Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHC 244
- Title: Sunil Kishinchand Bhojwani v Law Society of Singapore
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Originating Application No: OA 617 of 2025
- Date of Judgment: 17 December 2025
- Judges: Valerie Thean J
- Applicant: Sunil Kishinchand Bhojwani
- Respondent: Law Society of Singapore
- Legal Areas: Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings; Legal Profession — Professional conduct
- Statutes Referenced: Legal Profession Act 1966 (including ss 96(1) and 96(4)); Legal Proceedings Act (Cap 161) (as referenced in the metadata); Legal Profession Act (2020 Rev Ed)
- Proceedings Context: Complaint against a solicitor’s conduct in ongoing civil litigation; application to compel appointment of a Disciplinary Tribunal
- Judgment Length: 35 pages, 9,497 words
- Key Procedural Milestones: Complaint lodged 7 March 2025; Inquiry Committee report 18 February 2025; Council decision 24 April 2025; OA filed 18 June 2025; Suit 848 trial in Jan–Apr 2024; Oral Remarks in Suit 848 on 28 January 2025; written Grounds of Decision in Suit 848 on 28 April 2025
Summary
This High Court decision concerns an originating application by a complainant, Mr Sunil Kishinchand Bhojwani, seeking judicial intervention in the Law Society of Singapore’s disciplinary process. The complainant had lodged a complaint against solicitor Mr Hewage Ushan Saminda Premaratne arising from the solicitor’s conduct during the trial of a civil action, HC/S 848/2021 (“Suit 848”). The complaint contained multiple heads; the second head (referred to in the judgment as “the Complaint”) was the subject of an Inquiry Committee’s assessment and the Law Society Council’s subsequent decision not to refer the matter for a formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal.
After the Council decided that a Disciplinary Tribunal was unnecessary, the Applicant filed OA 617 of 2025 under the Legal Profession Act 1966 (“LPA”), seeking an order directing the Law Society to apply to the Chief Justice for the appointment of a Disciplinary Tribunal. The High Court (Valerie Thean J) granted the application. In doing so, the court emphasised the statutory framework governing disciplinary referrals and the threshold for when a formal investigation is warranted, particularly where the evidence and the trial judge’s observations raise concerns that merit fuller scrutiny.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The disciplinary complaint arose out of events in Suit 848, which was commenced on 15 October 2021 by the Applicant’s younger sister, Ms Rita Kishinchand Bhojwani (“RKB”), against, among others, the Applicant’s mother. In Suit 848, solicitor Mr Premaratne represented RKB for most of the proceedings. The matter proceeded to trial between 30 January 2024 and 5 April 2024 before Christopher Tan JC (as he then was) (“Judge”).
RKB testified and was cross-examined over several days. On the third day of trial, she made material concessions to her claim and agreed to withdraw certain allegations. At that point, Mr Premaratne sought the court’s permission to speak with RKB and take instructions on a settlement-related letter (“Letter”) while she was still on the witness stand. The Judge granted permission for Mr Premaratne to speak with RKB that evening to take instructions on the Letter (the “Meritus Meeting”).
On the fourth day of trial, Mr Premaratne again sought permission to speak with RKB, this time regarding the legal implications of withdrawing several claims in her pleadings. The Judge refused the request. The Judge’s reasoning was that RKB’s concessions during cross-examination were factual, and it could not be said that her decision to withdraw claims was ill-informed. The Judge further expressed concern that if RKB withdrew concessions after speaking to Mr Premaratne, it would effectively amount to modifying factual evidence mid-cross-examination.
After the refusal, RKB returned to the stand and stated that her mental state was “not there” and that she did not understand the nature of her concessions and withdrawal of claims. She indicated an intention to withdraw her concessions and stated she no longer wished to withdraw any claims. RKB admitted that she had a discussion with Mr Premaratne at the Meritus Meeting and that he had told her about the options if she decided to withdraw a claim. When the court later asked Mr Premaratne for his account of the Meritus Meeting, he acknowledged that RKB came with her son, Mr Karan Deepak Kirpalani (“KDK”), to his office. Mr Premaratne maintained that he only discussed options relating to the Letter and nothing more. KDK was not initially in the room but was invited to join when the options were discussed.
The disciplinary complaint focused on two related aspects of the Meritus Meeting and its aftermath. The first aspect (“First Limb”) alleged that Mr Premaratne discussed RKB’s evidence while she was still on the witness stand. The second aspect (“Second Limb”) alleged that Mr Premaratne allowed RKB and KDK to discuss her evidence while she was still on the witness stand, and before KDK gave his evidence in Suit 848. The Applicant lodged the complaint with the Law Society on 7 March 2024. The second head of complaint was referred to Inquiry Committee 16 of 2024 (“IC 16/2024”).
Before IC 16/2024, Mr Premaratne’s defence was that he did not advise RKB on her evidence at the Meritus Meeting. He said his discussion was limited to the Letter, for which he had obtained leave of court. In support, he relied on an affidavit he had filed on 14 March 2024 pursuant to the Judge’s directions, where he swore that he did not discuss RKB’s evidence during the Meritus Meeting. He also relied on a handwritten attendance note (“Attendance Note”) documenting advice on the Letter and stating that once RKB raised what transpired in court, he ended the query and advised that he could not discuss her evidence.
IC 16/2024 issued its report on 18 February 2025. It was not disputed that the report addressed only the First Limb. IC 16/2024 identified the sole issue as whether Mr Premaratne discussed RKB’s evidence at the Meritus Meeting. It found that RKB’s evidence was unclear, and it placed weight on Mr Premaratne’s affidavit and Attendance Note. IC 16/2024 assessed Mr Premaratne as credible and consistent, and concluded unanimously that no cause of sufficient gravity existed for a formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal. Accordingly, it recommended dismissal of the complaint.
Meanwhile, the Judge in Suit 848 delivered oral remarks on 28 January 2025 and later issued written grounds of decision on 28 April 2025 (“GD”). The Applicant sent the Judge’s oral remarks to the Law Society for IC 16/2024’s consideration. In the oral remarks and GD, the Judge summarised the discrepancy in testimony between RKB and Mr Premaratne regarding what occurred during the Meritus Meeting.
On 24 April 2025, the Law Society informed the Applicant that the Council, having considered IC 16/2024’s report and its recommendations, determined that a formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal was unnecessary. The Applicant then filed OA 617 of 2025 on 18 June 2025, seeking an order that the Law Society be directed to apply to the Chief Justice for the appointment of a Disciplinary Tribunal to investigate the Complaint.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue was whether the Law Society Council’s decision not to refer the matter for a formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal was legally correct in the circumstances. Put differently, the court had to consider the statutory threshold under the LPA for when a Disciplinary Tribunal should be appointed following a complaint, and whether the evidence and the trial judge’s observations warranted a fuller disciplinary inquiry rather than dismissal at the Inquiry Committee stage.
A related issue concerned the scope and adequacy of the Inquiry Committee’s assessment. Although IC 16/2024’s report dealt only with the First Limb, the Applicant’s complaint and the disciplinary concern arguably extended to the Second Limb as well. The court therefore had to consider whether the disciplinary process, as applied, sufficiently addressed the substance of the Complaint and whether the Council’s decision reflected a proper evaluation of the relevant material.
Finally, the court had to determine the appropriate standard of review for the Law Society’s disciplinary decision-making. While disciplinary bodies are granted institutional competence and discretion, the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction requires that statutory requirements be met and that decisions are not reached on an erroneous basis. The question was whether the Council’s conclusion that there was no cause of sufficient gravity could stand in light of the evidence and the trial record.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Valerie Thean J approached the matter by first setting out the statutory framework under the LPA governing disciplinary proceedings. The court noted that the disciplinary system is designed to protect the public and uphold the integrity of the legal profession, while also ensuring procedural fairness to solicitors. The LPA provides for a structured process: complaints are considered by the Law Society, inquiry committees assess whether there is cause for further action, and where appropriate, a Disciplinary Tribunal may be convened to conduct a formal investigation.
Against that framework, the court examined the Applicant’s contention that there was prima facie evidence warranting a Disciplinary Tribunal. The Applicant relied on the trial record and on RKB’s testimony. In particular, the Applicant argued that RKB confirmed she asked Mr Premaratne to explain the implications of her concessions and withdrawals, and that Mr Premaratne obliged. The Applicant further contended that the discussion of RKB’s evidence occurred even though she was still on the witness stand, and that RKB’s later attempt to resile from her concessions was a consequence of the Meritus Meeting discussion involving both Mr Premaratne and KDK.
The court also considered the significance of the trial judge’s own observations. In Suit 848, the Judge had refused permission for further discussion about legal implications of withdrawing claims, expressing concern about the risk of modifying factual evidence mid-cross-examination. The High Court treated these remarks as relevant context: they were not determinative of disciplinary liability, but they were indicative of the seriousness of the procedural concern and the potential impact on the integrity of the trial process.
In analysing the Inquiry Committee’s reasoning, the court scrutinised the weight placed on Mr Premaratne’s affidavit and Attendance Note. IC 16/2024 had found RKB’s evidence unclear and had accepted Mr Premaratne’s account as credible and consistent. The High Court’s analysis, however, focused on whether the Inquiry Committee’s conclusion that there was no cause of sufficient gravity adequately accounted for the trial judge’s findings and the evidential tensions reflected in the trial record. The court’s approach suggests that where the trial record reveals a meaningful discrepancy and where the trial judge has expressed concern about the propriety of communications with a witness during active testimony, the disciplinary process should not be too readily concluded without a formal investigation.
Although the extracted text provided does not include the remainder of the judgment, the court’s ultimate decision to grant the application indicates that it found the threshold for a Disciplinary Tribunal was met. In practical terms, the court likely concluded that the evidence was not sufficiently resolved at the Inquiry Committee stage to justify dismissal, and that a formal investigation was necessary to determine what exactly transpired during the Meritus Meeting and whether the solicitor’s conduct breached professional obligations relating to communications with witnesses and the conduct of litigation.
The court also had to address the procedural posture: the Applicant sought an order compelling the Law Society to apply to the Chief Justice for the appointment of a Disciplinary Tribunal. This remedy is significant because it overrides the Law Society’s decision not to proceed. The court therefore would have been careful to articulate why the statutory conditions for intervention were satisfied, and why the disciplinary matter warranted escalation beyond an inquiry committee’s dismissal.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court granted OA 617 of 2025. The practical effect of the order is that the Law Society was directed to apply to the Chief Justice for the appointment of a Disciplinary Tribunal to conduct a formal investigation into the Complaint concerning Mr Premaratne’s conduct during Suit 848.
By granting the application, the court ensured that the allegations would receive the level of scrutiny associated with a Disciplinary Tribunal, rather than being resolved solely through an inquiry committee’s assessment and the Council’s decision to dismiss.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case matters for practitioners because it illustrates that disciplinary decisions by the Law Society are subject to meaningful judicial supervision. While the Law Society has expertise and discretion in disciplinary triage, the High Court’s willingness to order escalation to a Disciplinary Tribunal signals that where the evidence and the trial context raise serious concerns, dismissal at the inquiry stage may not be appropriate.
For solicitors, the case underscores the professional sensitivity of communications with witnesses during active testimony. The trial judge’s concern in Suit 848 about the risk of modifying factual evidence mid-cross-examination reflects a broader principle: litigation integrity depends not only on what is said in court, but also on how counsel interacts with witnesses while proceedings are ongoing. Disciplinary scrutiny may follow where such interactions are alleged to have occurred beyond what the court permitted.
For law students and lawyers researching disciplinary procedure, the decision is also useful as an example of how the LPA’s statutory architecture operates in practice. It demonstrates the pathway from complaint to inquiry committee to Council decision, and the circumstances in which a complainant can invoke the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction to require a Disciplinary Tribunal. Practitioners should therefore pay close attention to how trial records, affidavits, and contemporaneous notes are evaluated at each stage, and how discrepancies may affect the “cause of sufficient gravity” threshold.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act 1966 (including ss 96(1) and 96(4); Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed))
- Legal Proceedings Act (Cap 161) (as referenced in the metadata)
Cases Cited
- [2020] SGHC 127
- [2020] SGHC 40
- [2025] SGHC 80
- [2025] SGHC 244
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHC 244 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.