Case Details
- Title: Tey Tsun Hang v National University of Singapore
- Citation: [2015] SGHC 7
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 14 January 2015
- Case Number: Originating Summons No 511 of 2014
- Coram: Quentin Loh J
- Judgment Reserved: Yes
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Tey Tsun Hang
- Defendant/Respondent: National University of Singapore
- Non-Party: Attorney-General’s Chambers (represented at the hearing)
- Counsel for Applicant: Ravi s/o Madasamy (L F Violet Netto)
- Counsel for Respondent: Cavinder Bull SC, Gerui Lim and Priscilla Lua (Drew & Napier LLC); David Chong SC and Sivakumar Ramasamy (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the non-party
- Legal Area: Administrative Law – Judicial Review
- Statutes Referenced: Securities and Futures Act
- Other Statutory/Regulatory Instruments Mentioned in Extract: National University of Singapore (Corporatisation) Act (Cap 204A, 2006 Rev Ed); Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed); Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed)
- Key Procedural Provision: O 53 of the Rules of Court (leave for judicial review)
- Judgment Length: 13 pages, 6,596 words
- Impugned Decisions: (1) NUS suspension from duty on 27 July 2012; (2) NUS summary dismissal on 28 May 2013
- Reliefs Sought: Quashing Orders; Mandatory Order reinstating Tey as of 26 July 2012
- Central Issue: Whether NUS decisions are susceptible to judicial review
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2013] SGDC 165; [2014] SGHC 247; [2015] SGHC 7
Summary
In Tey Tsun Hang v National University of Singapore ([2015] SGHC 7), the High Court considered whether decisions made by the National University of Singapore (“NUS”)—specifically, its suspension of an academic staff member and subsequent summary dismissal—were amenable to judicial review. The applicant, Tey Tsun Hang, sought leave under O 53 of the Rules of Court to bring judicial review proceedings to quash NUS’s decisions and to obtain an order requiring his reinstatement.
The court’s analysis turned on the threshold question of justiciability: whether the impugned decisions were of a kind that could be reviewed by the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. While the applicant framed his complaints in terms of alleged breaches of natural justice, violation of the presumption of innocence, and procedural impropriety, the court focused on whether NUS’s employment-related decisions were susceptible to judicial review in the first place.
The judgment also addressed procedural aspects arising from the applicant’s recusal objections against the judge hearing the leave application. Although the extract provided is truncated, it is clear that the court dealt with both (i) the judicial review threshold and (ii) the integrity of the proceedings, including the handling of the applicant’s late and contested recusal communications.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Tey Tsun Hang was appointed an associate professor at the Faculty of Law in NUS in 2010. NUS is a university corporatised in 2006 under the National University of Singapore (Corporatisation) Act. Tey’s employment relationship with NUS was governed primarily by an Employment Agreement dated 18 February 2010, executed by Tey on 26 February 2010. The agreement included provisions on termination and immediate dismissal in specified circumstances, and it also incorporated NUS policies and staff rules through a “policies, rules and regulations” clause.
On 27 July 2012, Tey was charged in court with six corruption-related charges under s 6(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On the same day, NUS suspended him from duty. The suspension letter from the Dean and Head of the Faculty of Law, Professor Simon Chesterman, stated that the suspension was initiated in light of the Attorney-General’s decision to charge Tey for alleged misconduct involving a student. The letter explained that NUS would initiate an investigation under NUS’s Staff Disciplinary Procedures and that, pending the investigation’s outcome, Tey would be suspended with immediate effect under paragraph 18 of those procedures. Importantly, the suspension was “with pay” and was framed as protective and procedural rather than punitive.
Paragraph 18 of NUS’s Staff Disciplinary Procedures provided that if disciplinary proceedings were contemplated, the Dean (in consultation with VP(HR)) may suspend the staff member pending the outcome if it is believed necessary to protect the interests of the university or to ensure the investigation and proper functioning of the university are not impeded. NUS’s position was that these disciplinary procedures were incorporated into the Employment Agreement by virtue of the incorporation clause in the agreement.
After the criminal proceedings, Tey was tried in the District Court. During the trial, Tey admitted that he had received gifts of significant value from a student at NUS, had been in an intimate relationship with that student, and had breached NUS’s Code of Conduct and related policies, including conflict of interest and acceptance of gifts. On 28 May 2013, the District Court convicted Tey as charged. That same day, NUS informed him that his employment would be terminated immediately and summarily. The termination letter relied on clause 5.2(a) of the Employment Agreement, which permitted immediate termination without notice or compensation if the university is of the opinion that the employee has been convicted of a crime likely to bring the university into disrepute. The letter also referred to clauses 5.2(b) and 5.2(c) concerning misconduct/gross impropriety and failure to perform duties or observe appointment terms.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue was whether the impugned decisions—NUS’s suspension and summary dismissal—were susceptible to judicial review. This is a threshold question in administrative law: even where a claimant alleges breaches of natural justice or illegality, the court must first determine whether the decision-maker and the decision fall within the scope of the supervisory jurisdiction.
Related to this threshold was the applicant’s framing of the grounds for review. Tey alleged that NUS breached natural justice, including his rights to a fair hearing and the presumption of innocence. He further alleged that the suspension decision was illegal, irrational, and/or procedurally improper, and that the summary dismissal decision was similarly tainted. The court therefore had to consider not only whether judicial review was available, but also how these complaints fit within the legal character of the employment decisions and the nature of NUS’s powers.
Finally, the case involved procedural issues concerning recusal. Tey objected to the judge hearing the OS, and the court had to address the timing and substance of those objections. While recusal is not the core administrative law question, it affects the fairness and legitimacy of the judicial process and can influence how the court proceeds with the substantive threshold analysis.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court’s reasoning began with the threshold question: whether NUS’s decisions were amenable to judicial review. Judicial review in Singapore is concerned with the legality of decisions made by public bodies or persons exercising public functions. The court therefore examined the legal nature of NUS and the character of the decisions under challenge. Although NUS is corporatised, it is not automatically outside judicial supervision; corporatisation does not necessarily remove public law character from all decisions. The analysis typically turns on whether the decision is made under a public law power, whether it affects public law rights, and whether it is sufficiently connected to the exercise of public functions.
In this case, the impugned decisions were employment-related: suspension pending disciplinary investigation and summary dismissal following conviction. The court had to consider whether these decisions were purely contractual/employment management decisions, or whether they were decisions made pursuant to public law authority. The Employment Agreement and the incorporated Staff Disciplinary Procedures suggested a contractual framework, with termination rights and internal disciplinary mechanisms. However, the court would still need to assess whether NUS’s role and statutory context meant that the decisions were part of the exercise of public functions.
The court also had to consider the applicant’s grounds of review in light of the factual matrix. The suspension letter indicated that suspension was pending investigation and was without pay changes, consistent with a protective purpose. The summary dismissal letter relied on the Employment Agreement’s termination clause tied to conviction and the university’s opinion about reputational impact. The court would have been attentive to whether the alleged breaches of natural justice could realistically arise in the context of a suspension pending investigation, and whether the presumption of innocence argument could be sustained where the criminal court had already convicted the applicant.
On the presumption of innocence point, the applicant’s argument was conceptually difficult because the summary dismissal followed a conviction by the District Court. Even if the applicant appealed, the conviction existed at the time of dismissal. The court would therefore have to examine whether NUS’s reliance on conviction for employment consequences undermined the presumption of innocence in a legally relevant way, or whether it was a legitimate consequence of a conviction under the contractual terms. The court’s approach would likely distinguish between using an unproven allegation (which might engage presumption concerns) and using an existing conviction (which is a judicial determination).
Procedurally, the court also dealt with the recusal applications. The extract shows that Tey had earlier indicated that he wanted the judge not to hear the OS, and he later sent an email to the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General raising dissatisfaction with the administration of justice and alleging that the judge had not produced written judgments in related criminal motions. When the hearing commenced, the judge stopped counsel and asked whether the recusal application was still being pursued. Counsel initially appeared uncertain and then, after being shown the email, indicated that the recusal application was still pursued. The judge then required grounds, and counsel deferred to what was raised in the email. The court’s handling of this episode reflects a concern with procedural fairness, proper administration, and the need for clear, timely grounds for recusal.
Although the extract is truncated, the overall structure indicates that the court proceeded to address the leave application in a manner consistent with the supervisory jurisdiction’s gatekeeping function. In judicial review leave applications, the court typically assesses whether there is an arguable case that the decision is unlawful and whether the claim is properly brought. Here, the threshold justiciability question—whether NUS’s decisions were reviewable—was described as central. That framing suggests that even if the applicant could articulate natural justice concerns, the court may have concluded that the decisions were not of a kind that could be challenged by judicial review.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court’s decision was to determine whether leave should be granted to commence judicial review proceedings against NUS. The judgment’s central issue being justiciability indicates that the court’s outcome likely turned on whether NUS’s suspension and summary dismissal decisions were susceptible to judicial review. Where the court finds that the impugned decisions are not amenable to judicial review, leave is typically refused, and the claimant’s recourse would be limited to contractual or employment remedies rather than public law supervision.
In practical terms, the outcome meant that Tey’s attempt to obtain quashing and mandatory relief through judicial review would not proceed if the court concluded that NUS’s decisions were not reviewable under O 53. The case therefore serves as a caution that allegations of natural justice breaches do not automatically convert employment decisions into public law decisions subject to judicial review.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case matters because it illustrates the importance of the threshold requirement of justiciability in Singapore judicial review. Applicants often focus on alleged procedural unfairness and rights-based arguments, but the court will first ask whether the decision-maker and the decision fall within the supervisory jurisdiction. For practitioners, this means that before drafting grounds of illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety, counsel must assess the legal character of the decision—particularly where the dispute concerns employment within a corporatised statutory body or a public institution.
The case also highlights how contractual incorporation of internal procedures can affect the analysis. Where employment rights and disciplinary outcomes are governed by an employment agreement and internal staff disciplinary rules, the dispute may be characterised as contractual. That characterisation can be decisive in determining whether judicial review is available, as opposed to private law remedies. Lawyers advising employees of public institutions should therefore consider whether the proper forum is judicial review or an employment/contractual claim.
Finally, the recusal episode underscores the procedural discipline expected in judicial proceedings. Late or unclear recusal objections can complicate hearings and may be treated with caution. For litigators, the case reinforces the need to raise recusal concerns promptly, with specific grounds, and to ensure that counsel is fully briefed on the factual basis for any objection.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), O 53
- National University of Singapore (Corporatisation) Act (Cap 204A, 2006 Rev Ed)
- Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed), s 6(a)
- Securities and Futures Act (as listed in the provided metadata)
Cases Cited
- [2013] SGDC 165
- [2014] SGHC 247
- [2015] SGHC 7
Source Documents
This article analyses [2015] SGHC 7 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.