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Sit Kwong Lam v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2645 [2017] SGHC 57

In Sit Kwong Lam v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2645, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of Land — Strata titles.

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Case Details

  • Citation: [2017] SGHC 57
  • Case Title: Sit Kwong Lam v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2645
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
  • Date of Decision: 27 March 2017
  • Case Number: Originating Summons 246 of 2016
  • Originating Tribunal: Strata Titles Board
  • STB Reference: STB No 40 of 2015
  • Judge: Kannan Ramesh JC
  • Parties: Sit Kwong Lam (appellant/applicant) v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2645 (respondent)
  • Counsel for Appellant: Alvin Yeo SC, Candy Agnes Sutedja and Hannah Lee (WongPartnership LLP)
  • Counsel for Respondent: Subramanian s/o Ayasamy Pillai and Perera Randall Mingyang (Colin Ng & Partners LLP)
  • Legal Area(s): Land — Strata titles; By-laws; Common property; Management corporation
  • Procedural Posture: Appeal on points of law from the Strata Titles Board pursuant to s 98(1) of the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (Cap 30C, 2008 Rev Ed)
  • Appeal to Court of Appeal: Dismissed (Civil Appeal No 28 of 2017) on 24 October 2017; see [2018] SGCA 14
  • Judgment Length: 38 pages; 20,137 words
  • Statutes Referenced: Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (Cap 30C, 2008 Rev Ed); Dictionary to the Strata Schemes Management Act; NSW Strata Schemes Development Act; Strata Titles Act; Strata Titles Act 1973
  • Key Statutory Provision(s) Mentioned in Extract: s 2(1) (definition of “common property”); s 33(1)(c) (exclusive use of common property); s 34 (proposal for conversion of common area to private usage); s 37(4) (management corporation powers/duties); s 98(1) (appeal on points of law); s 101(1)(c) and s 101(4); s 111(a) and s 111(b)

Summary

This High Court decision concerns a dispute in a strata development about whether certain alterations and installations made by a subsidiary proprietor were carried out on “common property” and, if so, whether the management corporation could require removal or refuse consent. The appellant, Sit Kwong Lam, installed works in areas that were demarcated in the strata title plan as common property, including (i) timber decking on wide ledges outside his unit on the 29th floor, (ii) timber decking on the flat roof on the 30th floor, and (iii) an air-conditioning ventilation unit on the external wall of Tower 15, requiring hacking through a common property wall to connect to the interior of the unit.

The Strata Titles Board dismissed the appellant’s application. On appeal to the High Court, Kannan Ramesh JC dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board’s approach and conclusions. The court emphasised the statutory definition of “common property” in s 2(1) of the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act, focusing on whether the relevant area is capable of being used or enjoyed by occupiers of two or more lots. The court also treated the appellant’s failure to obtain the requisite approvals through the general body as significant in assessing whether the management corporation could be compelled to consent or authorise the works.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The appellant was a subsidiary proprietor of unit #29-01, a penthouse occupying the 29th and 30th floors of Tower 15 of a condominium at 13 Ardmore Park. The respondent was the management corporation for the strata development. In or around November 2011, the appellant submitted an application through his appointed representative, Glory Sky Technology Ltd (“Glory”), seeking approval for a package of works described as demolition of non-structural walls, removal of existing trunking/cable trays/wires/AC ducting, installation of new electrical/data/water/ACMV/telephony services, erection of new walls and partitions, replacement of doors and window panels, laying of new wall and floor finishes, and installation of new ceiling, painting works and cabinetry.

Although the application indicated “Yes” to a question about additions/alterations to the electrical system including the air-conditioning system, the application did not specify that the works would be carried out in areas outside the appellant’s unit. The works were scheduled to commence on 14 November 2011 and be completed by 13 March 2012. The works were approved, but they were not completed by the completion date, and the appellant sought multiple extensions of time.

In August 2013, during inspections, the respondent discovered that fixed glass panels bordering two areas of the appellant’s unit had been replaced with sliding panels, and that the appellant had installed timber decking on two wide ledges beyond those panels outside the unit on the 29th floor (referred to as “Work 1”). The wide ledges ran along segments of the external façade and were enclosed by a low parapet of about 0.75m, which did not meet safety standards for balconies. It was common ground that the ledges were demarcated in the strata title plan as common property, and that the original fixed glass panels prevented physical access by the occupants of the unit; the ledges were not intended to be accessed by the unit occupants.

After the respondent notified the appellant that Work 1 was unauthorised and requested restoration of the fixed glass panels, the appellant was advised to submit a formal application to install timber decking on the ledges. However, the management council took the view that Work 1 amounted to exclusive use of common property, which it could not authorise. The appellant was advised to sponsor a 90% resolution at the AGM to acquire exclusive use under s 33(1)(c) of the Act, but he did not do so. Shortly thereafter, in May 2014, the respondent discovered Work 2: timber decking installed on the flat roof on the 30th floor outside the unit, covering the entire flat roof including the floor trap and drainage system, thereby making upkeep difficult. The flat roof was accessible via the kitchen back door of the unit and also accessible to all subsidiary proprietors via a common staircase. It was common ground that the flat roof was common property as shown in the strata title plan.

In May 2014, the respondent also discovered Work 3: an air-conditioning ventilation unit installed on the outside wall of Tower 15 in the vicinity of Work 2. The installation required hacking through a common property wall to connect the vent to the interior of the unit. The location was within an area demarcated as common property in the strata title plan. Despite repeated notices demanding removal of Works 1, 2 and 3, the works remained in place. The appellant indicated an intention to table a proposal under s 34 for conversion of common area to private usage, and later tabled motions at the AGM on 25 April 2015 seeking exclusive use and/or special privileges over the relevant common property areas for more than three years, for three years, or for one year. The motions failed, with votes ranging from 26% to 30% in favour and 70% to 74% against.

The principal legal issue was the correct interpretation of “common property” in s 2(1) of the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act. The Strata Titles Board had construed the definition as requiring two conjunctive elements: first, the area must not be comprised in any lot or proposed lot in the strata title plan; and second, the area must be used or capable of being used or enjoyed by occupiers of two or more lots. Since it was not disputed that the relevant areas were not comprised in any lot, the dispute turned on the second limb: whether the wide ledges, flat roof, and external wall area were “used or capable of being used or enjoyed” by occupiers of two or more lots.

Related issues included whether the appellant’s works breached by-laws governing alterations and use of common property, and whether the management corporation could be compelled to consent to or authorise the works under the statutory framework. The appellant sought declarations that he had not breached by-laws, or alternatively that the works did not amount to exclusive use/special privileges within the meaning of s 33. He also sought orders compelling the management corporation’s consent and/or authorisation, and declarations relating to alleged failures to exercise powers under s 37(4).

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

On appeal, Kannan Ramesh JC approached the case as one involving an appeal on points of law under s 98(1) of the Act. The court therefore focused on whether the Board had correctly interpreted and applied the statutory definition of common property and the relevant legal principles governing by-laws and consent/authorisation. The court noted that the Board’s analysis was particularly significant for Work 1, because Works 2 and 3 were not seriously disputed as being situated on common property.

For Work 1, the Board had accepted that the use or purpose of the wide ledges was “subject to speculation” but concluded that the ledges were “part and parcel of the fabric of the building” and contributed to the character and appearance of the building. The Board also reasoned that all subsidiary proprietors were entitled to “quiet enjoyment” of the building, and that the ledges served as a shelter or sunshade to units below. Critically, the ledges were demarcated as common property in the strata title plan. The High Court endorsed the Board’s reasoning that the statutory test did not require proof of actual use by multiple occupiers at the time of dispute; rather, the question was whether the area was capable of being used or enjoyed by occupiers of two or more lots.

The court’s analysis of the second limb of s 2(1) is best understood as rejecting an overly narrow approach that would treat common property as common only if it is actively used by multiple occupiers in the ordinary course. Instead, where an area is part of the building’s fabric and is demarcated as common property, it is generally consistent with the statutory scheme to treat it as “capable” of being used or enjoyed by multiple occupiers. The fact that the original fixed glass panels prevented physical access by the unit occupants did not negate the common property character; it underscored that the ledges were not intended for exclusive private enjoyment by the appellant.

For Works 2 and 3, the Board had found that the flat roof and the relevant external wall area were common property because they were accessible to all subsidiary proprietors via a common staircase and were located in areas demarcated as common property in the strata title plan. The appellant’s works—covering the flat roof entirely and installing an external ventilation unit requiring hacking through a common property wall—were therefore treated as interventions into common property rather than mere internal works within the unit. This distinction mattered because the statutory regime for dealing with common property is designed to preserve collective rights and to require collective approval for exclusive use or special privileges.

Turning to by-laws and consent/authorisation, the court treated the appellant’s conduct and the procedural history as relevant to whether the management corporation could be compelled to consent. The appellant had been advised that Work 1 amounted to exclusive use and that the management corporation lacked jurisdiction to authorise it. The appellant did not obtain the requisite 90% resolution for exclusive use at the AGM. Later, he tabled motions for exclusive use/special privileges for varying durations, but none achieved the required voting thresholds. The court therefore viewed the appellant’s attempt to obtain declarations and orders after the works were installed as inconsistent with the statutory design: where exclusive use or special privileges are sought, the proper route is collective decision-making through the general body, not unilateral installation followed by litigation.

Although the extract provided does not reproduce the full by-law analysis, the overall reasoning reflected a consistent theme: the statutory definition of common property and the governance mechanisms under the Act operate together. If the works are on common property and confer exclusive use or special privileges, the management corporation’s ability to consent is constrained by the Act and by the by-law framework. The court did not accept that the appellant could recharacterise the works as non-exclusive or non-privileged in order to bypass the collective approval requirements.

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal and upheld the Strata Titles Board’s decision to dismiss the STB Application. In practical terms, the appellant’s claims for declarations that he had not breached by-laws, or that the works did not amount to exclusive use/special privileges, were rejected. The court also did not grant the orders sought to compel the management corporation to consent to or authorise the works.

The effect of the decision is that the respondent management corporation was entitled to insist on removal or restoration of unauthorised works carried out on common property, and the appellant could not obtain retrospective relief that would undermine the Act’s collective approval structure for exclusive use of common areas.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how Singapore courts approach the statutory definition of “common property” under s 2(1) of the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act. The decision reinforces that the “capable of being used or enjoyed” limb is not limited to areas that are actively used at the time of dispute. Where an area is part of the building’s fabric and is demarcated as common property, it will generally satisfy the statutory test even if the precise manner of use is not certain or is not presently exercised by multiple occupiers.

For management corporations and subsidiary proprietors, the case underscores the importance of respecting the governance architecture of the Act. If works are likely to amount to exclusive use or special privileges over common property, the proper course is to obtain the requisite resolutions at general meetings. The court’s reasoning also illustrates the limited utility of attempting to obtain declarations or orders after works have been installed, particularly where the voting thresholds for exclusive use were not met.

Finally, the case has precedent value for disputes involving boundary lines between private lots and common property, especially where physical access is altered (as with the replacement of fixed glass panels and installation of decking) or where structural interventions are made to connect services to the interior (as with the air-conditioning ventilation unit requiring hacking through a common property wall). Lawyers advising on renovation approvals, by-law compliance, and the evidential framing of “capability” under s 2(1) will find the court’s approach useful.

Legislation Referenced

  • Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (Cap 30C, 2008 Rev Ed), including:
    • s 2(1) (definition of “common property”)
    • s 33(1)(c) (exclusive use of common property by special resolution thresholds)
    • s 34 (proposal for conversion of common area to private usage)
    • s 37(4) (management corporation powers/duties)
    • s 98(1) (appeal on points of law from the Strata Titles Board)
    • s 101(1)(c) and s 101(4)
    • s 111(a) and s 111(b)
  • Dictionary to the Strata Schemes Management Act
  • NSW Strata Schemes Development Act
  • Strata Titles Act
  • Strata Titles Act 1973

Cases Cited

Source Documents

This article analyses [2017] SGHC 57 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla
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