Case Details
- Citation: [2017] SGHC 57
- Title: Sit Kwong Lam v The Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No. 2645
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 27 March 2017
- Originating Summons: Originating Summons No 246 of 2016
- Background Proceeding: Strata Titles Board (“STB”) Application STB No 40 of 2015
- Judge: Kannan Ramesh JC
- Hearing Dates: 29 June, 4 August, 23 August, 27 September 2016; 13 January 2017
- Plaintiff/Applicant (Appellant): Sit Kwong Lam
- Defendant/Respondent (Respondent): The Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2645
- Legal Area(s): Strata titles; building maintenance and strata management; by-laws; common property; management corporation powers
- Statutes Referenced: Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (Cap 30C, 2008 Rev Ed) (“the Act”) (including ss 2(1), 33, 34, 37, 58, 98, 101, 111)
- Cases Cited: [1993] SGSTB 1; [2003] SGSTB 5; [2011] SGSTB 1; [2013] SGSTB 10; [2015] SGSTB 2; [2015] SGSTB 5; [2015] SGSTB 7; [2017] SGHC 57
- Judgment Length: 73 pages; 21,740 words
Summary
This High Court decision concerns a dispute between a subsidiary proprietor and the management corporation of a condominium over three works carried out by the subsidiary proprietor in areas demarcated as common property. The works included (i) replacing fixed glass panels with sliding panels and installing timber decking on wide ledges outside the unit on the 29th floor (Work 1), (ii) installing timber decking over the flat roof on the 30th floor including the floor trap and drainage system (Work 2), and (iii) installing an air-conditioning ventilation unit on the external wall requiring hacking through a common property wall to connect the vent to the interior of the unit (Work 3).
The Strata Titles Board had dismissed the subsidiary proprietor’s application. On appeal, the High Court (Kannan Ramesh JC) upheld the Board’s decision. The court affirmed that the relevant areas were common property under the statutory definition in s 2(1) of the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act, and that the works breached the prescribed by-laws governing alterations and use of common property. The court also addressed the scope of the management corporation’s and Board’s powers under the Act, including the proper interpretation of provisions relating to consent, exclusive use/special privileges, and the circumstances in which the management corporation may be required to authorise works.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The appellant, Sit Kwong Lam, was the subsidiary proprietor of unit #29-01, a penthouse unit occupying the 29th and 30th floors of Tower 15 of a condominium at 13 Ardmore Park. The respondent was the management corporation for the strata title plan. The dispute arose after the appellant carried out extensive renovation works in and around the unit, some of which extended beyond the boundaries of the lot.
In or around November 2011, the appellant submitted an application through his appointed representative, Glory Sky Technology Ltd (“Glory”), for a range of works. The application described demolition of non-structural walls, removal of existing trunking/cable trays/wires/AC ductings, installation of new electrical/data/water/ACMV/telephony services, erection of new walls and partitions, replacement of doors and window panels, laying of new wall and floor finishes, and installation of new ceiling, painting works and cabinetry. The application indicated that there would be additions/alterations to the electrical system including the air-conditioning system, but it did not specify that works would be carried out in areas outside the unit.
The works were approved, but they were not completed by the stated completion date. The appellant sought extensions of time. During inspections in August 2013, the management corporation discovered that fixed glass panels bordering two areas of the unit had been replaced with sliding panels, and that timber decking had been installed on two wide ledges beyond those panels outside the unit on the 29th floor (Work 1). Although the ledges visually resembled balconies, it was common ground that they were not balconies and that the parapet height did not meet the safety standards required for balconies. Critically, the fixed glass panels originally prevented physical access by occupants of the unit, and the ledges were demarcated in the strata title plan as common property.
Following the discovery, the management corporation demanded that the appellant restore the fixed glass panels and indicated that the appellant should submit a formal application to install timber decking on the ledges. The management council took the view that Work 1 amounted to exclusive use of common property, which it had no jurisdiction to authorise. The appellant was advised to sponsor a 90% resolution at the AGM to acquire exclusive use under s 33(1)(c) of the Act, but he did not do so.
Shortly thereafter, in May 2014, the management corporation discovered Work 2: timber decking installed on the flat roof on the 30th floor outside the unit. The decking covered the flat roof entirely, including the floor trap and drainage system, thereby making it difficult for the management corporation to properly upkeep the area. The flat roof was accessible to the appellant via a back door from the kitchen of the unit and also accessible to all subsidiary proprietors via a common staircase. It was common ground that the flat roof was demarcated as common property in the strata title plan.
In May 2014 as well, the management corporation discovered Work 3: an air-conditioning ventilation unit installed on the outside wall of Tower 15 in the vicinity of Work 2. Work 3 required hacking through a common property wall to connect the ventilation unit to the interior of the unit. Again, it was common ground that the relevant area was common property as shown in the strata title plan.
After repeated notices and correspondence, including 14-day notices to remove the works, the works remained in place. At the AGM on 25 April 2015, the appellant tabled three motions seeking exclusive use and/or special privileges in respect of the common property areas where the works had been carried out, with different voting thresholds: more than three years (90% resolution), three years (special resolution), and one year (ordinary resolution). None of the motions passed; the voting results were approximately 26% for and 74% against for the first two motions, and 30% for and 70% against for the third.
On 30 June 2015, the appellant commenced an STB application seeking, among other things, declarations that he had not breached the by-laws, that the works did not amount to exclusive use/special privileges within s 33, and orders requiring the management corporation to consent to or authorise the works under the relevant provisions of the Act. The STB dismissed the application on 11 February 2016. The appellant then filed the present appeal to the High Court on points of law under s 98(1) of the Act.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The High Court identified several issues, with the principal focus on the correct interpretation of “common property” in s 2(1) of the Act. This was particularly important for Work 1, where the appellant’s position depended on whether the areas were in fact common property. The court also had to consider the legislative history and the proper application of s 2(1), including how the statutory definition should be applied to areas demarcated in the strata title plan and to areas used or capable of being used or enjoyed by occupiers of two or more lots.
Second, the court considered whether the additional by-laws were breached by the appellant’s works. The management corporation’s case was that the works were installed on common property without the requisite approvals and in breach of by-laws governing alterations, use, and restrictions on works affecting common property.
Third, the court addressed whether Works 2 and 3 fell within the scope of a particular by-law provision (referred to in the judgment as by-law 5(3)(c)). Relatedly, the court examined whether the Board erred in its interpretation and application of ss 33 and 58 of the Act as regards Work 3, and the proper interpretation of s 111(a) of the Act. Finally, the court considered whether the Board erred in its interpretation of s 37 of the Act.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began with the statutory definition of “common property” in s 2(1) of the Act. The Board had construed “common property” as any area which is both (i) not comprised in any lot or proposed lot in a strata title plan and (ii) used or capable of being used or enjoyed by occupiers of two or more lots. The High Court treated this as the central interpretive question, because if the areas were common property, the appellant’s works would necessarily engage the by-laws and the statutory regime governing alterations and exclusive use.
In analysing the meaning of common property, the court considered the legislative history of the definition and the revisions introduced by the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act. The court’s approach emphasised that the statutory definition is not merely formalistic (ie, not solely dependent on what is labelled in the strata title plan), but also functional in the sense that the area must be used or capable of being used or enjoyed by occupiers of two or more lots. At the same time, where the strata title plan demarcates an area as common property, that demarcation is highly relevant to the inquiry.
Applying the definition to the facts, the court accepted that the wide ledges and the flat roof were demarcated as common property in the strata title plan. For Work 1, the court noted that the fixed glass panels originally prevented access by occupants of the unit, and that the ledges were not intended to be accessed as balconies. Nevertheless, the question under s 2(1) was whether the areas were common property in law, not whether the appellant personally had a right to access them. The court therefore focused on whether the areas were capable of being used or enjoyed by occupiers of two or more lots, and on the fact that the areas were outside the lot boundaries and demarcated as common property.
For Work 2, the flat roof was accessible not only to the appellant but also to other subsidiary proprietors via a common staircase. The court treated this as reinforcing the conclusion that the flat roof was capable of being used or enjoyed by occupiers of two or more lots. For Work 3, the ventilation unit was installed on the external wall enclosing the unit, and the work required hacking through a common property wall. The court’s reasoning therefore linked the physical location of the works and the nature of the alterations to the legal classification of the underlying areas as common property.
Having determined that the works were situated on common property, the court then turned to the by-laws. The management corporation’s position was that the appellant’s works were unauthorised and breached by-laws that regulate alterations and the use of common property. The court’s analysis proceeded on the basis that by-laws are binding on subsidiary proprietors and that compliance is required unless the Act provides a mechanism for approval or authorisation. The appellant had not obtained the necessary approvals at the time the works were carried out, and the later attempt to obtain exclusive use/special privileges at the AGM failed to achieve the required voting thresholds.
On the specific issue of whether Works 2 and 3 fell within by-law 5(3)(c), the court examined the by-law’s wording and the nature of the works. While the judgment extract provided here is truncated, the overall structure indicates that the court assessed whether the works were the type contemplated by the by-law provision, and whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to a breach. The court also addressed whether the Board erred in interpreting and applying ss 33 and 58 of the Act in relation to Work 3. The analysis reflected the statutory scheme: s 33 provides for exclusive use and special privileges over common property, typically requiring resolutions of specified voting thresholds, while other provisions regulate how the management corporation and subsidiary proprietors may deal with common property and the circumstances in which consent may be required.
In relation to s 111(a) of the Act, the court considered the proper interpretation of the provision invoked by the appellant to compel the management corporation to consent to the works. The court’s reasoning, consistent with the statutory framework, treated consent/authorisation as conditional upon compliance with the Act and the by-laws, and not as an automatic remedy simply because the subsidiary proprietor asserts that the works are permissible. The court also considered s 37, which governs the management corporation’s powers and duties in relation to common property and the circumstances in which it may be required to act.
Overall, the court’s reasoning was anchored in the interplay between (i) the classification of areas as common property under s 2(1), (ii) the binding effect of by-laws on subsidiary proprietors, and (iii) the Act’s procedural safeguards requiring resolutions and approvals for exclusive use or special privileges. The court treated the appellant’s failure to obtain the requisite approvals, and the subsequent unsuccessful resolutions, as significant in assessing whether the appellant could obtain declarations or orders compelling consent/authorisation.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Strata Titles Board’s decision. In practical terms, the appellant did not obtain the declarations sought that he had not breached the by-laws, nor did he obtain an order requiring the management corporation to consent to or authorise the works under the Act.
The effect of the decision is that the works remained treated as unauthorised alterations on common property. The management corporation was therefore entitled to insist on compliance with the by-laws and the statutory regime, including removal or rectification of the works where required, subject to the enforcement mechanisms available under the Act and the strata scheme.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how Singapore courts approach the statutory definition of “common property” in s 2(1) of the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act. The decision reinforces that common property analysis is both structural and functional: areas outside the lots and demarcated as common property will generally fall within the statutory definition, and the fact that a particular subsidiary proprietor may not have had intended access does not necessarily remove the area from the common property category.
For management corporations and subsidiary proprietors, the case also illustrates the importance of by-law compliance and the procedural requirements for exclusive use or special privileges. Even where a subsidiary proprietor attempts to regularise the position after works have been carried out, the statutory voting thresholds and approval mechanisms remain central. The court’s approach underscores that remedies such as orders compelling consent or authorisation are not meant to bypass the Act’s safeguards.
Finally, the decision is useful for legal research because it addresses multiple provisions of the Act in a single factual matrix—common property definition, by-law breaches, exclusive use/special privileges, and the scope of the management corporation’s powers and the Board’s remedial jurisdiction. Lawyers advising on strata disputes can use the case to frame arguments on classification, consent, and the limits of post hoc approval.
Legislation Referenced
- Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (Cap 30C, 2008 Rev Ed)
- Section 2(1) (definition of “common property”)
- Section 33 (exclusive use and special privileges)
- Section 34 (procedure relating to applications/approvals under the Act)
- Section 37 (management corporation powers/duties)
- Section 58 (provisions relating to by-laws and/or management corporation functions, as applied in the judgment)
- Section 98(1) (appeal on points of law to the High Court)
- Section 101(1)(c) and Section 101(4) (failure to exercise powers; related remedies)
- Section 111(a) and Section 111(b) (consent/authorisation remedies)
Cases Cited
- [1993] SGSTB 1
- [2003] SGSTB 5
- [2011] SGSTB 1
- [2013] SGSTB 10
- [2015] SGSTB 2
- [2015] SGSTB 5
- [2015] SGSTB 7
- [2017] SGHC 57
Source Documents
This article analyses [2017] SGHC 57 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.