Case Details
- Citation: [2022] SGHC 184
- Title: Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin and others v Attorney General
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of Decision: 12 May 2022
- Originating Summons: HC/OS 1025/2021 (Summons No 4742 of 2021)
- Costs Application: HC/SUM 4742/2021
- Judicial Officer: Kannan Ramesh J
- Procedural History (key dates): SUM 4742 heard and allowed on 16 November 2021; judgment reserved; costs decision delivered on 12 May 2022
- Plaintiffs/Applicants: Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin and others
- Defendant/Respondent: Attorney-General
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Costs
- Statutes Referenced: Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (No 19 of 2016) (“AJPA”) s 30; Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”) O 59 r 8(1)
- Cases Cited: Munshi Rasal v Enlighten Furniture Decoration Co Pte Ltd [2021] 1 SLR 1277
- Length of Judgment: 6 pages; 1,724 words
Summary
This High Court decision concerns costs arising from an earlier ruling in HC/OS 1025/2021, where the plaintiffs sought leave to commence contempt of court proceedings against the Minister for Law and Home Affairs, Mr K Shanmugam, SC. The Attorney-General successfully applied to strike out the originating summons in HC/SUM 4742/2021, and the present judgment addresses the consequential question of costs: first, whether costs should be awarded to the Attorney-General and in what quantum; and second, whether the costs should be borne personally by the plaintiffs’ solicitors, Mr Ravi s/o Madasamy and Mr Cheng Kim Kuan (KK Cheng Law LLC).
The court applied the general principle that “costs follow the event”. Since the Attorney-General was successful in striking out OS 1025 entirely, costs were awarded to the Attorney-General for both SUM 4742 and OS 1025. The court fixed the quantum at $10,000 (excluding disbursements) by reference to the range in Appendix G of the Supreme Court Practice Directions.
More significantly, the court ordered personal costs against counsel. Applying the Court of Appeal’s test in Munshi Rasal v Enlighten Furniture Decoration Co Pte Ltd, the court found that counsel acted improperly and negligently (or at least unreasonably), that this caused the Attorney-General to incur unnecessary costs, and that it was just in all the circumstances to order counsel to compensate the Attorney-General for the whole or part of the costs. The court concluded that both Mr Ravi and Mr Cheng should jointly and severally bear the costs of OS 1025 and SUM 4742, together with reasonable disbursements.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The litigation began with HC/OS 1025/2021, an application by the plaintiffs for leave to commence contempt of court proceedings against the Minister for Law and Home Affairs. Contempt proceedings are tightly regulated, and in this context, the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (“AJPA”) imposes a threshold requirement: under s 30 of the AJPA, consent of the Attorney-General is required before certain proceedings can be commenced. The plaintiffs’ originating summons did not obtain such consent prior to being filed.
The Attorney-General responded by filing HC/SUM 4742/2021 to strike out OS 1025. At the hearing of SUM 4742, the High Court allowed the Attorney-General’s application and struck out OS 1025 entirely. The present judgment does not revisit the merits of the strike-out; rather, it deals with the costs consequences of that outcome and the circumstances in which counsel should personally bear those costs.
After the SUM 4742 hearing, counsel for the Attorney-General indicated that personal costs orders against the plaintiffs’ counsel were being sought. The court directed the Attorney-General to file submissions on costs by 23 November 2021 and directed the plaintiffs and their counsel, Mr Ravi and Mr Cheng, to file reply submissions by 30 November 2021. However, only the Attorney-General filed submissions. The court nevertheless took cognisance of two letters from Mr Cheng dated 5 January 2022 and 28 January 2022, in which he urged the court not to impose costs personally on him.
The costs dispute therefore turned on two layers. First, the court had to decide whether costs should be awarded to the Attorney-General and what amount should be fixed. Second, the court had to determine whether counsel should be personally liable under O 59 r 8(1) of the Rules of Court, which permits personal costs orders against advocates and solicitors in appropriate circumstances. The court’s findings on counsel’s conduct were central to this second issue.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue was whether costs should be ordered in favour of the Attorney-General, and if so, what quantum. The court reiterated the general rule that costs follow the event. Since the Attorney-General succeeded in SUM 4742, resulting in OS 1025 being struck out entirely, the court considered that costs should be awarded to the Attorney-General for both SUM 4742 and OS 1025.
The second legal issue was whether personal costs should be ordered against the plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr Ravi and Mr Cheng, pursuant to O 59 r 8(1) of the ROC. This required the court to apply a structured test laid down by the Court of Appeal in Munshi Rasal v Enlighten Furniture Decoration Co Pte Ltd. Under that test, the court must consider: (a) whether counsel acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently; (b) whether this caused the other party to incur unnecessary costs; and (c) if so, whether it is just in all the circumstances to order counsel to compensate the other party for the whole or any part of the costs.
Although the case was framed as a costs application, the court’s analysis effectively required it to assess the underlying procedural missteps that led to the strike-out, particularly the failure to obtain the Attorney-General’s consent under s 30 of the AJPA before commencing OS 1025. The court treated this as a threshold defect that made the originating summons “misconceived from the outset”, which in turn informed the personal costs inquiry.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
On the first issue, the court’s approach was straightforward. The general rule is that costs follow the event. The Attorney-General had succeeded in SUM 4742, and OS 1025 was struck out in its entirety. Accordingly, the court held that costs should be awarded to the Attorney-General for both SUM 4742 and OS 1025. This reflects the baseline principle that the party who is forced to litigate unsuccessfully should ordinarily bear the costs consequences of the unsuccessful proceedings.
For quantum, the court referred to the applicable range in Appendix G of the Supreme Court Practice Directions, which set a range of $6,000 to $20,000. The Attorney-General sought costs at the lower end of the range, at $10,000. The court accepted that figure as reasonable, noting that the costs request accounted for the filing of various papers, attendance at three pre-trial conferences, and attendance at the hearing of SUM 4742.
The court also addressed a specific complaint about counsel’s attendance. It was submitted that Mr Ravi turned up late for a pre-trial conference on 10 November 2021, and that this occurred only after the hearing was stood down multiple times in an effort to procure his attendance. The court found that the Attorney-General’s counsel were forced to wait for a significant period, and that the costs of attendance during the absence should be reflected. The court therefore concluded that $10,000 was not unreasonable, while clarifying that disbursements were not included in the $10,000 because Appendix G excludes them.
On the second issue—personal costs—the court applied the Munshi Rasal test. It first considered Mr Ravi. The court began by identifying the threshold legal defect: OS 1025 was misconceived from the outset because it did not satisfy the statutory requirement of obtaining the Attorney-General’s consent under s 30 of the AJPA. The plaintiffs did not obtain consent before commencing OS 1025, meaning the proceedings were wrongly commenced.
The court then reasoned about counsel’s state of knowledge and conduct. If Mr Ravi was unaware of the consent requirement, the court held that he would have been negligent in commencing OS 1025 without first obtaining consent. Conversely, if he was aware of the requirement, then commencing without consent would be improper. The court found that, at minimum, Mr Ravi became aware early in the proceedings. On 11 October 2021—the day OS 1025 was filed—the Attorney-General sent a letter to court stating that consent under s 30 was not given, and KK Cheng Law LLC (the firm where Mr Ravi practised) was copied. The court noted that Mr Ravi did not deny knowledge of this letter.
Despite being put on notice at an early stage, Mr Ravi did not withdraw OS 1025, nor did he attempt to seek consent retrospectively. When the issue was squarely raised by the court during the hearing of SUM 4742, Mr Ravi argued that the plaintiffs did not require consent because s 30 of the AJPA was unconstitutional. The court rejected this argument on the basis that no constitutional challenge had been mounted against s 30 at that time. The court therefore treated the proceedings as needing to be addressed on the basis that the provision stood, reinforcing that the consent requirement was legally operative.
In short, the court concluded that counsel’s conduct was improper. It described counsel’s disregard for the statutory threshold as a fundamental flaw that should have been addressed once the consent issue was brought to his attention. The court also found further impropriety in counsel’s procedural and courtroom conduct. It observed that Mr Ravi showed disregard for court timelines: he was late for a pre-trial conference, missed a deadline for filing submissions in SUM 4742, and failed to file submissions on costs as directed. The court also criticised Mr Ravi’s conduct during the SUM 4742 hearing itself, where counsel did not focus on the merits but instead raised irrelevant matters and continued ad hominem attacks against persons not even part of the proceedings, despite reminders by the court to focus on the merits.
Turning to the second Munshi Rasal requirement, the court held that Mr Ravi’s conduct caused unnecessary costs. The Attorney-General was compelled to litigate the strike-out because OS 1025 was brought without the required consent and was pursued despite the consent issue being raised early. The court therefore treated the costs of SUM 4742—and the broader costs consequences of the ill-conceived originating summons—as unnecessary costs that were attributable to counsel’s conduct.
On the third requirement—whether it was just to order personal costs—the court emphasised the combined effect of the statutory defect and counsel’s disregard for procedural directions. Given that OS 1025 was “utterly ill-conceived” and counsel’s conduct compounded the problem, the court concluded that it was just in all the circumstances to order Mr Ravi to bear the costs of SUM 4742 and OS 1025.
The court then considered Mr Cheng. Mr Cheng had written to disclaim knowledge of Mr Ravi’s conduct and asked that personal costs not be pursued against him. The court rejected this. It noted that Mr Cheng’s name appeared on the cause papers in OS 1025 and SUM 4742, that he was the named partner of the firm where Mr Ravi practised at the material time, and that he had given a professional undertaking to supervise Mr Ravi as part of Mr Ravi’s Practising Certificate conditions. In light of these factors, the court held that Mr Cheng could not simply disclaim knowledge and disavow Mr Ravi’s actions.
Accordingly, the court ordered that both Mr Ravi and Mr Cheng jointly and severally bear all costs of OS 1025 and SUM 4742. The court fixed the costs at $10,000 and ordered reasonable disbursements, payable to the Attorney-General.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court ordered that costs be awarded to the Attorney-General for both HC/OS 1025/2021 and HC/SUM 4742/2021. The quantum was fixed at $10,000, with reasonable disbursements to be paid in addition. This reflected the court’s view that the Attorney-General had succeeded and that the proceedings were misconceived from the outset.
More importantly, the court ordered personal costs against the plaintiffs’ counsel. Mr Ravi and Mr Cheng were ordered to jointly and severally bear all of the costs of OS 1025 and SUM 4742, fixed at $10,000 and reasonable disbursements, payable to the Attorney-General. The practical effect is that the costs burden did not remain solely with the plaintiffs; it was shifted to counsel personally, reflecting the court’s assessment of improper and negligent conduct.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how the courts will enforce statutory preconditions for proceedings and will not hesitate to impose personal costs on counsel where those preconditions are ignored. The consent requirement under s 30 of the AJPA is not a mere technicality; it is a threshold legal requirement. Where proceedings are commenced without satisfying such requirements, counsel may face personal exposure to costs, especially once the defect is brought to their attention early in the litigation.
From a civil procedure perspective, the decision is also a practical application of the Munshi Rasal test for personal costs orders under O 59 r 8(1) of the ROC. The court’s reasoning shows that personal costs can be justified not only by the substantive procedural error (failure to obtain consent) but also by counsel’s broader conduct: missed deadlines, late attendance, failure to file directed submissions, and inappropriate courtroom behaviour. The decision therefore signals that personal costs may be ordered where counsel’s conduct is cumulatively improper, unreasonably persistent, or negligent.
For law firms and supervising partners, the case underscores the importance of supervision undertakings and internal compliance. Mr Cheng’s personal liability was grounded in his role as named partner, his inclusion on the cause papers, and his undertaking to supervise. Practitioners should take from this that disclaimers of knowledge may not protect partners where supervision responsibilities and formal involvement are established.
Legislation Referenced
- Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (No 19 of 2016) — s 30
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) — O 59 r 8(1)
Cases Cited
- Munshi Rasal v Enlighten Furniture Decoration Co Pte Ltd [2021] 1 SLR 1277
Source Documents
This article analyses [2022] SGHC 184 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.