SYED SUHAIL BIN SYED ZIN & 10 Ors v ATTORNEY GENERAL & Anor

"Accordingly, pre-action disclosures are excluded from this scope as they are not expressly provided for, and do not fall within the definition of civil proceedings for the purposes of ss 2(2) and 34 of the GPA." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 38

Case Information

• Citation: [2021] SGHC 59 (Para 0)
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Case Number: Originating Summons No 975 of 2020 (Para 0)
• Coram: See Kee Oon J (Para 0)
• Hearing Date: 18 January 2021 (Para 0)
• Judgment Date: 16 March 2021 (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Ravi s/o Madasamy (Carson Law Chambers) (Para 0)
• Counsel for the First Defendant: Tan Chee Meng SC, Leo Zhen Wei Lionel and Deya Shankar Dubey (WongPartnership LLP) (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Second Defendant: Vergis S Abraham SC and Lau Hui Ming Kenny (Providence Law Asia LLC) (Para 0)
• Area of Law: Administrative Law; Civil Procedure (Para 0)
• Judgment Length: Not stated in the extraction (Para 0)

Summary

The plaintiffs were 22 inmates of Changi Prison sentenced to death, and the originating summons was brought by the first 11 plaintiffs to obtain pre-action discovery and leave to serve pre-action interrogatories concerning correspondence between the Attorney-General and the Superintendent of Changi Prison. The dispute arose against the backdrop of the Court of Appeal’s observations in Gobi (JR), where the prison authorities’ handling of prisoners’ correspondence had been discussed. The plaintiffs sought the correspondence to identify public officers and to support contemplated claims, including claims framed in tort and possible disciplinary proceedings. (Paras 1, 2, 4, 10)

The court held that the requested pre-action disclosures were not available against the Government in the circumstances of the case because the Government Proceedings Act and the Interpretation Act exclude them from the scope of civil proceedings against the Government unless expressly provided for. The court further held that, even if such relief were conceptually available, the plaintiffs had not shown that the requests were necessary or relevant, because the Attorney-General had already voluntarily disclosed the correspondence received from the Singapore Prison Service and the plaintiffs already had sufficient material to formulate any claims they wished to pursue. (Paras 38, 40, 44, 60)

The application was therefore dismissed. The judgment is significant because it clarifies the limits of pre-action discovery and interrogatories against the Government, confirms that the Government Proceedings Act tightly controls disclosure obligations, and explains why pre-action procedures cannot be used as a fishing expedition to identify individual public officers where the plaintiffs already possess enough information to commence proceedings. The court also addressed possible causes of action in misfeasance in public office, breach of statutory duty, negligence, and disciplinary complaints, but concluded that the plaintiffs’ contemplated claims did not justify the relief sought. (Paras 38, 45, 48, 52, 55, 60)

What Was the Procedural and Factual Setting of the Plaintiffs’ Application?

The plaintiffs were 22 inmates of Changi Prison who had been sentenced to suffer death. The originating summons was brought by the first 11 plaintiffs, and the relief sought was pre-action discovery and leave to serve pre-action interrogatories. The documents sought were letters between the Attorney-General and the Superintendent concerning requests for copies of the plaintiffs’ correspondence with their lawyers and families, as well as copies of that correspondence and any enclosures forwarded to the Attorney-General. (Paras 1, 4)

"The Plaintiffs are 22 inmates of Changi Prison who have been sentenced to suffer death." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 1

"The Plaintiffs commenced the OS to obtain discovery of the letters between the AG and the Superintendent concerning the AG’s requests for copies of the correspondence between the Plaintiffs and their lawyers and families (“the Plaintiffs’ correspondence”), as well as copies of the Plaintiffs’ correspondence forwarded to the AG by the Superintendent, together with any enclosures thereto." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 4

The immediate background was the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gobi (JR), where the court had observed that the Superintendent of Prisons had copied and forwarded prisoners’ correspondence to the Attorney-General’s Chambers. The present application was aimed at obtaining the underlying correspondence and related material so that the plaintiffs could identify the public officers involved and assess possible claims. The Attorney-General’s position was that the application was misconceived, and the court noted that the Attorney-General voluntarily disclosed all correspondence received from the Singapore Prison Service in the interests of transparency. (Paras 2, 7)

"In Gobi (JR), the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs had appealed against the decision of the High Court to dismiss their applications, the substance of which is not material to the current case." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 2

"Notwithstanding the AG’s position and the arguments which were put forth, the AG voluntarily disclosed all the correspondence received from the SPS in the interests of transparency." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 7

How Did the Court Frame the Four Issues for Determination?

The court identified four key issues. First, it asked who the proper parties would be in the contemplated proceedings and whether pre-action discovery or interrogatories could be ordered to identify those parties. Secondly, it asked whether, assuming the proper parties were brought into the proceedings, pre-action discovery or interrogatories could be ordered against the Government. Thirdly, it asked whether, assuming such applications could be ordered against the Government, the present applications should be granted. Fourthly, it asked whether the plaintiffs could obtain pre-action discovery or interrogatories in contemplated disciplinary proceedings. This framing structured the entire judgment and determined the sequence in which the court addressed the statutory and procedural questions. (Para 10)

"There are four key issues that arise before me in this OS. First, who would be the proper parties in the contemplated proceedings by the Plaintiffs, and accordingly whether pre-action discovery or pre-action interrogatories can be ordered to identify these parties. Secondly, assuming that the proper parties were brought into the proceedings, whether pre-action discovery or pre-action interrogatories can be ordered against the Government. Thirdly, assuming that pre-action discovery or pre-action interrogatories can be ordered against the Government, whether the present applications ought to be granted. Fourthly, whether the Plaintiffs are able to obtain pre-action discovery or pre-action interrogatories in contemplated disciplinary proceedings." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 10

This structure mattered because the court did not treat the application as a single abstract request for documents. Instead, it separated the threshold question of legal availability from the separate question of whether the plaintiffs had shown necessity and relevance. It also isolated the special issue of disciplinary proceedings, which the plaintiffs appeared to contemplate alongside civil claims. The court’s analysis therefore moved from party identity, to statutory immunity and procedural limits, to the practical sufficiency of the material already disclosed, and finally to the disciplinary context. (Paras 10, 38, 44, 55, 57)

Why Did the Court Hold That Civil Proceedings Against the Government Must Be Brought Against the Attorney-General?

The court accepted the Attorney-General’s submission that civil proceedings against the Government and/or public office holders have to be commenced against the Attorney-General pursuant to s 19(3) of the Government Proceedings Act. The court treated the law on this point as settled, relying on the Court of Appeal’s decision in AHQ v Attorney-General. The judgment also explained that the Government may be vicariously liable for tortious acts of public officers acting in good faith in pursuance of their duties, but that this did not alter the statutory requirement that proceedings be brought against the Attorney-General. (Paras 14, 17)

"The AG argues correspondingly that in line with Chee Siok Chin v Minister of Home Affairs [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 at [23], “all civil proceedings against the Government and/or public office holders have to be commenced against the AG pursuant to s 19(3) of the GPA.”" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 14

"In my view, the law on this issue is well-settled in the Court of Appeal judgment in AHQ v Attorney-General [2015] 4 SLR 760." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 17

The court’s treatment of this issue was important because the plaintiffs’ stated purpose included identifying individual public officers who might be personally liable. The court did not accept that the pre-action process could be used to force the Government to identify those individuals before proceedings were commenced. Instead, the court treated the statutory framework as requiring the Attorney-General to stand as the defendant for civil proceedings against the Government, while leaving substantive questions of liability to be worked out in the proper proceedings if and when they were brought. The court’s reasoning therefore linked party identity to the broader statutory scheme governing claims against the Government. (Paras 14, 17, 19)

Why Did the Court Say Pre-Action Discovery and Interrogatories Are Excluded Against the Government?

The central holding of the case was that pre-action discovery and pre-action interrogatories are not available against the Government in these circumstances. The court traced the Government Proceedings Act to the UK Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and explained that the statutory scheme in Singapore was intended to define and limit the circumstances in which the Government could be subjected to civil process. The court relied on s 34(1) of the Government Proceedings Act and s 54 of the Interpretation Act to conclude that, unless expressly provided for, the Government is not bound by statutory provisions affecting its rights. On that basis, pre-action disclosures were excluded because they are not expressly provided for and do not fall within the definition of civil proceedings for the purposes of ss 2(2) and 34 of the Government Proceedings Act. (Paras 11, 29, 30, 36, 38)

"Section 19(3) of the GPA states:" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 15

"Subject to and in accordance with Rules of Court — (a) in any civil proceedings in the General Division of the High Court or a State Court to which the Government is a party, the Government may be required by the court to make discovery of documents and produce documents for inspection; and (b) in any such proceedings as aforesaid, the Government may be required by the court to answer interrogatories:" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 29

"[n]o Act shall in any manner whatsoever affect the rights of the Government unless it is therein expressly provided, or unless it appears by necessary implication, that the Government is bound thereby" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 30

"Accordingly, pre-action disclosures are excluded from this scope as they are not expressly provided for, and do not fall within the definition of civil proceedings for the purposes of ss 2(2) and 34 of the GPA." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 38

The court’s reasoning was reinforced by its discussion of the legislative history of the Government Proceedings Act. It noted that the Act was derived from the UK Crown Proceedings Act 1947, and that the historical purpose of that legislation was to address situations where the wrongdoer could not be identified or where there was uncertainty as to whether the identified public officer was acting personally or in an official capacity. The court also referred to parliamentary materials and comparative authority to show that the statutory scheme was designed to facilitate redress against government, but only within the limits set by the legislation itself. That history did not support an implied extension to pre-action procedures. (Paras 11, 12, 26, 34, 35)

"The Government Proceedings Act (Cap 121, 1985 Rev Ed) (“GPA”) is derived from the UK Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (c 44) (UK) (“CPA 1947”), as applied to Singapore in 1965 when Singapore was still part of Malaysia (see Re Fong Thin Choo [1991] 1 SLR(R) 774 at [16])." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 11

"The stated aim of the CPA 1947 was to deal with the very situation where either there was a question as to whether the identified public officer was acting on his own, or where the particular wrongdoer cannot be identified" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 11

"it was intended to facilitate, not restrict, the right of the citizen to gain redress against the government" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 12

The court distinguished English authority that had allowed pre-action disclosure against the Government in judicial review proceedings. It observed that the English High Court in British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection had proceeded in the absence of clear exclusions, whereas the Singapore statutory framework contained express limitations. The court also referred to the common law rule, reflected in Lord Advocate v Dumbarton District Council and R (Black), that the Crown is not bound by statute absent express words or necessary implication. Those authorities supported the conclusion that the Singapore legislation should not be read as silently authorising pre-action disclosure against the Government. (Paras 34, 35, 36)

"the English High Court held that the court does have such power to order pre-action disclosures against the Government in judicial review proceedings, in the absence of clear exclusions of the Court’s power to do so." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 34

"the English common law rule that the Government is not bound by any statutory provision unless by express words or necessary implication (see Lord Advocate v Dumbarton District Council [1989] 3 WLR 1346 at 1366E, per Lord Keith of Kinkel)" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 34

"a unanimous UK Supreme Court chose to uphold the rule on the ground that the rule was so well-established that many statutes will have been drafted and passed on the basis that the Government was not bound except by express words or necessary implication." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 35

How Did the Court Apply the Rules on Pre-Action Discovery?

Even apart from the statutory exclusion, the court held that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the ordinary requirements for pre-action discovery. The court relied on Ching Mun Fong and explained that an applicant must satisfy both relevance and necessity under O 24 r 6(3) and r 7 of the Rules of Court. The court emphasised that these are distinct requirements, and that the applicant must show that the documents sought are relevant to an issue that is likely to arise and necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs. The court’s analysis therefore treated pre-action discovery as a limited procedural tool, not a general investigative mechanism. (Paras 40, 41)

"It would be apparent from O 24 r 6(3) and r 7 that the applicant must satisfy both the requirements of relevance (r 6(3)) and necessity (r 7) to succeed in an application for pre-action discovery. These are two separate and distinct requirements." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 40

The court then examined the plaintiffs’ position in light of the material already disclosed. It found that the Attorney-General had voluntarily disclosed all correspondence received from the Singapore Prison Service and that the plaintiffs already had sufficient documents and information to mount whatever claims they might choose, whether for declaratory relief or in tort. On that basis, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown necessity. The court also noted that the Attorney-General had categorically affirmed that the correspondence was not used, and no advantage was gained, in any legal proceedings against the plaintiffs. That factual finding undermined the plaintiffs’ attempt to justify further disclosure. (Paras 43, 44)

"In addition, it has also been categorically affirmed that the AG did not “use such correspondence, or otherwise gain any advantage, in any legal proceedings against the Plaintiffs”." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 43

"In my view, the voluntary disclosures made by the AG already provide the Plaintiffs with sufficient documents and information to mount their contemplated claims as they may deem fit, whether for declaratory relief or premised on tort." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 44

The court’s conclusion on necessity was decisive. Because the plaintiffs already possessed enough material to formulate claims, the court saw no basis for compelling further pre-action disclosure. The judgment therefore treated the application as unnecessary even on its own terms, independent of the statutory bar. This dual reasoning made the dismissal especially robust: the plaintiffs failed both on legal availability and on the merits of the request. (Paras 38, 40, 44, 60)

Why Did the Court Reject the Pre-Action Interrogatories Sought to Identify Individual Public Officers?

The plaintiffs’ interrogatories were aimed at identifying individual public servants for the purpose of individual liability. The court held that this was not a proper use of pre-action interrogatories. It explained that necessity is the main cornerstone of an application for leave to serve pre-action interrogatories, and that the court must ask whether the interrogatories are necessary for the claimant to ascertain if his cause of action is viable. The court also stressed that claimants should not be allowed to search for amorphous causes of action through pre-action interrogatories. (Paras 54, 55)

"As such, beyond the obvious threshold of relevance, it is clear that necessity (as set out in O 26A r 2) remains the main cornerstone in determining whether pre-action interrogatories will be ordered: are the pre-action interrogatories applied for necessary for the claimant to ascertain if his cause of action is viable?" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 54

"I do not see how the Plaintiffs’ pre-action interrogatories which are meant to identify individual public servants for the purpose of individual liability are either necessary or relevant." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 55

The court’s reasoning was tied to the plaintiffs’ own pleaded and contemplated causes of action. It observed that the plaintiffs had already articulated possible claims in misfeasance in public office, breach of statutory duty, and negligence. The court then examined those causes of action and concluded that the plaintiffs already had enough information to assess whether any such claims were viable. Since the plaintiffs were not left in the dark about the nature of the alleged conduct, the interrogatories were not necessary to determine whether a cause of action existed. (Paras 45, 48, 52, 55)

In practical terms, the court refused to permit pre-action interrogatories to be used as a device for identifying defendants before proceedings were commenced. The judgment therefore preserved the distinction between legitimate pre-action clarification and impermissible fishing for a cause of action. That distinction was especially important in a case involving public officers, where the statutory framework already channels civil proceedings through the Attorney-General. (Paras 14, 38, 54, 55)

What Did the Court Say About the Plaintiffs’ Contemplated Claims in Tort and Statutory Duty?

The court considered the plaintiffs’ contemplated claims in some detail because those claims were part of the asserted basis for pre-action disclosure. In relation to misfeasance in public office, the court referred to the elements of the tort and noted that bad faith or knowledge of unlawfulness is not enough without material damage. In relation to breach of statutory duty, the court referred to the Bedfordshire line of authority and the need to show that Parliament intended a private right of action. In relation to negligence, the court referred to the Spandeck framework and the possibility, discussed obiter in TV Media, that a government body could in some circumstances be liable in negligence for breach of statutory duties. (Paras 45, 47, 48, 52)

"the tort of misfeasance in public office is in essence an act done by a public officer or public body where:" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 45

"the House of Lords had held that the tort of misfeasance in public office was not actionable without proof of material damage" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 47

"the relevant principles may be found in the House of Lords decision in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 at 731" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 48

"the party seeking to establish that a private right of action exists for a breach of statutory duty must show that Parliament, in imposing the statutory duty in question to protect the members of a class, intended those members to have such a right of action." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 48

"the decision of Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 (“Spandeck”) has established the framework for the imposition of a duty of care in negligence claims in Singapore." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 52

Having reviewed those possible causes of action, the court concluded that the plaintiffs already had sufficient information to decide whether to sue and whom to sue. The court therefore did not accept that further pre-action disclosure was needed to establish the viability of the claims. It also noted that the weight of common law authority suggests that a duty owed to the public at large does not automatically translate into a private law duty of care owed to individual members of the public. That observation further weakened any argument that the plaintiffs needed more material before commencing proceedings. (Paras 44, 52)

"the weight of the common law authorities suggests that a duty owed to the public at large does not extend to a private law duty of care owed to individual members of the public" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 52

Why Did the Court Reject the Plaintiffs’ Attempt to Use Pre-Action Procedures for Disciplinary Proceedings?

The plaintiffs also sought to justify pre-action disclosure and interrogatories by reference to contemplated disciplinary proceedings. The court rejected that route as well. It referred to Then Khek Khoon, where the proper forum for investigating and determining an alleged breach of the Professional Conduct Rules was the Law Society rather than the court, unless wider administration-of-justice concerns arose. The court also referred to Low Chai Ling for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. These authorities led the court to conclude that the plaintiffs could not use pre-action civil procedures to obtain material for disciplinary complaints in the manner sought. (Paras 57, 59)

"the proper forum for investigating and determining an alleged breach of the PCR was the Law Society rather than the court" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 57

"disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 59

The court’s conclusion on this issue was that the plaintiffs were not entitled to pre-action discovery or interrogatories in aid of contemplated disciplinary proceedings. This was consistent with the broader theme of the judgment: the court would not expand pre-action procedures beyond their statutory and procedural limits merely because the plaintiffs wished to investigate possible wrongdoing by public officers or others. The disciplinary context did not supply an independent basis for the relief sought. (Paras 57, 59, 60)

What Was the Court’s Final Order and How Did It Deal With Costs?

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ application for pre-action discovery and leave to serve pre-action interrogatories against the Attorney-General. It also indicated that it would hear the parties’ submissions on costs. The judgment further noted that, in any event, the applications by the 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 16th, 17th, 20th, 21st and 22nd plaintiffs would have been dismissed. The extracted material does not show a final costs order, only that costs would be addressed separately. (Paras 60, 61, 62)

"The Plaintiffs’ application for pre-action discovery and leave to serve pre-action interrogatories against the AG is therefore dismissed." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 60

"I shall hear the parties’ submissions on costs." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 62

The dismissal was the logical culmination of the court’s analysis on both the statutory and procedural fronts. The plaintiffs could not overcome the Government Proceedings Act and the Interpretation Act, and they also failed to show necessity or relevance. The court’s indication that some plaintiffs’ applications would have been dismissed in any event underscores that the relief was unavailable on the facts as presented. (Paras 38, 44, 55, 60)

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it clarifies the limits of pre-action discovery and pre-action interrogatories against the Government in Singapore. The court made clear that the Government Proceedings Act and the Interpretation Act define and limit the Government’s exposure to disclosure obligations, and that pre-action procedures are not automatically available simply because a claimant wants to investigate a possible claim. That is a significant procedural boundary for litigants considering claims against public authorities. (Paras 30, 36, 38)

The case also matters because it prevents pre-action procedures from being used as a fishing expedition to identify individual public officers for personal liability where the statutory framework requires proceedings to be brought against the Attorney-General. The court’s reasoning preserves the distinction between identifying a proper defendant and using discovery to search for a cause of action. For practitioners, the decision is a reminder that pre-action relief must be justified by necessity and relevance, not by a general desire for information. (Paras 14, 40, 54, 55)

Finally, the judgment is important for its broader doctrinal discussion of misfeasance in public office, breach of statutory duty, negligence, and disciplinary proceedings. Even though those issues were not finally determined on the merits, the court’s analysis shows how a claimant must connect the requested disclosure to a viable cause of action. The case therefore serves as a practical guide to the limits of pre-action procedure in public law-adjacent civil litigation. (Paras 45, 47, 48, 52, 57, 59)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Government Proceedings Act: ss 2(2), 5, 19(1), 19(3), 34(1) (Paras 15, 29, 30, 36, 38)
• Interpretation Act: s 54 (Paras 30, 36, 38)
• Rules of Court: O 24 r 6(1), O 24 r 6(3), O 24 r 7, O 26A r 1(1), O 26A r 1(3)(b), O 26A r 2, O 73 r 10, O 15 r 6(2)(a) (Paras 20, 40, 54)
• Prisons Act (referenced in the extraction, specific section not stated) (Para 2)
• Prisons Regulations (referenced in the extraction, specific regulation not stated) (Para 2)
• Supreme Court of Judicature Act (referenced in the extraction, specific section not stated) (Para 0)
• Legal Profession Act (referenced in the extraction, specific section not stated) (Paras 57, 59)
• Legal Profession (Professional Conduct Rules) 2015 (referenced in the extraction, specific rule not stated) (Para 57)
• Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules (referenced in the extraction, specific rule not stated) (Para 59)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN
• View in judgment: "I shall hear the parties’ submissions..."
• View in judgment: "I shall hear the parties’ submissions..."
• View in judgment: "disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature..."
• View in judgment: "Section 19(3) of the GPA states:..."
• View in judgment: "Section 34(1) of the GPA states:..."

This article analyses [2021] SGHC 59 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.