Case Details
- Citation: [2015] SGHC 7
- Title: Tey Tsun Hang v National University of Singapore
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 14 January 2015
- Case Number: Originating Summons No 511 of 2014
- Coram: Quentin Loh J
- Decision Type: Application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings (leave under O 53 of the Rules of Court)
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Tey Tsun Hang
- Defendant/Respondent: National University of Singapore
- Counsel for Applicant: Ravi s/o Madasamy (L F Violet Netto)
- Counsel for Respondent: Cavinder Bull SC, Gerui Lim and Priscilla Lua (Drew & Napier LLC)
- Counsel for Non-Party: David Chong SC and Sivakumar Ramasamy (Attorney-General’s Chambers)
- Legal Area: Administrative Law – Judicial Review
- Statutes Referenced (as stated): Securities and Futures Act
- Judgment Length: 13 pages, 6,596 words
- Other Statutory/Regulatory Materials Mentioned in Extract: National University of Singapore (Corporatisation) Act (Cap 204A); Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241); Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed); NUS Staff Disciplinary Procedures; Employment Agreement
- Earlier Related Proceedings (as stated): Public Prosecutor v Tey Tsun Hang [2013] SGDC 165; Tey Tsun Hang v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR 1189
- Cases Cited (as stated): [2013] SGDC 165, [2014] SGHC 247, [2015] SGHC 7
Summary
This High Court decision concerns an application for leave to bring judicial review proceedings against the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) arising from two employment-related decisions: (1) NUS’s suspension of the applicant, Tey Tsun Hang, from duty on 27 July 2012; and (2) NUS’s subsequent summary dismissal on 28 May 2013 following his criminal conviction. The applicant sought quashing orders in respect of both decisions and a mandatory order requiring reinstatement to his position as at 26 July 2012.
The central issue was whether NUS’s decisions were “susceptible to judicial review”. In other words, the court had to determine whether the impugned decisions were amenable to public law scrutiny under O 53 of the Rules of Court, or whether they were instead properly characterised as private employment decisions governed by contract and internal disciplinary processes. The court’s approach reflects Singapore’s broader administrative law framework on the boundary between public law and private law, particularly where statutory bodies or corporatised entities take employment actions.
Although the extract provided is truncated, the judgment’s framing indicates that the court treated the question of justiciability as determinative at the leave stage. The court also dealt with procedural matters, including the applicant’s recusal objections directed at the judge hearing the OS, which were raised late and in a manner that required the court to consider fairness and the integrity of the judicial process.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Tey was appointed an associate professor at the Faculty of Law in NUS in 2010. NUS is a university corporatised in 2006 under the National University of Singapore (Corporatisation) Act. Tey’s employment was governed primarily by an Employment Agreement dated 18 February 2010, executed by Tey on 26 February 2010. The agreement contained provisions on termination, including the University’s ability to terminate immediately without notice or compensation upon certain events, such as conviction by a court of law of a crime which, in the University’s opinion, is likely to bring the University into disrepute.
On 27 July 2012, Tey was charged in court with six corruption charges under s 6(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On the same day, NUS suspended him from duty. The suspension letter, written by the Dean and Head of the Faculty of Law, Professor Simon Chesterman, stated that the suspension was initiated in light of the Attorney-General’s decision to charge Tey for alleged misconduct involving a student. The letter indicated that an investigation would be initiated under NUS’s Staff Disciplinary Procedures and that, pending the outcome, Tey would be suspended with immediate effect. Importantly, the suspension was described as “without any change to your pay”.
The suspension was expressly linked to paragraph 18 of NUS’s Staff Disciplinary Procedures, which provided that if disciplinary proceedings were contemplated, the Dean (in consultation with VP(HR)) may suspend the staff member pending the outcome if such action is deemed necessary to protect the interests of the University or to ensure the investigation or proper functioning of the University is not impeded. NUS’s position, as reflected in counsel’s submissions, was that these procedures were incorporated into the Employment Agreement by clause 6.5, meaning they formed part of the contractual framework governing Tey’s employment.
After Tey’s criminal trial, the District Court convicted him on 28 May 2013. Tey had admitted receiving gifts of significant value from a student, being in an intimate relationship with the student, and breaching NUS policies including the Code of Conduct, conflict of interest policy, and policy on acceptance of gifts by staff. On the same day as the conviction, NUS wrote to Tey informing him of the immediate termination of his employment. The termination letter relied on clause 5.2(a) of the Employment Agreement (immediate termination upon conviction of a crime likely to bring the University into disrepute), and also referred to clause 5.2(b) and 5.2(c) for summary dismissal in cases of misconduct or failure to perform duties or observe appointment terms.
Tey appealed his criminal conviction. The High Court allowed his appeal on 28 February 2014, but did not disturb the factual findings made by the District Court concerning his admissions and breaches of NUS policies. The High Court affirmed findings that he breached NUS policies and abused his position as a lecturer when he exploited the student. On 3 June 2014, Tey filed the present OS seeking leave to commence judicial review proceedings challenging NUS’s suspension and termination decisions.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The principal legal issue was whether NUS’s decisions to suspend and to summarily dismiss Tey were susceptible to judicial review. This required the court to consider whether the impugned decisions were exercises of public power (or otherwise sufficiently public in character) such that they could be challenged through public law remedies under O 53, as opposed to being purely contractual or private employment decisions.
Closely connected to this was the applicant’s reliance on grounds of illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety, as well as breach of natural justice and alleged violation of fundamental rights, including a fair hearing and presumption of innocence. The applicant sought quashing orders for both decisions and a mandatory order reinstating him to his position as at 26 July 2012.
In addition, the case involved procedural and fairness concerns through the applicant’s recusal objections. Tey indicated that he wanted the judge who heard certain related criminal matters and the appeal not to hear the OS. The recusal objection was raised during pre-trial conferences and later through an email sent shortly before the hearing. The court therefore had to address whether the recusal application should be entertained and how it affected the fairness and legitimacy of the judicial process.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by identifying the central issue as justiciability: whether NUS’s decisions were amenable to judicial review. This is a threshold question in leave applications under O 53. Judicial review is not available for every grievance; it is concerned with legality and public law constraints on decision-makers. Therefore, the court’s analysis necessarily focused on the nature of NUS’s decision-making and the legal character of the employment actions taken against Tey.
On the facts, NUS’s suspension and termination were tied to the Employment Agreement and to NUS’s internal Staff Disciplinary Procedures. The suspension decision was made pending disciplinary investigation, with explicit reference to paragraph 18 of the procedures. The termination decision was made immediately following conviction, with explicit reliance on clause 5.2(a) of the Employment Agreement. This contractual architecture suggested that NUS’s actions were grounded in the terms of employment rather than in a statutory scheme conferring public law powers to determine rights in a manner typical of public authorities.
At the same time, the case could not be treated as purely private because NUS is a corporatised university established under statute. Corporatisation does not automatically convert all institutional decisions into private law matters; courts have to examine whether the decision-maker is performing functions of a public nature and whether the decision affects rights in a way that attracts public law oversight. The court’s framing indicates that it treated the corporatised status of NUS as relevant, but not conclusive, and that it required a careful assessment of whether the impugned decisions were exercises of public power or merely contractual enforcement of employment terms.
Regarding the applicant’s substantive grounds—natural justice and presumption of innocence—the court’s approach at the leave stage would have been to consider whether these grounds were legally sustainable in the context of the decision’s character. For example, where termination follows a conviction and is implemented pursuant to a contractual clause triggered by conviction, the question becomes whether the employer is required to conduct a fair hearing on the underlying facts, or whether the contractual mechanism and the criminal process already provide the relevant procedural safeguards. The extract also shows that Tey’s criminal appeal did not disturb key factual findings, which would likely affect how the court viewed the presumption of innocence argument in relation to the employment consequences.
Separately, the court dealt with the recusal applications. The extract shows that Tey’s counsel initially indicated an objection to the judge hearing the OS, and later Tey sent an email to the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General raising dissatisfaction with the administration of justice and alleging that the judge had previously ruled in related criminal motions without producing written judgments. When the matter came before the judge, counsel appeared uncertain about whether the recusal application was still being pursued. The judge then reviewed the email and required counsel to respond to the grounds. This portion of the judgment underscores the court’s concern with procedural fairness, transparency, and the proper administration of justice, particularly where objections are raised late or without clear articulation of grounds.
Although the extract is truncated, the court’s reasoning likely proceeded by applying established principles governing judicial review and recusal. For judicial review, the court would have considered the legal test for susceptibility to judicial review, including whether the decision is made under public law authority and whether the applicant has a public law remedy. For recusal, the court would have considered whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias or whether the circumstances warranted recusal, taking into account the timing and substance of the objection.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court’s decision, as reflected in the extract, turned on the threshold question of whether NUS’s suspension and summary dismissal decisions were susceptible to judicial review. The court’s determination at the leave stage would have practical consequences: if the decisions were not amenable to judicial review, the OS would be dismissed or leave refused, leaving the applicant to pursue any remedies through private law channels (such as contractual claims) rather than public law remedies.
In addition, the court addressed the recusal objection and the manner in which it was raised. The practical effect was that the court proceeded with the OS despite the late and procedurally complicated recusal challenge, subject to the court’s assessment of whether the objection met the legal threshold for recusal.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for administrative law and employment-related judicial review in Singapore because it illustrates the boundary between public law review and private contractual governance. Corporatised entities like NUS often perform functions with public character, but employment decisions may still be structured through contractual terms and internal policies. Practitioners therefore need to assess not only the identity of the decision-maker, but also the legal source and nature of the decision-making power.
For lawyers advising employees of statutory or corporatised bodies, the case highlights the importance of framing the claim correctly. If the decision is characterised as contractual enforcement of employment terms (for example, termination triggered by conviction under a contractual clause), judicial review may be unavailable even if the employee alleges breaches of natural justice or presumption of innocence. In such situations, the appropriate remedies may lie in private law claims, or in statutory complaint mechanisms if available, rather than in O 53 proceedings.
For law students and litigators, the decision also serves as a procedural reminder on recusal applications. Objections must be raised promptly and with clear grounds. Late objections, especially those communicated through informal or broad allegations, may complicate proceedings and may not necessarily lead to recusal. The court’s handling demonstrates that fairness is maintained through structured judicial process, and that parties must articulate concrete grounds rather than rely on generalized dissatisfaction.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), O 53
- National University of Singapore (Corporatisation) Act (Cap 204A, 2006 Rev Ed)
- Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed), s 6(a)
- Securities and Futures Act (as stated in provided metadata)
Cases Cited
- [2013] SGDC 165
- [2014] SGHC 247
- [2015] SGHC 7
- Public Prosecutor v Tey Tsun Hang [2013] SGDC 165
- Tey Tsun Hang v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR 1189
Source Documents
This article analyses [2015] SGHC 7 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.