleged offending, such as the nature of the offence and the particulars of the time and place of the alleged offence, to enable the subject of the charge to prepare their defence adequately" — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 50

The court also referred to the professional obligation to conduct a proper risk-benefit evaluation at each stage of legal proceedings. That principle was relevant because the charges concerned not only whether advice was given, but whether the advice reflected a proper assessment of litigation and ADR options. The court’s use of that principle shows that the adequacy of the charges and the substance of the alleged misconduct were closely connected. (Para 48)

In practical terms, the court’s approach meant that the disciplinary process could proceed where the respondent had enough information to understand the case, even if the charges were framed in broad language. The court did not require hyper-technical precision; it required fairness and sufficient specificity. That is a significant point for disciplinary practice because it balances the need for proper notice against the reality that professional misconduct may involve a pattern of conduct rather than a single discrete act. (Paras 48, 50)

What Did the Court Say About the Duty to Evaluate Litigation Strategy and ADR Options?

The court emphasized that lawyers have a professional obligation to ensure that a proper risk-benefit evaluation is undertaken at each stage of legal proceedings. This principle was central to the allegations against Mr Hanam because the disciplinary complaint concerned his handling of litigation strategy and his advice on alternatives such as adjudication under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act. The court treated this as part of the minimum standard of competence expected of a solicitor in his position. (Paras 2, 48)

"lawyers have a professional obligation to ensure that a proper risk-benefit evaluation is undertaken at each stage of legal proceedings" — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 48

The judgment also noted that the misconduct required Mr Hanam to demonstrate a minimum standard of competence and experience as an advocate and solicitor of 18 years’ standing at the material time. That observation matters because it links the standard of care to the respondent’s seniority and experience. The court was not assessing a junior lawyer’s misstep; it was assessing the conduct of an experienced practitioner expected to advise on legal issues and ADR options with professional judgment. (Para 2)

By framing the issue in terms of risk-benefit evaluation, the court made clear that a solicitor cannot simply pursue litigation without considering whether another route may better serve the client’s interests. The extraction indicates that the court considered this obligation in the context of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act and SOPA adjudication. The significance is that professional misconduct may arise not only from affirmative wrongdoing, but also from a failure to properly advise on strategic alternatives. (Paras 2, 48)

How Did the Court Assess the Evidence and the Tribunal’s Adverse Inference?

The court accepted that the disciplinary tribunal drew an adverse inference against Mr Hanam because of the absence of attendance notes and contemporaneous documents, despite the numerous meetings he said he had with Mr Pugazendhi. The tribunal’s reasoning was evidential: if the solicitor had in fact given the advice and had the discussions he described, one would ordinarily expect some contemporaneous record. The court treated that reasoning as sound. (Para 40)

The judgment further explained that the primary basis for the tribunal’s decision was evidential in nature and arose from the absence of proper attendance notes and contemporaneous records to support Mr Hanam’s defence. That is a strong statement because it shows that the court did not regard the matter as turning on a mere credibility contest alone; rather, it saw the lack of records as a structural weakness in the defence. (Para 53)

"The DT found that it was appropriate to draw an adverse inference against Mr Hanam, as sought by the Law Society, having regard to several matters. First, the DT noted the absence of attendance notes and contemporaneous documents notwithstanding the numerous meetings that Mr Hanam purportedly had with Mr Pugazendhi." — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 40

The court’s treatment of the evidence also reflects a broader professional norm: lawyers are expected to keep records that can later verify what advice was given and what decisions were made. The judgment cited authorities supporting the proposition that proper records are useful in clarifying matters and corroborating testimony. In disciplinary proceedings, that evidential discipline can be decisive. (Para 53)

Which Parts of the Tribunal’s Findings Did the Court Uphold, and Which Did It Set Aside?

The extraction states that the court set aside some of the tribunal’s findings but upheld enough misconduct to establish due cause. Although the provided material does not identify every individual finding that was set aside, it does make clear that the court did not simply adopt the tribunal’s reasoning wholesale. Instead, it reviewed the evidence and the charges, accepted some aspects of the tribunal’s approach, and rejected others. (Paras 3, 45, 48)

What remained decisive was that the two primary charges were made out to the court’s satisfaction. The court’s final order therefore rested on the misconduct that survived its review, not on every aspect of the tribunal’s original conclusions. This is an important feature of the case because it shows that disciplinary liability can be sustained even where the appellate or supervisory court trims back parts of the tribunal’s reasoning. (Paras 3, 45)

"Having considered the parties’ submissions including the evidence before the DT, we hold that in respect of the two primary charges, due cause has been shown for Mr Hanam to be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the LPA and order that he be suspended for a period of 9 months." — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 3

The practical lesson is that a respondent does not escape sanction merely because some findings are vulnerable. If the remaining findings still establish misconduct of sufficient gravity, the court may still find due cause and impose a sanction. That is exactly what happened here. (Paras 3, 45)

What Were the Parties’ Main Arguments on Liability and Sanction?

The Law Society argued that there was due cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action, that the Second and Third Charges were established beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts, and that the breaches amounted to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under s 83(2)(b) of the LPA. The Law Society also relied on aggravating factors and cited authorities in support of suspension as the appropriate sanction. (Para 43)

Mr Hanam disputed that the Second and Third Charges were made out. He argued, first, that the charges were irregular because they had been unjustifiably broadened and framed very generally. The extraction also records that he challenged the weight given to his oral evidence and contended, in substance, that any misconduct was isolated and did not warrant suspension. The court’s analysis shows that it did not accept those submissions. (Para 44)

"The Law Society argues that there is due cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action against Mr Hanam. The Second and Third Charges are established beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts, and these breaches amount to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under s 83(2)(b) of the LPA." — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 43

The court’s resolution of the dispute was to accept that due cause had been shown and that suspension was warranted. It therefore rejected the respondent’s attempt to characterize the matter as merely technical or isolated. The final sanction indicates that the court regarded the misconduct as serious enough to justify a substantial disciplinary response. (Paras 3, 45)

Why Did the Court Impose a 9-Month Suspension?

The court ordered a nine-month suspension after concluding that due cause had been shown under s 83(1) of the LPA in respect of the two primary charges. The extraction does not provide a full sentencing-style breakdown of aggravating and mitigating factors, but it does show that the Law Society argued for a substantial sanction and that the court accepted suspension as the appropriate outcome. (Paras 3, 43)

The sanction is significant because it reflects the court’s view that the misconduct was not trivial. The judgment links the misconduct to failures in advising the client, evaluating strategy, and maintaining proper records. Those failures go to the heart of professional competence and trust, which explains why the court considered suspension rather than a lesser response. (Paras 2, 6, 53)

"we hold that in respect of the two primary charges, due cause has been shown for Mr Hanam to be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the LPA and order that he be suspended for a period of 9 months." — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 3

The court also cited cases on sanction, including Loh Der Ming Andrew v Koh Tien Hua and Law Society of Singapore v Ooi Oon Tat, which indicates that it considered prior disciplinary outcomes in calibrating the appropriate response. The extraction does not reproduce the full sanction analysis, so one should not infer more than the text provides; however, it is clear that the court regarded suspension as justified on the facts before it. (Para 19)

Why Does This Case Matter for Solicitors’ Record-Keeping and Client Advice?

This case matters because it reinforces the professional importance of keeping proper attendance notes and contemporaneous records. The court treated the absence of such records as a major evidential weakness and relied on that absence in upholding the tribunal’s adverse inference. For practitioners, the message is straightforward: if advice is given orally, it should still be documented. (Paras 6, 40, 53)

The case also matters because it confirms that a solicitor may face disciplinary sanction for failing to properly advise a client and for failing to evaluate litigation and ADR options at each stage of proceedings. The court’s reference to the need for a proper risk-benefit evaluation underscores that professional competence includes strategic judgment, not merely procedural compliance. (Paras 2, 48)

Finally, the case is important because it shows that disciplinary liability can survive partial success on review. Even where some tribunal findings are set aside, the court may still find due cause if the remaining misconduct is sufficiently serious. That makes the case a useful authority for both prosecutors and defence counsel in professional discipline matters. (Paras 3, 45)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed): s 98 (Para 1)
• Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed): s 83(1) (Paras 1, 3, 45)
• Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed): s 83(2)(b) (Para 43)
• Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed): s 83(2)(h) (Para 20)
• Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015: rr 17(2)(e), 17(2)(f), 17(5), 17(7), and 5(2)(c) (Paras 6, 38, 20)
• Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Para 2)

What Is the Broader Significance of the Decision for Professional Discipline?

The broader significance of the decision lies in its insistence that professional discipline is not confined to overt dishonesty or blatant misconduct. A solicitor may be sanctioned for failing to properly advise a client, failing to evaluate litigation and ADR options, and failing to keep the records that would substantiate the advice given. The court’s reasoning therefore reinforces a high standard of professional care in day-to-day legal practice. (Paras 2, 6, 48, 53)

The case also illustrates how disciplinary tribunals and reviewing courts may rely heavily on contemporaneous documentation. Where a lawyer’s account depends on oral conversations, the absence of attendance notes can be fatal to the defence. That practical lesson is especially important in contentious matters, where later disputes about advice and strategy are common. (Paras 40, 53)

Most importantly, the case shows that the court will look at the substance of the misconduct and the adequacy of the respondent’s professional judgment, rather than allowing technical objections to obscure the underlying issue. The result is a clear message to practitioners: proper advice, proper evaluation, and proper records are all part of the same professional obligation. (Paras 3, 48, 50)

"The primary basis for the DT’s decision was thus evidential in nature and it arose from the absence of proper attendance notes and contemporaneous records to support Mr Hanam’s defence." — Per Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, Para 53

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN
• View in judgment: "The Second Charge, which was framed..."
• View in judgment: "P&P failed to resist SUM 431..."
• View in judgment: "SUM 1394 was dismissed with costs..."
• View in judgment: "Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA (delivering..."
• View in judgment: "The Second Charge, which was framed..."

This article analyses [2023] SGHC 132 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.