Case Details
- Citation: [2015] SGHC 7
- Case Title: Tey Tsun Hang v National University of Singapore
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 14 January 2015
- Originating Process: Originating Summons No 511 of 2014
- Coram: Quentin Loh J
- Judgment Type: Decision on leave for judicial review (under O 53 of the Rules of Court)
- Applicant/Plaintiff: Tey Tsun Hang
- Respondent/Defendant: National University of Singapore
- Legal Area: Administrative Law — Judicial Review
- Key Relief Sought: (i) Quashing Order in respect of NUS’s decision of 27 July 2012 suspending Tey; (ii) Quashing Order in respect of NUS’s decision of 28 May 2013 summarily dismissing Tey; (iii) Mandatory Order requiring reinstatement to his position as of 26 July 2012
- Central Issue: Whether NUS’s decisions to suspend and summarily dismiss an academic staff member are susceptible to judicial review
- Counsel for Applicant: Ravi s/o Madasamy (with L F Violet Netto)
- Counsel for Respondent: Cavinder Bull SC, Gerui Lim and Priscilla Lua (Drew & Napier LLC); David Chong SC and Sivakumar Ramasamy (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the non-party
- Statutes Referenced: Criminal Procedure Code; NUS Staff Code; Prevention of Corruption Act; Securities and Futures Act
- Cases Cited: [2013] SGDC 165; [2014] SGHC 247; [2015] SGHC 7
- Judgment Length: 13 pages, 6,492 words
Summary
This High Court decision concerned an application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings against the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) arising from the suspension and subsequent summary dismissal of Tey Tsun Hang, an associate professor at NUS. The applicant sought quashing orders in relation to NUS’s decisions of 27 July 2012 (suspension) and 28 May 2013 (summary dismissal), and a mandatory order requiring reinstatement to his position as of 26 July 2012. The applicant framed his challenge in terms of alleged breaches of natural justice, including alleged violations of his rights to a fair hearing and a presumption of innocence, as well as allegations that the decisions were illegal, irrational, and/or procedurally improper.
The central issue was not whether NUS’s decisions were substantively correct, but whether they were legally amenable to judicial review at all. In other words, the court had to determine whether NUS, a corporatised university, and its internal disciplinary and employment decisions could be characterised as “public law” decisions subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under O 53 of the Rules of Court. The judgment also addressed procedural matters relating to the applicant’s attempts to seek the recusal of the judge who heard the leave application.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Tey Tsun Hang was appointed an associate professor at the Faculty of Law in NUS in 2010. NUS is a university corporatised in 2006 by the National University of Singapore (Corporatisation) Act. Tey’s employment was governed primarily by an Employment Agreement dated 18 February 2010, executed by him on 26 February 2010. The agreement provided for termination by notice, but also contained provisions allowing NUS to terminate immediately and without compensation in specified circumstances, including where the employee is convicted of a crime which, in the opinion of the university, is likely to bring the university into disrepute, or where the university forms an opinion that the employee is guilty of misconduct or gross impropriety, or fails to perform duties or observe terms and conditions of appointment.
On 27 July 2012, Tey was charged in court with six corruption-related charges under s 6(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On the same day, NUS suspended him from duty. The suspension was communicated by the Dean, Professor Simon Chesterman, who informed Tey that the Attorney-General had decided to charge him for alleged misconduct involving a student, and that NUS would initiate an investigation under its Staff Disciplinary Procedures. Pending the outcome of the investigation, Tey was suspended with immediate effect, with pay unchanged.
The suspension decision was anchored in paragraph 18 of NUS’s Staff Disciplinary Procedures, which permitted the Dean, in consultation with the relevant vice-president, to suspend a staff member if disciplinary proceedings were contemplated and if suspension was believed necessary either to protect the interests of the university or the university community, or to ensure that the conduct of the investigation or proper functioning of the university would not be impeded. NUS argued that these procedures were incorporated into the Employment Agreement through the agreement’s “policies, rules and regulations” clause.
After the criminal trial, the District Court convicted Tey on 28 May 2013. On that same day, NUS informed him that his employment was terminated immediately and without compensation. The termination letter referred expressly to clause 5.2 of the Employment Agreement, particularly clause 5.2(a), which allowed immediate termination without prior notice or compensation if the employee was convicted of a crime which, in the university’s opinion, was likely to bring it into disrepute. The letter also referred to clauses 5.2(b) and 5.2(c), which allowed summary dismissal where the university formed an opinion that the employee was guilty of misconduct or gross impropriety, or had failed to perform duties or observe terms and conditions.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The principal legal issue was whether NUS’s decisions to suspend and summarily dismiss Tey were susceptible to judicial review. This required the court to consider the boundary between public law supervisory jurisdiction and private law employment or contractual disputes. Judicial review under O 53 is concerned with the legality of decisions made by public bodies or persons exercising public functions, and the court must determine whether the impugned decisions fall within that category.
A secondary but related issue concerned the applicant’s procedural complaints. Tey alleged that NUS breached natural justice, including his rights to a fair hearing and a presumption of innocence. He also contended that the decisions were illegal, irrational, and/or procedurally improper. While these grounds are typical in judicial review challenges, they presuppose that the decisions are legally reviewable in the first place.
In addition, the judgment addressed recusal applications and the applicant’s conduct in raising objections to the judge hearing the matter. The applicant had earlier indicated that he did not want the judge who heard the criminal motion, the judge who heard the appeal, and another judge to hear the originating summons. Later, close to the hearing, he emailed the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General contending that the judge should not hear the judicial review leave applications, and alleging that the judge had not produced written judgments for certain criminal motions. The court had to deal with whether the recusal objection was properly pursued and, if so, whether it warranted the judge’s withdrawal.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by framing the matter as an application for leave to bring judicial review proceedings. Leave is a threshold filter: the applicant must demonstrate that there is an arguable case that the decision is amenable to judicial review and that there is a reasonable basis for the relief sought. The court therefore focused on the central question—reviewability—before turning to the applicant’s substantive complaints.
On the reviewability issue, the court’s analysis (as reflected in the judgment’s framing) centred on whether NUS’s decisions were made in the exercise of public power or public functions, or whether they were essentially employment and disciplinary decisions governed by contract and internal procedures. NUS is corporatised, and its status can complicate the reviewability analysis: corporatised entities may perform functions with public character, but not every internal employment decision necessarily attracts public law scrutiny. The court therefore had to consider the nature of the impugned decisions and the legal source of the powers relied upon by NUS.
The court also considered the contractual and procedural basis for NUS’s actions. The Employment Agreement incorporated NUS policies, rules and regulations, including the Staff Disciplinary Procedures. The suspension decision was expressly tied to paragraph 18 of those procedures, and the summary dismissal decision was tied to clause 5.2 of the Employment Agreement, including the university’s opinion-based assessment of whether a conviction was likely to bring it into disrepute. This contractual architecture tends to support the view that the decisions are grounded in employment terms rather than in a statutory disciplinary regime with public law characteristics. However, the court would still need to assess whether NUS’s corporatised role and the disciplinary context transformed the decisions into public law decisions.
In addition, the court addressed the applicant’s natural justice and presumption of innocence arguments. While those arguments are often relevant where a public body makes an adverse decision affecting rights or interests, the court’s approach suggests that such grounds could not be evaluated in isolation from the reviewability threshold. If the decisions were not susceptible to judicial review, the court would not proceed to determine whether the alleged procedural defects occurred. Conversely, if the decisions were reviewable, the court would then examine whether the procedures adopted by NUS met the requirements of fairness in the circumstances.
Finally, the court dealt with the recusal-related procedural history. The judgment records that, during pre-trial conferences, counsel indicated that the applicant wanted certain judges not to hear the originating summons. Later, the matter was fixed before Quentin Loh J. A week before the hearing, the applicant emailed the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General objecting to the judge hearing the OS, alleging that the judge had not produced written judgments for certain criminal motions. When counsel appeared before the judge, the judge stopped submissions and asked whether the recusal application was still being pursued. Counsel initially appeared uncertain, and only after being shown the email did counsel confirm that the recusal application was still being pursued. The judge then required grounds, but counsel effectively deferred to the email’s content. The court’s handling of this episode underscores that recusal objections must be properly articulated and pursued in a timely and coherent manner, and that allegations about judicial process must be grounded in the relevant procedural record.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court ultimately dismissed the application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The practical effect was that Tey’s attempt to challenge NUS’s suspension and summary dismissal decisions through the judicial review route could not proceed. This meant that the quashing and mandatory reliefs sought—namely, setting aside the suspension and dismissal decisions and requiring reinstatement—were not granted at the leave stage.
In addition, the judgment’s treatment of the recusal objection indicates that the court did not accept the basis for removing the judge from hearing the matter. The decision therefore proceeded before Quentin Loh J, and the leave application was determined on the merits of reviewability and the threshold requirements for judicial review.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates the importance of the reviewability threshold in Singapore judicial review. Even where an applicant alleges serious procedural unfairness—such as breach of natural justice or violation of the presumption of innocence—those allegations do not automatically confer jurisdiction. The court must first determine whether the impugned decision is susceptible to judicial review, which depends on the nature of the decision-maker and the character of the decision.
For employment-related disputes involving corporatised public institutions, the case highlights that internal disciplinary and employment decisions may be treated as contractual or administrative in a private-law sense unless they can be properly characterised as exercises of public power. Lawyers advising staff members or institutions should therefore carefully assess the legal source of the power being exercised, the statutory or contractual framework, and the extent to which the decision resembles a public law determination rather than a contractual employment management decision.
From a litigation strategy perspective, the case also serves as a reminder that procedural objections, including recusal applications, must be raised clearly and supported with specific grounds. Where counsel is unable to articulate the grounds beyond what is contained in an email, the court may be less receptive to the objection. Practitioners should ensure that any recusal basis is promptly and precisely stated, with attention to the relevant procedural record and the legal test for apparent bias or actual bias.
Legislation Referenced
- Criminal Procedure Code
- National University of Singapore (NUS) Staff Code / NUS Staff Disciplinary Procedures (as referenced in the Employment Agreement)
- Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241)
- Securities and Futures Act
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), in particular O 53
Cases Cited
- [2013] SGDC 165
- [2014] SGHC 247
- [2015] SGHC 7
Source Documents
This article analyses [2015] SGHC 7 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.