Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHCR 33
- Title: Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul and another v Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of decision: 29 September 2025
- Judges: AR Tan Yu Qing
- Originating Claim: HC/OC 125 of 2025
- Summons: HC/SUM 1240 of 2025
- Procedural history (context): SUM 1240 was an application to set aside a default judgment entered as HC/JUD 143/2025
- Hearing dates: 4 June 2025 (directions); 22–23 July 2025 (substantive hearing on SUM 1240); 31 July 2025 (dismissal of the application on merits); 29 September 2025 (full grounds)
- Plaintiff/Applicant (Claimants): Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul and another
- Defendant/Respondent: Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen
- Legal areas: Civil Procedure — Costs; Legal Profession — Professional conduct
- Key themes: Costs; artificial intelligence; fictitious authority; professional responsibility of advocates and solicitors
- Statutes referenced: Legal Profession Act (including reference to “Legal Profession Act 1966”); Moneylenders Act (including reference to “Moneylenders Act 2008 (2020 Rev Ed)” and “Moneylenders Act 2008”)
- Cases cited: [2025] SGHCR 33 (the present case); Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju and another matter [2017] 4 SLR 1369; Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2025] FCAFC 26
- Judgment length: 34 pages, 8,777 words
Summary
This High Court decision addresses a serious professional misconduct issue arising from the citation of a fictitious authority generated by a generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) tool. The court emphasised that advocates and solicitors are officers of the court and must ensure that all materials placed before the court—including AI-generated content—are independently verified as accurate, true, and appropriate. The case arose in the context of an application to set aside a default judgment, but the court’s principal focus in the costs portion was the improper conduct of counsel in citing a non-existent case.
While the court ultimately dismissed the defendant’s application on the merits, it separately ordered that counsel for the claimants (CC) personally pay costs to the defendant in relation to the summons. The court applied a structured “personal costs” framework, finding that CC’s conduct was improper, unreasonable, and negligent; that it caused unnecessary costs; and that personal costs were fair and proportionate to compensate the defendant, preserve the integrity of the justice system, and deter similar conduct.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute in HC/OC 125/2025 involved a claim in which the defendant (Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen) failed to file a Notice of Intention to Contest or Not Contest. As a result, a default judgment was entered against her (HC/JUD 143/2025). The defendant then brought HC/SUM 1240/2025 to set aside the default judgment. The central issue in that summons was whether the defendant had a prima facie defence to the claimants’ claim.
In the course of preparing for the substantive hearing of SUM 1240, the claimants filed written submissions on 1 June 2025 (“CWS”). Anticipating that the defendant might raise a defence under the Moneylenders Act, the claimants argued that any such defence would be inapplicable. To support this proposition, the claimants cited a purported case, asserting that isolated or ad hoc loans between acquaintances do not constitute “moneylending” under the Moneylenders Act 2008 unless there is a systematic business of lending for profit.
However, the purported case was not included in the claimants’ bundle of authorities filed on 2 June 2025 (“CBOA”), and it later emerged that the cited authority was fictitious. The court treated the matter as gravely improper: the name and case number of the fictitious authority had been produced by a GenAI tool. The defendant’s counsel (DC) drew the court’s attention to the non-existence of the case and sought costs on the basis that the defendant had been put to unnecessary time and expense in uncovering the improper citation and alerting the court.
There were also procedural developments leading up to the hearing. On 4 June 2025, the court directed both parties to ensure that all cited authorities were exhibited and to insert pinpoint citations. On 18 July 2025, DC informed CC that he could not locate the fictitious authority. On the afternoon of 21 July 2025, CC filed amended written submissions (“AWS”) and a supplementary bundle of authorities containing a replacement authority (“CSBOA”) on e-Litigation without seeking the court’s permission. CC later explained that the amendments were prompted by issues with paragraph numbering and a “wrongly cited” case. At the hearing on 22 July 2025, CC ultimately admitted that the fictitious authority “did not exist,” and that it was omitted from the bundle because it was non-existent.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue was procedural and substantive: whether the defendant had a prima facie defence such that the default judgment should be set aside. This issue was addressed in the merits decision, and the court dismissed the defendant’s application on 31 July 2025. Given that dismissal, the defendant was the unsuccessful party and would ordinarily be liable for the claimants’ costs of the application.
The second, more legally significant issue for the present grounds was costs in relation to counsel’s improper conduct. Specifically, the court had to decide whether it should make a personal costs order against CC—separate from the costs of the application—because CC had cited a fictitious authority to the court. This required the court to consider the appropriate test for personal costs orders in Singapore and how that test applies where the improper citation arises from GenAI output.
Finally, the court had to consider the broader professional conduct implications. The judgment frames the issue not merely as a technical error but as conduct that undermines the integrity of the justice system and public confidence in the legal profession. The court therefore had to balance fairness to the parties, proportionality, and deterrence, while ensuring that the personal costs order was justified on the facts.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by situating the professional duties of advocates and solicitors within the broader framework of their role as officers of the court. It cited the principle that every advocate and solicitor is entrusted with the solemn duty of assisting the court in the administration of justice. From this, the court derived a binding obligation: advocates and solicitors must ensure that all materials placed before the court, including content generated by AI tools, are independently verified, accurate, true, and appropriate. The court treated the citation of a fictitious authority as wholly impermissible, regardless of whether the error was intentional or inadvertent.
In analysing the conduct, the court emphasised that the gravity of the improper citation extends beyond wasted judicial time and unnecessary expenditure by the opposing party. The court described the reputational and systemic harm: citing fictitious authorities can create a “fissure” in public perception of the legal profession, casting doubt on its legitimacy and honour as a custodian of justice. This framing is important because it explains why the court was willing to impose personal costs rather than confining the response to ordinary costs between parties.
On the procedural side, the court addressed the claimants’ handling of the matter after DC alerted them to the non-existence of the authority. The court noted that CC filed AWS and CSBOA on his own initiative without seeking permission, and that CC’s explanation initially focused on typographical and paragraph-numbering issues. Only when probed by the court did CC admit that the fictitious authority did not exist. The court also recorded that DC did not object to the filing of AWS, and that DC accepted that CC might have unintentionally cited the fictitious authority. Nonetheless, the court held that the responsibility to verify the existence of all authorities cited to the court remained with CC.
Crucially, the court explained why it permitted the claimants to tender the AWS and rely on the replacement authority. It took into account that DC did not object to the filing, and that the legal proposition relied on by the claimants was “trite.” This meant that the court did not treat the merits of the defence as dependent on the fictitious authority. However, the court separated the merits from the costs consequences: even if the substantive legal point was not materially affected, the improper citation still warranted sanction through personal costs.
For the personal costs analysis, the court applied a structured approach. The judgment describes a three-stage framework for imposing personal costs orders. Stage 1 requires that the advocate’s conduct be improper, unreasonable, or negligent. Stage 2 requires that the conduct caused unnecessary costs. Stage 3 requires that personal costs be just compensation for the costs incurred, assessed through fairness and proportionality, preserving the integrity of the justice system, and deterrence. The court’s reasoning shows that these stages are not merely formalities; they guide the court in determining both liability for personal costs and the appropriate quantum.
Applying Stage 1, the court found that CC’s conduct met the threshold of improper, unreasonable, and negligent. The court treated the citation of a fictitious authority as a clear breach of the duty to verify. The fact that GenAI produced the case did not excuse the failure to check. The court’s emphasis on independent verification reflects a policy choice: GenAI output may be helpful, but it cannot replace professional verification and diligence.
Applying Stage 2, the court found that CC’s citation led to unnecessary costs. The defendant had to spend time and resources uncovering the non-existent authority and alerting the court. The court also considered the procedural disruption caused by the late filing of replacement materials without permission, which contributed to the additional work and expense.
Applying Stage 3, the court ordered personal costs as just compensation. It reasoned that fairness and proportionality supported the order because the costs were directly linked to CC’s improper citation. It also stressed the need to preserve the integrity of the justice system and to deter similar conduct by advocates and solicitors. The court’s analysis indicates that deterrence is not abstract: it is grounded in the risk that GenAI tools could be used carelessly, leading to further fictitious citations and erosion of confidence in legal submissions.
What Was the Outcome?
The court dismissed the defendant’s application to set aside the default judgment on 31 July 2025. This meant that the default judgment stood, and the defendant remained liable under the claimants’ case.
Separately, in relation to SUM 1240, the court ordered that CC personally pay costs to the defendant. The court also directed that both CC and DC provide a copy of the court’s directions to their respective clients, underscoring the seriousness of the issue and ensuring that parties understood the professional conduct implications.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for two overlapping reasons: it clarifies the professional responsibility of advocates and solicitors when using AI tools, and it demonstrates that Singapore courts are prepared to impose personal costs orders to address AI-related misconduct. The judgment makes clear that the duty to verify is non-delegable. Even where GenAI output is the source of the error, counsel remains responsible for ensuring that authorities cited to the court exist and support the propositions advanced.
From a precedent and practical standpoint, the case provides a useful template for how courts may approach personal costs in the AI context. The three-stage framework—improper/unreasonable/negligent conduct, unnecessary costs, and just compensation assessed through fairness, integrity, and deterrence—offers a structured method that lawyers can anticipate in future cases. Practitioners should treat this as a warning that AI-generated citations, if not checked, can lead to personal financial exposure and reputational harm.
For law students and litigators, the decision also illustrates the court’s willingness to separate merits from costs. Even if the substantive legal proposition is “trite” or the replacement authority cures the defect for the purposes of deciding the case, the court may still sanction the improper conduct through costs. This reinforces the importance of diligence at the submission stage, including verifying case existence, pinpoint citations, and bundle inclusion.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act 1966 (as referenced in the judgment)
- Legal Profession Act (as referenced in the judgment)
- Moneylenders Act 2008 (including reference to “Moneylenders Act 2008 (2020 Rev Ed)”)
- Moneylenders Act 2008 (as referenced in the judgment)
Cases Cited
- Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju and another matter [2017] 4 SLR 1369
- Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2025] FCAFC 26
- [2025] SGHCR 33 (Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul and another v Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHCR 33 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.